The first Chechen campaign: causes, progress, results. The Chechen war in brief. Causes of the Chechen conflict

The conflict, called the Second Chechen War, occupies a special place in the history of modern Russia. Compared to the First Chechen War (1994-1996), this conflict was aimed at solving the same problem: establishing state power and constitutional order in the region, which was controlled by supporters of separatism, through military force.

At the same time, the situation that developed during the period between the two “Chechen” wars changed both in Chechnya itself and at the level of the Russian federal government. Therefore, the Second Chechen War took place under different conditions and was able, although it dragged on for almost 10 years, to end with a positive result for the Russian government.

Reasons for the start of the Second Chechen War

In short, the main reason for the Second Chechen War was the mutual dissatisfaction of the parties with the results of the previous conflict and the desire to change the situation in their favor. The Khasavyurt agreements, which ended the First Chechen War, provided for the withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya, meaning the complete loss of Russian control over this territory. At the same time, legally there was no talk of any “independent Ichkeria”: the question of the status of Chechnya was only postponed until December 31, 2001.

The official government of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI), led by Aslan Maskhadov, did not receive diplomatic recognition from any country and at the same time was rapidly losing influence within Chechnya itself. In the three years after the first military conflict, the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria became a base not only for criminal gangs, but also for radical Islamists from Arab countries and Afghanistan.

It was these forces, controlled only by their “field commanders” and who found powerful military and financial support from the outside, that by the beginning of 1999 openly declared their refusal to obey Maskhadov. These same paramilitary groups began to actively engage in kidnapping for subsequent ransom or slavery, drug trafficking and organizing terrorist attacks, despite the proclaimed norms of Sharia.

To ideologically justify their actions, they used Wahhabism, which, combined with aggressive methods of instilling it, turned into a new extremist movement. Under this cover, radical Islamists, having established themselves in Chechnya, began to expand their influence into neighboring regions, destabilizing the situation throughout the North Caucasus. At the same time, individual incidents developed into increasingly large-scale armed clashes.

Parties to the conflict

In the new confrontation that arose between the Russian government and the CRI, the most active party was the paramilitary Wahhabi Islamists led by their “field commanders,” the most influential of whom were Shamil Basayev, Salman Raduev, Arbi Barayev and a native of Saudi Arabia, Khattab. The number of militants controlled by radical Islamists was estimated as the most massive among the armed formations operating in the CRI, covering 50-70% of their total number.

At the same time, a number of Chechen teips (tribal clans), while remaining committed to the idea of ​​“independent Ichkeria,” did not want an open military conflict with the Russian authorities. Maskhadov followed this policy until the outbreak of the conflict, but then he could count on maintaining the status of the official power of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and, accordingly, continue to convert this position into a source of income for his teip, which controls the key oil companies of the republic, and only on the side of opponents of the Russian government. Armed formations numbering up to 20-25% of all militants operated under his control.

In addition, supporters of teips led by Akhmat Kadyrov and Ruslan Yamadayev, who back in 1998 entered into open conflict with the Wahhabis, represented a significant force. They could rely on their own armed forces, covering up to 10-15% of all Chechen militants, and in the Second Chechen War they sided with the federal troops.

Important changes occurred in the highest echelon of Russian power shortly before the start of the Second Chechen War. On August 9, 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced the appointment of FSB Director Vladimir Putin to the post of head of government, publicly introducing him as a further successor to his post. For Putin, little-known at that time, the invasion of Islamist militants in Dagestan, and then the terrorist attacks with explosions of residential buildings in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk, the responsibility for which was assigned to Chechen gangs, became a significant reason to strengthen his power through a large-scale counter-terrorism operation (CTO). .

Since September 18, the borders of Chechnya have been blocked by Russian troops. The Presidential Decree on the conduct of the CTO was promulgated on September 23, although the first movements of army units, internal troops and the FSB, included in the grouping of federal forces in the North Caucasus, began at least two days earlier.

Combat tactics on both sides

Unlike the Chechen war of 1994-1996, to conduct the second military campaign in Chechnya, the federal group much more often resorted to new tactics, which consisted of taking advantage of heavy weapons: missiles, artillery, and especially aviation, which the Chechen militants did not have . This was facilitated by a significantly increased level of training of troops, in the recruitment of which it was possible to achieve a minimal involvement of conscripts. Of course, it was impossible to fully replace conscripts with contract soldiers in those years, but in most cases the “voluntary-order” mechanism with contracts for a “combat mission” covered conscripts who had already served for about a year.

Federal troops widely used methods of setting up various ambushes (usually practiced only by special forces units in the form of reconnaissance and strike groups), including:

• waiting for ambushes on 2-4 of the possible routes of movement of militants;
• mobile ambushes, when only observation groups were located in convenient places for them, and assault groups were located deep in the area of ​​​​operation;
• driven ambushes, in which a demonstrative attack was intended to force militants to the site of another ambush, often equipped with booby traps;
• decoy ambushes, where a group of military personnel openly carried out some actions to attract the attention of the enemy, and mines or main ambushes were set up on the routes of his approach.

According to the calculations of Russian military experts, one of these ambushes, having 1-2 ATGM systems, 1-3 grenade launchers, 1-2 machine gunners, 1-3 snipers, 1 infantry fighting vehicle and 1 tank, was capable of defeating a “standard” bandit group of up to 50 -60 people with 2-3 units of armored vehicles and 5-7 vehicles without armor.

The Chechen side included hundreds of experienced militants who were trained under the guidance of military advisers from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia in the methods of various sabotage and terrorist actions, including:

• avoiding direct confrontations in open areas with superior forces;
• skillful use of terrain, setting up ambushes in tactically advantageous places;
• attacking the most vulnerable targets with superior forces;
• quick change of base locations;
• rapid concentration of forces to solve important problems and their dispersal in the event of a threat of blockade or defeat;
• use as cover for civilians;
• hostage taking outside the zone of armed conflict.

Militants widely used mine-explosive devices to limit the movement of troops and sabotage, as well as the actions of snipers.

Units and types of equipment used in combat operations

The start of the war was preceded, like the actions of the US and Israeli armies in similar conditions, by massive rocket and artillery shelling and air strikes on enemy territory, the targets of which were strategic economic and transport infrastructure facilities, as well as fortified military positions.

Not only the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but also military personnel of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and FSB officers took part in the further conduct of the CTO. In addition, special forces units of all Russian “security” departments, individual airborne brigades, including those assigned to the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian Ministry of Defense, were actively involved in participation in hostilities.

Second Chechen War 1999-2009 became a place where the army and special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs tested some new types of small arms, albeit in relatively modest quantities. Among them:

1. 9-mm silent assault rifle AS “Val” with a folded butt;
2. 9-mm silent sniper rifle VSS "Vintorez";
3. 9-mm automatic silent pistol APB with stock;
4. RGO and RGN grenades.

In terms of military equipment in service with the federal forces, military experts gave the best marks to helicopters, which, in fact, reflected the Soviet experience of successful operations in Afghanistan. Among the Russian troops equipped with modern equipment that has proven to be effective, electronic intelligence units should also be noted.

At the same time, the tanks, represented by the T-72 models in modifications AB, B, B1, BM and a small number of T-80 BV, having quite successfully conquered open terrain, again suffered significant losses (49 out of about 400) in street battles in Grozny .

Chronology of the war

The question of when exactly the Second Chechen War began remains open among specialists. A number of publications (mostly earlier in time) generally combine the First and Second Chechen Wars, considering them two phases of the same conflict. Which is unlawful, since these conflicts differ significantly in their historical conditions and the composition of the warring parties.

More compelling arguments are made by those who consider the invasion of Chechen Islamist militants into Dagestan in August 1999 to be the beginning of the Second Chechen War, although this can also be considered a local conflict not directly related to the operations of federal troops on the territory of Chechnya. At the same time, the “official” date of the start of the entire war (September 30) is tied to the beginning of the ground operation on the territory controlled by the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, although attacks on this territory began on September 23.

From March 5 to March 20, over 500 militants, having captured the village of Komsomolskoye in the Urus-Martan region, attempted to break through the ring of federal troops who blocked and then stormed this settlement. Almost all of them were killed or captured, but the core of the gang was able to escape from encirclement under their cover. After this operation, the active phase of military operations in Chechnya is considered completed.

Storm of Grozny

On November 25-28, 1999, Russian troops blocked Grozny, leaving a “humanitarian corridor” that was nevertheless subject to periodic air attacks. The command of the federal forces officially announced the decision to abandon the assault on the capital of the Chechen Republic, placing troops 5 kilometers from the city. Aslan Maskhadov left Grozny along with his headquarters on November 29.

Federal forces entered certain residential areas on the outskirts of the Chechen capital on December 14, maintaining a “humanitarian corridor.” On December 26, the active stage of the operation to take the city under the control of Russian troops began, which initially developed without much opposition, especially in the Staropromyslovsky district. It was only on December 29 that fierce battles broke out for the first time, resulting in noticeable losses for the “federals.” The pace of the offensive slowed down somewhat, but the Russian army continued to clear more residential areas of militants, and on January 18 they were able to capture the bridge over the Sunzha River.

The capture of another strategically important point - the Minutka Square area - continued during several assaults and fierce counterattacks by militants from January 17 to January 31. The turning point of the assault on Grozny was the night from January 29 to 30, when the main forces of the armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichnia, a group of up to 3 thousand people led by well-known “field commanders,” having suffered significant losses, broke through along the Sunzha riverbed towards the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

In the following days, federal troops, who had previously controlled just over half of the city, completed its liberation from the remnants of the militants, encountering resistance mainly from a few enemy sniper ambushes. With the capture of the Zavodsky district on February 6, 2000, Putin, by that time the acting president of the Russian Federation, announced the victorious completion of the assault on Grozny.

Guerrilla war 2000-2009

Many militants managed to escape from the besieged capital of the Chechen Republic; their leadership announced the start of a guerrilla war on February 8. After this, and until the official end of the offensive of the federal troops, only two cases of long-term large-scale clashes were noted: in the villages of Shatoy and Komsomolskoye. After March 20, 2000, the war finally entered the guerrilla stage.

The intensity of hostilities at this stage steadily decreased, periodically escalating only in moments of individual cruel and daring terrorist attacks that occurred in 2002-2005. and committed outside the conflict zone. The hostage takings in the Moscow “Nord-West” and in the Beslan school, and the attack on the city of Nalchik were staged as a demonstration by Islamist militants that the conflict was far from ending soon.

The period from 2001 to 2006 was more often accompanied by reports from the Russian authorities about the liquidation by the special services of one of the most famous “field commanders” of Chechen militants, including Maskhadov, Basayev and many others. Ultimately, a long-term decrease in tension in the region made it possible to end the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic on April 15, 2009.

Results and truce

In the period after the active military operation, the Russian leadership relied on the massive recruitment of civilians and former Chechen fighters to their side. The most prominent and influential figure among the former opponents of the federal troops during the First Chechen War was the Mufti of the Chechen Republic of Ichryssia, Akhmat Kadyrov. Having previously condemned Wahhabism, in the current conflict he actively showed himself during the peaceful transition of Gudermes to the control of the “federals”, and then headed the administration of the entire Chechen Republic after the end of the Second Chechen War.

Under the leadership of A. Kadyrov, elected President of the Chechen Republic, the situation in the republic quickly stabilized. At the same time, Kadyrov's activities have made him a central target for militant attacks. On May 9, 2004, he died after a terrorist attack during a mass event at the Grozny stadium. But the authority and influence of the Kadyrov teip remained, as evidenced by the election of Akhmat Kadyrov’s son Ramzan to the post of President of the republic, who continued the course of cooperation between the Chechen Republic and the federal government.

Total number of deaths on both sides

Official statistics on losses following the Second Chechen War have caused many criticisms and cannot be considered fully accurate. However, the information resources of militants who took refuge abroad and individual representatives of the Russian opposition reported completely unreliable data on this matter. Based primarily on assumptions.

Grozny in our time

After the end of active hostilities in Chechnya, the need arose to restore the republic practically from ruins. This was especially true of the capital of the republic, where after several assaults there were almost no entire buildings left. Serious funding from the federal budget was allocated for this, sometimes reaching 50 billion rubles a year.

In addition to residential and administrative buildings, social facilities and urban infrastructure, much attention was paid to the restoration of cultural centers and historical monuments. Some of the buildings in the center of Grozny in the area of ​​Mira Street were restored in the same form as they were at the time of construction in the 1930-1950s.

To date, the capital of the Czech Republic is a modern and very beautiful city. One of its new symbols of the city was the “Heart of Chechnya” mosque, built after the war. But the memory of the war remains: in the design of Grozny for its 201st anniversary in the fall of 2010, installations with black and white photographs of these places destroyed after hostilities appeared.

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1. The First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian troops (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya, and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus, with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991.



2. Officially, the conflict was defined as “measures to maintain constitutional order”; military actions were called the “first Chechen war”, less often the “Russian-Chechen” or “Russian-Caucasian war”. The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of ethnic cleansing of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.



3. Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the withdrawal of Russian units, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya before the Second Chechen War and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.



4. With the beginning of perestroika in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev.



5. On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.



6. During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House. More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. The head of the Chechen Republic, D. G. Zavgaev, spoke on this issue in 1996 at a meeting of the State Duma."

Yes, on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (today it is divided) the war began in the fall of 1991, it was the war against a multinational people, when the criminal regime, with some support from those who today also show an unhealthy interest in the situation, flooded this people with blood. The first victim of what was happening was the people of this republic, and the Chechens first of all. The war began when Vitaly Kutsenko, chairman of the Grozny City Council, was killed in broad daylight during a meeting of the Supreme Council of the republic. When Besliev, the vice-rector of a state university, was shot on the street. When Kancalik, the rector of the same state university, was killed. When every day in the fall of 1991, up to 30 people were found killed on the streets of Grozny. When, from the autumn of 1991 until 1994, the morgues of Grozny were filled to the ceiling, announcements were made on local television with a request to take them away, to establish who was there, and so on.





8. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation



9. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991).” After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted; the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Checheno-Ingush Republic (1991)” was canceled on November 11, three days after its signing, after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and from the republic The withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses.



10. Dudayev’s forces received a lot of weapons: Two launchers of an operational-tactical missile system in a non-combat-ready state. 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 trainer aircraft, the aircraft converted into light attack aircraft; three MiG-17 fighters and two MiG-15 fighters; six An-2 aircraft and two Mi-8 helicopters, 117 R-23 and R-24 aircraft missiles, 126 R-60 aircraft; about 7 thousand GSh-23 aerial shells. 42 tanks T-62 and T-72; 34 BMP-1 and BMP-2; 30 BTR-70 and BRDM; 44 MT-LB, 942 vehicles. 18 Grad MLRS and more than 1000 shells for them. 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-30 howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them; as well as self-propelled guns 2S1 and 2S3; anti-tank guns MT-12. Five air defense systems, 25 missiles of various types, 88 MANPADS; 105 pcs. S-75 missile defense system. 590 anti-tank weapons, including two Konkurs ATGMs, 24 Fagot ATGM systems, 51 Metis ATGM systems, 113 RPG-7 systems. About 50 thousand small arms, more than 150 thousand grenades. 27 wagons of ammunition; 1620 tons of fuels and lubricants; about 10 thousand sets of clothing, 72 tons of food; 90 tons of medical equipment.





12. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.



13. The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.



14. The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not been determined to this day (2012). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.





16. As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.



17. In reality, the state system of the CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994. In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994



18. A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.



19. Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.






21. In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. Amendments were made to the constitution adopted last year; a regime of Dudayev’s personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament



22. After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).



23. Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.



24. The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and none of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.



25. In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, Bislan Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander Ruslan Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.



26. On November 26, oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.



27. Deployment of troops (December 1994)

At that time, the use of the expression “the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya,” according to deputy and journalist Alexander Nevzorov, was, to a greater extent, caused by journalistic terminological confusion - Chechnya was part of Russia.

Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government that justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya as consistent with the Constitution.

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different directions - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.

Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.

A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Regiment blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.

Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance



In mid-December, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bomb attack was carried out on the city center. The artillery shelling and bombing killed and injured many civilians (including ethnic Russians).

Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops had aerial photographs of the city, outdated plans of the city in limited quantities. The communications facilities were not equipped with closed-circuit communications equipment, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications. The troops were given an order to occupy only industrial buildings and areas and not to invade the homes of the civilian population.

The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade (more than 300 people), a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company of the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment (10 tanks), under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. Federal forces were surrounded - the losses of the battalions of the Maykop brigade, according to official data, amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.

The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.

On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.

Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.

Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.

By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the line of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.

In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of ​​Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.

As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.



29. Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)

After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.

The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.

Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya). It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). After Russian soldiers entered the village, some residents who had weapons began to resist, and shootouts broke out on the streets of the village.

According to a number of international organizations (in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights - UNCHR), many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This information, disseminated by the separatist agency Chechen Press, however, turned out to be quite contradictory - thus, according to representatives of the Memorial human rights center, this data “does not inspire confidence.” According to Memorial, the minimum number of civilians killed during the clearing of the village was 112-114 people.

One way or another, this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk and resumed in February 1996.

By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.



30. Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.

The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.

Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.

Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times



On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory in trucks and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.

The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.

Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.

After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded



32. The situation in the republic in June - December 1995

After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.

From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.

Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.

On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.

In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to remain in accordance with previously reached agreements.

On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.

On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.

The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.

On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.

On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.



On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar. The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.

The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.



On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded



On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoy, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses - almost all the armored vehicles and half of the personnel were lost.



From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.

On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of ​​the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.

By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the titles of Heroes of the Russian Federation



37. Negotiations with the separatists (May - July 1996)

Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.

On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.

On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.

The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.

On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.

On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.



On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.

Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).

According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements



On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.



40. The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).



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42. Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% of the contract amount. . Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War."



43. According to data released by the OGV headquarters, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, 19,794 wounded



44. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen).



45. However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the militants’ losses did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.



46. ​​On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev "). “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.



47. On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the assault on Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,



48. According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “because of his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.” In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya”



49. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) launched an extensive relief program since the beginning of the conflict, providing more than 250,000 internally displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance. In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for residents of the North Caucasus.





51. During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to assist those affected by the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, and provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages shelters.







Exactly 20 years ago the First Chechen War began. On December 11, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government that justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya as consistent with the Constitution.

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different directions - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia, from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan.

The famous St. Petersburg political scientist, Doctor of Philosophy, discusses the causes and consequences of the First Chechen War in an interview with the Russian People's Line Sergey Lebedev :

Why did the First Chechen War begin? I discussed this topic in my book “Russian Ideas and Russian Cause.” Everything cannot be blamed on personal hostile relations between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov, and then Dudayev. Some have suggested that they fought over “black gold,” but this is not true, because large reserves of oil are extracted in Siberia and processed in the Urals. Moreover, at that time there was a shortage of oil in the Chechen Republic, so it was delivered to Grozny even during the war.

What are the true reasons for the war?! In my opinion, everything is simple and tragic. It was 1994, Parliament was shot last fall, an American dictatorship reigned in the country - dozens of all-knowing and all-knowing Washington advisers sat in every ministry. What problem did they face?! It was necessary to finally dispose of the Russian state. But how can this be achieved if Russia still has powerful armed forces capable of challenging the United States?! Let me remind you that in those days China was weak, although now it is not so strong. And Saddam Hussein was given a demonstrative flogging back in 1991. What should American advisers do? After all, it will not be possible to simply disband the powerful armed forces. Therefore, it was decided to carry out a reform that would destroy the Russian army, but present it as a necessary and urgent decision. What is needed for this?! Little dirty shamefully lost war! As a result of this action, demand reforms, since allegedly everything in the army is poorly and incorrectly organized. In addition, defeat in Chechnya would foreshadow a “parade of sovereignties” and then the collapse of Russia. Chechnya would be followed by the rest of the country's republics. It was precisely these deep-reaching plans that the American advisers nurtured.

Until then, Dudayev’s Ichkeria had been fed for three years, starting in the fall of 1991, when the Maidan took place in Grozny and the former leader of the republic was overthrown, and Dudayev seized power. For all three years, Chechnya did not recognize itself as part of Russia, although money regularly flowed into the republic for the social needs of the population - salaries, pensions, benefits. In turn, Russia did not receive a penny from Chechnya; the oil was sent to an oil refinery in Grozny. The republic in those days became a zone where the mafia had its own territorial and political entity. The puppeteers understood that the Chechens were courageous and wonderful warriors. It was in Latvia in August 1991 that 140 Riga riot police calmly established Soviet power on the territory of the republic. However, such a scenario will not work in Chechnya. The Americans counted on the military impulse of the Chechens, filling them with weapons and choosing the right time - the sunset of 1994. Military operations began in the winter, when the numerical and technical superiority of the federal forces, otherwise called “federals,” came to naught in the mountainous areas. Starting a war in December in the mountains is very difficult. But, nevertheless, it was for this reason that the war was started. The puppeteers were counting on a shameful defeat of the Russian army, after which they would sign a peace treaty and the purge of the armed forces would begin. The Chechen war was intended to be a huge defeat for Russia, so it began in December, at the worst possible time. For unknown reasons, not only Yeltsin, who was undergoing surgery, but also the generals were not at the post of Commander-in-Chief. The guys who were drafted into the army in the spring and autumn of 1994 were thrown into the war! The calculation was based on the defeat of the armed forces, but as always, when the headquarters calculate how to defeat Russia, what comes out is not at all what was intended.

From a military point of view, there were no defeats in the First Chechen War. Of course, there were failures at the start of the assault on Grozny, but, although with heavy losses, the city was taken and cleared of terrorists. At that time, there were also suspicious nuances when they demanded that the military take off their body armor, etc. If there were private military failures, they were all explained by betrayal at headquarters, because the Chechens knew almost everything. A special forces officer who participated in the First Chechen War told me a story about how the Chechens hung up a poster congratulating the unit commander on his birthday, his last name, first name, patronymic, and the name of the military unit that had just arrived in Grozny. They knew not only secret information, but also the personal data of the commanders.

The most important headquarters was the first traitor in the war, which was started with the goal of a shameful loss of the federal forces. But it didn't work out. As General Lebed said, this was a custom-made military campaign. The Kremlin sometimes declared a truce in order to not defeat the Chechens so quickly. At one time he announced the introduction of a moratorium on aviation flights, although from the point of view of common sense it was possible in the spring, when there was no dense greenery, to destroy gangs using aerial bombing. Human rights activists were unleashed on the military like dogs. The entire Russian “fourth estate” fought for Dudayev, and the soldiers were called “federals.” This word has an ironic connotation; at that time the population was not yet accustomed to this term. Also, puppeteers created legends about bandits, they were glorified as freedom fighters, constantly spitting in the back of Russian soldiers!

This is an indicator of how our society has changed because of that war. Many people began to recover from the intoxication that had been going on since the times of glasnost and perestroika. The attempt to create an anti-war movement failed. Government figures - Gaidar, Yavlinsky - suddenly began speaking at rallies against the war in Chechnya! One of two things: if you are against the war, then resign, if you are for it, then don’t interfere. The calculation was for the emergence of an anti-war movement along with the dispersal of the army, which would throw a hysteria that would lead to the collapse of the army. But eighteen-year-old conscripts took and broke the backs of the Chechen wolves. What about military generals?! Let's remember Rokhlin, Babichev, Kvashnin! All these generals of the First Chechen War showed extraordinary abilities while fighting against the Chechens.

After the start of finishing off the bandits, the famous strange provocation followed - the Chechens captured Grozny while our troops were out on maneuvers, and only the police remained in the city. Newspapers write at lightning speed about the imminent capture of Grozny by the Chechens. But when General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov blocked the city, intending to destroy the militants with artillery fire, General Lebed arrived and signed the surrender in Khasavyurt. In the First Chechen War there was only one defeat - political. In military terms, despite a number of frequent setbacks, the war was won. The surrender in Khasavyurt was signed after the almost complete destruction of the gang. The media and traitors at the top played a shameful role in this matter.

From 1996 to 1999, Chechnya was again stewing in its own juice. By this time, “Russification” had occurred in Russia, after a decade of rabid glorification of liberalism. The press covered the beginning of the Second Chechen War (1999-2000) in a completely different way. Is this war over, given the recent terrorist attack in Chechnya? Unfortunately, wars have been going on in the Caucasus for tens and hundreds of years.

To some extent, the opinion that the Kremlin feeds the Caucasus is partly true. Masses of people with weapons were busy with something in these small conditions. No matter how we finance Chechnya, where over 90% of the revenue comes from the federal budget, no matter how it sounds, it is still cheaper than war.

Nowadays an interesting situation has developed in the Caucasus. On the one hand, they were beaten well, but, on the other hand, they began to be appeased and respected. After a certain time, they will forget how they got hit in the neck. Placating sooner or later will lead to them saying - not enough, give us more money! To avoid war, the Kremlin pursued a policy that was initially effective and brought good results - it relied on local figures, including Akhmat and Ramzan Kadyrov. So far it's effective. He managed to quite calmly integrate many militants into normal life. In the Caucasus, as the tsarist and Soviet experience shows, the most effective was the general government headed by a Russian general. Why Russians?! Chechens are people of a clan society, and when one of the Chechens is in power, the rest of the clans can feel offended. So far, the current policy in Chechnya is producing good results, but it cannot be continued for long. Care must be taken to avoid war, which could break out with renewed vigor!

Security officials have drawn conclusions from two Chechen wars. Vladimir Putin came to power in the 1999-2000s with considerable support, primarily from the security forces. Among them there were many people associated with the Chechen war, so they were determined that entities like Ichkeria would not appear on Russian territory. It must be admitted that a number of military leaders who made a career in both Chechen wars entered the military-political elite. Of course, there are not many of them, but they exist. Let us remember that Shamanov was not very effective, but still a governor, and General Troshev was engaged in the revival of the Cossacks. These are the proponents of two Chechen wars.

The Kremlin made a conclusion about the media and public organizations, such as Soldiers' Mothers. The conclusions are correct - it is impossible to completely ban and close such organizations, creating an aura of martyrdom for them, otherwise the Kremlin will be suspected of hiding something. The Kremlin has put them on a short leash. Now a certain citizen Vasilyeva is trying to repeat the experience of human rights activists of the 90s. She created the “Gruz-200” society, gives interviews and tries to prove something about the huge number of soldiers who died in the Donbass. Vasilyeva’s imagination has run out, so she lists all sorts of football teams where everyone died, or simply takes numbers from a lantern. Such individuals must be deftly neutralized by directing them to the marginal sphere.

If we compare the information field of 1994 and the current one, it’s heaven and earth. Of course, the victory is not final, but Putin’s rating is known, which is recognized with gnashing of teeth by Western figures speaking from the position of Chechen terrorists, “white ribbon activists,” liberals and other anti-Putin opposition. Who are these pussies, writers who have declared their desire to emigrate?! For example, Akunin wants to be expelled from the country in disgrace, like Solzhenitsyn was in his time. They told Akunin - go! Who needs him over the hill?! It is very awkward to merge the opposition, showing what it is, without banning it.

In Soviet times, everything was prohibited; many people spoke in glowing terms about Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. But then they read what Sakharov wrote. Some brave souls who are trying to overcome the burden of Solzhenitsyn’s novels are perplexed, what did these authors want to say, did they really have such an influence on minds?! Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov would not have had the influence they had if they had not been silenced, but had been allowed to speak, as they say, to the side.

The Kremlin has learned the lessons of the First Chechen War. It was by relying on the security forces that a change of regime took place with the arrival of Putin. The Kremlin has realized the role of the media, and the fight against them should not be so primitive, in the spirit of “take it and shut it down.” In pathetic language, the guys who died in Chechnya did not die in vain! In Russia, it was possible to overcome the real collapse of the country and preserve the armed forces, which received a certain training and experience. As often happens, they wanted to destroy Russia, but everything turned out the other way around, the country grew stronger in spite of its enemies.




BACKGROUND The Chechen war, in short, became the most terrible and cruel event for Russia after the collapse of the USSR. Opinions about her are still ambiguous. Some historians and analysts support the authorities’ decision to send in troops, while others say that this difficult conflict could have been prevented and terrible losses could have been avoided. Be that as it may, when talking about the Chechen war, first of all you need to find out the reasons for its outbreak. It should be remembered that this war is divided into two stages. First Chechen War. Second Chechen War.





Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, in September 1991, an armed coup took place in the republic, led by Dzhokhar Dudayev. As a result, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria arose, which immediately declared its independence from the RSFSR. This event occurred on November 1, 1991. Dudayev introduced martial law in the country and refused to negotiate with the Kremlin until the independence of Ichkeria was officially recognized by him. The forces of the republic also captured military bases of Russian troops on its territory.





FIRST CHECHEN WAR () Date - December 11, 1994 - August 31, 1996 Place - Chechnya Result - Khasavyurt agreements Opponents - UNO-UNSO volunteers (Chechen separatists), Arab separatists





PROGRESS OF THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR Deployment of troops (December 1994) Storming of Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995) Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March-April 1995) Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995) Terrorist attack in Budennovsk ( June 1995) Terrorist attack in Kizlyar (January 9–18, 1996) Militant attack on Grozny (March 6–8, 1996) Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996) Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996) Negotiations with separatists (May - July 1996) Operation Jihad (August 6 - 22, 1996) Khasavyurt Agreement (August 31, 1996)





PROGRESS OF THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR In September 1991, “The United Committee of the Chechen People, headed by Dudayev, seized power in Chechnya, announcing the creation of the Republic of Ichkeria. He formed his own army and began to pursue an anti-federal policy. In November 1994, Yeltsin issued an order to suppress the armed rebellion in Chechnya. The war has begun. The Russian command underestimated the enemy. In winter there were bloody battles for Grozny. In the summer of 1995, Prime Minister V.S. Chernomyrdin entered into negotiations with terrorists, and as a result, the bandits left the city and went to Chechnya. At the end of 1995, hostilities intensified throughout the republic. The war became protracted. Moscow has finally realized that it is impossible to solve the problem of Chechnya through military confrontation. On August 31, 1996, a peace treaty was signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first war. The first president of Chechnya, A. Maskhadov, was elected. Chechnya became de facto independent. Both in the center and in Chechnya they understood that the signed agreement did not resolve the conflict.











LOSSES IN THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR Russia lost: people killed missing/deserted/captured people wounded Chechnya lost: people killed thousands killed civilians Almost the entire non-Chechen population left the Chechen Republic.











Russia 1999 15 military operations 2000 4 major military operations 2001 2 major military operations 2002 1 military operation 2003 no major military operations 2004 2 military operations 2005 4 military operations 2006 7 military operations 2007 3 military operations 2008 2 military operations Chechnya 1999 7 terrorist attacks 2000 - 4 terrorist attacks 2001 - 1 terrorist attack 2002 - 6 terrorist attacks 2003 - 6 terrorist attacks 2004 - 9 terrorist attacks 2005 - 1 terrorist attack 2006 - 2 terrorist attacks 2007 - 1 terrorist attack 2008 – 2 terrorist attacks PROGRESS OF THE SECOND CHECHEN WAR





In 1999, Chechen militants attacked Dagestan. Russia unilaterally terminated the 1996 peace treaty. During this time, the Chechen leadership established connections with international terrorist networks, formed special troops, organized the supply of weapons and the flow of funds. The goal is to capture the North Caucasus. The Russian leadership turned out to be powerless. In fact, Chechnya fell out of the Russian Federation. None of the center's peace initiatives had any effect. On September 23, Yeltsin signed a decree on the start of hostilities in Chechnya, and on October 18, federal troops surrounded Grozny. Civilians fled the city. In February 2000, Grozny was captured, but fighting continued until 2003. In March 2003, the Constitution of Chechnya was adopted, and A. Kadyrov was elected president. Gradually, economic life improved, but the political situation still remained difficult: terrorist attacks continued.
THE UNFINISHED WAR After the end of the first Chechen campaign, the fate of more than 1,200 Russian military personnel remained unknown. Some of them were captured by Chechen militants, some lay in foreign soil, and the bodies of more than 500 soldiers were kept in the refrigerators of the 124th forensic laboratory in Rostov until the identification procedure. Thus, politicians and generals actually lost an entire regiment in Chechnya (and this is not counting more than 4 thousand soldiers and officers officially declared dead). At one time, Novaya Gazeta launched a campaign to search for missing people and release prisoners and hostages. This action was called "Forgotten Regiment". As a result, with the help of journalists and readers of the newspaper, it was possible to free more than 150 captured military personnel and hostages from captivity in Chechnya, and to help mothers find and identify the remains of many dead children. In August 1999, after the attack of the Basayev and Khattab gangs on Dagestan, the second Chechen campaign began. And again the problem of prisoners, hostages, and missing persons arose. The authorities, as always, turned out to be unprepared to fully solve these problems.

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