Storming of Khankala. Crossfire to kill

Khankala in Chechnya is a Russian military base located seven kilometers from the capital Grozny. But there is also the Khankala station, through which trains go to Moscow, Volgograd and other Russian cities.

Location

The city of Khankala in Chechnya is a western suburb of Grozny, located in the North Caucasus, in the very center of the republic. It lies on the left bank of the Argun River and on the right bank of the Sunzha River.

Unlike, for example, the Krasnodar Territory, this region of Chechnya is not protected by mountains, so the climate here is much harsher. Winters are frosty, and summers are hot and dry, as precipitation is irregular.

Khankala village

The airfield was built in 1949, and a residential town for military families was built along with it. It was located next to the station, at which there was a small village. Today there is also the Khankala station and the Khankala military town.

There is still a railway station in the village. The movement of trains is carried out using diesel locomotives, since it is not electrified due to the dismantling of the contact network during hostilities.

The word "khankala" is translated into Russian as "watchtower". Before the hostilities, this was a suburban rural area of ​​the city of Grozny. Currently, approximately 7,900 people live in the village, more than 83% of them are Russian military personnel and railway station workers. As a matter of fact, only a few houses remain from the former village.

Khankala military base in Chechnya

Khankala is considered the most peaceful place in all of Chechnya, due to the location of the main base of Russian troops in the country. This is the most guarded facility, surrounded along the perimeter of the territory by several rows of barbed wire, minefields, and periodically located checkpoints. Even in previous years, the militants did not approach it, preferring to fire from afar.

Strategic military facilities are located here: the joint headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, the FSB service, a hospital, and other federal bodies. The base was created in 2000 in connection with the tragic events in Chechnya. Khankala, in addition to glorious pages in history, has sad ones.

In September 2001, militants shot down an MI-8 helicopter here, killing 2 generals and 8 officers. In August 2002, an MI-26 helicopter with 154 people on board was shot down during landing near Khankala. Only 30 servicemen managed to survive. In September 1995, an MI-8 helicopter with wounded on board was shot down in Khankala in Chechnya, one of them died.

Military airfield

During the Soviet Union, the airfield of the USSR Ministry of Defense was located on the territory of Khankala. Subsequently, it was transferred to the Stavropol Flight School and was used as a training school. It carried a regiment of L-29 training aircraft. During the first Chechen war, they were captured by the militants of D. Dudayev, who wanted to convert them into combat ones, but did not have time. They were located on the territory of the Khankala airfield in Chechnya. Photo attached.

Currently, the airfield belongs to the Russian Ministry of Defense. This is a modern and powerful strategic facility, equipped with modern instruments and devices. An Orthodox chapel was erected here, built by builders from Ulyanovsk.

Background to the Chechen conflict

In 1991, Ichkeria was proclaimed, President D. Dudayev pursued a policy of separating the ChRI from Russia, which did not recognize it. The military operation was carried out in border areas and in the territory. It had the definition of an operation to maintain constitutional order. In common parlance, the military actions were called the first Chechen war.

A characteristic feature of this war was the enormous casualties among the Russian population, since it was at this time that ethnic cleansing was carried out against persons of non-Chechen nationalities: Russians, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Tatars and others. The vast majority of the victims were Russians.

Economic and political background

The situation inside Russia and Chechnya was very unfavorable. The power of presidents increased. In Chechnya, this led to confrontation between clans and open confrontation and strengthening of anti-Dudaev positions. It was also necessary to improve relations and establish constitutional order due to the fact that for the transit of Caspian oil it was necessary to build an oil pipeline through the territory of Chechnya. Dudayev did not enter into negotiations. No one could give guarantees for the safety of the oil.

Battles for Khankala

In accordance with the Decree of Russian President B. Yeltsin, on December 11, 1994, units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of Russia entered the territory of Chechnya. After 3 days, namely on December 14, missile and bomb attacks were carried out on the three existing ones, Khankala and Kalinovskaya, where about 250 aircraft of various classes and purposes were concentrated, ranging from civil to agricultural.

The Battle of Khankala took place from December 24 to 29. As a result, the takeoff field, garden houses and the line of the Grozny-Argun road were occupied. In 2000, a Russian military base was re-established on the territory of Khankala.

Chechnya, September 2001. At Khankala, the main military base of the federal forces, a large-scale audit of funds that have entered the republic since the beginning of the second Chechen campaign is underway. The inspection is carried out by a commission of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Officers - Major General Anatoly Pozdnyakov, Major General Pavel Varfolomeev, Colonel Igor Abramov, Colonel Vladimir Talaev, Colonel Igor Khakhalkin, Colonel Yuri Makhov, Colonel Sergei Toryanin, Colonel Igor Tribunov, Colonel Vladimir Smolennikov and Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Lyubimsky - regularly fly helicopters a united military group from Khankala to Grozny and back.

All funds coming into the republic (both the military budget of the group and the budget of the Chechen government) pass through the field banks of military units. The most effective way to detect embezzlement is to conduct a counter audit. That is, compare the financial documents received at Khankala with the financial statements stored by the government. Thus, auditors from the General Staff actually check not only the military, but also the leadership of the republic.

From Khankala to the complex of government buildings in Grozny is very close. But Grozny 2001 is dangerous for land movement. Military and high-ranking civilians prefer the "air taxi". Dozens of helicopters fly over the city every day. They even built a specialized helipad No. 104 near the government complex. However, these measures are justified by statistics: during the period of active hostilities in the Grozny area, not a single aircraft was shot down.

Little is known about the work of the commission. All members of the commission, without exception, went on a business trip without informing their loved ones what exactly they would be doing. The wives of some officers did not even know that their husbands were in Chechnya. But even information from open sources allows us to conclude: many did not like the work of the General Staff commission.

On September 10, at a meeting in Khankala, the head of the commission, Major General Anatoly Pozdnyakov, proposed reducing the number of checkpoints and checkpoints in lowland Chechnya and at the same time increasing the number of ambushes, patrols and secrets in the mountainous regions of the republic. This proposal did not arouse enthusiasm among the military, although it was dictated even by primitive logic: according to statistics, the federal forces suffered the greatest losses at checkpoints. On the other hand, checkpoints were not only targets for militants, but also a source of income for the feds - taxes were collected from almost every car and passenger. This practice was widespread and ineradicable. However, General Pozdnyakov gave an ultimatum that he would return to Moscow, prepare all the necessary documents within a week and sign them with his leader - the Chief of the Main Staff of the Russian Defense Ministry, Army General Anatoly Kvashnin.

Three hours before the tragedy

On the morning of September 17, a member of the commission, deputy head of the 4th department of the Armed Forces Logistics Headquarters, Colonel Yuri Makhov called home. Makhov told his wife that the business trip was over and he would be home tomorrow.

The members of the commission completed their work in the government of Chechnya with a short meeting with the leadership of the republic. At 12.06, the Mi-8 helicopter with tail number 33 landed on site 104 and took on board members of the commission and boxes of documents. At 12.07 it took off and flew towards Khankala at an altitude of 150-200 meters. The entire flight time is about 10 minutes...

From the “Accident Investigation Report” dated October 17, 2001: “Clarification of the task of transporting a group of generals and officers from site No. 104 (Grozny) to the Khankala airfield for the crew of Captain V.N. Mineev. was carried out at 9.00 on September 17... At 12.06 the crew landed at site No. 104, and at 12.07 with the group on board they took off from the site, which they reported to the AA OGV checkpoint. After the report, the crew did not contact us.

<…>At 12.20, a report was received from the operational duty officer about the crash of an Mi-8 helicopter on the eastern outskirts of Grozny near the railway track. The PSO group raised by command ( search and rescue team. - EAT. ) at 12.43 discovered the crash site of the helicopter. Having landed next to the burning helicopter, the PSO crew confirmed that the helicopter with tail number 33 was burning, there were no living crew members or passengers, and employees of the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic and the commandant's office of the Oktyabrsky district were working at the scene of the disaster. Due to the strong fire, the bodies of the dead could not be evacuated by the rescue team.

<…>According to eyewitnesses,<…>the shot (launch) at the helicopter was fired from the area of ​​Grozny, which caused the first explosion on board. The helicopter caught fire in the air and began to descend into a vacant lot on the eastern outskirts of the city. Burning fuel spilling onto the ground lit a tree on the street. Nursery. At an altitude of 15-20 meters and at a distance of 70-100 meters from the place where the helicopter crashed, a second explosion occurred (an additional fuel tank presumably exploded), and the uncontrollable helicopter fell to the ground, collapsed and burned. Until the last opportunity, the crew tried to turn the collapsing helicopter away from residential buildings, thereby saving dozens of civilians from death; they did not use rescue means, fighting for the lives of the passengers...”

One very important conclusion follows from the “Report of Investigation”: few people knew what task was assigned to the crew of the helicopter with tail number 33. The crew itself was tasked with delivering the General Staff commission from Grozny to Khankala 3.5 hours before departure. I repeat: dozens of helicopters fly over Grozny every day. During the fighting over the city, not a single vehicle was lost. But it was on September 17, and it was precisely the very plane on which the generals and colonels of the General Staff were flying that became a target. The fact that this is far from a random target is evidenced by another fact recorded in the materials of the criminal case.

Crossfire to kill

The Mi-8 helicopter was fired at from two points from two MANPADS* systems.

The report of the helicopter commander of the aviation of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Captain Semenov, clearly indicates that they observed “two strong, medium-density, bluish-colored trails, presumably from missiles, one of which ended in a fireball...”

Detailed testimony was given by police sergeant Chernikov and senior police sergeant Cherepanov. They saw exactly how the helicopter carrying the General Staff commission was shot down, described in detail and pinpointed the location from which the missile was launched. This building is on Sapernaya Street, 750 meters from checkpoint No. 26, over which a helicopter with a General Staff commission actually flew. This is the most important point.

At checkpoint No. 26 there was also another witness to the helicopter shelling - St. Petersburg riot police officer Sergei Oraev. Witness Oraev describes in great detail the launch of a rocket from... a completely different place - from the side of the tram park in Grozny, near the intersection of Sunzhenskaya and Stanichnaya streets. But this is very far from checkpoint No. 26 and from the flight path of the Mi-8. From the intersection of Sunzhenskaya and Stanichnaya, apparently, that same second missile was fired, which, in the words of Captain Semenov, “ended in a fireball,” or rather, self-destructed. In the table of the main characteristics of domestic MANPADS ( "Soldier of Fortune" magazine, No. 11, 1999, p. 46) the maximum firing range of a missile fired from the Igla MANPADS is indicated - 3300 meters. At the time of the missile launch, the Mi-8 helicopter was more than three and a half kilometers from the tram depot and the intersection of Sunzhenskaya and Stanichnaya streets. That is, outside the range of this missile.

Witness Oraev testified that “during his military service he was a senior MANPADS shooter.” And at the same time, experienced MANPADS shooter Sergei Oraev SAYS NOTHING in his testimony that another missile was launched next to checkpoint No. 26, where he served. The one who achieved the goal!

Papers worth a lifetime

Another equally important question: what happens at the site of a helicopter crash in the first minutes and hours?

Here is the testimony of senior sapper engineer Valery Solopov: “On September 17, I was at checkpoint No. 26. “... Additionally, I would like to inform you that when the helicopter fell, there was a trail of falling sheets of paper behind it, which we later collected. The next day they gave it away<эти листы>in the VOVD** of the Oktyabrsky district.”

This is extremely interesting evidence. There are other eyewitness accounts, from which the fact follows: when the helicopter was shot down, members of the General Staff commission began throwing documents overboard. They saved documents - the results of a two-week audit. Apparently, there was something very important in these papers. In fact, this is not even a guess. This statement. Because the hunt for these documents immediately began.

Here is the testimony of Anatoly Chaikin, an employee of the city police department of Rostov, Yaroslavl region: “In September 2001< я>was on a business trip to Chechnya as the head of the criminal investigation department of the Oktyabrsky district VOVD of Grozny. According to his functional responsibilities, he had to go to all murders. On September 17, 2001, I went with the task force as a senior officer to the crash site of the Mi-8 helicopter.<…>Everything that was at the scene of the incident was put in one place and recorded in the protocol kept by the investigator. Along with the inspection, a video recording was carried out by an expert. In my presence, the wreckage of the helicopter and documents were taken away. Some of the things and the wreckage of the helicopter were taken by a colonel of the Armed Forces from Khankala, citing the fact that they are secret and cannot be included in the criminal case...”

And here is a request from the first deputy head of the FSB Directorate for the Chechen Republic, Colonel Peshkhoev, addressed to Captain 1st Rank Maltsev (at that time - acting head of the Russian FSB department for coordinating the counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus region).

“Dear Yuri Alexandrovich! ...From the testimony of witnesses interrogated in the case, it follows that after the helicopter crashed, ROSH *** military personnel arrived at the scene, collected and took away documents and objects found at the scene of the helicopter crash. In addition, the police sergeant...Chernikov V.I. Officers arriving from Khankala seized a videotape recording the helicopter crash.

Based on the above, I ask you to instruct your subordinate employees:

1. Send to us documents and objects found at the site of the helicopter crash that have evidentiary value in the criminal case under investigation.

2. Establish the location of the video tape for its subsequent inclusion in the materials of the criminal case as material evidence.

3. Ensure the appearance at the investigative department of the Federal Security Service of Russia in the Chechen Republic for interrogation as witnesses of the ROSH servicemen who were on September 17-18 at the site of the helicopter crash...”

Call sign "Typhoon"

And, finally, the mysterious report of police lieutenant Kirillov, detective officer of the Oktyabrsky District Department of Internal Affairs of Grozny: “During operational search activities, a woman, an FSB officer, was identified at the scene of the incident.<с документами прикрытия>major<а>police... which is stationed in the village. Khankala is at the regional operational headquarters and has the call sign “Typhoon” and the name Tamara.

During a conversation<с ней>it was established that she was going to her cousin, who lived on the street. Parnikova, 1... She couldn’t explain anything more, and she didn’t give her personal information, explaining that she could give an explanation with the permission of her superiors...”

The question arises: weren’t too many nameless FSB officers from Khankala discovered by investigators from the Oktyabrsky District Department of Internal Affairs who arrived at the scene of the helicopter crash? In violation of the law, they collect and remove from the scene of the incident documents thrown out of the burning helicopter by the deceased General Staff officers. What was their interest?

In the materials of the criminal case, only one “interested person” briefly appears - a native of the military counterintelligence, Yuri Maltsev, head of the special department of the Russian FSB for coordinating the counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus region. At ROSH, he headed one of the key structures - the Operations Directorate, which was responsible for the development of all major special operations carried out in Chechnya.

Soon after the death of the General Staff commission, Maltsev was formally removed from the FSB, transferred to the post of deputy head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and appointed head of the ROSH.

Here is his response to a request from his colleague Peshkhoev, the deputy head of the FSB Directorate for Chechnya, whom Maltsev clearly ignores, writing directly to the head of the FSB Directorate for Chechnya, Sergei Babkin:

“In connection with your request, I answer that... ROSH employees did not take part in the investigation into the causes of the disaster. All items seized from the helicopter crash site were sent to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic.”

But the investigation materials do not include documents from the General Staff commission at all. It is also not reflected anywhere that any documents were handed over to the prosecutor's office. So why did the ROSH employees “light up” by hastily taking away valuable evidence from the helicopter crash site?

To answer this question, it is worth recalling exactly who was checked by the General Staff commission. And she checked the regional operational headquarters.

Sudden consequence

Important point. Despite the death of a high-ranking commission of the General Staff (two generals, seven colonels, one lieutenant colonel!), the criminal case is being investigated at a very low level - only by the prosecutor's office of Grozny. But it was then that at the first (always the most important) stage of the investigation, employees of the Grozny prosecutor’s office, as the most disinterested persons, “dug up” all the important facts. All that remained was to compare them. At this stage, those at the top came to their senses. And the case was transferred “subject to jurisdiction” to the FSB Directorate for the Chechen Republic. Since that moment, practically no investigative actions have been carried out. Four months later - on December 17, 2001 - the investigation was suddenly suspended due to the impossibility of identifying the criminals.

And only in May 2002, the investigation into the death of the General Staff commission was again initiated under pressure from the Chechen prosecutor's office (department for supervision of the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Here’s the wording: “The investigation into the case was conducted in violation of Art. 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR on a comprehensive, complete and objective study of all the circumstances of the committed act.”

However, this resolution does not say anything about the fact that some interrogations and very important material evidence disappeared from the investigation materials. The main version is not in doubt - that the helicopter with the General Staff commission was allegedly hit by a missile from the direction of the tram depot in Grozny. All references to the fact that there were two missiles and that the helicopter with the General Staff commission was hit by a completely different missile, the one fired from a MANPADS near checkpoint No. 26, were erased from the case. It was this moment that was accidentally filmed by police sergeant Chernikov. The fact that such a tape existed and that it was confiscated from Chernikov by representatives of the ROS is known only from a request from the deputy head of the FSB Directorate for Chechnya. There are no other mentions of this tape in the case. As, indeed, the cassette itself.

...The second time the investigation was closed even faster. A month later - June 18, 2002 - the case of the death of the General Staff commission was again suspended with the stunning wording: “Unidentified persons fired at an Mi-8 helicopter from an UNIDENTIFIED weapon...”

From the wreckage of the side of a downed helicopter, from the smallest particles of a missile shell, which, as a rule, have special stamps with numbers (nameplate), it is possible to determine not only the type of weapon, but also which batch the anti-aircraft complex belonged to, which military unit it was from. gone". The Ministry of Defense has a special expert institution that carries out such examinations. The problem is that the investigators did not need any examinations. They were faced with a more difficult task - how to make a “hanging” out of a criminal case.

Resurrection of the "hanging"

The case has been frozen for a year and a half. No attempts are made to identify the “unidentified persons” who destroyed the General Staff commission. And suddenly in January 2003 in ORB-2**** ( scary torture place. - EAT.) four Chechens allegedly confess and admit that they committed many, many terrorist attacks. In particular, on September 17, 2001, a helicopter carrying General Staff officers was shot down.

The investigation and trial were quick to punish. Three Chechens - Shamsudin Salavatov, Sultan Matsiev, Dokku Dzhantemirov - were sentenced to life imprisonment. The fourth, Viskhan Khabibulatov, received 13 years in a maximum security colony. But none of them fired at the helicopter with the General Staff commission. This is recorded anecdotally in the case materials. First, Matsiev was tortured into testifying that it was he who knocked out the Mi-8 by firing a MANPADS from the roof of a three-story building on the side of the tram depot. All this was formalized procedurally, we went to the crime scene, checked the evidence on the spot, filled out a protocol on which the witnesses signed. And then a witness turned up who 100% identified Matsiev. At the time of the helicopter shelling, she was just pouring gasoline into his car at the other end of the city. We had to extract new testimony from Matsiev that he himself did not shoot at the helicopter, but was in a gang, and misled the investigation.

Real assassination attempt on virtual murderers

The history of the war in Chechnya is rich in crimes without punishment. But the tragedy with the General Staff commission is not just a high-profile crime. This was a challenge to the entire army system. However, there were no statements even that the investigation was taken under high control (as happens all the time). This story has a monstrously primitive outcome: the destruction of the largest commission of the General Staff was “pinned” on the Chechens who came to hand. No one objected publicly. Even the relatives of the deceased General Staff officers remained silent, although some of them closely followed the investigation and participated in the trials.

Only the defendants resisted. Their lawyers did a great job for the investigators and asked the right questions. There is nothing certain in this loud and mysterious case, only questions that in themselves clarify a lot. Namely: who had the motive to eliminate the commission, who had the necessary information and means (in the literal sense of the word - MANPADS systems), who was noticed in hiding evidence. The answer is actually clear and concise. Khankala. But Khankala is not a homogeneous concept at all, and someone, apparently, did not need the truth. The chance to fight arose after the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation overturned the life sentence of the Chechens and returned the case to court for a new trial. The Supreme Court suddenly broke the whole scheme and “saw” a really huge number of procedural violations and simply factual inconsistencies in the “Ichkerian Air Defense” case. But at this stage, the Chechens Salavatov, Dzhantemirov, Matsiev and Khabibulatov essentially stopped fighting. Although for the first time they had a chance to at least commute the sentence.

At the second trial, the defendants abandoned their lawyers, who achieved the overturning of the verdict in the Supreme Court. They hired other defenders, among whom the main role was played by lawyer Murad Musaev.

Musaev became famous during the trial of the murder of Anna Politkovskaya. But even before that he was a famous lawyer, persistent and tenacious. But where did all this go? Perhaps Murad Musaev decided not to aggravate the already unenviable position of his clients when the threat to their lives was clearly identified. After the car in which the defendants were transported from the pre-trial detention center in Grozny to the building of the Supreme Court of Chechnya was blown up. Three guards then died, the defendants were wounded and shell-shocked. But after that the process went smoothly. Soon the harshest sentence was re-imposed. This summer, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation approved it.

Help "Novaya"

The General Staff Commission became the third commission from Moscow that they tried to destroy in Chechnya. In 2000, in one of the northern regions of Chechnya, where active military operations had never taken place, a helicopter was shot down, on which Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff of the Defense Ministry, was flying (he came to Chechnya to inspect troops). True, the helicopter was fired upon after Kvashnin and his entourage left the plane. There were no casualties, but the car itself was completely burned out. In the spring of 2001, on the border of Ingushetia and Chechnya, a helicopter of the North Caucasus regional department of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia was shot down. On board was a parliamentary commission that had completed its work in Chechnya. The crew commander, Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Konstantinov, was wounded in the chest and neck and managed to land the helicopter. He died himself. The members of the commission were not injured, only deputy Alexei Arbatov had his legs cut by shrapnel.

According to the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper, after the death of the General Staff commission in the fall of 2001, flight safety rules were revised: high-ranking military officials were prohibited from flying in the same helicopter. However, in January 2002, an Mi-8 helicopter carrying a commission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs was shot down in the Shelkovsky district of Chechnya. 14 people were killed, including the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Southern Federal District, Lieutenant General Mikhail Rudchenko, and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Commander of the Internal Troops Group of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, Major General Nikolai Goridov. At the same time, the Mozdok - Khankala - Mozdok route, passing over the village of Shelkovskaya, was considered the most “trodden” and safest for military helicopters.

* MANPADS - portable anti-aircraft missile system.
** VOVD - temporary department of internal affairs.
*** ROSH - regional operational headquarters.
**** ORB - operational search bureau.

Chechnya, Khankala - Itum-Kalinsky district

August 2001

The minutes of the meeting between the colonel and one of the best officers of the brigade were, as always, brief: a question half consisting of obscenities and an equally “florid” answer. In war, pretentious and cumbersome phrases are not used. The main thing is the essence! Straight as the horizon and clear as the ABC for a first-grader. And in the vestment of this essence variations can be used - it’s like hanging a tongue.

Well, now that everything is assembled, let's get down to business. Two days ago, reconnaissance spotted the advance of the remnants of Ruslan Chilaev’s gang here along the gorge,” unfolding the map, the brigade commander pointed his finger at the blue snake that marked the river at the bottom of the deep gorge. - You will select ten people for the operation; The helicopter will transfer the group to the base of the Itum-Kalinsky border detachment, from there you will move to the southeast on two armored personnel carriers.

Is the intelligence fresh? - the special forces major clarified.

The latest. According to the scouts' report, there are not many bandits - five or six people; They are running out of food and ammunition, and there are also wounded. Therefore, they have nowhere to go - they need to look here.

He drew a circle on the map, raised his finger significantly and, slowly lowering it, pointed at the very center of the simple figure - at a tiny village on the gentle slope of the ridge.

Same task?

There can be no other. That's it, Arkady - half an hour to get ready and off you go! Communication via the second channel. Good luck…

The day turned out to be bright and cloudless. A light breeze could be felt on the peaks, but in the lowlands and gorges the air was still.

The transport “eight” covered seventy kilometers from Khankala to the border detachment base, which was located southwest of the large village of Itum-Kale, in twenty minutes. Not far from the three concrete platforms, armored personnel carriers were already waiting - there followed a shaking descent along the serpentine road to the gorge, which was replaced by a calm ride along the flat bank of the Argun to the bridge across the floodplain. This path did not take much time - it took much longer to get to the area designated by the brigade commander: first along the same river, but in the opposite direction, then along a dirt road that gradually climbed upward. Having crossed a wooded ridge, the bumpy road circled along the southern slope...

Dense vegetation covered only the northern slopes of the spurs, and moving along them was always more dangerous. Here, at best, there were green bushes or individual low trees sticking out. Of course, if desired, a landmine can be buried anywhere - even in the Kuban steppe or in the African desert. Bury it, hide behind a hillock or dune and wait for the right opportunity. But this is how Russian people work: if there is no direct threat three miles around, then there is no need to worry.

The engines of the armored personnel carriers hummed strainedly; eight pairs of huge wheels raised clouds of whitish, flour-fine dust into the air. Major Serebrov positioned himself near the turret of the first vehicle and held an unfolded map on his knees. All the way from Khankala, he looked at the folds of the terrain marked on paper - first in the cabin of the "turntable", now sitting on the hot armor...

The task set by the brigade commander was not new or overly complex. All that was required was to quietly approach the desired area at a distance of two or three kilometers, disperse, surround it and thoroughly comb it. Comb so that no dog has time to slip out.

The area was known, and now the trick was to correctly select the point from which the group, having split, would disperse in different directions. The point should be at the optimal distance from the area of ​​upcoming work: not too close, otherwise the maneuver will lose its stealth; but not ten miles away, so as not to clog up the airwaves with unnecessary commands, coordinating the movements of subordinates.

Several years ago, Serebrov took part in a major army operation carried out in these parts, and now, looking at the map, he saw not only meager markings, but also imagined the area “in nature.” A long elongated ridge creeping from the southeast to Itum-Kale, crossed here and there by falling folds; a snake of dirt between scattered small villages; below is the cold and fast tributary of the Argun. Opposite is the wooded slope of a neighboring, higher ridge. The center of the designated area was the last village - tiny and forgotten by God. And not far from its eastern outskirts there lived an old cemetery with a dilapidated stone house. The major chose these ruins as the starting point of the operation...

From the description of the battle: “On December 24, 1994, the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion received orders to move from the Mozdok station area to the suburban area of ​​Grozny, the settlement (airfield) of Khankala. The strike group consisted of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment (commander Major Yu. [Yuri Grigoryevich] Saulyak on an armored personnel carrier-70 with the emblem of the peacekeeping forces - a blue circle with yellow letters MS in it) and the 1st tank company of the 133rd Guards separate tank battalion, captain S. Kachkovsky on T-80BV<...>. Having completed a forced march from Mozdok to Khankala, the 1st motorized rifle battalion and the 1st tank company, having destroyed two cars with militants, immediately occupied the village of Khankala, reaching the outskirts of Grozny. Having taken up the defense, the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th motorized rifle regiment and the 1st tank company of the 133rd Guards separate tank battalion, three hours later, received an order to retreat east of the village and take up defense at the line 1.5 km from Khankala in order to block the road Grozny-Argun."1

From the description of the battle: “On the night of December 26, 1994, militants launched an attack with up to a platoon of forces along the Grozny-Gudermes railway embankment to guard the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th motorized rifle regiment. As a result of the heated battle, one BTR-70 was shot down, the reconnaissance platoon commander Lieutenant D. [Dmitry Anatolyevich] Komirenko was killed, three soldiers were wounded. As a result of massive fire from tanks and armored personnel carriers, up to six militants were destroyed (two corpses remained in the trenches, the rest were taken with them during the retreat). The tankers observed the movement through night vision sights from Grozny tanks, ZSU and cars in the direction of Khankala, where the militants carried out engineering equipment of the positions. After adjusting the artillery fire according to the night vision sights of the tanks, they managed to destroy the enemy's T-72A tank and car.
On December 26, 1994, at about 12:00, the main forces of the regiment and tank battalion, coming from Mozdok, approached the concentration area of ​​the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 1st tank company of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion. During the transition, during an overnight stay and collection of lagging equipment near the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, a fire broke out in one of the tanks of the 2nd tank company (commander Lieutenant S. Kisel), which destroyed the vehicle."2

On the night of December 26-27, with the support of the State Administration of the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment, a group of 173 special forces worked in the direction of Khankala. As a result of reconnaissance, BM-21 "Grad", ZU and BTR.3 were discovered

From the description of the battle: “On December 27, 1994, preparations began in the units of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion to destroy the militants and take control of the village of Khankala and the airfield. During a mortar attack on the positions of the 129th Guards motorized rifle regiment, two soldiers were wounded and a warrant officer was fatally wounded. One of the T-80BV tanks of the 2nd tank company, after sticking its barrel into the ground, fired a shot, and the barrel was torn off at the injector. The tank immediately received the nickname "bulldog" and was transferred to a repair platoon and used like a tractor."4

Defense in the village Khankala was occupied by the battalion of Umalta Dashaev (died on December 28, 1994).

From the description of the battle: “On December 28, 1994, at 11:30 a.m., the forces of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion began the assault on Khankala. Support for the attack by Mi-24 helicopters was refused. But closer to lunch, a couple of Mi-24 24 nevertheless appeared and made several moves in. The 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th motorized rifle regiment, together with the 1st tank company of the 133rd separate tank battalion, moving from the left along the Argun-Grozny road, were supposed to capture the air camp.
On the right, along the Gudermes-Grozny railway, with the aim of capturing the railway station, the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (commander Major S. Goncharuk) was advancing, the 2nd and 3rd tank companies of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion were advancing along airfield to the air town.
After turning in line, the advance in battle formations began in the direction of Khankala. Each motorized rifle company was assigned a tank platoon. The first loss of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion was the T-80BV tank (board number 521), which after a dashing turn fell from a height of 15 meters into a quarry. Having stuck the gun barrel into the ground along the driver's hatch, the vehicle turned out to be helpless; while trying to evacuate from the tank, the gunner-operator Private Yu. Sidorenko died under fire, the tank commander Private I. Knyazhev and the driver mechanic Private A Inzhievsky received shrapnel wounds. The battle unfolded on a parallel course. A 12.7-mm NSVT machine gun and two enemy grenade launchers hit the quarry from a distance of 400 meters, and a T-72A came out along the edge, at the same time machine gun fire was opened, pinning the motorized riflemen to the ground.
Taking advantage of the confusion of the attackers, the militants concentrated the fire of RPGs and five T-72 tanks and one T-62 on the armored vehicles and the artillery battery commander's handgun. As a result of a direct hit by a shell from a T-72A tank on the crankshaft, Captain Basmanov and the driver were killed. A T-80BV tank (aircraft number 517) was hit by a hit in the transmission at the intersection behind the quarry. With return fire, the commander of the 1st tank company, Captain S. Kachkovsky T-80BV (aircraft No. 510), despite three RPG hits in the turret and hull, knocked out one T-72 tank and provided fire cover for the retreating motorized riflemen from the Grozny-Argun road intersection . It was not possible to evacuate the tank (aircraft No. 517) under fire; it had to be destroyed during the retreat. During the subsequent counterattack of the militants with the participation of two T-72A tanks, one militant tank was hit by fire from the T-80BV tanks of the 1st tank company of the 133rd Guards separate tank battalion.

During the attack of the 2nd tank company on the runway of the Khankala airfield, the T-80BV (aircraft number 536), having received a hit from an anti-tank system on the left side between the rollers, caught fire. Driver mechanic Private A. Shmatko and gunner-operator Private S. Dulov, who were seriously wounded, managed to escape the burning tank under fire. After a short time, the ammunition detonated, taking the life of the tank commander, junior sergeant E. Gorbunov. The T-80B tank of the commander of the 3rd tank company, Lieutenant D. Zevakin, was hit in the front plate in the area of ​​​​the right towing hook from an RPG; fortunately for the crew, the cumulative jet, sliding but did not penetrate the armor.
As a result of the fleeting battle, garden plots and the airfield of the airfield were taken under the control of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion. The 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 1st tank company of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion were located at the line along the Argun-Grozny road, the 2nd tank company - between the road and the airfield in the area of ​​garden plots, 3 - I tank company - in caponiers on the airfield in front of the air camp.
An air town with several five-story buildings remained under the control of the militants.
The losses of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment were: seven people were killed and about 13 wounded, the artillery battery commander’s gunship was burned out, and two BTR-70s were damaged.
Five people from the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion were injured, two were killed. The 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion permanently lost four tanks (sides No. 517 and 521 from the 1st Tank Company and sides No. 532 and 536 from the 2nd Tank Company); the tank, which fell into a quarry, was evacuated and repaired a week later." .5

According to official data, by December 29, “6 tanks, 6 guns and one armored personnel carrier” were captured from the militants6.

Advancement of the 98th Guards. Airborne Division

On the night of December 28-29, part of the consolidated infantry battalion of the 98th Airborne Division came out to reinforce the eastern group. During the Mozdok-Khankala march near the settlement. Petropavlovskaya there was a car explosion.8

From the description of the explosion: “The artillery control vehicle “Rheostat”, on which Lieutenant Ptitsyn was, drove off the track in the dark and collided with a land mine like a caterpillar. The explosion threw the officer out of the vehicle through the open landing hatch. Ptitsyn came to his senses already on the ground when the senior warrant officer Alexander Kozlov pulled him away from the burning "armor". Despite the painful shock - the cranial bones were broken, while first aid was provided, Ptitsyn remained conscious, and even managed to understand that the price of the driver's mistake was four wounded and two killed."9

During the explosion, warrant officer Anatoly Borisovich Smirnov and private Ivan Vitalievich Morozov were killed.10

From the description of the battle: “On December 29, 1994, at the location of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion, work was underway to equip personnel at the locations of the units, equipment was repaired by the crews and the logistics platoon, ammunition was replenished, and fuel was refueled. fuel."11

Senior lieutenant of one of the reconnaissance units of the 98th Airborne Division (or 45th OrpSpN Airborne Forces): “On December 29, 1994, the Eastern group consisted of two defense rings and a headquarters in the center. Tanks, other heavy equipment, and artillery arrived.<...>On the night of December 30, we were again given an unusual task - to hold the right flank. My group, on one armored vehicle, was given a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and a BMD-2 from the airborne battalion. When management sets a task, it is not customary to ask again. Get a problem, and how to solve it is your problem. Before the assault on Khankala, with three units of equipment and personnel, I moved to the right flank and, like a gambler, castling an anti-aircraft gun, a BMD-2 and my armored personnel carrier, I somehow got them out. While still on the move, I figured out what an anti-aircraft gun was: how it fired, what its radius was. I chose a place for her. They buried the BMD-2 and installed an armored personnel carrier. The right flank, as my deputy and I thought, we had closed, providing security for possible dangerous directions."12

Senior lieutenant of one of the reconnaissance units of the 98th Airborne Division (or 45th OrpSpN Airborne Forces): “On the thirtieth of December, our unit bypassed the captured part of Khankala, the airfield and, already as part of a group, stopped in front of a military town, which was closely adjacent to the bridge connecting with the outskirts of Grozny.”13

List of dead (incomplete)

1. commander of the 1st rv 129 motorized rifle regiment lieutenant Dmitry Anatolyevich Komirenko (December 26.)
2. warrant officer 129 motorized rifle regiment (December 27, mortar attack)

3. gunner-operator of tank No. 521, private Yuri Aleksandrovich Sidorenko (December 28)
4. commander of tank No. 536, junior sergeant Evgeny Yuryevich Gorbunov (December 28)
5. captain from sadn 129 motorized rifle regiment Oleg Viktorovich Basmanov (December 28)
6. mechanic-driver KShM sadn (28.12)
7. junior sergeant 129 motorized rifle regiment Alexander Valerievich Noskov (December 28, missing)

8. Warrant Officer 217 PDP Anatoly Borisovich Smirnov (December 29)
9. private 217 traffic police Ivan Vitalievich Morozov (December 29.)

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1 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 20.
2 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. pp. 20-22.
3 Nedobezhkin V. War or playing with soldiers? // Kozlov S. et al. GRU Special Forces. M., 2002. pp. 330-331.
4 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 22.
5 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. pp. 23-25.
6 Yeltsin era. M., 2001. P. 628.
7 Criminal regime. Chechnya, 1991-95 M., 1995. P. 70.
8 Raschepkin K. And you and I, brother, are from the landing // Red Star. 2004. June 18. (