Fighting near the village of Pervomayskoe. Battle of Pervomaisky. Who betrayed our soldiers? Advancement of militants to Kizlyar

Major V.V. Nedobezhkin

– For me, the events associated with the breakthrough of militants from the village of Pervomaisky began on January 11, 1996. At this time, the army special forces detachment that I commanded was in Khankala (the headquarters of the group of Russian troops in Chechnya. – Ed.). We closely followed the hostage taking in Kizlyar, we were very worried both for those who were taken hostage there and for our comrades who were painfully searching for a way out of the situation.

On the evening of January 10, the commander of the United Group of our troops, General Anatoly Kulikov, calls me and sets the task: in cooperation with the paratroopers, to prepare an option for conducting an operation to free the hostages. Moreover, as if sensing that the militants would be released from Kizlyar, by decision of the Russian leadership, he proposed storming buses with militants and hostages on the way to Chechnya. The paratroopers had to land and block the operation site, and we had to storm the buses, neutralize the militants and free the hostages. But I didn’t really understand how they could be distinguished inside the bus - who was a hostage and who was not a hostage...

But the task was set. We started to think. We had six hours to think. We studied the area, although only from photographs. There was only one option - as soon as the column of bandits with hostages crosses into the territory of Chechnya, we will storm it in the place we have chosen. They reported to the command that they had chosen the most convenient place where losses among the hostages would be minimal. Everyone understood perfectly well that it would be impossible to do without casualties. But everyone also understood that it was impossible to repeat the shame that happened in 1995 in Budennovsk, when ours had to release the militants.

There were no specifics at that time. According to calculations, the buses should have arrived at the site we chose at seven to nine o’clock in the morning. The convoy consisted of several buses, where patients and doctors from a hospital in the city of Kizlyar were held hostage. According to official data, the militants numbered from one hundred fifty to three hundred people. I had forty scouts and seventy paratroopers. The road ambush is, from a tactical point of view, a classic. I believe that we prepared well for this option. And in terms of the number of fighters, we were quite sufficient to carry out this task, taking into account the surprise.

We decided to attack the buses already on the territory of Chechnya. I think that the militants calculated that there would be an attack. But they probably thought that this would happen on the territory of Dagestan. Therefore, the main thing for them was to get to Chechnya, where the detachments that Maskhadov sent to help them were already waiting for them. But these detachments did not find us.

However, further events began to develop not according to our version. A column of militants with hostages passed through the village of Pervomaiskoye. Behind the village there is a bridge over a ditch, and then the territory of Chechnya begins. Suddenly, the crews of our two MI-24 helicopters launch a missile attack on this bridge. The column immediately turns around and returns to Pervomaiskoe. Later, I was able to ask the commander of the 58th Army, General Troshev, who commanded the operation at the first stage: who gave the command to the helicopter pilots in front of the very nose of the column to destroy the bridge on the road to the place where we were waiting for them. Troshev replied: “I didn’t give it.” I still don’t know the answer to this question... But if we had stormed the column according to our version, then, firstly, there would have been no subsequent week-long sitting around Pervomaisky, and secondly, there would have been losses among the hostages, and among the military there are much fewer. There would be, but not like that...

They say that at that moment the capture of Pervomaisky itself began. But in reality there was no capture as such. Near the village there was a checkpoint of riot police (OMON - a special purpose police detachment. – Ed.) from Novosibirsk. The convoy with militants and hostages was accompanied by a local police colonel (he was later shown on TV several times). He approached the commander of the Novosibirsk residents and, clearly not on his own initiative, invited them to lay down their arms, which they did. They say, however, that some of the riot police refused to surrender and retreated with weapons. After this, the militants collected weapons, the surrendered policemen were added to the hostages, and they themselves entered the village of Pervomaiskoe.

We are urgently given the command to take off and dropped off one and a half kilometers from the northwestern outskirts of Pervomaisky. They set a new task - to block the northern and northwestern sides. We chose the minimum distance to the village and began to prepare - digging trenches, organizing defense. Anyone who knows will understand what it means to force special forces to dig trenches. But then many remembered with gratitude that we did it after all.

In my opinion, the task of blocking and storming the village of Pervomaiskoye could have been carried out by any experienced battalion commander using one battalion - after all, this is a normal army operation. But everything went completely differently. Various forces were involved in the operation - the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, the Ministry of Defense. However, of all the participants in the operation, it was mainly my soldiers and officers who had combat experience (there were fifty-five of us, along with the doctor and signalmen), as well as the paratroopers who stood to our left. The main units of the Ministry of Defense were from the 135th motorized rifle brigade from Budennovsk.

In my opinion, given the number of forces involved in the operation, it should have been commanded by General Anatoly Kvashnin, at that time the commander of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District. But FSB Director Mikhail Barsukov and Interior Minister Viktor Erin were also at the scene. So I don’t know who was actually in command. I had contact with the chief of intelligence of the 58th Army, Colonel Alexander Stytsina. When the militants broke through, he was in the positions of our detachment and died in battle. But first he was at the command post, and it was he who gave me the commands.

But the tasks themselves were not set by the military. For example, a combined army special forces detachment arrives from Rostov. But this squad has no combat experience at all! And I have a whole detachment stationed on Khankala. It is much closer, from there you can deliver everything you need much faster - property, ammunition. So, my friend Valera is flying in with the Rostov detachment. I ask him what their task is. He replies: “Four of our scouts during the assault on the village must ensure passage for each Alpha fighter (FSB special unit. – Ed.). The scouts must lead the Alfovites to the mosque where the militants are concentrated and ensure that they storm it.” But what kind of madness is this?!! Four conscript soldiers provide passage for an adult alpha man! This task was clearly not set by a military man. The plan with four scouts for one Alpha member was no longer necessary - I managed to convince the operation command that this was nonsense.

From the moment the missile attack was launched on the bridge on January 11, until January 15, this mess of negotiations and conversations lasted. Gradually, additional troops began to arrive. By the way, I still don’t understand why the militants didn’t leave immediately. This, of course, is Raduev’s idiocy. The south, southwest and southeast were open for another day. Only a day later the so-called ring was completely closed. The density of this ring was approximately the same as ours - fifty-five people per one and a half kilometers.

We stood at the place where there was the most convenient place for a breakthrough. Firstly, it is close to the border with Chechnya. Secondly, it was here that a gas pipe ran across the river, above the water. I suggested: “Let’s blow up the pipe.” And to me: “And we’ll leave the whole republic without gas?” I again: “So what is the task? Don't miss it? Then fight like that.” And again about the republic without gas. At our own peril and risk, we placed mines in front of the pipe. All of them subsequently worked when the militants climbed onto the pipe.

On the third or fourth day, ours attempted an assault. "Vityaz" (special forces of internal troops. – Ed.), "Alpha", "Vympel" (special units of the FSB. – Ed.) tried to enter the village from the southeast and got stuck there. Then I talked to the guys from Vityaz. They said: “We came in, got hooked, and we are fighting in the village for every house. “Alpha couldn’t follow us.” That is, Vityaz’s back remained open. After all, “Alpha”, with such a battle formation, had an order to go behind and help “Vityaz”, concentrate, storm houses together, and so on. In a populated area, walking forward with your back open is simply suicide. (I had the same case in my life, when in the same year, 1996, we were also framed by the Emved.)

As a result, “Vityaz” found itself surrounded, and emerged from this cauldron on its own, with heavy losses. After the battle, the commander of the Vityaz, naturally, said to the Alfovites: “Thank you! I don't go there anymore. Neither with you, nor with others...” There they even got personal.

The next day, the command planned another assault with the same forces. But first, I from the north-west had to simulate an assault. We were given the task of reaching the first houses, distracting the militants and attracting their main forces. And in the southeast at that moment a real assault was supposed to begin.

It took us twenty minutes to approach these houses (the distance was about seven hundred meters), and it took us four and a half hours to leave. One group of us walked along the ravine almost to the outermost houses. The other one is through the destroyed building of some farm, and then to the houses. The group in which I myself was walking was making its way through the foundations of some building. We managed to reach these foundations, but it was already difficult to lean out from behind them - for some reason the assault did not take place again. We lay down, no one else attacks the village, and they give us the command to retreat. It turns out: we carried out reconnaissance in force. When moving forward, we did not hide ourselves very much, we walked noisily, deliberately attracting attention to ourselves. The militants, as the command intended, went to our side of the village and started shooting at us. And it was about ten in the morning.

During the time we gave them, the militants managed to organize a defense, the hostages dug trenches. We saw in which houses the militants were sitting, destroyed several machine gunners and snipers, and began to direct artillery. Our MI-24 helicopter appeared from behind. Fires missiles at those houses that we indicated. And suddenly two rockets come out, but they don’t fly forward, they fall behind us and explode. We said to the helicopter pilots: “What are you doing?” And they: “Sorry, guys, the rockets are substandard.” But it’s funny to remember this only now. It was no laughing matter then...

When we were given the command to retreat, I began to withdraw the groups one by one: two groups concentrated fire, provided cover, and one slowly retreated. During the so-called assault we had one wounded, and during the retreat - three.

The paratroopers were stationed not far from our positions. They got it too, they even seemed to be dead... The militants hit us, and grenades passed over our heads and exploded at the paratroopers in position. Then they have two infantry fighting vehicles (infantry fighting vehicles. – Ed.) burned. We see that the militants are aiming an ATGM (anti-tank guided missile) at the BMP. – Ed.), we wave to the paratroopers: “Retreat!” The crew managed to jump out, but the car was blown apart. The paratroopers put another one in its place, and everything was repeated from the beginning - the militants aim, we wave, the crew moves to the side, the missile hits the car. But at that moment they didn’t seem to care about anyone...

I don’t know who was in charge and how he was in charge of everything. But I have never seen a more ignorant and careless operation in my life. And the worst thing is that even ordinary soldiers understood this. There was practically no leadership, and each unit lived its own separate life. Everyone fought as best they could. For example, the task was set for us by one, and for the paratroopers to our right - by another. We are neighbors, we are located a hundred meters from each other, and we are commanded by different people. It's good that we more or less agreed with them. We had contact with them both visually and by radio. True, radio communications were open; the militants were probably listening to our conversations.

On the night of January 13-14, the old New Year began. From the detachment's permanent location, ours sent a huge basket of gifts. This was very useful, since we went here only with ammunition - we were supposed to work on storming the column for about forty minutes. And then we stood in an open field, and it was January... I asked them to send us felt boots, and they dropped them from a helicopter. I later heard someone complaining: they slept in the Ikarus, it was very uncomfortable!.. And all this time we slept, as usual, on the ground, some in the trenches. Then they brought sleeping bags, and we made capes out of them. It’s frosty at night, frosty during the day, your feet and all your uniform are wet all day long. We were very unlucky with the weather.

But the detachment helped us as best they could. So for this New Year they sent salads and vinaigrettes. We made an improvised table from the door. The head of intelligence, Colonel Alexander Stytsina, kept wondering how we were able to organize a “celebratory” table under such conditions. Twelve people drank one bottle of vodka purely symbolically, and left the rest for later.

The same drudgery and shootings continued. Either they would shoot, or my machine gunners with snipers... So we kept each other in suspense. When we realized that the operation was protracted, we ourselves began to think through options for the operation in groups, at night, quietly. After all, we were prepared for precisely such actions - from the detachment’s base in Khankala they handed us all the silent weapons, mines. But in the end they used us as infantry.

And no one knew the prospects, no one knew what would happen next. Either we storm, or we wait for them to come out. And this uncertainty influenced a number of my decisions. We started placing minefields in front of us every night to cover ourselves. After all, the militants had the only real way - through our positions to get to the gas pipe and cross the river along it. I reported this to Colonel Stytsina, who asked the command to at least strengthen us with armored vehicles. Armored vehicles on fire do not provide much of an advantage, but they have a strong psychological effect on the enemy. (I myself have been under such fire a couple of times - it puts a lot of psychological pressure on me.)

Every night from January 15 until the breakthrough on January 18, flares were hung by parachutes over the village. This lighting, of course, was amazing. And on January 17 I was given the command: tomorrow at dawn there will be a second assault. But now we no longer distract, but go to the end together with others in our sectors. So, naturally, I didn’t put mines in front of me for the night. At 2.30 am I asked the group of observers who were in front: “Is it quiet?” They answer: “Quiet.” And I gave them the command to retreat to their positions. I leave a third of the people to guard, and give the rest the command to rest, because in the morning there will be an assault. A week has already passed in such conditions: naturally, people began to sway slightly when walking. But in the morning you have to run another seven hundred meters. And it’s not easy to run, but under fire.

...And then almost immediately it all began...

Interestingly, there was no lighting at all that night. Therefore, we noticed the militants about forty meters away. Frost hangs in the air, and almost nothing is visible through night binoculars. At this time, the group that was returning was following our trenches. My signalmen, who were on duty in turns, launched a rocket and saw the militants. They start counting - ten, fifteen, twenty... a lot!.. I give the signal: everyone to fight! A group of twelve people, which came from the observation post, was fully prepared and immediately attacked the militants from the left flank. Thus, they gave the others the opportunity to prepare.

And the breakthrough itself was constructed competently. The militants had a distracting group on the side, a fire group with large-caliber weapons, grenade launchers, and machine gunners. Their fire group did not let us raise our heads. Basically, all our dead and wounded appeared during this first strike. The density of the fire was such that officer Igor Morozov’s finger on his hand was crushed. He, an experienced officer, walked through Afghanistan and shot while sitting in a trench, sticking out only his hands with a machine gun. That's where his finger got crippled. But he remained in service.

Their fire group hits, and the rest go under their own fire. They came close to us. We hear: “Allah Akbar!” Most likely, they were on drugs, then they found a bunch of medicines and syringes in each of their backpacks. And under our fire they did not run, but simply walked, as if in a psychic attack. And here's another thing that was bad. Our scouts have 5.45 mm weapons. After all, bullets of 7.62 caliber are stopped, and 5.45 are simply pierced through, but the fighter still goes on. And the fighters have different psychological training. He shoots, sees that he hits the militant, and he walks another twenty meters and does not fall. This has a great effect on the nerves, and the impression will remain with the fighters for a long time. The children's fairy tale about Koshchei the Immortal involuntarily comes to mind.

We had a gap in the defense of two or three rifle cells. In one of them, Vinokurov died immediately; during the first fire strike, a bullet hit him in the head. This distance is about thirty meters. The militants went along the parapet of our trenches - the group that returned forced the militants to turn in the opposite direction with fire. And then we started throwing grenades at them. They walked further past us - and then suddenly they turned towards Valera Kustikov. He later said: “I didn’t shoot at all, I just threw grenades.” The sergeant sat, screwed in the fuses and handed them to him. And Valera pulled the pin and threw it away. This is the kind of conveyor they have. Then the paratroopers entered the battle and also began to push the militants along the line towards the center.

The militants, whom Valera stopped with her conveyor grenade launching and the paratroopers with their fire, return to the center of our positions and begin to pass through this thirty-meter gap. I didn’t have a second line of defense - there were only fifty-five of us along the one and a half kilometer front, along with the doctor and radio operators. Behind us stood a post of five or six people, Igor Morozov, who was supposed to make sure that the militants did not come at us from behind. He was just the head of the night shift and at that moment he came to drink tea.

Of course, no one counted the militants at night. But there were several hundred of them. And they all rushed into this gap. We had to work both along the front and along the flank, where the militants had passed. When we no longer had time to do this, I gave the command to retreat to the flanks and create a corridor and let the militants through it. I myself moved towards the infantry, the other part - towards the paratroopers. I call the artillery and say: “Hit our location.” They: “Give me the coordinates.” I give you the coordinates. They: “So there you are!” Me: “We moved away.” They: “Where did you go?” And this is all over open communication. In short, the artillery never struck. And it was still dark for the helicopters.

About thirty minutes later this rampart passed, we closed our defenses and began to look around. It became clear that the first assault group of militants, which we threw grenades at, and the fire group did not make it through. We, together with the paratroopers who were standing on the right, suppressed it with crossfire. Only the group that Raduev was in left. The breakthrough itself was organized competently. But in practice, this was not done by Raduev, but by an Arab who was often shown on TV. Raduev is simply a Komsomol bandit who was raised by family ties.

The bandits went into the forest, which on one side and the other came close to the river behind our back. The width of the river in this place is about fifty meters. On the other side there were already KAMAZ trucks, the boats were already prepared for the crossing.

It was getting light. We examined those militants who remained in our positions. There were almost no wounded among them, only dead. We later found many wounded in the forest, and the dead too. These are those who walked through us and were mortally wounded, but were still moving by inertia.

By that time we had already counted our losses. Out of fifty-five people, I only have ten left. Five were killed. Fifteen were injured (they were evacuated immediately). The rest were about the same as an officer with a shot off finger - they remained in the ranks, but were no longer walkers. And then my ten remaining scouts were given the task of going into the forest to look for the militants hiding there. And at the same time, one hundred fresh paratroopers from the reserve are sent to the forester’s house. In the forest area to the north of us there was a forester’s house and some kind of broken shack. I tell the command: “There is no one there. The militants understand that if they sit in the house, they will be blocked - that’s all. Let the paratroopers be thrown onto our bank of the river, they will push the militants towards me, and I will meet them here.” My squad had been in battle for almost ten days before, sleeping on the ground in trenches. And after the night battle we got so stressed! But they didn’t listen to me, and an order is an order - we moved into the forest. We just entered - we have one “300th” (wounded. – Ed.), then another. This is how it turns out because of our Russian mentality! The ensign, who came up and saw the wounded girl and guy there, did not think that the girl, by her feminine nature, could shoot. An automatic burst pierced the ensign's knee... Then the same thing happened to the old man, who also seemed unable to shoot. But he can. Naturally, our people threw grenades at them, and I gave the command to retreat.

When I brought my men out, I asked the helicopter pilots: “Work through the forest.” But the artillery never fired. But the paratroopers did not find anyone in the forester’s house, loaded into helicopters and flew away in victory.

When it began to get light, in the field in front of the village we began to collect hostages who were walking with the militants and carrying their wounded. How can you tell them apart: is he a hostage or not? Those who were in police uniform were asked a couple of questions. It seems like our own... We lit a fire, let's have some tea. Among them, many doctors were from the Kizlyar hospital, which Raduev captured. Doctors, one might say, were the luckiest of all. When the militants went to break through, they put on white coats. The soldiers immediately realized. The policemen were in their uniforms. But here the Russian mentality showed itself again. Among the hostages we see a girl of about nineteen, beaten to death. Immediately give her hot tea, crackers, and stew. But she doesn’t eat stew. The FSB guys come up: “Can I talk to the girl?” - "Yes, sure". And they take her under her little white hands and take her with them. Then we watch the tape recording the capture of Kizlyar, and she is among the militants!

I also remember how someone from high command explained why the killed militants were barefoot. It seemed to make it easier to sneak up on us. In fact, everything is much simpler. One of the Novosibirsk riot police points to the dead man and says: “Oh, my boots, can I take them off?” And the jackets of the killed bandits were also taken off. I don’t consider this looting, considering what the riot police were wearing.

We collected eighty-three corpses in front of our position, and thirty-two more to the edge of the forest behind us, not counting those who had already died in the forest. We took twenty prisoners.

The command was so euphoric when they arrived at the battlefield!.. I thought they were going to carry me in their arms. The picture is good: corpses, mountains of weapons. All this is normal by military standards. The first to approach me was General Anatoly Kvashnin, commander of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District. We have known him for a long time. At the beginning of the war, he personally instructed the first groups, I was the commander of one of them. When we met later, the first thing he always said was the same phrase: “Are you here again?” This time he greeted me like that too.

But our ordeal did not end there. I understood that during the day or night the bandits, according to Islamic law, must come for the bodies. There will be a battle, there will be no battle - it is unknown, but they will definitely come for the bodies. But when the victorious euphoria ended, everyone boarded the helicopters and flew away. The paratroopers also get on the equipment and leave, the motorized rifles fold up and leave. And I am left alone with my people, who are still intact, because our lightly wounded were also sent away. Colonel Stytsina, with whom I had a connection, died in this battle. I ask the command: “What should I do? You gave me a command to go forward, and a command to go back?.. When does my task end?” And they answered me: “Take a defensive position, only in the opposite direction.” I say: “Are you crazy? My people are falling off their feet, the frost is starting again!” And to me: “This is an order, your people are under fire.” I answered: “Yes, they were very well shelled, they shelled all night.”

There is nothing to do, we take up defensive positions facing the river. At first I pushed several people forward, but, given their condition, then I brought them back - if they fell asleep, no amount of kicking could wake them up. It was a fun night, especially for the officers. After all, they understand that if they fall asleep, then that’s it, it’s over. Two are sitting by the fire, the rest are walking back and forth along the line, waking up the fighters: “Don’t sleep!” You're almost passing out yourself. I pass and see that one fighter is sleeping. I kick him in my hearts: “Don’t sleep, you bastard, you’ll destroy everyone!” And the fighters around are giggling. It turned out to be a dead “spirit”; they hadn’t been taken out yet. The fighters remembered this incident to me for a long time...

In the morning the Dagestan police arrived. They tried to detain us by all means. They say: “You leave now, the spirits will come, but we won’t be able to do anything.” I answered them: “No, brother, I’m sorry, this is your war.” And as soon as we started to take off, we immediately saw the “spirits” coming out of the forest. But they did not have a fight with the Dagestan policemen. But then the entire list of my squad who took part in this battle ended up with the Dagestan police. We were witnesses in a criminal case.

None of our people were deprived of awards or attention back then. Officers and warrant officers were given personalized weapons, although only officers were entitled to them. Five from our detachment were awarded the title of Hero of Russia, the fighters were given orders and medals. I was awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel ahead of schedule, given a Hero star and a personalized pistol. In this regard, the authorities atone for their sins well. Now I understand that they simply shut our mouths.

I wear this star with a clear conscience. I earned my title, and everything else, not only with this operation, but with my entire service... My conviction is this: the heroism of one is the mistake of someone else, who should have done everything right. One bad thing is that the militants finally broke through. Then my comrades and I analyzed this battle and came to the conclusion that it was possible to prevent a breakthrough. And all that was needed was to strengthen us with armor.

According to all military laws, my losses should have been much greater. But the preparation and the fact that the people were under fire had an effect. And, as it turned out, the fact that the trenches were dug played an important role. The soldiers later thanked us for forcing them to dig trenches, because for special forces it’s almost like another feat to accomplish.

I often remember a story that circulates among those who participated in the siege of Pervomaisky. By the time the militant breakthrough began on the night of January 17-18, the entire operation was commanded by Mikhail Barsukov, director of the FSB. At night they report to him: “The militants are breaking through!” And he was a giver, he commands: “Bring them to me!” And they sarcastically answer him: “Sorry, Comrade General, they are still just breaking through.”

Sergey Galitsky

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The story of an FSB special forces officer about his participation in the operation to liberate the village of Pervomaiskoye, captured by Raduev’s gang after a large-scale attack on the city of Kizlyar. January 10-19, 1996.

Wikipedia Help:

Battle for Pervomaiskoe

On January 10, militants, under the cover of human shields, moved on nine buses towards Chechnya, but were stopped by federal forces[how?] near the village of Pervomaiskoye. There, the militants captured a checkpoint of the Novosibirsk riot police, capturing 36 policemen (the deputy commander of the police detachment was killed while trying to resist), and entered the village.

For the next four days of confrontation, both sides actively prepared for hostilities. The militants fortified the village with hostages. Federal troops brought up artillery, additional units, and carried out reconnaissance. Thus, a multi-service group of troops with a total number of 2,500 people, 32 guns and mortars, 16 flamethrowers, 10 grenade launchers, 3 Grad MLRS installations, 54 infantry fighting vehicles, 22 armored personnel carriers, 4 BRDMs, several tanks and combat helicopters were concentrated near Pervomaisky. S. Raduev had about 300 militants, over 100 hostages, 82-mm mortars taken from Kizlyar on trucks with the bodies of the dead, as well as a large number of machine guns, grenade launchers, flamethrowers and other weapons and ammunition. The militants replenished their arsenal by disarming the checkpoint of the Novosibirsk riot police.

On January 15, terrorists shot two Dagestani elders and 6 hostage policemen who came to them for negotiations, after which it was decided to storm the village of Pervomaisky using helicopters, tanks and armored personnel carriers, despite the possible losses of the hostages. The overall command of the federal forces was exercised by Viktor Zorin, first deputy director of the FSB Mikhail Barsukov. On the morning of January 15, after ineffective artillery preparation and air support, nine assault groups: the Vityaz special forces detachment, special rapid reaction units (SOBR) and units of the 22nd separate special forces brigades of the GRU General Staff - went on the assault. In the second echelon, in full readiness to storm buildings in which there could be hostages, were the assault groups of Directorate “A” of the FSB TsSN and the SBP RF TsSN. By 13:00, the “knights”, having crossed the canal, captured the first line of defense of the militants on the outskirts of the village and broke into the south-eastern quarter. The rest, encountering fierce fire resistance in the area of ​​the bridge and cemetery, were forced to stop. Two hours later, having suffered minor losses, the Vityaz also stopped. At dusk, all units were ordered to retreat to their original positions.

On January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, terrorists led by M. Tokcan, who, according to him, fought in Basayev’s battalion, captured the ferry “Avrasia” with predominantly Russian passengers on board. The terrorists' demands were the lifting of the blockade of the village of Pervomaiskoye and the withdrawal of federal troops from the North Caucasus.

On the morning of January 17, a small, possibly reconnaissance, group of militants broke into the village of Sovetskoye, located near Pervomaisky, from Chechnya and destroyed a UAZ car with Dagestani riot police.

On the night of January 19, the main forces of the militants (including Raduev and Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev) managed to escape from the encirclement and return to Chechnya. The total number of militants who moved forward was 256 people, who left in 7 KamAZ trucks. During the night breakthrough of the Raduevites from Pervomaisky, 2 soldiers (1 conscript and 1 contract soldier) and 3 officers of the 22nd separate special forces brigade were killed. The breakthrough came through their positions. The intelligence chief of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District, Colonel A. Stytsina, who was in their positions, also died. In total, 40 servicemen of the 22 Special Operations Brigade were involved in the operation (20 people each arrived from Khankala and Rostov). Soldiers of the 411 Special Forces Special Forces, led by the detachment commander, arrived from Rostov, and a combined group arrived from Khankala. Data on losses of other security forces vary and cannot be accurately determined.

"Soldier of Fortune" for 1996.

PERVOMAYSKY FIGHT

IT'S FIFTEEN YEARS SINCE THE ATTACK OF RADUEV'S MILITARS ON DAGESTAN

On January 9, 1996, on the personal instructions of the first president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev, a detachment of militants (total number, according to various sources, about 300,350 people) under the leadership of Salman Raduev attacked Kizlyar.

The bandits were unable to capture the local airfield, although they managed to destroy one helicopter and two fuel tankers. As a result of the battle, the attackers were also driven back from the location of the battalion of internal troops. Immediately after this, the militants seized a maternity hospital and a hospital, where they drove more than three thousand hostages from nearby residential buildings. A group of militants held the bridge over the Terek on the approach to the city.

Raduev said on local radio that “wolves have come to the city and will not leave until Russia withdraws federal troops from Chechnya and the entire North Caucasus.”

According to some information, fame came to the leader of the Dzhokhar Dudayev Army by accident: at the last stage, he replaced the wounded bandit HunkarPasha Israpilov, who was the leader of the action.

After negotiations with the leadership of Dagestan, on January 11, the militants with hundreds of hostages left the city on assigned buses. The checkpoints were ordered to let terrorists through without hindrance and “not to provoke them.”

Assault options were developed right along the route. Along the route in the Babayurt area, the raiders changed their route, turning towards the village of Pervomaisky. When the security forces realized that Raduev was trying to leave with hostages for Ichkeria, and that it would not be easy to get him, a decision was made to stop the convoy. This was done with warning shots from a helicopter.

Apparently, the federals did not have a final plan of action, just as there was no leader on the scene who was ready to take full responsibility for the consequences of the force operation. Only this can explain the confusion, which Raduev took advantage of one hundred percent. While the situation was “stuck,” he deployed his detachment and occupied the village of Pervomaisky, simultaneously disarming 37 Novosibirsk riot police who were at the checkpoint: the fighters found themselves hostage to the order not to open fire.

Negotiations lasted five days, during which it was possible to achieve the release of all detained women and children. During this time, the militants were able to build defensive fortifications. The hostages were forced to dig trenches; some of them, despite the cold nights, were deliberately left on the buses in order to prevent shelling of terrorist positions.

In those days, it was repeatedly reported that the village had been turned into a fortress. In fact, Pervomaisky was an ordinary Caucasian village, where adobe buildings predominated. The wealthiest residents managed to acquire brick houses. Of course, the militants dug trenches and communication passages, but still it was nothing more than a populated area, prepared for defense in the shortest possible time. The positions did not constitute a single system, but rather were designed to deliver surprise attacks and quickly withdraw. There was no talk of any reinforced concrete structures. However, even without all these “engineering horrors,” any house, and especially the basement, posed a serious danger to the attackers.

...What we observed then does not have a clear definition. The initiative belonged entirely to the generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They made a number of gross professional mistakes that were unacceptable in principle. SOBR detachments arrived at the village with assault ladders, which are absolutely unsuitable for storming one-story rural houses.

“We entered this village with absolutely no idea what specific task needed to be completed. Straight ahead, like a penal company, we cannot understand why elite units are used as cannon fodder,” this is a typical confession of those days. “I have never seen such a mess before, it seems that someone specially organized this whole circus. Now there is no talk of liberation, we are only being pushed forward to completely destroy the militants,” said another SOBR officer who left the village along with the wounded.

However, why be surprised? After the New Year’s assault on Grozny and the entire first “Chechen” campaign, the question of how the federal government treats the workers and peasants’ children of their (?) country, abandoned with weapons in their hands to slaughter, this purely rhetorical question disappeared by itself.

CHAZY STORM

The first assault on Pervomaisky was planned for January 14, but it had to be postponed because the bandits, having precisely timed it, placed in front of them a human shield of captured Dagestani riot police and other civilian hostages. Throughout the next night, planes dropped flares over the village.

The operation to destroy Raduev and free the hostages began on January 15 with fire preparation, which was carried out by three MT12 anti-tank guns and a pair of Mi24 from the air. If we take into account that the attack was carried out on the positions of a motorized rifle battalion (and there were so many militants), entrenched in a populated area, it becomes clear that these fire weapons were clearly not enough.

The operation was carried out by a combined group, which included “Alpha”, “Vityaz”, “Rus”, “Vega” (yesterday’s “Vympel”), Korzhakovites from the SBP, SOBR soldiers from Volgograd, Stavropol, Makhachkala, Krasnodar, Moscow and Moscow region, employees of the Main Directorate for Organized Crime Control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the cordon were units of internal troops, motorized rifles, a unit of the combined parachute battalion of the 7th Guards Airborne Division and the 876th Separate Special Forces Company of the 58th Army. The most dangerous section, a kilometer long, was covered by soldiers of the 22nd Specialized Brigade.

When setting the tasks, not only the layout of the village was not used, but even elementary diagrams and maps were not used. Each unit participating in the operation was provided with its own resources. And it seems that the command had no idea that the operation might have engineering support.

As in Grozny, the attackers had practically no numerical superiority. By 2 p.m., the Interior Ministry forces managed to occupy half of the village, but losses forced them to retreat. Since the tasks were set “on the fly,” is it any wonder that interaction between the detachments was not organized, operating frequencies did not coincide, and there was virtually no centralized support for the operation both at the front line and in the rear.

On the 16th the assault was repeated, but again unsuccessfully, control was partially lost. Although by mid-day the Vityaz fighters managed to reach the center of the Pervomaisky mosque, where the terrorists were holding hostages...

Only at the end of the day did artillery arrive - a battery of BM21 Grad rocket launchers and a battery of 122 mm D30 howitzers. On the morning of the 17th, at 8 o’clock, the forward formations received a command to leave their positions and retreat five hundred meters so as not to suffer from artillery fire. The “Gods of War” carried out shooting, but due to the weather, fire preparation did not take place.

Not wanting to fall under the assault attack, on the night of January 18, the Radievites tried to launch a diversionary strike and captured a checkpoint near the village of Sovetskoye, forcing the Dagestani riot police to retreat, but they were knocked out of there almost immediately. At this time, the main part of the gang made a breakthrough in several groups to the only possible escape route - the bridge over the Terek River. The wounded and dead were tied to the stretchers, which were “entrusted” to the hostages.

Since the “triple ring of the blockade” was exclusively a propaganda “duck” (the density of the front was 46 people per one and a half kilometers), Raduev and part of the militants, despite huge losses, managed to escape. The main blow was taken by the soldiers from the 22nd brigade, who lost five killed and six “heavily”.

“The scouts fought desperately, holding back an enemy five times superior, who also had nothing to lose,” writes military historian and journalist Sergei Kozlov. - No one supported their heroic efforts either with fire or maneuver. And who was there to support if the battle order of the operation did not imply either the creation of an armored group or a reserve, and in order to carry out a quick regrouping, one must at least be in a sober mind. When Kulikov’s deputy, Lieutenant General Golubets, was informed about the breakthrough, he, according to eyewitnesses, was so drunk that the only order he could give sounded something like this: “Deliver them (the militants) to me here!” It would be interesting to see how quickly he would sober up if suddenly the “Czechs” fulfilled his request and came to the call.”

According to official investigation data, 39 militants were killed during the breakthrough, and another fourteen were captured. By a bitter irony of fate, this breakthrough saved the lives of almost half of the hostages - 64 people were taken to Ichkeria, including seventeen Novosibirsk riot police. Another 65 people were freed during the assault on the village, fifteen hostages died.

At about 11 a.m. on January 18, after a Grad attack and howitzers, the special forces launched a new attack and by 3 p.m. captured the village. By this time, the main forces of the Chechens had long broken out of Pervomaisky.

Over the next month, riot police were exchanged for captured militants, civilian hostages for the corpses of killed terrorists. Official losses of the security forces amounted to nine people killed and 39 wounded in Kizlyar, as well as 29 killed and 78 wounded in Pervomaisky. 24 killed and 19 wounded in Kizlyar were civilians.

IN THE NAKED FIELD...

The press reported monstrous “details”: “During the assault on the village, the attackers often had inconsistencies, helicopters fired indirectly, under which their own people fell under. On the first day of the assault, when Alpha went forward, it was covered in exactly this way. The special forces managed to move forward, and the army units that had retreated back called in helicopters and artillery fire for support. The Alfa team had to experience this blow themselves. Apparently, the elite units suffered serious losses. There is no exact information yet, but we are talking about dozens of dead.”

In Pervomaisky, soldiers of Group “A” (senior Lieutenant General A.V. Gusev), together with “Vityaz”, conducted reconnaissance in force on the southeastern outskirts of the village, identified and suppressed enemy firing points, provided fire cover for the Ministry of Internal Affairs units, provided medical assistance and evacuated the wounded from battlefields.

At the final stage of the operation, Alpha employees Major Viktor Vorontsov and Major Andrei Kiselyov died a brave death. Eternal memory to them... We remember you guys!

State security special forces had to act like field infantry. Several days, thrown into an open field without tents, and often even warm ammunition (they gathered for actions in urban conditions for one day literally in half an hour), lack of supplies and coordination.

The guys flew to Dagestan after 24 hours, tired,” says Anna Kiseleva, the wife of a major Alpha officer. “They were thrown into a bare field, in snowy mud, without normal food, without warm clothing. But even in these difficult conditions, they did everything they had to do. They completed their task. They are heroes, although they tried to hush it up. And it is not their fault that the management of the operation was carried out so frankly incompetently.

And at this time, President Yeltsin, in front of television cameras, spoke in all seriousness about the fact that “... 38 snipers were located in positions, and each had their own goal.”

AFTERWORD

Unfortunately, the operation in Pervomaisky, in turn, was not analyzed, the actions of its participants were not analyzed, and as a result, an action plan to prevent similar situations in the future was not developed.

Raduev and other commanders who participated in that attack became brigadier generals after the war and received the highest awards in Ichkeria. On March 13, 2000, Dudayev’s son-in-law was arrested by FSB representatives on the territory of Chechnya.

On December 25, 2001, the Supreme Court of Dagestan found Raduev guilty of all charges except “organizing illegal armed groups.”

The demands of the state prosecutor - Vladimir Ustinov - were fulfilled, and Raduev was sentenced to life imprisonment. On December 14, 2002, he died in one of the Perm maximum security colonies. Turpal Ali Atgeriev also died in custody.

HunkarPasha Israpilov died in the winter of 2000 while leaving Grozny, which was blockaded by federal troops. Umar Khasakhanov, another well-known Chechen commander associated with those events, was killed in the spring of 1996 during an assassination attempt on Raduev.

THE HEART STOPPED...

On January 10, 2011, Alfa Group veteran Captain Alexander Vasilievich Perov died as a result of acute heart failure.

Born on September 3, 1957 in Moscow. In 1974 he graduated from secondary school No. 758. In 1976 1978 served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG). In February 1979, he was hired by the State Security Committee, the 15th Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

From March 1982 to February 1993 - in Group “A”. As part of the unit, he underwent combat training in Afghanistan (November-December 1983). Participated in the destruction of the gang of field commander Kali Kuduz (“Bald”).

Over the years spent in Group A, Captain Perov repeatedly participated in special operations. Awarded the medals “For Distinction in the Protection of the State Border of the USSR”, “For Impeccable Service of the 3rd Degree”, “70 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR”, “Internationalist Warrior from the Noble Afghan People”.

Alexander Vasilyevich was buried at the Babushkinskoye cemetery. His comrades and work colleagues came to say goodbye to him.

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants under the command of Salman Raduev attacked the maternity ward and hospital in the city of Kizlyar. The terrorists drove about three thousand residents from nearby houses into the captured buildings. On January 10, the militants with some of the hostages began moving towards Chechnya. The operation to free people and eliminate militants became one of the most disastrous in modern Russian history.
President Boris Yeltsin tried to pretend that the situation was under the control of federal forces. In an interview on January 13, he said: “The operation is very, very carefully prepared; Let’s say, if there are 38 snipers, then each sniper is assigned a target, and he sees this target all the time.” In fact, there were neither the mythical 38 snipers who appeared from nowhere in Yeltsin’s speech, nor the careful preparation of the operation.

The militants' goal was to capture the airfield, where they believed there was a weapons depot. But only two helicopters and empty boxes were found on the premises. Terrorists burned helicopters. During the battle, they were pushed away from the town by internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In order to get out of the city, the militants decided to create a human shield. A demand was also voiced: in exchange for hostages, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the North Caucasus.

As soon as the incident became known in Moscow, Yeltsin blamed the border service for this, which allegedly “overslept” and let the militants through the Dagestan and Chechen borders. At the same time, Yeltsin did not take into account that there are no border controls between the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

Column movement

On January 10, militants and a hundred hostages left Kizlyar on assigned buses. The convoy was not stopped at checkpoints - the order “not to provoke” was announced. Buses with special forces went after the militants, but they could not bridge the 40-minute gap. The decision to chase the Ikarus was ill-conceived; landing special forces from helicopters would have been much more effective.

There was no plan for interception either - it was created in the process. When it became clear that the militants were heading towards Chechnya, they tried to stop them with shots from helicopters.

Salman Raduev took advantage of the confusion of the federal forces, deployed the column and occupied the village of Pervomaisky. The order not to open fire cost the freedom of 37 Novosibirsk riot policemen from a checkpoint near the village.

Negotiation

The negotiations lasted five days. During this time, the gang of militants grew greatly, and fortifications appeared in the village. The hostages dug trenches. Buses with hostages also covered terrorist positions. As one of the participants in the assault recalled, “the village was indeed very strongly fortified, and reinforcements were constantly approaching the Dudayevites. We saw them ourselves, but we couldn’t shoot - there was no order, negotiations continued. Only on the third day of sitting, we and our neighbors were given the task of storming the village.”

During the negotiations, it was possible to achieve the release of women and children, but the remaining hostages remained in the hands of terrorists. It was the human shield of captured riot police and other captured people that prevented the assault from starting on January 14, as originally planned.

First assault

All the weakness of the organization manifested itself at the stage of the assault, which began on January 15. The special forces soldiers had little idea of ​​the task; the SOBR arrived with ladders, which were useless during an assault on the village. According to the recollections of the participants, “there was no equipment or artillery, coordination was only through the headquarters. Communication is poor, since each unit's radios operate on their own frequencies. Throughout the entire assault, the helicopter pilots acted on their own; we still didn’t understand who they were subordinate to.” Despite the fact that different units took part in the assault, each of them acted almost independently - a general plan with the distribution of tasks was never created. According to some sources, neither a model of the village nor even its maps and diagrams were used, although aerial photography could have been carried out in a few days of negotiations.

The situation was complicated by the nature of the terrain - the open steppe provided the militants with the opportunity to see all positions and movements of groups of federal forces. Helicopter support was able to force the terrorists to move deeper into the village.

The militants fired back, Russian units suffered losses. The order was given to retreat. A participant in the events testifies that “they walked away across a bare field, and the militants fired at them from all types of weapons they had, including mortars.”

Decisive assault

The next attempt to capture the militants, carried out on January 16, was also unsuccessful. Vympel fighters were able to approach the mosque in the center of the village, but were forced to retreat. In the evening, artillery arrived at Pervomaisky. On the 17th, federal forces carried out shooting.

Realizing that a decisive assault was planned, the militants who came to the aid of Raduev’s detachment tried to carry out a diversionary maneuver and seize a checkpoint near the village of Sovetskoye, but were driven out from there. One of the fighters of the federal forces recalls: “A detachment of at least 150 people tried to get to Pervomaiskoye between the villages of Sovetskoye and Teremnoye. Our detachment and units of the North Caucasus Military District destroyed almost half of the militants in a battle that lasted no more than 20 minutes; groups of Dudayevites leaving towards Chechnya were destroyed by fire from helicopters.”

At the same time, part of the gang began to retreat to the Terek, loading the dead and wounded onto stretchers. The stretcher was carried by the hostages. The 22nd Brigade, which suffered heavy losses, tried to stop the militants, but Raduev and part of the detachment managed to escape. How the militants managed to leave the village undetected is still unclear. The FSB director answered questions from journalists: the militants used an unexpected technique, took off their boots and walked barefoot in the snow.

An artillery strike helped liberate Pervomaiskoye. During the assault, 65 hostages were rescued. The militants who had retreated earlier took 64 people to Chechnya, 17 of them were Novosibirsk riot police. Later they were exchanged for captured militants, and civilians for the bodies of killed terrorists.

According to official sources, the losses of federal forces and civilians in Kizlyar and Pervomaisky amounted to 78 people. Several hundred people were injured. In Kizlyar, 24 civilians were killed. The militants' losses amounted to about 150 people killed.

“On January 9, 1996 at 9.45, in accordance with the instructions of the Director of the FSB of Russia, Army General M.I. Barsukov. The personnel of department “A” were raised on combat alert to receive further instructions.”

The ancient and wise Sun Tzu advised: “Feed a soldier for a thousand days, so that he can use one hour at the right time and in the right place.”

This hour has come in Kizlyar and Pervomaisky. The country is tired of the threats and bloody deeds of Chechen terrorists. Everyone hoped for victory. Completely forgetting to feed and train the soldier.

Then they shouted: who is to blame? Incompetent generals or talented terrorists? Completely convince yourself that generals and colonels are to blame for all our military troubles.

Who spat on and destroyed the army through lack of money, thoughtless cuts, and insane conversion? Who shouted from the parliamentary stands that the KGB’s “black dog” could not be washed away and therefore had to be killed?

It turns out that they are not to blame, who, under the guise of a holy war against totalitarianism, destroyed the army and special services. But then who? Until we answer this question, the bloody fingers of the Basayevs will continue to hold us by the throat. We cannot see victories in the fight against terror. We will not be able to protect our citizens on our land. After all, the key to these victories is the wise advice of Sun Tzu: feed a soldier for a thousand days...
...And now let's return to Pervomayskoye.

“According to primary information, a group of militants of 300 people, armed with small arms, firing at civilians, took about 350 people hostage in a hospital in Kizlyar, Republic of Dagestan. At the same time, militants attacked the helipad of the city of Kizlyar, as a result of which 2 helicopters and a tanker were destroyed, and a residential building was also captured.

At 11.30, one hundred and twenty employees, led by Major General A.V. Gusev, carrying weapons, special means and protective equipment, and equipment necessary to carry out the tasks of freeing the hostages, left for the Chkalovsky airfield.

12.00. The personnel arrived at the airport and at 13.00 on two Tu-154 planes flew to Makhachkala on a special flight. At 15.30 and 17.00 the planes landed at Makhachkala airport.

At 20.00, personnel arrived in vehicles at the FSB headquarters in Makhachkala, where the head of the Anti-Terrorism Center of the FSB of Russia, Colonel General V.N. Zorin. brought up the current operational situation.

At 01.20 on January 10, upon the arrival of two armored personnel carriers, the convoy began moving to the city of Kizlyar, where it arrived at 5.30.”

What did the Alpha fighters see in Kizlyar? Essentially, they saw the tail of a column with terrorists and hostages who were leaving the city. By this time, the leadership of Dagestan decided to release the Chechen bandits from the city hospital and provide them with unhindered passage to the border of Chechnya. The terrorists promised to release the hostages at the border.

At 6.40 a column of terrorists on 9 buses, 2 KamAZ vehicles and 2 ambulances began moving. The Kizlyar hospital remained mined.

The pursuit began. Initially, it was planned to carry out an operation along the route: to block the convoy and free the hostages. Although, I must admit, there was considerable risk in this option. Some high-ranking officials, deputies of Dagestan, and a convoy of 9 buses were taken hostage. Imagine the death of at least one of the hostages. And it would be inevitable, since there are not one or two terrorists, and they are armed not with guns, but with machine guns, machine guns, and grenade launchers.

Now “superpose” these events on the military, bloody, tense situation in the Caucasus - and you will understand what doubts tormented the leaders of the operation.

In a word, Raduev and his terrorists were not stopped or blocked along the route. He safely reached Pervomaisky, disarmed the checkpoint of the Novosibirsk riot police, who meekly raised their hands, and replenished the number of hostages and his arsenal.

From the official report of group "A"

“During further negotiations, the militant commander Raduev put forward demands for the convoy to be allowed to enter the territory of Chechnya, where he promised to release the hostages. In connection with this, the headquarters of control “A” developed an option for conducting an operation to free the hostages along the route.

The operation plan included blocking the convoy with armored vehicles, destroying the terrorists with sniper fire and blowing up KamAZ vehicles loaded with weapons and ammunition, inducing the terrorists to surrender their weapons and release the hostages.

Employees of Department “A” carried out reconnaissance of the area and selected possible locations for the operation. The unit was assigned a combat mission, a communication and interaction scheme was worked out, and forces and assets were calculated.”

However, the efforts of the commanders and soldiers of the special forces were in vain. Raduev refused the demands put forward, remained in Pervomaisky and began equipping firing positions. I must say that this was a strong move by the bandits. Now the operation was turning from a special one - to free hostages and destroy terrorists - into a military one. Or, rather, to a special, security-military unit. By the way, experts still do not have a consensus on this matter.

The Ministry of Defense considers the operation in Pervomaisky a special operation, and the Federal Security Service considers it a combined arms operation. Who is right and who is wrong here?
Since the hostages were taken prisoner, the terrorists made demands and shot some of the captured, all the components for carrying out an anti-terror operation are present.

But there are not one or two terrorists, or even a dozen or two, but more than three hundred bayonets. They are armed with mortars, grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, machine guns, and sniper rifles. They dug full-profile trenches, created a fortified defense area according to all the rules of military science, with forward and cut-off positions, with communication passages and even blocked cracks. Ask any person who has the slightest understanding of military affairs: what is this? This is nothing more than a motorized rifle battalion on the defensive. And since the battalion dug in not in an open field, but in a fairly large village, for the attackers this was also an assault on a populated area. With all the ensuing consequences.

What are the consequences? They can be very deplorable if a few “ifs” are not fulfilled.

If you don’t carry out artillery preparation and suppress the enemy’s fire weapons, if you don’t create at least a three-fold (during the Great Patriotic War, five- and ten-fold) superiority of forces is created, if you don’t throw unprepared soldiers and officers into the assault, if... However, even this , I think that's enough. In this case, the people who are going to attack will simply die, and the attack will fizzle out.

Which is exactly what happened. By and large, there was no artillery preparation. The shelling from several anti-tank guns, perhaps, looked more like psychological pressure than the actual destruction of firing points.

Wow the pressure... They fired cannons and destroyed the village. Yes, they fired and destroyed. Everyone saw this on TV screens. But the gunfire did little harm to the militants who had buried themselves in the ground. When, after the shelling, the first units moved to attack, the terrorists met them with hurricane fire. The Dagestan riot police immediately lost several people killed and wounded and retreated. According to the laws of tactics, this meant only one thing: the front line of the enemy’s defense was not suppressed, the bandits retained their firepower, and anyone who tried to rush forward would face death.

From the official report of group "A"

“On January 15 at 8.30, the management personnel took up their starting positions. After delivering a fire strike by aviation and helicopters, combat groups consisting of departments, setting up an advanced patrol, in cooperation with the Vityaz unit, entered into battle with Chechen militants and advanced to “square four” on the south-eastern outskirts of the village of Pervomaiskoye.

During the fighting on January 15-18, department employees identified and destroyed militant firing points, provided fire cover for the Ministry of Internal Affairs units, provided medical assistance, and evacuated the wounded from the battlefield.”

There is a lot hidden behind these meager lines of the report. For example, removing from under fire the fighters of the “Vityaz” detachment, who found themselves, in fact, in a fire bag. They were helped by the employees of group “A”.

In war, when the attack stalled, they brought up artillery and again began to “process” the front line. If possible, they called in aviation and carried out a bomb attack. Or there was another option: the advancing troops bypassed the center of resistance and moved forward.

The “federals” did not have such an option, as, indeed, there was no other. They could not resume the artillery barrage, since from the first gun salvos a howl arose: the hostages were being killed.

It turns out that there was only one thing left: to destroy our special forces - “Alpha”, “Vympel”, “Vityaz”, throwing them under the dagger fire of the bandits.

I often think about a terrible dilemma: yes, the state must, must, save the lives of the hostages. But what is the price of this salvation?

Lately, we often look at the problem through the eyes of a captured unarmed person. The bitter, humiliating role of a suicide bomber, and an innocent one at that. But how humiliated and crushed is the professional, powerless in his main task - freeing prisoners and punishing bandits! What could an Alpha fighter do in Pervomaisky? Even the most experienced, first-class fighter? Rise to your full height to attack and die heroically? But this is, to say the least, stupid. Although there is enough of this in war.

Not to die yourself, to save as many hostages as possible, to destroy terrorists - this is the triune task of special units.

The fighters of group “A” successfully know how to storm hijacked buses, planes, and houses in which terrorists have settled, but they are not trained to walk in chains and are not strong in combined arms tactics. It's none of their business. But then whose? Motorized riflemen, artillerymen, tankmen...

“We’ve arrived,” my opponents will say. “Eighteen-year-old unfired, untrained boys were thrown into the fire, while excellent shooters, athletes, experienced fighters who have been in more than one altercation will remain on the sidelines.”

This is where the main question arises, with which I began my thoughts and which underlies all our recent defeats: why are the soldiers of the Russian Armed Forces unfired, untrained, poorly equipped, and even hungry?

All this, by the way, was present in Pervomaisky. And the drivers who made their first march in an infantry fighting vehicle, and many days of cold, and the lack of basic living conditions.

Employees of Group “A” told me how freezing Russian soldiers asked to board their buses at night. The “Alfovites” would have been glad to let us in, but they themselves slept sitting, so to speak, on each other’s laps.

And our television has gone crazy about everything: the cordon, the ring, the blocking. Forgetting that behind every word there are people. How many days and nights without sleep and rest can you “block” militants while sitting in a trench or in a winter field? Considering that the militants were warming themselves at that time in the houses of Pervomaisky.

Now many are asking the question in surprise: how did Raduev escape? And so he escaped, fighting his way through. Because, by and large, there was no ring there. And not just external and internal, but even the usual environment. Well, except for the “islands” of defense, one of which was defended by three dozen army special forces. A handful of fighters who were attacked by Raduev’s gang. They killed the bulk of the terrorists, letting them come almost close. However, remember how many people Raduev had - more than three hundred. So the advantage is almost ten times. These Russian special forces guys are undoubtedly heroes. Almost all of them were wounded, and some were killed.

How it happened, few people know. There weren’t many of them left after that battle—special forces of the 22nd brigade. Some retired, some went to other cities, military districts. After those events, I had difficulty finding several heroes. This is how one of them talks about that terrible battle:
“We have been set up once again. The press then wrote - three rings of encirclement, snipers. This is all nonsense. There were no rings there. The guys from our 22nd Special Forces Brigade took the blow.

The density of the front was 46 people per one and a half kilometers. Imagine! According to all standards, the length for each fighter is exceeded three times. And the weapons were only small arms, light, and two armored personnel carriers.

Our site was the most likely for a breakthrough. Why? Yes, because only here, in the only place, you can cross the Terek. I emphasize, in the only way. There is an oil pipeline across the river, and there is a bridge over it. And it was clear to the fool: there was nowhere else to go.
We suggested blowing up the pipe. No, this is oil, the money is big. People are cheaper. If they blew it up, the “spirits” would have nowhere to go.

By the way, two Chechen KamAZ trucks approached from the other side. They stood and waited. From our side - nothing, the “turntables” did not work on them.

The terrorists had no training as such. They began shelling, and their strike group went on the attack. Having approached the strong point about a hundred meters, the leading bandits lay down and began to apply fire pressure. Meanwhile, the covering group pulled up, and everyone rushed forward en masse.

From a tactical point of view, they acted correctly. They couldn't do it any other way. After the battle, we checked the documents of the dead. Afghans, Jordanians, Syrians. About fifty professional mercenaries.

Each person usually has two duffel bags, one with ammunition and canned food, the other with drugs, syringes, etc. So they attacked in a state of narcotic stupor. They say they are fearless suicide bombers. The bandits were afraid.

Yes, Raduev escaped, but we killed many. About 200 terrorists went into battle. We killed 84 people. Not counting the wounded and prisoners. In the morning I looked at the tracks - about twenty people escaped, no more. Raduev is with them.

The brigade also suffered losses: five were killed, six were wounded. If two or three companies had been planted in our area, the result would have been different. Much was done stupidly. They put a small handful in defense and did not mine the approaches. What did you expect? Maybe someone needed such a breakthrough?”

These are such bitter confessions.

In that battle, the head of intelligence of the 58th Army, Colonel Alexander Stytsina, the commander of the communications company, Captain Konstantin Kozlov, and the medic, Captain Sergei Kosachev, were killed.

In Pervomaisky, Group “A” also lost two of its officers – Majors Andrei Kiselev and Viktor Vorontsov.

Vorontsov was from the border guards, served in a separate control detachment at Sheremetevo-2. First he got to Vympel, and in 1994 he moved to Group A. He distinguished himself during the liberation of hostages in the city of Budennovsk, for which he was awarded the Suvorov medal.

Andrey Kiselev is a graduate of the Ryazan Airborne School. He served in a special forces company of the Airborne Forces communications regiment and was an instructor in airborne training. In 1993 he was accepted into division “A”.

Both officers took part in complex operational activities and combat operations. For the courage and courage shown in rescuing the hostages, Andrei Kiselev and Viktor Vorontsov were awarded the Order of Courage (posthumously).