The KGB of the USSR is a state security agency. functions and structure. From the memoirs of Lieutenant General of the KGB of the USSR

Lieutenant General Vakulchik Valery Pavlovich

In 1985 he graduated from the Kharkov Guards Higher Tank Command School. In 1992 - Higher courses of military counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR. In 2011 - Academy of Management under the President of the Republic of Belarus.

From 1985 to 1991 he served in the Armed Forces. From 1991 to 2008 he served in state security agencies. Since May 2008 - Head of the Operational and Analytical Center under the President of the Republic of Belarus.

Since October 2011 - Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Republic of Belarus.

Appointed Chairman of the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus on November 16, 2012 by Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus No. 511.

Awarded the Order of the Fatherland, III degree, and 11 medals.

Deputy Chairmen of the KGB

First

Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus
Major General Kalach Vladimir Viktorovich

Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus
Major General Tertel Ivan Stanislavovich

Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus
Major General Chernyshev Oleg Anatolyevich

Heads of regional departments and Department of Internal Affairs of the KGB

Head of the KGB department for Minsk and the Minsk region
Colonel Reutsky Dmitry Vasilievich

Head of the KGB department for the Brest region
Colonel Gladyshev Sergey Sergeevich

Head of the KGB department for the Vitebsk region
Colonel Stolyarchuk Oleg Valerievich

Head of the KGB department for the Gomel region
Major General Terebov Sergey Evgenievich

Head of the KGB department for the Grodno region
Major General Alexander Viktorovich Neverovsky

Head of the KGB department for the Mogilev region
Major General Terekhov Alexander Alexandrovich

Head of the KGB military counterintelligence department
Colonel Kuchinsky Konstantin Anatolyevich

WHO HAS IGNORANCE AND WHO HAS IMMORTALITY
“Father! let them go, they don’t know what they are doing..."
From the memoirs of Lieutenant General of the KGB of the USSR Nikolai Sergeevich Leonov about the events of August 1991 in Moscow:
- Nikolai Sergeevich, reflecting on the role of the individual in history, you once told one episode when you were sitting in the KGB building on Lubyanka in August 1991, around which an angry crowd was raging, and you were waiting for it to break in, and That’s when the will of one person manifested itself...
- Such moments happen in the life of any person. And they, as the famous song says, “distribute shame to some, disgrace to others, and immortality to others.” I, of course, remember well this terrible day on August 21, when it became clear that members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested, and at the board of the State Security Committee we learned that Kryuchkov was arrested upon his return from Foros, and the now deceased Shebarshin was appointed temporary chairman of the KGB. At the same time, we saw from the windows that a huge mass of people was gathering on Dzerzhinsky Square. We were talking about 10-15 thousand people, extremely excited. The situation was very dangerous. By the way, from the windows of the upper floors you could see people standing in all the alleys, pouring vodka and alcohol from canisters into paper cups and offering them to everyone who came up.
The committee buildings were barricaded, and the guards kept asking what we would do if the building was stormed? And many speakers openly called for this. Through amplifiers they called: “Let’s go storm the committee, let’s take all the documents.” And now the question was what to do for the State Security Committee. Shebarshin called Yeltsin on the phone. I think it was Burbulis who answered the phone. Shebarshin reported that there is a threat of storming the KGB building, we have several thousand officers in the State Security Committee, bloodshed could occur... And then the head of the border troops, Colonel General Yakov Kalinichenko, stood up and said: “I am responsible for the main directorate of the border troops. Our border guard officers will not allow themselves, like sheep, to have their throats cut in their offices. We will protect the documentation and archives of the border troops by force of arms. We have 200 machines that will now go into operation if needed.” Like this! These words were transmitted, including directly to Yeltsin’s reception. And he immediately arrived, 15 minutes later, spoke in the square and began calling for everything to stop, because he understood what this could escalate into...
- What then happened to the fate of General Kalinichenko?
- He was fired, of course. But he normally remained on his pension, which he was not deprived of. Of the entire KGB leadership, General Plekhanov, who was the head of the 9th Security Directorate, suffered the most. He was punished personally by Gorbachev upon returning from Foros; deprived him of his title, his pension, everything. He was rehabilitated only a week before his death. And Kalinichenko lived like an ordinary pensioner. He did not dirty himself in any way - a real military leader and a worthy person (but by a strange coincidence, he died, again on August 28, 1997, at the age of only 66 years - A.V.).
After the failure of the State Emergency Committee, on August 23, 1991, at the insistence of Yeltsin, the President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev and the presidents of the union republics, during a meeting in the Kremlin, without the consent of the KGB board of the USSR, offered the former first secretary of the Kemerovo regional committee of the CPSU Vadim Bakatin, a foreman by education like Yeltsin, to head the KGB USSR for its reorganization and reform. Later, in his memoirs, the alcoholic and pathological sadist Yeltsin explained the purpose of this appointment: “He was faced with the task of destroying this terrible system of suppression, which had been preserved since Stalin’s times.”
In 1988, having entered the office of the Secretary General as an instructor, Vadim Bakatin emerged as the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and then he suffered... Having settled comfortably in the ministerial chair, enjoying the full support of Gorbachev and Politburo member Ligachev, Bakatin first of all requested the affairs of paid agents of influence, which was used in the development of crime bosses and thieves in law of the Soviet Union. And what? 90% of the secret assistants of the operational staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who ruined their health in cells and in zones, risking their lives, were fired without severance pay and without a pension! Even his work books did not include years of secret work for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Bakatin called the operation to eliminate police agents of influence “Clean Field.” The generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs remained silent - perestroika!
Having become the last chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Bakatin held this position until January 15, 1992. The removal of individual structures from the KGB of the USSR, their reassignment to other departments or giving them independent status began already in August 1991. In his book “Getting Rid of the KGB,” Bakatin defined his own role in the committee as follows: “I was forced not just to start slaughtering cattle, but to exterminate them...”
Bakatin reveled in the role of a temporary worker unique in world history, who headed the most important state institution in order to destroy it. Apparently, the former foreman enjoyed the role of a liquidator of all-Union significance and swaggered around carrying out anti-state, criminal clean-ups. Objective facts testify: Bakatin, with his “reforms,” sharply weakened the activities of the most important law enforcement institutions precisely at the moment when they needed to be strengthened in every possible way. Professional crime immediately took advantage of this, quickly developing into organized crime. The police and intelligence services of Western countries consider working with agents to be one of their main directions, as evidenced by dozens of Western TV series that have filled the Russian screen. But Bakatin destroyed this institution of informants with one stroke of his pen. The number of agents was reduced thousands of times, and their files had to be destroyed by order of the would-be minister. It seems that criminals and foreign intelligence agents are obliged to erect a monument to Bakatin in gold, sprinkled with diamonds...
Unexpected and, most importantly, timely assistance to Bakatin in his savage deeds was provided by the CIA, which developed Operation “Slander” to discredit KGB officers with the help of a stream of anonymous letters. But at first, “white doves” with accusations against the security officers ended up in the letters department of the CPSU Central Committee, because they were addressed to General Secretary Gorbachev. Hasty checks ended in party courts, which passed sweeping verdicts. A massive outflow of professionals from the KGB of the USSR began.
With the sanction of the country's leadership - by decision of Gorbachev - Bakakin, as a sign of “good will”, on December 5, 1991, handed over to the US Ambassador to the USSR Robert Strauss technical documentation related to the installation and use of top-secret listening devices in the new building of the US Embassy in Moscow. The then head of the Federal Security Agency of the RSFSR, Major General Viktor Valentinovich Ivanenko, formerly deputy. the head of the USSR KGB Department for the Tyumen Region and a good friend of my father, recalled this: “He passed the system without consulting with professionals. I only found out about this on the radio. Bakatin later said that he agreed on this step with both presidents (apparently, the USSR and the RSFSR), he had a letter with their visas. But is this the competence of presidents? I think they didn't understand what this could lead to. And for the KGB officers it was a blow. Hand over the holy of holies - the technique of eavesdropping in the embassy, ​​if not of the enemy, then of a competitor! Bakatin made excuses: they say, the Americans knew about it anyway. Nothing like this! A completely new technology was used there. Elements of the sound conducting system were walled up in bricks. We received them from foreign suppliers. It was know-how. They were built by foreign contractors whom the Americans trusted. The KGB recruited contractors."
Strictly speaking, Bakakin and scum like him are not traitors. They are the real enemies, they zealously served the authorities who appointed them and scrupulously carried out all his instructions. It turns out that the enemies were sitting at the very top...
It became known from the American media that until 1995, Bakakin and his family lived in Alabama, on the first floor of the two-story cottage of defector intelligence officer Oleg Kalugin. This character is there under the protection of the American Federal Act "On the Protection of Helpers Promoting the Prosperity of the United States of America." In 1996, on the eve of Boris Yeltsin’s re-election as President of the Russian Federation, the CIA leadership, realizing the complete failure of Bakakin as their consultant on countering Russian intelligence services, decided to “finish the marathon” and invited him to leave the United States.
According to unconfirmed reports, Bakakin, having returned to Moscow, with the help of the already ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev, got an appointment with Yeltsin. Having fallen at the feet of “Tsar Boris,” he begged for indulgence and a 5-room apartment in the “general’s houses” on Frunzenskaya Embankment.
Later he worked as an adviser to the Alfa Cement company.
“U T V E R J D A Y”
Chairman of the KGB of the USSR
lieutenant general
V.V. Bakatin
“____“ September 1991
CONCLUSION
based on materials from the investigation into the role and participation of KGB officials of the USSR
in the events of August 19-21, 1991.
Pursuant to the order of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR No. 140 dated September 1, 1991, a special Commission of the KGB of the USSR conducted an official investigation into the actions of officials of the KGB of the USSR, state security agencies and troops of the KGB of the USSR on the eve of and during the anti-constitutional coup in August of this year.
From the investigation materials it is clear that back in December 1990 Kryuchkov V.A. instructed the former deputy head of the PGU KGB of the USSR V.I. Zhizhin. and assistant to the former first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.F. Grushko. Egorov A.G. carry out the study of possible initial measures to stabilize the situation in the country in the event of a state of emergency. These materials were prepared, but, according to the performers, they were not used until the beginning of August 1991.
With a high degree of certainty it can be assumed that from the end of 1990 to the beginning of August 1991, taking into account the current situation in the country, V.A. Kryuchkov. together with other future members of the State Emergency Committee, they took possible political and other measures to introduce a state of emergency in the USSR by constitutional means. However, having not received the support of the President of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, from the beginning of August 1991, these individuals began to implement specific measures to prepare for the introduction of a state of emergency by illegal means.
From August 7 to 15 Kryuchkov V.A. He repeatedly held meetings with some members of the future State Emergency Committee at the secret facility of the PGU KGB of the USSR, codenamed “ABC”. During the same period of time, Zhizhin V.I. and Egorov A.G. At the direction of Kryuchkov, we corrected the December documents on the problems of introducing a state of emergency in the country. They also with the participation of the then commander of the airborne troops, Lieutenant General P.S. Grachev. prepared for V.A. Kryuchkov data on the possible reaction of the country's population to the introduction of a constitutional state of emergency. The content of these documents was later reflected in official decrees, appeals and orders of the State Emergency Committee. August 17 Zhizhin V.I. participated in the preparation of the abstracts of V.A. Kryuchkov’s speech. on television in the event of a state of emergency.
The materials obtained during the investigation indicate that the participants in the conspiracy at various stages of its implementation assigned the KGB of the USSR a decisive role in carrying out the following tasks:
removing the President of the USSR from power by isolating him;
blocking possible attempts by the President of the RSFSR to resist the activities of the State Emergency Committee;
establishing constant control over the whereabouts of the heads of government bodies of the RSFSR, Moscow, people's deputies of the USSR, RSFSR and Moscow City Council, known for their democratic views, and major public figures with a view to their subsequent detention;
carrying out, together with units of the Soviet Army and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, an assault on the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR with the subsequent internment of persons captured there, including the Russian leadership.
For these tasks, the former chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov, using his official position, attracted separate, including special forces and means of units of the central apparatus and troops of the KGB of the USSR.
As a result, during the period from August 17 to 19, some special forces of the KGB of the USSR and special forces of the PGU KGB of the USSR were put on heightened combat readiness and redeployed to pre-designated places to participate, together with units of the SA and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in measures to ensure the state of emergency.
Through specially created groups, on August 18, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev was isolated in a vacation spot in Foros, and behind the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin. and other persons opposed to the conspirators established external surveillance.
With the participation of forces and means of the KGB of the USSR, other measures were also carried out aimed at creating conditions for the implementation of the conspiracy.
Thus, after the announcement on August 19 of the formation of the State Emergency Committee and the introduction of a state of emergency, the leadership of the Committee took measures aimed at increasing the combat readiness of the KGB bodies and troops and ensuring their participation in the implementation of the decisions and instructions of the State Emergency Committee. Using the forces of the KGB of the USSR, control over the activities of the media was organized, and the reaction of the population in the USSR and foreign circles to events in the USSR was studied.
On August 20, preparations were made for the previously unplanned seizure of the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR by special forces of the KGB of the USSR, using units of the SA, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and special forces of the KGB of the USSR in this operation. At the same time, due to the impossibility of carrying it out without significant casualties on the part of the civilian population, the assault was canceled.
Carrying out general management of the ongoing events, V.A. Kryuchkov For these purposes, he actively used people close to him from among the leadership of the KGB of the USSR, who, according to his instructions, organized the deployment of individual forces and means of units of the Central Apparatus and troops of the KGB of the USSR in specific areas and directions
In particular:
First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Colonel General F.V. Grushko
He was a direct participant in the conspiracy, repeatedly together with V.A. Kryuchkov. attended his meetings with members of the State Emergency Committee. Systematically took part in the work of the so-called. working group of Baklanov O.D. Along with Kryuchkov V.A. gave the most important orders to use the capabilities of the USSR State Security Committee to implement the plans of the conspirators. He directly ordered the preparation of measures to isolate the President of the RSFSR, the involvement of special forces of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR, and the strengthening of security measures at the USSR State Television and Radio.
First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Colonel General Ageev G.E.
He directly supervised the measures to isolate the President of the USSR by turning off communications at the Zarya facility in Foros and reassigning the 79th border detachment and the 5th separate brigade of border patrol ships to the head of the Security Service of the KGB of the USSR, Yu.S. Plekhanov. and his deputy Generalov V.V. On his direct orders, preparations were made for the detention and isolation of the President of the RSFSR and the leadership of the Russian Federation, the blocking of the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in contact with units of the Soviet Army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, its subsequent assault, the disarmament of the persons in it and their internment. He gave orders to form and send groups of operational officers to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to ensure a state of emergency. On August 15, he personally briefed the head of the 12th department of the KGB of the USSR, Major General E.I. Kalgin, who was called back from vacation. and the head of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant General Bedu A.G. on the organization of auditory control in relation to a number of leaders of the USSR and the RSFSR, served by top secret, secret and city telephone communications at their places of work and residence. From August 18, he provided general guidance on the use of the forces and means of the units of the Central Apparatus and the KGB troops of the USSR involved in the implementation of the conspiracy. As a representative of the KGB of the USSR, he took part in a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR on August 19 of this year, supervised the preparation of individual documents on the activities of the bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR in a state of emergency, sent to the localities.
Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Major General V.F. Lebedev
On August 18 he gave instructions to organize external surveillance of a number of leaders of the USSR and the RSFSR, people's deputies of the USSR and the RSFSR, prominent public figures, and the administrative detention of some of them. In particular, on his direct orders, the forces of Directorate “Z” and Directorate 7 of the KGB of the USSR were used to detain Urazhtsev, Gdlyan, Proselkov, Kamchatov. Created an information support group for the state of emergency, supervised the preparation and distribution of documents of the State Emergency Committee, as well as those related to the activities of the media, including in relation to the Ekho Moskvy radio station.
Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant General Petrovas I.K.
He gave the order to bring special forces to combat readiness and sent specific instructions to the bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR, regulating their actions in conditions of increased combat readiness. He provided leadership and coordination of actions with the USSR Ministry of Defense to advance troops towards Moscow, including in preparation for the assault on the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. On his command, 300 personnel of the 103rd Airborne Division were sent to the Baltic states.
Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Head of the Directorate of the KGB of the USSR for Moscow and the Moscow Region, Lieutenant General V.M. Prilukov.
On August 17, he was introduced to V.A. Kryuchkov. with the main idea of ​​the conspiracy and, starting from August 18, took practical measures to participate in its implementation using the forces and means of the KGB. He took personal part in all meetings with the leadership of the KGB of the USSR and the USSR Ministry of Defense, where specific measures were developed for the use of troops, special forces and operational personnel in Moscow, and gave instructions for their implementation to his deputies.
The data obtained by the commission regarding the above-mentioned persons gives reason to believe that even a few days before August 19, they were, to one degree or another, aware of the plans of the conspirators and consciously acted in their interests.
At the same time, from the investigation materials it is clear that a number of heads of units of the Central Apparatus and troops of the KGB of the USSR actively participated in the implementation of their instructions. Moreover, some of them, even before the events began, had information about the direction and goals of the activities they were carrying out, however, before signs of failure of the conspiracy of specific steps appeared no efforts were made to counteract it. During the work of the commission, some of them showed insincerity and tried to diminish their share of responsibility.
In particular:
Head of Directorate “Z” of the KGB of the USSR, Major General V.P. Vorotnikov.
According to the deputy head of Department “Z” Moroz A.V. Vorotnikov informed him that at 18:00 on August 18, a state of emergency would be declared in the country. On the same day, by 16:00, he ensured that Department employees were called and sent together with representatives of the Third Main Directorate on a special flight to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. At the same time, on his instructions, a group of 11 employees of Directorate “3” and 7 employees of the Directorate for State Security in Moscow and the Moscow Region was formed to carry out administrative detentions. (During the briefing, each group member was given blank forms for orders for administrative detention, the implementation of which was envisaged in cooperation with the “NN” brigades).
On August 19, I received from V.F. Lebedev. a list of persons subject to secret surveillance and detention, and handed it over to G.V. Dobrovolsky.
Deputy beginning Directorate “3” of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Dobrovolsky G.V.
As the leader of the above group, he directly supervised the efforts to detain Urazhtsev, Gdlyan, Komchatov and Proselkov.
Head of the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR, Colonel General Kalinichenko I.Ya.
On August 18, he set tasks for the Simferopol border detachment and the Balakovo brigade of border patrol ships to increase attention to protecting the area of ​​the recreation area of ​​the President of the USSR and to subordinate the commanders of these units only to the head of the security service, Lieutenant General Yu.S. Plekhanov. and his deputy, Major General V.V. Generalov. Having learned on August 19 about the introduction of a state of emergency in the country, he gave an order to strengthen the security of the state border, and at a meeting of the leaders of the Main Directorate, he announced an order to transfer troops to a state of high combat readiness. Signed and sent to the troops prepared by the head of the Military-Political Directorate of Border Troops, Lieutenant General N.V. Britvin. an instruction in which it was proposed to widely promote the documents of the State Emergency Committee among all categories of military personnel and to take part in the work of the CHR created locally in the interests of fulfilling official tasks. These documents, also signed by the secretary of the party committee of the border troops, Major General V.G. Antsupov, recommended that measures to implement the decisions of the State Emergency Committee be discussed at party meetings.
Head of the 3rd Main Directorate, Vice Admiral A.V. Zhardetsky
I knew about the existence of the State Emergency Committee and its plans since August 18. He personally took part in meetings with the leadership of the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Defense, where issues of forming forces and means to block the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces and storm it were resolved, and gave instructions to his deputies on their implementation. On his instructions, operational groups were formed at the Main Directorate: for operations at the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces, headed by the Deputy Head of the USSR KGB Office for the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major General Yu.A. Gushchei; to fly to the Baltics under the leadership of his deputy, Major General N.I. Ryzhak; to analyze the operational situation, as well as the reserve group.
Deputy Head of the Third Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Bulygin Yu.E.
He supervised the bodies subordinate to the Main Directorate, gave instructions to the heads of the Special Departments of the KGB of the USSR in the Military Districts that, due to the aggravation of the situation in a number of regions on the eve of the signing of the Union Treaty, authorized representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense were sent there, with whom they should come into contact and receive appropriate explanations for further actions.
Deputy Head of the Third Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Ryzhak N.I.
He exercised general leadership of the operational groups that flew to the Baltic States on August 18, led by him. On August 19-20, on personal initiative, he sent from the special department of the KGB for Prib. Three encrypted telegrams were sent to the military counterintelligence of the Baltic zone and the KGB of the USSR, which expressed actual support for the actions of the State Emergency Committee, and proposals were made to introduce a state of emergency in the Baltic states.
Deputy Head of the USSR KGB for Moscow and the Moscow Region, Colonel Karabanov E.P.
He personally took part in a meeting with the leadership of the KGB of the USSR and in the USSR Ministry of Defense when discussing issues of the storming of the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces, the administrative detention of a number of people there, directly supervised the development of a plan to ensure the state of emergency in Moscow, and personally gave orders for the planning and preparation of measures on the participation of the KGB in the assault.
Deputy Head of the KGB for Moscow and Moscow Region, Major General Kucherov V.K.
From August 19, he headed the operational headquarters created at the KGB. On his instructions, an encrypted telegram was sent to the city district authorities on August 19 “about clarifying the availability of a printing base, cable television and taking control of their work.” Sent groups of employees of the “Z” service of the KGB to deliver notifications to publishing houses about the closure of publication of some central, Moscow city and regional publications. Gave instructions to the head of the department of Service “Z” Ryazanov A.I. take part in a discussion with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.F. Lebedev. the issue of localizing the activities of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”, assigning several employees of the KGB for this purpose. On the morning of August 19, he sent 7 people to the disposal of the deputy head of Directorate “Z” of the KGB of the USSR G.V. Dobrovolsky. to participate in the administrative detention of some people's deputies.
Deputy Head of the KGB for Moscow and Moscow Region, Major General Korsak A.B.
As deputy head of the operational headquarters, he coordinated actions with the airborne troops to blockade the Mossovet, the Ostankino television center, the State Bank and the Gokhran of the USSR.
He gave instructions to issue service weapons to 7 employees of the KGB. He personally took part in meetings with the leadership of the KGB of the USSR and the USSR Ministry of Defense, at which issues of military operations in the area of ​​the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces were discussed. He gave the necessary orders for the preparation of KGB officers to participate in the storming of the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces. Despite the decisive refusal of the heads of the operational units of the KGB to participate in this action, he gave instructions to continue the necessary preparations for the assault. Generals Alferov, Korsak, Kucherov did not communicate to the department employees the documents received through liaison officers, accepted by the Russian and Moscow leadership, and until the evening of August 20, they did not try to give a fundamental assessment of the actions of the State Emergency Committee.
Head of the 7th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant General Raschepov E.M.
During the period of preparation and introduction of a state of emergency, he directly participated in the organization of activities for secret surveillance of the heads of government bodies of the RSFSR, Moscow, people's deputies of the USSR, RSFSR and the Moscow City Council, and gave instructions to his subordinates for their participation in the administrative detention of four of them. On August 18 at 2 p.m., he personally handed over lists of Soviet citizens to a group of heads of external intelligence units and gave instructions to urgently place them under surveillance. There were 63 people on the lists, including Rutskoy, Khasbulatov, Burbulis, Popov, Luzhkov, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Shakhrai, Stankevich.
On August 17, before the return of the President of the RSFSR from Almaty, together with the head of group “A” of the 7th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General V.F. Karpukhin. studied the conditions for carrying out measures for the possible detention of B.N. Yeltsin. at the Chkalovsky airport. For these purposes, I personally went to the site, set the task of preparing 25-30 employees of group “A” for this and coordinating actions with the USSR Ministry of Defense. The next day, similar events were carried out at the Sosenki-4 and Arkhangelskoye-2 complexes. On the special instructions of Raschepov E.M. On August 18, external surveillance forces recorded the arrival of B.N. Yeltsin. to Vnukovo airport and his arrival at the dacha in the Arkhangelskoye-2 village.
In addition, Raschepov E.M. instructions were given to prepare the necessary forces to organize external surveillance of V.V. Bakatin, but work on it should not begin until further notice.
Commander of Group “A” of the 7th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Karpukhin V.F.
By orders of V.A. Kryuchkov and Grushko V.F., Ageev and Raschepov, on August 17 and 18, brought the group’s personnel into combat readiness, prepared special measures against the President of the RSFSR, carried out reconnaissance at the Chkalovsky airport, in the Sosenki and Arkhangelskoye dacha complexes. On his command, group “A” of 60 people moved on August 19 to the Arkhangelskoye area. At the direction of Ageev, he prepared the assault by group “A” together with units of the Soviet Army and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs of the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces. Taking into account the current situation around the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces, the negative attitude of the group’s personnel and attached units, he reported to Ageev that the operation was inappropriate.
Head of the 12th Department of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Kalgin E.I.
On the personal instructions of V.A. Kryuchkov, having received instructions from G.E. Ageev. in violation of the laws of the USSR and current regulations, he gave orders to the first deputy head of the 12th department, Major General G.V. Guskov. on the organization of technical execution of control in relation to the leaders of the USSR and Russia. The auditory control was carried out from August 18 to 21, the incoming information was orally reported to Kalgin, and, according to his instructions, partially stated in writing without appropriate recording. Kalgin introduced Kryuchkov to the materials received, and in his absence Ageev. Kalgin and his deputies, Generals Guskov, Smirnova, Colonels Kutny, Abakumov, Fetisov, behaved insincerely during the official investigation; they reported truthful information only upon presentation of facts incriminating them of illegal actions.
Head of the Government Communications Department of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant General Beda A.G.
On the personal instructions of Kryuchkov, on August 15-17, he organized the supply of government communication lines to the 12th department of the KGB of the USSR for subscribers - the leaders of the USSR and Russia. On August 15, at the direction of Ageev, he sent, as part of the operational group of the USSR KGB Security Service that flew to Crimea, UPS officers headed by his deputy, Major General A.S. Glushchenko, subordinating him to the head of the USSR KGB Security Service. At the direction of Plekhanov Yu.S. August 18 at 16.30 Glushchenko A.S. gave the order to the head of the 21st department of the Department of the Criminal Investigation Department of the KGB of the USSR S.V. Parusnikov. turn off all types of communications at the dacha of the President of the USSR in Foros (Object “Zarya”). At the same time, from 18.00 on August 18 to 9.00 on August 22, the Security Service of the KGB of the USSR cut off communications with the border troops units guarding the external perimeter of the dacha of the President of the USSR. On August 19, by order of V.A. Kryuchkov. gave instructions to turn off the government long-distance communication devices of Yeltsin B.N., Silaev I.S., Burbulis G.E.
Head of the Legal Department with Arbitration of the KGB of the USSR, Major General of Justice Alekseev V.I.
Together with the senior consultant of the Group of Consultants under the Chairmen of the KGB of the USSR Sidorenko A.G. and the head of the secretariat of the KGB of the USSR Sidak V.A. On August 20, we prepared a draft of Yanaev’s Decree “On Decrees of the President of the RSFSR Nos. 59,61 and 63 of August 19, 1991.” He was involved by the leadership of the KGB in the legal assessment and consultations of some other regulatory documents.
Regarding the role of other officials of the Central Apparatus and KGB troops in the preparation and participation in the events of August 19-21, it should be noted that they learned about their beginning from media reports or upon arrival at the USSR KGB on the morning of August 19. Subsequently, they acted in strict accordance and within the framework of their functional responsibilities. The work of the units they headed was carried out as usual, with the exception of the introduction of increased duty of personnel and the implementation of individual instructions from the leadership of the KGB of the USSR.
BALLAD ABOUT THE MONUMENT
I
The following story is told in the mountains:
War came to the North Caucasus,
And a statue with an outstretched hand
The enemy saw it over the foamy river.
- Put away! - said the German general
And he ordered the bronze to be melted down.
And then the statue lay on the ground.
And in the evening, when the darkness thickened,
German machine gunners convoy
She was taken away in a truck.
II
That night a storm raged on the slopes,
In the gorges of the mountains hiding partisans.
And where there was a turn in the road,
The machine gun spoke in Russian.
And the echo echoed him in the mountains
In all guttural mountain languages.
And the heights lit up with shots:
In the gorges of the mountains they fought for Lenin.
And Lenin himself - from a truck -
I watched this partisan battle.
III
People in the town woke up in the morning,
And the children were the first to go to the river.
They went to look at the pedestal
Where Lenin stood for so many years and winters.
And they see: Lenin is safe and sound
And he also extends his hand to them.
As before, he extends his hand to them
And he says: “Friends, we will win!”
He speaks - or the river roars,
Running here from afar...

1 Main Directorate (intelligence), 2 Main Directorate (counterintelligence), 3 Main Directorate (military counterintelligence), 4 Directorate (anti-Soviet underground, nationalist formations and hostile elements)...

• February 1954 - Decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee of February 8, 1954 on the separation of state security agencies from the Ministry of Internal Affairs
• March 1954 - Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council of March 13, 1954 on the formation of the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers

The main tasks of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1954):

"a) conducting intelligence work in capitalist countries;

b) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorism and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR;

c) the fight against enemy activities of all kinds of anti-Soviet elements within the USSR;

d) counterintelligence work in the Soviet Army and Navy;

e) organization of encryption and decryption business in the country;

f) protection of party and government leaders"

KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (March 1954):

1 Main Directorate (intelligence), 2 Main Directorate (counterintelligence), 3 Main Directorate (military counterintelligence), 4 Directorate (anti-Soviet underground, nationalist formations and hostile elements), 5 Directorate (counterintelligence at particularly important government facilities), 6 Directorate (counterintelligence in transport), 7 directorate (surveillance), 8 Main directorate (cryptography), 9 directorate (protection of party and government leaders), 10 (Department of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin), Personnel Directorate, Investigation Department, 1 special department (counterintelligence in the nuclear industry) , 2 special department (use of operational equipment), 3 special department (documents), 4 special department (radio counterintelligence), 5 special department (production of operational equipment), department " WITH"(government communications), Accounting and Archives Department (AAD), Prison Department, Economic Management, Financial Planning Department, Accounting, Mobilization Department, Department of Educational Institutions, Secretariat, Inspection.

"Regulations on the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR"approved by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on December 23, 1958 and introduced by the Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of December 23, 1958. Functions of the KGB:

"a) intelligence work in capitalist countries;

b) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorism and other subversive activities;

c) combating the hostile activities of anti-Soviet and nationalist elements;

d) counterintelligence work in the SA, Navy, Civil Air Fleet, in the PV and the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;

e) counterintelligence work at special facilities, especially important industrial facilities and transport;

f) protection of state borders;

g) protection of party and government leaders;

h) organization and provision of government communications;

i) organization of radio counterintelligence work"

KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (March 1960):

1 Main Directorate, 2 Main Directorate, 3 Directorate, 7 Directorate, 8 Main Directorate, 9 Directorate, Operational and Technical Directorate (OTU), Personnel Directorate, Investigation Department, Accounting and Archives Department (UAO), Main Directorate of Border Troops (GUPV) , Economic Administration (HOZU), Government Communications Department (GCC), Financial Planning Department, Mobilization Department, Secretariat, Group under the Chairman

KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (December 1967):

1 Main Directorate, 2 Main Directorate, 3 Directorate, 5 Directorate, 7 Directorate, 8 Main Directorate, 9 Directorate, Operational and Technical Directorate (OTU), Personnel Directorate, Investigation Department, 10 Department (accounting and archiving), 11 Department, 12 Department (hearing control of premises and telephones), Main Directorate of Border Troops (GUPV), Economic Department (HOZU), Government Communications Department (GCC), Financial and Planning Department, Mobilization Department, Secretariat, Inspectorate under the Chairman, Group of Consultants under the Chairman

The structure of the KGB, given by Gordievsky:

CHAPTERS

• First (reconnaissance)
• Second (internal security and counterintelligence)
• Border troops
• Eighth (communications and encryption service)

MANAGEMENT

• Third (military counterintelligence)
• Fifth (political, ideological issues)
• Sixth (economic counterintelligence and industrial security)
• Seventh (surveillance)
• Ninth Directorate (Government Security)
• Operational and technical (OTU)
• Fifteenth (security of state facilities)
• Sixteenth (radio interception and electronic intelligence)
• Construction of military facilities

DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES

• investigation Department
• Government Communications
• KGB Higher School
• Sixth department (interception and clarification of correspondence)
• Twelfth Department (audition)

Structure of the First Main Directorate of the KGB - foreign intelligence ()

MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES

• Management R (operational planning and analysis)
• Directorate K (counterintelligence)
• Directorate C (illegals)
• Directorate T (scientific and technical intelligence)
• Directorate of Intelligence Information (Analysis and Assessment)
• Department of the Republic of Tatarstan (operations on the territory of the USSR)
• Labor protection management (operational and technical)
• Management I (computer service)
• Service A (disinformation, covert operations)
• Service R (radio communications)
• Service A of the Eighth Main Directorate of the KGB PGU (encryption services)
• Electronic intelligence - RP direction

Chairmen of the KGB

• Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov (October 1988 - August 1991)
• Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov (December 1982 - October 1988)
• Vitaly Vasilievich Fedorchuk (May - December 1982)
• Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov (May 1967 - May 1982)

KGB of the USSR. 1954–1991 Secrets of the death of the Great Power Oleg Maksimovich Khlobustov

The last chairman of the KGB of the USSR

The last chairman of the KGB of the USSR

Actually last Chairman of the KGB of the USSR in 1988–1991 years became Vladimir Alexandrovich Kryuchkov.

During the 23 months of Kryuchkov’s tenure as chairman of the KGB of the USSR, many dramatic events occurred in the history of our country, the apotheosis of which was the death of the Great Power - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Like Chebrikov and Fedorchuk, Kryuchkov was a leader Andropov school, but, apparently, did not possess his intellectual, business and strong-willed qualities.

The head of the PGU Kryuchkov was appointed to the position of chairman of the KGB in connection with the election of V.M. Chebrikova Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee by a joint resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on October 1, 1988.

According to established tradition, even earlier, on September 20, 1989, V.A. Kryuchkov was also elected a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee - Politburo of the Central Committee and personally General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev remained the main recipients of information from the KGB of the USSR.

In accordance with the ongoing reforms of government and administrative bodies, after the formation of the new convocation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the appointments of Union ministers, including chairmen of state committees and other departments, were made by him in July 1989.

Statement of V.A. Kryuchkov as Chairman of the KGB of the USSR - his candidacy was supported and proposed for approval by the Committee on Defense and State Security of the USSR - at a meeting of the Supreme Council was accompanied by his report on the main directions and tasks of the activities of state security agencies. This report also became a kind of report on the work of the KGB before the highest legislative body of the country, which marked the beginning of parliamentary control over the state of state security of the country.

It should be especially emphasized that for a number of reasons, which will be discussed below, in Soviet society at the end of the 80s of the last century there was an inadequate understanding of the history, purpose and content of the activities of domestic state security bodies, which was reflected directly in speeches of KGB leaders, as well as in questions asked to them in various audiences.

For objective coverage of the entire range of problems of ensuring state security, as national security of the USSR was then called, the leadership of the State Security Committee decided to more actively, regularly and systematically inform the population about the activities of the KGB, explaining both the features of the current situation in the country and in the world, and the tasks the solution of which is entrusted to the KGB, and the contribution of the security agencies to the solution of various problems facing the state.

As noted in the editorial preface to the collection "KGB facing the people"(M., 1990), the content and essence of the activities of the security agencies in the conditions of perestroika were actively discussed not only in the KGB groups - and this is the absolute truth, I testify to this as an eyewitness and contemporary - but also by people's deputies, executive authorities, representatives of various public organizations and the media.

This collection of interviews and speeches by the chairman of the KGB of the USSR and his deputies was prepared to objectively inform the people's deputies of the USSR and the RSFSR on the entire range of issues of the activities of the KGB bodies, and then it was planned to publish it in mass circulation. The last project was not destined to come true. Due to its small circulation of 1 thousand copies and the targeted nature of the publication, this collection, which has now become a bibliographic rarity, is still a valuable source of information for historians today about the activities of the KGB bodies in 1985–1991.

However, let us immediately make a reservation that all the speeches of V.A. included in this collection. Kryuchkov were later included in his book “Without a Statute of Limitations” (M., 2006).

It should also be noted that great importance for truthful and objective coverage of the activities of security agencies there was also adoption and implementation decision of the KGB Board of April 21, 1989 “On the development of transparency in the activities of the bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR.”

This decision was dictated both by the growing interest of the population in the activities of state security agencies, and as a consequence of the change in the information situation in the country, as well as attempts inspired from abroad to discredit the KGB bodies. The desire to discredit state security agencies has always been inherent in ideological sabotage against the USSR, because foreign political strategists understood perfectly well that undermining the population’s trust in the KGB, weakening the state structure designed to protect the public and state interests of the country, would create more favorable conditions for the activities of its geopolitical competitors , implementation of their plans and intentions.

As rightly noted by the deputy head of the VGU KGB of the USSR, General A.A. Fabrichnikov, “glasnost in all its manifestations and various combinations with forms, methods and techniques of secret warfare was previously and is today in the arsenal of all counterintelligence services in the world.” Emphasizing that “there is every reason to consider Glasnost as one of the most important socio-political principles of the activities of Soviet counterintelligence, which, along with other socio-political principles, ensures high efficiency of counterintelligence activities.”

On December 1, 1987, the issue of expanding openness in the activities of the KGB was considered at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

In the previous meeting KGB note to the CPSU Central Committee dated November 24, 1987, in particular, it was noted:

“The State Security Committee of the USSR, in restructuring its activities, pays great attention to measures aimed at increasing the role of the KGB in implementing the party’s goals for the comprehensive development of socialist democracy. Of great importance in this process are the expansion of openness in matters of ensuring the state security of Russia, a deep understanding among broad circles of the Soviet public of the goals and objectives of the KGB, and the active participation of workers in protecting against the subversive machinations of opponents of the revolutionary process of perestroika.

The work of the KGB agencies to uncover the aspirations and suppress hostile actions of the enemy is quite noticeably reflected in the media. However... the demands of today put before the State Security Committee the task of further expanding transparency in its activities.

In this regard, it was considered advisable to implement a number of additional measures, which, in the opinion of the KGB of the USSR, would contribute to expanding transparency in the activities of the KGB bodies, strengthening their ties with workers and would have important preventive and preventive significance.”

The note also noted that “Glasnost is one of the main forms of active communication between state security agencies and workers. But today Our fellow citizens do not know everything they should know about state security agencies. It happens that information from the KGB does not keep up with events, sometimes sweeping criticism and sometimes malicious attacks against the KGB go unanswered.

...specific measures to promote transparency in activities The KGB of the USSR is aimed at creating a system of constant and comprehensive information to society, which is one of the defining guarantees of strengthening ties with workers, compliance with socialist legality, and constitutional obligations.

Today, in covering the activities of the State Security Committee, there are essentially no taboo topics, with the exception of quite understandable restrictions arising from the requirements of secrecy.

... topical issues are increasingly reflected in the media - the participation of the KGB in the fight against organized crime, interaction in this matter with the prosecutor's office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and customs officials.

Glasnost concerns not only the present, but also the past, it requires its objective analysis, further measures to eliminate the consequences of violations of Leninist principles in the activities of the security agencies during the period of the cult of personalities...”

The intensification of this area of ​​activity led not only to the reorganization of the Press Bureau of the KGB of the USSR, on the basis of which the Center for Public Relations (CPR) was formed, but also prompted the search and approval of qualitatively new approaches to interaction with the media.

The practice of the CSO bodies began to include holding a press conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Press Agency "Novosti" (APN), meetings with foreign correspondents.

It is also becoming traditional for territorial KGB departments to conduct interviews with their leaders, round table meetings, and broadcast “live” on radio and television.

The museums and rooms of the glory of the KGB departments opened their doors to visitors____.

In addition, publications of declassified documents also began to appear, including those from the KGB of the USSR, articles, collections, studies and documentary journalistic publications prepared on their basis, which became very numerous in 1988–1990. In particular, they were regularly published in the socio-political bulletin “Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU”, in the newspapers “Pravda”, “Glasnost”, “Military Historical Journal” and other publications.

A significant contribution to the expansion of relations between journalists and representatives of the KGB bodies was made by the former head of the press service of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region, and subsequently of the Public Relations Center (CSR) of the MB-FSK-FSB, now retired Major General A.G. Mikhailov, as well as Lieutenant General A.A., who replaced him. Zdanovich.

Speech by V.A. Kryuchkov at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 14, 1989 was broadcast on Central Television, and later his transcript was published in the newspaper “Soviet Russia”, as a result of which a multimillion-dollar audience and readership in our country could become acquainted with him.

In his report to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kryuchkov also described the work KGB foreign intelligence:“The main task of intelligence activities is to contribute in every possible way to ensuring peace, strengthening the security of the Soviet state, its foreign policy positions and interests.”

Somewhat later, specifying the activities of the PGU, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR in an interview with a correspondent of the weekly newspaper “Novoe Vremya” noted:

“The very fact that we are participating in the development of certain foreign policy problems requires us to be responsible and indicates that we are taken into account. In general, I must say that there is no country where intelligence is not taken into account. Sometimes we initiate certain steps in the field of foreign policy. However, in my opinion, in this area we have one organization - a trendsetter - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs...

The task of intelligence is to provide the country’s leaders with objective information so that they can make the best decision.”

V.A. Kryuchkov also clarified that the KGB “must receive and communicate (to senior authorities - O.Kh.) objective information, I emphasize - objective, if possible proactive” (“Novoye Vremya”, 1989, No. 32).

At that time, Soviet intelligence already knew that October 30, 1988 US CIA Director W. Webster emphasized that “The work carried out against the USSR will remain the main focus of the CIA’s activities in collecting and analyzing information in the 90s. The Soviet Union's military capabilities, efforts to expand its global influence, and active intelligence activities continue to pose a threat to the security of the United States." And regarding “perestroika,” he noted that the United States “must pay closer attention to the processes and political struggle in the Soviet Union.”

To implement this task, a special Perestroika Progress Center was created in the US intelligence community in 1989, which included representatives of the CIA, DIA and the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research.

Intelligence reports on the situation in the USSR prepared by the Center were reported daily personally to President George W. Bush and other members of the US National Security Council.

At the direction of George W. Bush, annual appropriations for human intelligence alone have increased by more than 20% since 1989.

It is clear that achieve precisely proactive information was not always possible. Because the KGB, like any other intelligence agency in the world, worked in a confrontation with a real and strong enemy represented by the intelligence coalition of NATO countries, seeking to both hide and disguise their true goals and intentions, and conduct special disinformation and diversionary campaigns and activities.

These circumstances explain the occurrences failures and failures in the activities of the intelligence services, including the KGB of the USSR.

It seems interesting to compare Soviet and American conceptual views on the purpose and role of intelligence in the mechanism of government.

In this regard, we note that in a keynote speech in the US Congress, Robert Gates, who became director of the CIA in the George W. Bush administration, stated that “Intelligence is becoming an increasingly central factor in the formation of American foreign policy... The most important thing is that the role of intelligence is increasing as the only organization in the American administration that looks forward, one might say, “scouts the future.” Intelligence is far ahead of other US agencies in assessing and identifying the problems that the US will face in 5-10 years and even in the 21st century.”

In a speech at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, candidate for the post of chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov emphasized that “one of the main activities of the state security agencies is counterintelligence, that is, the protection of our interests and secrets.”

The term “national interests” itself had not yet been uttered, but it was specifically about protecting interests of the Soviet Union, the interests of the peoples inhabiting it, in Western political terminology - the national interests of the country.

And later, answering numerous questions from deputies - a total of 96 questions were asked to him during the meeting - V.A. Kryuchkov added:

What is happening in our country is of great interest to the special services of Western countries, some other countries, and especially all kinds of organizations that often take anti-socialist, anti-Soviet positions. We feel this from the propaganda, from the arrival of their emissaries here, from the literature that they bring here. There is another direction, the so-called Islamic fundamentalist. This is a very dangerous thing, given the fanaticism and indiscriminateness in methods and means. It seems that this is a question of state security agencies, and legal authorities, and our organizations engaged in propaganda work...

Of course, those on the other side are not inactive, they are trying to actively influence the state of affairs in our country. But, comrades, let's look for reasons first of all in our own home, in ourselves. Look for reasons within ourselves, where we once did something wrong... I, as the chairman of the KGB, as a former intelligence chief, can say that they are not inactive there. We see it. It seems to them that the Soviet Union, when it looks like a powerful factor, is one situation that is unfavorable for them. And the Soviet Union as a weakened factor is another situation that is beneficial for them. Although there are sober people there who understand that this is far from true.”

As the events of subsequent years showed, these words turned out to be prophetic in the full sense of the word.

Such a detailed reproduction of some of the speeches of that a time already far from us, in our opinion, it is necessary in order to show what the KGB of the USSR knew at that time, what it informed the political leadership of the country about, what decisions were made based on this information.

Because, as we know, history tends to repeat itself...

At the same meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in July 1989, Kryuchkov was also first stated that The KGB is fighting terrorism, including international terrorism. Although, until the mid-90s, this topic seemed irrelevant not only to the general audience, but also to the majority of political figures of that era.

But the security officers already then really realized, felt this threat and were actively preparing to repel it, and It is not their fault that in less than 15 months the KGB will fall victim to political intrigue and confrontation. And the victims of these hidden intrigues and political confrontations will be the security and population of our Motherland, its genuine rights and freedoms, and national interests.

On the issue of the essence of perestroika in the activities of state security agencies KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov explained:

We believe that qualitatively new principles of the relationship between state and security should be formulated and implemented. It is not the interests of society and the state that should adapt to the activities of state security agencies and their special services, but, on the contrary, the KGB bodies and their services must strictly submit to the interests of society and the state and proceed from them.

In the course of answering numerous questions from deputies, Kryuchkov explained that the scope of activity of state security bodies is determined, in particular, by the criminal and criminal procedural legislation of the USSR and union republics - Article 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR of 1960 and the corresponding articles of the criminal procedural codes of the union republics of the USSR .

Let us immediately emphasize that, in connection with the reorganization of the public administration system in the USSR in 1989, the right to control the activities of the KGB, in addition to the CPSU Central Committee, was also granted to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, both directly and through its Committee on Defense and State Security , as well as the Constitutional Oversight Committee, which were truly extremely important legal innovations.

Speaking about the priorities, main directions and principles of restructuring in the work of state security agencies, V.A. Kryuchkov defined them as Law, Truth and Glasnost.

The first of them was understood as improving the entire legal framework for both ensuring the security of the country and the activities of the KGB of the USSR.

Indeed, the absence of laws on counterintelligence and operational investigative activities made the situation stalemate and acutely raised the question of the legislative basis for the work of all law enforcement agencies, including the KGB.

The Committee on Defense and State Security of the USSR Armed Forces, together with the KGB, the Prosecutor General's Office and other government bodies, began work on preparing draft laws “On State Security”, “On Crimes against the State”, and on KGB bodies.

At the same time, it was assumed that the latter would reveal questions about the principles of activity, tasks and functions of the KGB, the place of the State Security Committee in the comprehensive security system of the Soviet Union, since many other ministries and departments took part in its implementation, relations with other government agencies and public organizations, as well as the rights and obligations of their employees, the procedure for appealing certain of their actions.

These plans were implemented in Law “On State Security Bodies in the USSR”, adopted by the Supreme Council on May 16, 1991.

On the issue of the participation of KGB bodies in the rehabilitation of victims of Stalinist repressions, which we will talk about in more detail later, the KGB chairman said:

This work means the need and even the need for a new generation of security officers, not involved in the tragic period of the past, to go through the pain of atrocities and losses suffered by the people, and even by the state security agencies themselves, to politically and emotionally survive the pain in order to never allow anything like this in the future.

Kryuchkov emphasized that “the most important guarantee against arbitrariness and violation of the legitimate rights and interests of citizens should be the implementation of the principles of democracy and transparency in all activities of state security agencies. Soviet people have the right to know about the activities and nature of the work of the KGB bodies. The authorities themselves are also interested in this, since this will help form an objective idea of ​​state security authorities, their duties, responsibilities and rights.

It is important to make permanent and effective connections between state security agencies and the public and labor collectives. In this case, you can count on the support of workers in solving problems of ensuring state security... This can only be done together with the people, relying on the public on a daily basis...”

The KGB chairman also pointed out to the people's deputies of the USSR the shortcomings in the work of his subordinates:

We often we don't deliver on time We have a rather sharp, principled assessment of the difficult situations that are brewing, but we do not show integrity and persistence in raising issues with local and even central authorities. They have an effect and are purely psychological barrier, timidity caused by a number of political, social events and circumstances... inability to discern negative, alarming aspects in the rapidly developing generally constructive processes. It is especially difficult in cases where we are talking about conflict situations on an interethnic basis when mass unrest occurs...

It should be noted that it was in the late 80s that mass unrest, including with the use of weapons, arose in a number of regions of the USSR. And it is in these conflicts that were not resolved in time that the reasons for many of the bloody clashes of 1991–1994 are rooted, which already took the form of armed conflicts of a non-international nature (internal armed conflicts, according to internationally accepted terminology), in the newly independent states - the former Union republics of the USSR.

The KGB leaders were asked many questions about the 5th Directorate.

Describing the activities of the 5th Directorate, the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov in an interview with the Izvestia newspaper on October 26, 1989, for the first time officially admitted that the state security agencies in the 70s - 80s identified and prevented more than 1,500 persons who were carrying out terrorist activities. intentions.

In the summer of 1989, in connection with changes occurring in the country, as well as changes in criminal legislation, a decision was made to abolish the 5th Directorate and create the USSR KGB Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System (Directorate “3”).

Legislative changes, in particular, concerned the disposition of Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of September 11, 1989, the legal norm on criminal liability for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda was abolished. Instead, in the same article 70 of the Criminal Code there was criminal liability has been established for calls for a violent change in the constitutional order.

In a note by the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov in the CPSU Central Committee to justify the need to abolish the 5th Directorate and create a new division on August 4, 1989, it was emphasized:

“In the conditions of the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society, the expansion of democratization and openness, special services of capitalist countries and associated foreign anti-Soviet centers and other organizations are transferring their subversive activities against the USSR to a new strategic and tactical platform.

In its goals and forms, it takes on the character of a struggle against the constitutional foundations of the USSR.

By reviving nationalism, chauvinism, and clericalism, Western intelligence services and anti-Soviet organizations are actively trying to inspire hotbeds of social tension, anti-Soviet manifestations and mass unrest, and incite hostile elements to actions aimed at the violent overthrow of Soviet power.

With particular persistence, they strive to form legal and illegal groups of an anti-constitutional nature, directly supervise them, provide material and ideological support, and incite extremist actions.”

At the same time, antisocial elements, “using some of the amateur formations brought to life by the political activity of citizens, hiding behind the slogans of democratization and renewal of Soviet society, they are working for anti-constitutional purposes to create structures opposition to the CPSU and other organizational formations. Their subversive activities using nationalism and chauvinism intensified especially sharply. In a number of places, groups and movements that have arisen on this basis openly preach violent methods of changing the social and state system of the USSR, organize mass riots, commit dangerous extremist actions, terrorist manifestations, and other acts of violence against officials and citizens, including the use of weapons.

The stated circumstances urgently require strengthening of work on the proper protection of the constitutional system of the union Soviet state, protecting Soviet society from the subversive activities of Western intelligence services, foreign anti-Soviet organizations and their like-minded people within the country...

In this regard, the operational activities of the newly created counterintelligence department are intended to be focused on solving the following main tasks:

Failure of the plans of special services of capitalist countries to create and use organizational anti-socialist groups for anti-constitutional purposes;

Suppressing the criminal activities of anti-socialist elements trying to violently overthrow Soviet power;

Prevention and suppression of terrorist acts;

Prevention and localization of mass riots and other illegal group actions of an extremist nature;

Identifying and neutralizing anti-Soviet nationalist manifestations.”

According to the technology that existed at that time for making organizational and personnel decisions, the note of the KGB chairman on August 11 was considered by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and, based on its results, the draft corresponding Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (N 634–143 of August 13, 1989) was approved.

On this legal basis On August 29, 1989, order N00124 of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR was issued on the abolition of 5 management and education management “3” (Protection of the constitutional order).

As noted on this occasion by the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Army General F.D. Bobkov, “it may seem strange, but for the first time in the entire history of the country, the state security agencies have been publicly and clearly entrusted with the task of protecting the constitutional order.” Listing the above tasks of the new department, F.D. Bobkov also mentioned the fight against organized crime. (“Motherland”, 1989, N 11).

E.F. was appointed head of Directorate “3” of the KGB of the USSR. Ivanov, and on January 30, 1990 he was replaced by V.P. Vorotnikov. Breaking the chronological order of presentation, we note that on September 25, 1991, by order of V.V. Bakatin, who became the chairman of the KGB, Vorotnikov was relieved of his post, and soon this department itself was liquidated.

Subsequently, the actual legal successors of Directorate “3” were first the Department for Combating Terrorism (UBT) of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation (1992–1993), and then the Department for the Protection of the Constitutional System and Combating Terrorism of the FSB of Russia.

But still, retrospectively assessing the activities of Directorate “3” of the KGB of the USSR from the standpoint of today, it should be objectively recognized that it did not fulfill many of the tasks assigned to it...

What, however, is the fault not only of its employees and leaders, but also, first of all, of the country’s political leadership, which showed inconsistency and indecisiveness both in protecting the Constitution of the country and upholding officially declared political course.

And also already decision taken at that time, but not officially declared M.S. Gorbachev about a different concept for the restructuring of Soviet society.

In our opinion, an important recognition of the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union is contained in the article of the former first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR F.D. Bobkov, published in January 2005 in the magazine “Life of Nationalities”.

In it he emphasized: "during the height of the Cold War" it was like war were not perceived. About her spoke and wrote only a limited circle of party lecturers, and leaders in their reports quoted the necessary excerpts for propaganda purposes. At the same time, no one warned about the danger of the Cold War for the state.

The KGB understood this danger and tried to the best of their ability not only to help the country’s leadership realize it, but also sought to convey the threat posed by the Cold War to the general public."

And again, turning to the reasons for the final collapse of the USSR, I will cite the opinion of F.D. on this matter. Bobkova:

“The leaders reveled or enjoyed power, discarding all information about threats from the outside, about processes in the country that could sow distrust in the authorities and disrupt stability in the state. Not only state leaders were affected by the “invincibility” virus. The disease has struck the community."

Genuine The cause of the collapse of the USSR was the notorious “human factor” - incompetence the then leadership of the country - which turned into a fatal “mistake of the crew” and the “ship’s captain.”

As noted on this occasion by the director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences S.M. Rogov, “the unprecedented decline of the 90s is the result not of the machinations of the CIA and the Pentagon, but of the incompetent and irresponsible policies of the then Russian leaders.”

And the American the strategy of “crushing a geopolitical rival” acted only as a background, an external factor, nevertheless - powerful factor who created real challenges and threats for the USSR, which Gorbachev’s leadership was powerless to resist.

However, few people have yet spoken seriously about the real reasons for the collapse of the Soviet state. But, due to the approaching twentieth anniversary(2011) “the beginning of the new history of Russia,” which means “the cessation of the existence of the USSR as a geopolitical reality,” there will undoubtedly be a serious conversation about this, as well as about the “social price,” the results and “the results achieved.”

As well as the fact that many unexpected discoveries and confessions await us here. But, I repeat, this matter is not yet so close future.

Another feature of the operational situation in the country at the end of the 80s of the last century was the growth of organized crime and the strengthening of its negative impact on the entire complex of socio-economic processes in the country.

In many speeches by the heads of state security agencies, it was noted that the growth and modification of crime in the country - it was then proudly emphasized that crime level(i.e. total number of registered in the country crimes), did not reach the level of leading capitalist states, but was characterized by trends of steady growth, which required both the expansion of the participation of the KGB in the fight against its most dangerous forms, and the adoption of appropriate political decisions and legislative acts.

This is how the president of the Russian Criminological Association A.I. Dolgova characterized the dynamics of changes in the crime situation in the country using the five-year average crime rate coefficient, that is, the number of registered crimes per 100 thousand residents of Russia:

1976–1980 - 664 reported crimes;

1981–1985 - "- 901;

1986–1990 - "- 982;

1991–1995 - "- 1,770.

Unfortunately, we have to admit that in subsequent years this growth continued in our country. objective criminological indicator.

Thus, according to the All-Russia Research Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2003, it was already 1,926 crimes per 100 thousand inhabitants, and adjusted for the number of adult (i.e., over 16 years old) citizens of the country - already 2,124.

Along with the general increase in the number of criminal acts in the late 80s, there was a growth and consolidation of organized crime, characterized by a higher level of criminal “professionalism”, scale of acts, organizational cohesion, secrecy, technical equipment, the presence of connections in administrative and economic management bodies, and also with foreign criminal groups.

The increase in crime in the country noted since the mid-80s, the aggravation of the crime situation at the turn of the 90s, required both certain organizational and staffing changes and appropriate legal regulation. And the basis for it was laid by the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 4, 1989 “On the decisive strengthening of the fight against crime.”

Another feature of the development of the crime situation in the country was the growth of economic crime, its merging with general criminal and violent crime, the formation of mafia-type criminal communities, which was accompanied by corruption of government officials who actually sided with serving criminal clans.

In one of his interviews, V.A. Kryuchkov noted that “we must act very energetically to restore order and destroy the causes that give rise to crime. This can be achieved in two ways: economic and financial measures; strengthening the fight against crime,” but, at the same time, “law enforcement agencies alone cannot solve this problem.”

Organized criminal groups both acquired international criminal connections, experience and “weight”, and became politicized and actively became involved in undermining the foundations of state power in the country.

According to law enforcement agencies, already in 1989 in the country There were about 700 criminal groups, and their annual turnover was more than 100 million rubles.

As V.A. noted later in his speech at the XYIII Congress of the CPSU. Kryuchkov, only based on materials from the KGB of the USSR only in 1989. Members of about 300 organized criminal groups were brought to criminal responsibility, illegally acquired currency and valuables worth more than 170 million rubles were converted into state income.

Despite the alarming warnings that were heard, they, unfortunately, were not heard and perceived properly, as a result of which, in subsequent years, organized crime burst into the “operational space.”

And a significant contribution to this was made by the hasty decisions of September 1991 to liquidate the 6th Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the “OP” Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

It should be noted that initially M.S. Gorbachev, as befits the leader of a Great Power, was attentive to information from state security agencies.

After cancellation March 14, 1990 Ill Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies Article 6 of the USSR Constitution “on the leading and guiding role of the CPSU in Soviet society”, KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov is quite rightly appointed as a member of the USSR Presidential Council, and after its reorganization on March 7, 1991, as a member of the USSR Security Council.

And here is what V.A. reported under the heading “Of Special Importance” (N 313 - K/OV dated February 14, 1990). Kryuchkov on the results of the operational and official activities of the KGB in 1989. To the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev:

“In all its activities, the State Security Committee was guided by the political line of the Communist Party, decisions of the highest authorities and resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. As part of the implementation of the foreign policy course of the Soviet state, the Committee directed its efforts to promoting the creation of a favorable climate in international relations, the formation of a comprehensive system of international security, disarmament, and expanding the scope of economic and humanitarian cooperation between states and peoples.

Along with the traditional areas of work on monitoring the military-strategic situation in the world, early detection of the preconditions for an enemy breakthrough in the military-technical field, the State Security Committee provided information about the plans and intentions of the ruling circles of the United States and its allies in connection with events in Eastern Europe and the development of internal political processes in our country.

The situation developing in Europe was carefully analyzed, in particular in the light of changes in German-German relations, the situation in NATO and the Warsaw War.

Significant adjustments were made to the work in the Afghan direction after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic of Afghanistan, in China, in connection with the normalization of relations with this country, as well as in Japan, South Korea and a number of other countries. The effectiveness of intelligence support for negotiations within the CSCE on nuclear and space disarmament has been increased. The fight against international terrorism, drug trafficking and smuggling has been intensified, and cooperation in these areas is being established with the intelligence services of capitalist states.

In solving internal political problems, the Committee focused on fully facilitating the perestroika processes and ensuring control over the situation in the country, destabilized by many unresolved issues in the economic and political fields. Particular attention was paid to monitoring the actions of nationalist, anti-socialist, extremist forces that entered the political arena, the localization of interethnic conflicts, separatist processes, anti-constitutional and other destructive manifestations.

Measures were consistently implemented to expand transparency in the activities of the Committee, bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR.... The publication of an open information bulletin on the work of the KGB has been established. Politically, one of the leading places was occupied by the work on the rehabilitation of citizens who were unreasonably repressed during the 30-40s and early 50s. In 1989, the KGB took part in the rehabilitation of 838,630 citizens.

The dynamic development of the situation in the country and the world required the State Security Committee to intensify its work to provide information to the top leadership of the state, the government of the USSR and interested departments. A large number of notes and encrypted telegrams were sent to the authorities. Particular attention was paid to preparing materials for negotiations between Soviet leaders and leaders of the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, China and India and for the discussion of international and domestic problems by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

Great importance was attached to obtaining secret documentary materials from the governing bodies of capitalist states and their military-political blocs, including by intercepting and decrypting correspondence passing through various communication systems.

A number of large-scale active measures have been carried out in order to have a long-term beneficial impact on influential foreign circles, in solving key problems in the field of international security, nuclear, chemical and conventional disarmament, and in promoting the concept of a “common European home”.

A wide range of measures have been implemented to neutralize Western interference in the development of internal political processes in the USSR, to influence the positions of leaders and parliamentarians of a number of countries, in particular in their approaches to events in the Soviet Baltic republics...

Active measures in the economic field were aimed at strengthening cooperation between the USSR and leading developed countries, creating a favorable environment for Soviet exports, and gaining access to the latest technology. The actions taken had a certain positive impact on the approaches of the US administration and Congress to trade relations with the USSR, and on the decision of a number of countries to use Soviet space technology. Some measures made it possible to avoid large financial losses when concluding contracts and create favorable conditions for a number of important trade and economic transactions.

In the scientific and technical direction, the Committee's intelligence was able to obtain a number of samples and documentary materials that were urgently needed for the defense industries, to make a significant contribution to the solution of national economic problems, to the acceleration of fundamental and applied research, to the development of new equipment and technology...

The possibilities for conducting reconnaissance work from illegal positions and from the territory of the country have been expanded. Its quality and efficiency have improved somewhat.

The security of Soviet institutions and citizens abroad was ensured. A large number of provocative actions by enemy intelligence services, including those directed against intelligence officers, were thwarted. According to the KGB, 274 Soviet citizens were recalled from abroad ahead of schedule. It was not possible to prevent the non-return of 118 Soviet citizens to their homeland.

At the same time, there were also shortcomings in the intelligence work. In particular, the quality of intelligence information does not yet fully meet today's requirements. This is primarily due to insufficient operational capabilities in the most important targets for reconnaissance penetration. Another pressing issue is increasing the efficiency of active exploration activities and acquiring new reliable channels for their implementation.

The Committee's counterintelligence activities were aimed at suppressing attempts by enemy intelligence services and anti-socialist elements to use for subversive purposes the expansion of international cooperation, the processes of renewal in the country, and serious difficulties in interethnic relations, the economy and other spheres of life of Soviet society.

Counterintelligence operated in the context of a significant expansion of contacts between the USSR and the USA and other NATO countries... Among the citizens of NATO countries who visited Soviet defense facilities, about a third were intelligence officers.

Intelligence officers from NATO countries working in the USSR under the cover of diplomats and journalists made 2,267 trips around the country (1,478 in 1988). State security agencies stopped more than 200 attempts to penetrate military installations. 19 people were expelled from the USSR for illegal activities...

Attempts by a number of Soviet citizens, including military personnel and civilian secret carriers, to proactively establish contact with foreign intelligence services for criminal purposes were prevented.

The fight against terrorism has been intensified, and 384 members of international terrorist organizations have been prevented from entering the country. Based on reliable data on involvement in such organizations, 899 foreigners were placed under entry control. 130 citizens of the USSR were taken under control in connection with statements of terrorist intentions. Three attempts to hijack and hijack passenger planes abroad were foiled. The behavior of 140 citizens who expressed intentions to hijack aircraft was monitored.

Much attention was paid to preventing the leakage of data to the enemy about the most important weapons programs and other state secrets, his misinformation on these issues, and the diversion of attention and efforts to false targets. At the same time, significant adjustments have been made to the organization of secret protection... They (state departments of the USSR - O.Kh.) were provided with the necessary assistance in the work of declassifying documents and removing unjustified restrictions.

In the economic sphere, counterintelligence prevented a number of disruptive trade and economic actions. The largest of them is an attempt by foreign companies, through the mediation of the Moscow cooperative "Alkov", the Estonian joint venture "Estek" and other Soviet organizations, to purchase several billion rubles in the USSR at the "black market" rate. The intentions of a number of officials to reveal commercial secrets for personal gain were thwarted. Together with customs authorities, contraband items worth more than 76 million rubles were detained. In the economic zone of the USSR, fines were imposed on foreign ships in the amount of about 1 million foreign currency rubles.

Measures were consistently taken to further improve the operational and staffing structure of the KGB, and to make more rational use of available forces and means. In accordance with the basic principles of building a rule of law state, a Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System was formed in the Committee, and corresponding units were created in local bodies. They got involved in the work to stabilize the situation, especially in the Transcaucasian and Baltic republics, in Moldova and a number of other regions where the most tense situation has recently developed. Much work is being done by these units in Moscow and Leningrad, especially in uncovering and neutralizing subversive actions of foreign intelligence services trying to intensify the activities of extremist organizations. Information work in this area has improved somewhat.

In connection with the increase in crime throughout the country, the Committee more actively used its forces in the fight against its organized forms. A number of successful operations have been carried out against smugglers, corrupt elements, bribe-takers and extortionists. 282 people were brought to criminal responsibility for committing criminal acts as part of organized groups. A significant number of materials on these issues were transferred to the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the prosecutor's office, many activities were carried out jointly with them.

Assessing the results of counterintelligence work, the State Security Committee sees that its effectiveness significantly lags behind the requirements of the situation. The effectiveness of many security measures remains low. The fight against organized crime is still progressing slowly.

Taking into account the situation in the country, the KGB authorities paid main attention to general prevention, strengthening the educational function of the State Security Committee...

Along with preventive work, criminal prosecution measures were used. 338 people were brought to criminal responsibility for especially dangerous, other state and other crimes.

Taking into account the difficult situation in the country, the KGB bodies took the necessary measures to ensure socio-political events, protect the leaders of the party and state, and distinguished foreign guests. Government communications worked steadily.

This text is an introductory fragment. From the book “Death to Spies!” [Military counterintelligence SMERSH during the Great Patriotic War] author Sever Alexander

Chapter 2 Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" NPO of the USSR and NKVMF of the USSR Military counterintelligence, by a secret resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, was transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, under which the counterintelligence departments "Smersh" were established

From the book The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People (in the context of World War II) author Krasnova Marina Alekseevna

7. TELEGRAM OF THE DEPUTY PEOPLE’S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.P. POTEMKIN TO THE PLENIFYED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR IN THE CHSR S.S. ALEXANDROVSKY Moscow, September 20, 19381. To Benes' question whether the USSR, according to the treaty, would provide immediate and effective assistance to Czechoslovakia,

From the book of the KGB of the USSR. 1954–1991 Secrets of the death of a Great Power author Khlobustov Oleg Maksimovich

11. NOTE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR M. M. LITVINOV TO THE AMBASSADOR OF GERMANY TO THE USSR F. VON SCHULENBURG Moscow, March 18, 1939 Mr. Ambassador, I have the honor to confirm receipt of your note dated the 16th and note dated the 17th of this month, notifying the Soviet government of the inclusion of the Czech Republic

From the book Nuremberg Alarm [Report from the past, appeal to the future] author Zvyagintsev Alexander Grigorievich

9. TELEGRAM from the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. MOLOTOV to the Plenipotentiary REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR IN THE KINGDOM OF ROMANIA A. I. LAVRENTYEV ON THE ISSUE OF THE RETURN OF BESSARABIA June 27, 1940. On June 26, I called Davidescu and gave him the following statement of the Soviet government. “On 19 18

From the book Under the Bar of Truth. Confession of a military counterintelligence officer. People. Data. Special operations. author Guskov Anatoly Mikhailovich

5. REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL GOLIKOV, TO THE USSR NGO, SNK USSR AND THE AUCP(B) Central Committee “STATEMENTS, [ORGANIZATIONAL EVENTS] AND OPTIONS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMY AGAINST THE USSR” March 20, 1941 d.Most of the intelligence data concerning

From the book The Andropov Phenomenon: 30 years in the life of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. author Khlobustov Oleg Maksimovich

Part II. Lubyansky is a long-liver. Fourth

From the book SMERSH [Battles classified as secret] author Sever Alexander

The treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. Military preparation for an attack on the USSR Gentlemen, judges! I now turn to an account of the crimes committed by Hitler’s aggressors against my country, against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. June 22

From the book Scouts and Spies author Zigunenko Stanislav Nikolaevich

Cleansing. Chairman of the KGB of Azerbaijan After the party congress, the apparatus of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the republic were purged of persons who had compromised themselves during Bagirov’s tenure as 1st Secretary of the Central Committee. The situation during this period was extremely

From the book In the intelligence services of three states author Golushko Nikolay Mikhailovich

Part II Chairman of the KGB of the USSR And you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free The inscription on the CIA coat of arms in the central hall of the headquarters of this organization in Langley (USA, District of Columbia) “... Impartial history will pronounce its verdict, more lenient than

From the book Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence. Volume 3 author Primakov Evgeniy Maksimovich

Chapter 2 Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" NPO of the USSR and NKVMF of the USSR Military counterintelligence, by a secret resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, was transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, under which counterintelligence departments were established

From the author's book

Red Chairman Ernest Wohlweber was born in 1898 in Hanover-Münden. His parents were working people and held leftist views. So it’s no coincidence that immediately after graduating from school, when Ernest went to work as a loader at the port, he joined

From the author's book

From the author's book

No. 3 FROM A REPORT OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated August 28, 1939. From Paris they tell us the following data from August 23 about Hitler's negotiations with the British: “Halifax and the British ambassador in Berlin have been invited to Hitler for important negotiations. They received instructions -

From the author's book

No. 7 FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE NKGB OF THE USSR TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the NGOs of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR dated March 6, 1941. Message from BerlinAccording to information received from an official of the Committee on the Four-Year Plan, several committee workers received an urgent task to make calculations of raw material reserves And

From the author's book

No. 8 FROM THE REPORT OF THE NKGB OF THE USSR TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated March 11, 1941. March 6 of this year. British Ambassador Cripps called a press conference, which was attended by British and American correspondents Chollerton, Lovell, Cassidy, Duranty, Shapiro and Magidov.

From the author's book

No. 9 NOTE OF THE USSR People's Commissar of State Security V.N. MERKULOV TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars and the NKVD of the USSR WITH THE TELEGRAM OF THE ENGLISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS A. EDEN TO THE AMBASSADOR OF ENGLAND TO THE USSR S. CRIPPS ABOUT GERMANY'S INTENTIONS TO ATTACK THE USSR No. 1312/M April 26, 1941 Top Secret Directed

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