CHAPTER I BORDER TROOPS IN THE FAR EASTERN WARS (1900–1905) In the second half of the 19th century. many countries began to show increased interest in the Far Eastern region, and primarily in China and Korea. The colonization of China by foreign powers began in 1842. Then, according to the results

1. BORDER TROOPS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST BASMACHISTISM (1923–1933) At different periods of history in Russia, internal armed conflicts of various natures repeatedly arose, associated with separatist uprisings and the use of military force by the state for their

CHAPTER IV BORDER TROOPS IN THE SOVIET-FINLAND WAR (1939–1940) In the 30s. The contradictions between the major imperialist powers intensified significantly, and the struggle for world domination intensified. Germany, having significantly increased its military-economic potential,

CHAPTER V BORDER TROOPS OF THE USSR IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

1. BORDER TROOPS OF THE WESTERN DISTRICTS ON THE EVE OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR The growing military threat on the western border of the USSR did not remain out of sight of the Soviet leadership. In this regard, in 1939–1941. a number of measures were taken to strengthen the border troops,

3. BORDER TROOPS IN COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN SECTIONS OF THE SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT In the southern (border with Romania) and northern (border with Finland) sectors of the Soviet-German front, the situation for our troops in the initial period of the war was more

CHAPTER VI BORDER TROOPS OF THE FAR EASTERN DISTRICTS IN THE WAR WITH JAPAN (1945) The service and combat activities of the border troops during the military campaign in the Far East in 1945 took place in a situation different from the one in which the border guards of the Western countries operated

2. BORDER TROOPS OF THE TRANSBAIKAL, KHABAROVSK AND PRIMORSKY DISTRICTS DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS Military operations of Soviet troops against Japan in accordance with the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters began on August 9, 1945. The day before, the leadership of the Soviet Union stated that from 9

CHAPTER IX USSR BORDER TROOPS IN THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN For ten years (1980–1989), the attention of the world community was focused on the events taking place in Afghanistan. After the so-called April Revolution, which overthrew the power of M. Daoud, the Soviet Union, without taking into account

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2. BORDER TROOPS IN THE CHECHEN CONFLICT

The prerequisites and causes of the Chechen conflict are, of course, complex. Here is a change in the social system in the country, and the encouragement of separatist movements locally, and the inconsistency of the Russian leadership in relation to Chechen separatism, and the abandonment of a large amount of weapons and military equipment after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Chechnya.

Along with the internal reasons that contributed to the emergence of the Chechen political conflict and its escalation into a military one, there were also external reasons. There are many factors in this region that attract constant attention. One of them is oil reserves 676
According to experts, about 25 billion tons of oil are concentrated in the Caspian region and the Caspian Sea alone.

With the reduction of oil reserves on the planet, this region is turning into a zone of increased interests of many subjects of world politics, in particular the USA, Great Britain, Germany, as well as some other countries of the West and the Near and Middle East. The factor of Islamism, or more precisely the Wahhabi movement encouraged by Saudi Arabia, which is extremely aggressive not only towards “non-believers”, but also towards supporters of traditional Islam, is also very significant in Chechnya.

The impact of this complex of reasons complicated the military-political situation in the Caucasus. In the early 90s. a conflict arose between Ossetians and Ingush. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was divided into two republics within Russia. It was at this time that a regrouping and concentration of political forces took place in Chechnya. The first demands for granting it sovereignty were declared.

Events developed in this sequence. In November 1990, the National Congress of the Chechen People (OCCHN) was formed. Its executive committee was headed by D. Dudayev. The First Congress of the OKCHN adopted the Declaration on the formation of the Chechen Republic (CR), and the session of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty. In March 1991, the legislative body of Checheno-Ingushetia decided to abandon the Russian referendum. Since that time, the Chechen Republic has not participated in all-Russian political events. At the same time, some Ingush regions (Nazran, Malgobek and Sunzhensky) took part in the Russian referendum. For the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that there were no political reasons for separatism on the part of the Chechens. In 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Russia adopted the Law on the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples, which condemned the cruelty and recognized the illegality of the actions of the Stalinist regime, and provided for a number of measures to eliminate the consequences of the forced deportation of Chechens, Ingush and other peoples. The Russian government has allocated significant funds for the implementation of socio-economic and environmental programs in the North Caucasus.

Nevertheless, separatism was gaining strength, skillfully fueled both from within by ambitious and unselfish figures, and from without by forces interested in weakening Russia. In July 1991, the Second Congress of the OKChN officially announced secession from the RSFSR and the USSR, and in September D. Dudayev expelled the Supreme Council, headed by D. Zavgaev, and dissolved the then still existing Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. In October 1991, the OKCHN executive committee held parliamentary and presidential elections in violation of democratic norms. The Supreme Council of the RSFSR recognizes the elections as illegal, but despite this, D. Dudayev becomes president of Chechnya. Opposition to the Dudayev administration arises. In April 1993, Dudayev dissolved the Council of Ministers and parliament and introduced presidential rule. The independence of the Republic of Ichkeria is declared. However, the government in Chechnya was not legitimate, since most of its residents did not participate in the presidential elections.

Achieving political goals by the separatists involved the use of military means. From the first days of its existence, the regime began to create armed formations and equip them with technical equipment. At the first stage, the main source of weapons and military equipment for Dudayev’s illegal formations was the weapons of the Soviet troops. Even before their withdrawal in June 1992, a number of attacks were organized on military units in order to seize weapons. The last point in supplying weapons to illegal groups in Chechnya was put by the then Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation P.S. Grachev 677
Who started the armed conflict in Chechnya. Govorukhin Commission. M., 1995.

The Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General V. Dubinin, reported in June 1992 on how the weapons were left on Chechen territory. Responding to a request from the Chairman of the Security Committee of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation S. Stepashin, he noted, in particular: “ Due to the sharp aggravation of the situation in Grozny and the ultimatum of the Chechen leadership to the military until June 10 of this year. to leave the city, the command of the North Caucasian Military District was forced to urgently withdraw the remaining personnel of the Grozny garrison outside the republic. As a result, some of the weapons, ammunition and supplies were captured." 678
Muzaev T. Chechen Republic: Authorities and political forces. M., 1995, p. 25–26.

There was no reliable data on the composition and number of illegal armed groups (IAF) in Chechnya. The Government of National Revival claimed the presence of 4–5 thousand people, including 1.5–2 thousand mercenaries and 1 thousand volunteers mainly from rural areas of self-proclaimed Ichkeria. According to the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation, there were about 15 thousand people in the ranks of Dudayev’s militias, including 5 thousand in Grozny and Gudermes, 1.5 thousand in the Shekhovsky district, 2 thousand in the mountainous part of Chechnya, in Argun - 500 people and in the village of Kargalinskaya - 100 people. The Dudayevites did not have exact information about the number of weapons and military equipment. From the statement of the Ex-Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation O. Lobov, it followed that the illegal armed formations were armed with about 300 training aircraft, 100 modern tanks, dozens of Grad installations, various types of artillery installations, air defense systems, and a variety of small arms.

According to observers, the illegal armed formations of the Chechen Republic numbered: T-62 and T-72 tanks - 42, BMP-1 and BMP-2 - 36, BTR-70 and BRDM-2 - 30, Konkurs anti-tank missile systems - 2, "Fagot" - 24, "Metis" - 51, RPG-7 grenade launchers - 513, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) - 24, mortars, guns and howitzers - 124, airplanes and helicopters - 258, air defense systems (Strela, “Igla”, “Shilka”, and since 1999 “Stinger”) - 40, small arms - more than 41 thousand units 679
Novichkov N.N. and etc. Russian Armed Forces in the Chechen conflict: Analysis. Results. Conclusions. Paris. M., 1995, p. 13–17.

The organization of economic, socio-political and spiritual life in the republic testified to the reactionary-criminal nature of the Dudayev regime. This was the main reason for his confrontation with the opposition. Since August 1994, a civil war was actually unleashed in the Chechen Republic. The ultimatum of the President of Russia to cease fire and lay down arms was not fulfilled. D. Dudayev announced mobilization and informed the world community that volunteers from all over the Caucasus were being drawn to the republic.

Discussion of the Chechen problem at meetings of the Security Council (SC) starting in 1992 and peace negotiations did not lead to the normalization of relations within Chechnya and the Chechen Republic with the Russian Federation. The decision to use military force in Chechnya was made by the President of the Russian Federation on November 30, 1994. By his decree, a group was created to manage actions to disarm illegal armed groups, on the basis of which in December of this year the headquarters for the management of the military operation in Chechnya was formed, headed by N. Egorov. The group included the heads of all law enforcement agencies, including the Director of the Federal Border Service, Colonel General A.I. Nikolaev. December 1, 1994, the President of the Russian Federation “for the purpose of urgent measures to resolve the armed conflict on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation" appointed the plenipotentiary representative of the President of Russia in the Chechen Republic. He guaranteed exemption from criminal liability for citizens of the Chechen Republic who voluntarily surrendered their weapons and were not involved in serious crimes against humanity. However, the decree of the President of Russia did not have any effect on the Chechen separatists, and on December 9, 1994, he signed the Decree “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.”

To carry out the operation to disarm illegal armed groups, three groups were created by the Russian Armed Forces: “North”, “West” and “East”. The composition was very heterogeneous. The operation involved formations and units of four types of armed forces, border and internal troops, forces and assets of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK). It was based on: the 8th Army Corps, the 76th (Pskov) Airborne Division and other formations and units of military districts. The number of troops changed, and at the time of the conclusion of the Khasavyurt agreements, the group of armed forces in Chechnya amounted to 39,188 people, including: the Ministry of Defense - 12,990, internal troops - 24,229, special forces units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 1,969 people 680
Red Star, 1996, October 4.

On December 11, 1994, federal armed forces, troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other security forces were introduced into the Chechen Republic. The Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the citizens of Russia noted: “Today, December 11, 1994, troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation were introduced into the territory of the Chechen Republic. The government’s actions are caused by a threat to the integrity of Russia, the safety of its citizens both in Chechnya and beyond, and the possibility of destabilizing the political and economic situation.” 681
Russian gas., 1994, December 13.

The prevailing conditions objectively, albeit indirectly, brought the troops of the Caucasian Special Border District (KOPO) into the Chechen events. Before the introduction of federal forces into Chechnya, the district's troops guarded the state border and protected Russia's interests along two lines: the first - on the border of the former Soviet Union with Turkey and Iran (with the forces of two military groups - "Georgia" and "Armenia"); the second is on the state border of Russia with Georgia and Azerbaijan.

The situation on the border became more complicated as the confrontation between Grozny and Moscow, between the Dudayev regime and the opposition in Chechnya grew. Attempts to smuggle smuggled weapons across borders, cross borders using forged documents, and violate the maritime border on the Black and Caspian Seas by military, commercial and fishing vessels have become more frequent. All this, even before the decision was made to use the Russian Border Troops in the Chechen conflict, forced border security to be carried out in an enhanced mode.

For the first time, the issue of including border troops and subunits in the operation to disarm illegal armed groups was considered at a meeting of the Security Council in November 1994. The leadership of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia expressed the opinion that it was inappropriate to use border troops to cover the administrative border of Chechnya with Dagestan and Ingushetia. Nevertheless, the Security Council decided to include border guards in the federal forces. They were tasked with covering the administrative border, as well as carrying out instructions to restore and maintain constitutional order in the territories of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation adjacent to Chechnya 682
Interview A.I. Nikolaev// Panorama, 1995, No. 10, p. eleven.

By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 9, 1994, the government was instructed in accordance with paragraphs “d” and “f” of Art. 114 of the Constitution of Russia to use all means available to the state to ensure state security 683
War in Chechnya. Crisis of federal power // “Club Realists”, M., 1995, p. 80.

In pursuance of this Decree, a decree of the Russian government was adopted on December 9, 1994 “On ensuring state security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, the rule of law, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the disarmament of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and the adjacent regions of the North Caucasus.” Based on these documents, on December 17, 1994, the Security Council decided to involve border troops in the task of covering the administrative border of the Chechen Republic with Ingushetia (80 km long) and Dagestan (150 km). Specific tasks for the troops were determined in the decision of the Security Council of the Russian Federation dated January 6, 1995 and the directive of the director of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia dated January 9, 1995. On January 10-11 of the same year, the KOPO troops were regrouped and sections of the administrative border of the Chechen Republic in the former zone were taken under protection responsibility of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

According to the leadership of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia, the main goal of the border troops on the administrative border of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan was to cover and control those most important directions that the separatists and their patrons could use to transfer weapons, materiel, mercenaries and other purposes to Chechnya , and thereby providing assistance to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. By June 1995, the group was formed. In total, the leadership of the border troops recruited about 6 thousand people to complete the task. 684
Border of Russia, 1997, No. 1.

Border troops received two zones of responsibility in Dagestan and one in Ingushetia.

The task of covering the administrative border of Chechnya, preventing the smuggling of contraband and the infiltration of militants was extremely difficult. Complete closure of the administrative border to the movement of citizens and vehicles turned out to be impossible for objective reasons. Border troops covered only areas with the most intense traffic. In pursuance of presidential decrees and decisions of the Security Council, an action plan was developed in the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia, a management system was created, including, in addition to permanently existing bodies, operational groups, etc.

By decision of the commander of the KOPO troops, in cooperation with formations and units of the North Caucasus District of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB departments, it was envisaged to concentrate efforts to protect the state and administrative border in the areas of active actions of extremist, nationalist and smuggling groups. There was a consistent increase in efforts to cover the border by setting up border posts at the expected breakthrough sites. When necessary, aviation, naval forces and means were used. KOPO troops were reinforced by freelance motorized maneuver groups.

The tactics of the border troops were determined by the techniques and methods of fighting illegal armed groups, which included: ambushes, mining of objects and communications of the border troops, shelling of their positions, breakthroughs to commit sabotage and terrorist acts, attacks by mercenaries dressed in the uniform of Russian military personnel on border units and convoys for capture weapons and military equipment, kidnapping of border guards in order to obtain ransom or exchange for captured militants and persons serving sentences in prison for all kinds of crimes.

The exceptionally high mobility of illegal armed groups forced the district command to carry out maneuvers with available forces and means in the most threatened directions, continuously increase the density of security of the state and administrative borders, create reserves, conduct a tough defense in covered areas and active ambush and reconnaissance and search operations, and carry out fire strikes against the enemy in order to prevent the Chechen formations from breaking through the administrative border into the territory of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation adjacent to Chechnya.

As they accumulated combat experience, the personnel of the border troops who took part in the Chechen conflict, constantly improving their combat and service skills, successfully completed their assigned tasks. According to the leadership of the Federal Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation, a particularly difficult situation has arisen on the administrative border of Chechnya with Ingushetia in the area of ​​​​the settlements of Nizhny and Verkhny Alkun, Alkhasty. The militants did not stop trying to mine the border area, take hostages, and break through the border in order to penetrate the territory of the Ingush Republic. In the Dagestan-Chechen sector the situation was not much better. In 1995 alone, border troops units stationed on the administrative border of Chechnya entered into military clashes with violators 119 times. The tension of the situation on the border is evidenced by the dynamics of illegal actions towards border guards in the first months of the military conflict. If in December 1994 one such action was committed, then in January 1995 there were already 20 of them, including 13 shellings, 5 attacks, 2 cases of mining. Three border guards were killed and three were wounded.

Certain periods of the confrontation were especially tense. For example, from February 3 to February 10, 1995 alone, 16 illegal acts were committed against border guards. The barbaric nature of the actions of Dudayev’s formations is evidenced by the events in the village of Assinovskaya, where three border guards were brutally killed and their corpses were mutilated. A number of similar actions were taken to demoralize the border troops. The bandit attacks of illegal armed groups received more and more decisive rebuff over and over again.

So, on May 19, 1995, in the area of ​​the village. Muzhichi, a group of Chechen militants numbering more than 30 people attacked an armored personnel carrier of the border troops. A battle ensued that lasted about two hours. The coherence of the crew and mutual assistance, acquired during the performance of service and combat missions on the administrative border, forced the militants to retreat.

On June 18, 1995, a border post in the village of Ziberkhali was attacked by militants. The balance of forces was unequal, but the border guards, despite this, remained faithful to their military duty. Skillfully maneuvering, using engineering structures and natural shelters, they withstood the onslaught of the militants. The combat operations were skillfully led by Major I. Pinchuk, captains I. Bondarenko, V. Bukharov, A. Vinogradov, and junior lieutenant P. Ivanenko, who showed high leadership qualities. Junior sergeants A. Pislichin, V. Antropov and other soldiers acted heroically in battle. The action to destroy the border post and seize weapons, ammunition and materiel failed. But in this battle, Corporal I. Asadullin, privates V. Vasiliev, S. Krasnoglazov and S. Ryabov died. One of the outposts of the Zheleznovodsk border detachment is named today after the brave border guard I. Asadullin.

Near Nesterovskaya village in January 1996, unknown persons killed Sergeant S. Nenza. A few days later, from an ambush on the outskirts of this village, an armored personnel carrier returning from a military outpost to the location of a motorized maneuver group was fired at almost point-blank with automatic weapons. There were eight people on board the car. As a result of the bandit attack, the head of the outpost, Captain A. Prilutsky, and the commander of the material support company of the Ignatov NCO School, Senior Lieutenant V. Nosikov, were killed. Two more border guards were seriously wounded.

The fighting on the border required appropriate measures from the General Headquarters of the Border Troops.

The KOPO command constantly had to carry out maneuvers with the available forces and means in order to unconditionally fulfill the tasks assigned to the district troops and improve security in particularly threatened areas. In the fight against Chechen illegal groups, they used tough defense, carried out active ambushes and reconnaissance searches, and launched fire strikes on the enemy in cases of attempts to break through the administrative border into the territory of adjacent objects of the Russian Federation. In the course of carrying out service and combat missions, the interaction of the district troops with other troops participating in the disarmament of illegal paramilitary groups and the establishment of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic was steadily improved, although many problems of interaction between the border troops and other troops remained unresolved for a long time.

The longer the military conflict in Chechnya continued, the more weapons, ammunition, and other material resources illegal armed groups needed to conduct combat operations with federal forces. It was possible to replenish military supplies only outside the Chechen administrative border. And the more acutely the need for weapons was felt, the more stressful the life of the border guards became. The emerging military situation forced us to act actively, develop new tactics, and continuously improve our professional skills.

But, despite the complete dedication of the border units and units participating in ending the military conflict on the territory of the Russian Federation, the effectiveness of their service and combat activities could not be sufficiently effective. This was due to a number of reasons that negatively affected the nature and performance of the border troops.

One of these reasons was the lack of a legal framework for the use of troops in internal military conflicts. In Art. 30 of the Law of the Russian Federation “On the State Border of the Russian Federation” states: “Border troops guard the State border on land, sea, rivers, lakes and other bodies of water, as well as at checkpoints across the State border... It is not allowed for the Border Troops to use the rights granted to them to solve problems , not imposed on them by federal laws." The service and combat activities of border troops at the administrative border are not provided for by any legislative act.

The absence of a clearly established border between Chechnya and other constituent entities of the Russian Federation, a regime for the passage of citizens and various cargo from the territory of Dagestan, Ingushetia to Chechnya and back, as well as the lack of a legal framework for the use of border troops in internal military conflicts put border guards in a very difficult position.

The transparency of Azerbaijan’s borders with Turkey and Iran significantly hampered their performance of service and combat missions. Certain political forces, being interested in escalating tension in the Caucasus, used the open border for unseemly purposes. For example, before the introduction of temporary restrictions on crossing the state border, 16 thousand people left Azerbaijan for Russia, and only 14 thousand returned. More than 200 foreign citizens of non-CIS countries with USSR passports issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan did not receive entry permission, since they had characteristic features of mercenaries 685
Pravda, 1996, October 15.

Attempts to transport large quantities of weapons from Azerbaijan to Chechnya were also stopped...

The negative impact on the functioning of the border troops was caused by the rejection by the majority of the population, many political parties and movements of forceful methods of resolving the Chechen crisis. The Federation Council, on the eve (December 8, 1994) of the adoption by the President of Russia of the Decree “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict” (December 9, 1994), adopted a resolution “On the situation in the Chechen Republic ”, in which he condemned the use of troops in resolving the conflict. The executive branch was asked to strictly follow the Constitution and federal laws when choosing methods and means to preserve the state integrity of the country, stop armed confrontation and “not allow the use of force on the territory of the Chechen Republic until a different decision is made by the competent authorities in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation.” 686
War in Chechnya: Crisis of Federal Power, p. 81.

A significant factor influencing the effectiveness of border guards in carrying out combat missions in the Chechen conflict zone was poor logistics and financial support. According to the former director of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia, Army General A.I. Nikolaev, the deployment of border troops units on the administrative border with Chechnya was carried out at the expense of the already approved budget of the Federal Border Service of Russia. No additional appropriations were made 687
Moscow Komsomolets, 1995, May 30.

As a result of chronic underfunding, KOPO's debt to suppliers by September 1996 reached almost 15 billion rubles. Help from local organizations in the same year exceeded 9 billion rubles. and was one of the sources of financing the activities of border guards. But these funds were clearly not enough. For example, one-way delivery of just one motorized maneuver group from Transbaikalia to the Caucasus cost 1 billion rubles. (at the rate of 1996), and in Chechnya there were more than ten of them 688
Interview A.I. Nikolaev…, With. eleven.

Just for food for COPO personnel, as stated by the commander of the troops, Colonel General V. L. Zemtsov, 460 million rubles were required. per day. Over 30 units and formations of the district were stationed in the field, in tents 689
Rural life, 1996, September 24.

The logistical support provided to the illegal Chechen paramilitary forces was incomparable.

But the criminal aspect had a particularly negative impact on the character and results of the service and combat activities of border guards participating in the Chechen conflict. It manifested itself primarily in the illegal accumulation of weapons and military equipment on the territory of Chechnya, one of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and in their concentration in the hands of a political force that is actively working to destroy the state integrity of the country.

The criminal aspect was also visible in the continuous replenishment of means of warfare, material, economic and financial resources by illegal armed groups during the fighting in Chechnya. The presence of crime in the Chechen conflict was also pointed out at hearings in the State Duma on the Chechen issue. During the discussion, it was noted that not so much from abroad, but from Russia, “BTR-90s, trucks with weapons and ammunition for militants are being supplied. Pay money and there will be weapons" 690
New gas., 1996, October 7-13, p. 8.

There are also numerous indications that the most extremist elements found moral and financial support from some Moscow government officials and oligarchs.

It was also a crime that hundreds of billions of rubles allocated for the restoration of the destroyed economy of Chechnya were not used for their intended purpose and left the budget without a trace. “We can say with a great deal of responsibility that in order to carry out tasks, to conduct combat operations, no one either in Chechnya or to Chechnya makes its way along mountain paths,” said the director of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia, Army General A.I. Nikolaev. “The militants – alive and wounded – move quite comfortably with the appropriate legally issued documents. And it is impossible to solve this problem only by carrying out certain activities at the state border.” 691
Lit. Gaz., 1996, September 4.

To all this, the border guards countered a fairly effective system of command and control of troops in all types of their combat activities and forms of life activity, continuous and at the maximum level of capabilities of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia ensuring the service and combat activities of the KOPO troops, the organization of interaction and mutual assistance of formations and units of the district, loyalty of personnel to military duty, the highest responsibility for the fate of society and the state.

The high moral and combat qualities of border soldiers were and remain the most important factor in the combat readiness of border troops. But the experience of their participation in the Chechen conflict showed that the ability to act in an extreme situation is not given by birth, but is formed by the purposeful painstaking work of commanders, educators, and the organization of everyday life.

The group of border troops in these directions carried out their assigned tasks until the end of November - beginning of December 1996, after which a decision was made to transfer the areas covered by border guards on the administrative border with Chechnya to the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 692
Border of Russia, 1997, No. 1.

The signing on August 22, 1996 of the so-called Khasavyurt agreements on urgent measures to cease fire and hostilities in Grozny and on the territory of the Chechen Republic marked the beginning of the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of federal troops to areas of previous or new deployment, but before the normalization of relations between the center and the Chechen Republic there was still far. Each of the warring sides declared its own victory. However, the victory of the Chechen side was more obvious, therefore, will and boundless patience were required from the leadership of the Russian Federation for the complete and final normalization of the situation in Chechnya and throughout the North Caucasus region.

The leaders of the Chechen Republic, not to mention the field commanders, as the leaders of armed groups are often called, did not hide their goal of secession from Russia. One of the most authoritative among them, Vakha Arsanov, said: “Let everyone who doesn’t like Ichkeria go to their own Russia. I don’t see them point blank and I don’t want to know.” 693
Moscow news, 1996, September 10.

Not only statements, but also specific actions of the separatists emphasized their disdain for the Khasavyurt agreements. The security forces of the Russian Federation were withdrawn from the rebellious republic, and the militants were not disarmed and prisoners were not handed over. The idea of ​​​​creating the so-called Vainakh state was actively implemented, providing for the inclusion of Ingushetia, part of Dagestan with access to the Caspian Sea and the separation of part of the Stavropol Territory into Chechnya.

The Russian leadership was, if not completely at a loss, then in anticipation of some kind of self-resolution of the problem. Explosions in Armavir, Pyatigorsk, Kaspiysk, hundreds of kidnapped Russian and foreign citizens, strengthening of militant groups on the territory of Chechnya, attacks on police checkpoints and military units and much more testified to the determination of the Chechen side in achieving its goals and the passivity of the official authorities of the Russian Federation in solving the problem Chechnya and the North Caucasus as a whole.

Under these conditions, at many KOPO sites, service was organized under an enhanced regime. The criminal situation has sharply worsened. The number of violations of territorial waters by foreign vessels has increased fivefold. The most serious situation has developed on the Russian-Azerbaijani section of the border, where in 1996 more than half of the total number of smugglers were detained. Poaching of sturgeon caviar alone is projected to reach 200 tons per year. The losses of criminal clans from the actions of border guards to seize alcohol on the Russian-Georgian border are estimated at 4 trillion. non-denominated rubles. However, the confrontation at the Verkhniy Lars checkpoint did not end in favor of the Russian Federal Border Guard Service. According to one version, it was in revenge for honest and principled service that the house in which the border guards of the Caspian border detachment lived was blown up. 54 people became victims. In 1997, 10 Russian border guards were taken hostage. In June 1998, a separate KOPO aviation squadron and civilian transport 200 m south of the Verkhniy Lars checkpoint came under fire.

Good day to all! A few days ago I returned from the Caucasus, from a big trip through the mountains of Chechnya and Ingushetia, which ended with a big press tour organized by the FSB Border Department for the Republic of Ingushetia for journalists and bloggers in the region.

In the photo: the Assa River a kilometer from the border with Georgia.

I’ll say right away that this was the best press tour in recent times. A couple of years ago I was forbidden to photograph the border infrastructure even from afar, but now it turned out to be possible to visit four border outposts of Ingushetia (we spent the night at one), and go to wild, protected places where civilians are not allowed, including right on the border with Georgia. We were shown in detail how border guards live, serve and protect the territory. And they let us feel a little in their role)) Such openness surprises and pleases. And what amazes me most is the readiness of the border services to help tourists, their friendliness and hospitality. I remember how three years ago, even before the opening of borders and the tourism cluster, I was greeted at posts with distrust and fear. But last year, when the border guards met, even before checking my documents, they began to invite me to the guest room “for tea.” I was very surprised then. It turned out that this was no coincidence. Positive changes are really taking place in the border service, and the press tour showed this perfectly.

1. The press tour began in Nazran, from where we moved to the mountains in an organized column on brand new “patriots”. In the seat pocket, each participant in the press tour found Achaluki mineral water and a glass. It’s a small thing, but how convenient it is to ride with all the amenities in a normal jeep :)

2. When entering the mountainous Dzheirakh region of Ingushetia from Vladikavkaz, everyone is greeted by the Ezmi checkpoint, made in the shape of a medieval arch. The “Gateway to the Mountains” was built in the spring of 2013, after the procedure for entry to the border areas was simplified. Currently, Russian citizens only need to show a Russian passport to travel. If you forgot your passport, you will have to go back to get it, there is a border, the rules are strict, no other identification and “calls to a friend” are accepted. Before our eyes, border guards also carried out a random search of the trunk of one of the passing cars.

3. Memorial plaque in memory of those killed during the war.

4. The second checkpoint "Khamkhi" is located at the exit from the Assinsky gorge, if you get to the mountains from the Sunzhensky district of Ingushetia. Its reconstruction was completed in 2015, and it looks especially beautiful in the evening. We went inside, and the monitors showed how video control was being carried out. As our accompanying person said, now when checking passports, special attention is paid to reducing possible conflicts with visitors, when, for example, they forget their passport.

5. The first border post on the side of the Georgian military road, “Ezmi”. In the depths you can see apartment buildings - housing is being built here for several dozen families of border guards, and a children's playground is being installed. There will also be two large houses in Magas.

6. Upon entering each border post, the participants of the press tour were met at the highest level, given a tour, and given interviews.

7. In “Ezmi” at that moment they were organizing an excursion for schoolchildren from neighboring Dzheirakh, the border guards talked about their equipment, but most of all, of course, the weapons aroused interest)

8. Military-patriotic work with schools in the district is carried out regularly.

10. Breakfast in the canteen of the Ezmi border post. Buns, fruit, sweets, tea or coffee. Serving like in a restaurant :)

11. The second border post in Ingushetia - “Lyazhgi”, is located near the famous waterfall.

12. Here we were shown a local bathhouse)

13. This is a steam room.

14. And this is part of the recreation area. Opposite there is a large table with a samovar.

15. We went down to the storage rooms. This is a vegetable store. It maintains a comfortable temperature for storage, fresh food, local farm products.

16. Second breakfast) The border guards did not let us go until we stayed for tea :) Each canteen at the border posts is made in an individual design, with the soul, by the border guards themselves. For me, this is a real resort area, which can successfully compete with the canteen of the Armkhi Health and Fitness Center)))

19. The fourth border post in mountainous Ingushetia - “Besht”.

20. It is the highest mountain, right below Tsey-Loam, the border guards see this view every day.

21. Below the border post there are numerous guarded gorges. In mountainous areas, the most popular transport here is horse-drawn.

22. In “Besht” there are separate stables, each horse usually has one owner-rider, but journalists were allowed to ride them.

23. There are also donkeys on the Besht. They transport goods, without them - nowhere. Donkeys, by the way, reproduce well))

24. Food warehouse. We were even shown the contents of the refrigerators, all the products were fresh, and at the end of the press tour, each participant was given a dry ration for mountainous areas as a gift) It is designed for one person for one day, I ate it for three days while I got to Moscow))

25. Equipment for rescue teams. I have almost the same equipment.

26. All the corridors of the border posts are decorated with photographs, these are either mountains, or tower complexes of Ingushetia, or from the history of the Russian border service.

27. Lunch. Tasty and satisfying. Many thanks to the chefs!

28. Next, our path lay down the pass, along new asphalt laid from the Khamkhi post to almost the hotel for base jumpers. And to connect Dzheirakh and Targim, it remains to lay about 10 kilometers of asphalt, the rest is already ready.

29. On the road to the sixth border post, which is located under the Ozdice towers.

30. Stop at the famous towers of Vovnushka, built on the edge of a cliff.

31. Fifth border post, "Targim".

32-33. Practicing emergency departures. Upon receiving a command (a certain signal is heard over the loudspeakers throughout the outpost), border guards from the “alarm group” or others must quickly gather and leave in vehicles; certain time standards are given for this. Training sessions happen every week, we witnessed one of them.

34. An integral companion of border guards are service dogs.

35. They are also trained every week.

36. They also practice arresting offenders.

37. One of the journalists, Adam Burazhev, volunteered to check how strong the grip is))

38. Each of the dogs is assigned to its own leader; they are kept in well-equipped enclosures.

39. Canteen for dogs.

40. And this is a special medical room for their treatment.

41. People in “Targim” are also comfortable) The kitchen is in one of the buildings. We spent the night at this border post; lights out was after 21:00.

42. Breakfast at 8:00.

43. Not far from Targim is one of the oldest Christian churches in Russia, Thaba-Erdy. We were given a tour to see him.

44. Then we went to Pyaling.

45. Next to the towers is the farm of Israpil Chaniev.

46. ​​Some time ago, Israpil said, he was injured, and the first who provided medical assistance to him were the border guards. A doctor from the border post visited the old man every day for two weeks, worried about his health. Mutual assistance in the mountains is an immutable rule even now.

47. Israpil treated us to apples from his own garden.

48. And he showed a pond in which there are fish:)

49. Further our path lay to the very border with Georgia, here literally a kilometer away there was a border heating station “Assa”, intended for the rest of border guards during long periods of duty.

50. It works completely autonomously. And the conditions are almost like at a resort))

51. The next stop is at the climbing wall for mountain training. Specialists from the CBD are invited to conduct classes.

52. Our journalists also decided to test themselves, on the descent - Amir Kokurkhoev ghalgha (by the way, Amir, it was very nice to see you here, thank you for helping me get on this press tour :))

53-56. Not far from Targim, a shooting complex is now being installed, where training shooting is carried out and hand-to-hand combat techniques are practiced.

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57. Journalists were not denied the pleasure of a fun ride)

58. At the end, the head of the Border Department of the Russian FSB for Ingushetia, Major General Igor Tsvetkov, arrived at the shooting range and a small press conference took place. I was interested in the question of the relationship between the border service and tourists and the local population, are the border guards ready for an increase in people coming to the area, are they ready to help if necessary? The major general assured that with the increase in flow, the infrastructure will also be expanded, and no problems will arise. I hope so.

I also talked a lot with ordinary border guards (by the way, many came from Dagestan), I was impressed that they knew the history and ancient monuments on the territory of Ingushetia well. As soon as I mentioned that I wanted to visit one of the separated tower villages, they immediately found an employee ready to accompany me. Many guys have photographs on their phones of ruins they discovered in the forests, which few people know about. There are those who almost got to the Maiden Tower, I saw its photo up close! In general, from conversations I was convinced that the times of a barbaric attitude towards the heritage of the past are over, now the border service is trying to preserve and improve what it has, no less than the local residents, which, in fact, they already are. By the way, in this post, for obvious reasons, I did not talk about technical means of control, but believe me, they exist, from simple video cameras to special thermal imagers, from which nothing can escape.

At the end of the press tour, each participant was given a letter of gratitude (her photo was immediately published by Akhmed Osmiev in his Instagram, now everyone will be sure that I work for the FSB)).

Many thanks to all the organizers of the press tour, everything went smoothly and smoothly. Good luck to you in your service and peace to all of us!

PS. Other reports from the press tour:
Amira Kokurkhoeva: http://ghalgha.livejournal.com/505479.html
Adam Burazhev:

By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 9, 1994, the government was instructed in accordance with paragraphs “d” and “f” of Art. 114 of the Russian Constitution to use all means available to the state to ensure state security. In pursuance of this Decree, a decree of the Russian government was adopted on December 9, 1994 “On ensuring state security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, the rule of law, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the disarmament of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and the adjacent regions of the North Caucasus.” Based on these documents, on December 17, 1994, the Security Council decided to involve border troops in the task of covering the administrative border of the Chechen Republic with Ingushetia (80 km long) and Dagestan (150 km). Specific tasks for the troops were determined in the decision of the Security Council of the Russian Federation dated January 6, 1995 and the directive of the director of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia dated January 9, 1995. On January 10-11 of the same year, the KOPO troops were regrouped and sections of the administrative border of the Chechen Republic in the former zone were taken under protection responsibility of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

According to the leadership of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia, the main goal of the border troops on the administrative border of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan was to cover and control those most important directions that the separatists and their patrons could use to transfer weapons, materiel, mercenaries and other purposes to Chechnya , and thereby providing assistance to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. By June 1995, the group was formed. In total, the leadership of the border troops recruited about 6 thousand people to complete the task. Border troops received two zones of responsibility in Dagestan and one in Ingushetia.

The task of covering the administrative border of Chechnya, preventing the smuggling of contraband and the infiltration of militants was extremely difficult. Complete closure of the administrative border to the movement of citizens and vehicles turned out to be impossible for objective reasons. Border troops covered only areas with the most intense traffic. In pursuance of presidential decrees and decisions of the Security Council, an action plan was developed in the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia, a management system was created, including, in addition to permanently existing bodies, operational groups, etc.

By decision of the commander of the KOPO troops, in cooperation with formations and units of the North Caucasus District of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB departments, it was envisaged to concentrate efforts to protect the state and administrative border in the areas of active actions of extremist, nationalist and smuggling groups. There was a consistent increase in efforts to cover the border by setting up border posts at the expected breakthrough sites. When necessary, aviation, naval forces and means were used. KOPO troops were reinforced by freelance motorized maneuver groups.

The tactics of the border troops were determined by the techniques and methods of fighting illegal armed groups, which included: ambushes, mining of objects and communications of the border troops, shelling of their positions, breakthroughs to commit sabotage and terrorist acts, attacks by mercenaries dressed in the uniform of Russian military personnel on border units and convoys for capture weapons and military equipment, kidnapping of border guards in order to obtain ransom or exchange for captured militants and persons serving sentences in prison for all kinds of crimes.

The exceptionally high mobility of illegal armed groups forced the district command to carry out maneuvers with available forces and means in the most threatened directions, continuously increase the density of security of the state and administrative borders, create reserves, conduct a tough defense in covered areas and active ambush and reconnaissance and search operations, and carry out fire strikes against the enemy in order to prevent the Chechen formations from breaking through the administrative border into the territory of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation adjacent to Chechnya.

As they accumulated combat experience, the personnel of the border troops who took part in the Chechen conflict, constantly improving their combat and service skills, successfully completed their assigned tasks. According to the leadership of the Federal Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation, a particularly difficult situation has arisen on the administrative border of Chechnya with Ingushetia in the area of ​​​​the settlements of Nizhny and Verkhny Alkun, Alkhasty. The militants did not stop trying to mine the border area, take hostages, and break through the border in order to penetrate the territory of the Ingush Republic. In the Dagestan-Chechen sector the situation was not much better. In 1995 alone, border troops units stationed on the administrative border of Chechnya entered into military clashes with violators 119 times. The tension of the situation on the border is evidenced by the dynamics of illegal actions towards border guards in the first months of the military conflict. If in December 1994 one such action was committed, then in January 1995 there were already 20 of them, including 13 shellings, 5 attacks, 2 cases of mining. Three border guards were killed and three were wounded.

Certain periods of the confrontation were especially tense. For example, from February 3 to February 10, 1995 alone, 16 illegal acts were committed against border guards. The barbaric nature of the actions of Dudayev’s formations is evidenced by the events in the village of Assinovskaya, where three border guards were brutally killed and their corpses were mutilated. A number of similar actions were taken to demoralize the border troops. The bandit attacks of illegal armed groups received more and more decisive rebuff over and over again.

So, on May 19, 1995, in the area of ​​the village. Muzhichi, a group of Chechen militants numbering more than 30 people attacked an armored personnel carrier of the border troops. A battle ensued that lasted about two hours. The coherence of the crew and mutual assistance, acquired during the performance of service and combat missions on the administrative border, forced the militants to retreat.

On June 18, 1995, a border post in the village of Ziberkhali was attacked by militants. The balance of forces was unequal, but the border guards, despite this, remained faithful to their military duty. Skillfully maneuvering, using engineering structures and natural shelters, they withstood the onslaught of the militants. The combat operations were skillfully led by Major I. Pinchuk, captains I. Bondarenko, V. Bukharov, A. Vinogradov, and junior lieutenant P. Ivanenko, who showed high leadership qualities. Junior sergeants A. Pislichin, V. Antropov and other soldiers acted heroically in battle. The action to destroy the border post and seize weapons, ammunition and materiel failed. But in this battle, Corporal I. Asadullin, privates V. Vasiliev, S. Krasnoglazov and S. Ryabov died. One of the outposts of the Zheleznovodsk border detachment is named today after the brave border guard I. Asadullin.

Near Nesterovskaya village in January 1996, unknown persons killed Sergeant S. Nenza. A few days later, from an ambush on the outskirts of this village, an armored personnel carrier returning from a military outpost to the location of a motorized maneuver group was fired at almost point-blank with automatic weapons. There were eight people on board the car. As a result of the bandit attack, the head of the outpost, Captain A. Prilutsky, and the commander of the material support company of the Ignatov NCO School, Senior Lieutenant V. Nosikov, were killed. Two more border guards were seriously wounded.

The fighting on the border required appropriate measures from the General Headquarters of the Border Troops.

The KOPO command constantly had to carry out maneuvers with the available forces and means in order to unconditionally fulfill the tasks assigned to the district troops and improve security in particularly threatened areas. In the fight against Chechen illegal groups, they used tough defense, carried out active ambushes and reconnaissance searches, and launched fire strikes on the enemy in cases of attempts to break through the administrative border into the territory of adjacent objects of the Russian Federation. In the course of carrying out service and combat missions, the interaction of the district troops with other troops participating in the disarmament of illegal paramilitary groups and the establishment of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic was steadily improved, although many problems of interaction between the border troops and other troops remained unresolved for a long time.

The administrative border of Dagestan with Chechnya is an internal border of Russia, but the war in Chechnya turns it into an external one. The information and analytical department of the Federal Border Guard Service told a Kommersant correspondent the details of the incident. Early in the morning, the border guard of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Novozhilov set off towards the Chechen border to check the posts. In the Harami Pass area, he was ambushed by militants who had crossed the border at night, and after a shootout, four officers and a soldier driver were captured. Three mobile groups of 50 people each were sent to help. One of them, in the area of ​​Lake Kazenoy-Am, clashed with militants. In the battle, 4 border guards and 8 Dagestani riot police were killed, 14 people were wounded; 20 Chechen militants were killed and wounded. By joint efforts, the border guards forced the violators to retreat to the village of Vedeno, where the militants of Shamil Basayev’s sabotage battalion are located.
The appearance of militants at the Harami Pass is easy to explain: it is the strategic point of the route along which weapons are delivered to gangs from Azerbaijan. The Basayevites are trying to control not only the pass, but also to extend their influence to the Botlikh-Karata-Mekhelta triangle, adjacent to the Azerbaijani border. In this they are prevented by Russian border guards, who have managed to lose faith in the assurances of the leadership of the Azerbaijani border troops about the impossibility of caravans with weapons passing through their borders (these statements do not prevent Basayev from saying that he bought either a tank or an infantry fighting vehicle, clearly hinting that, supposedly, from the Russians ). It can be assumed that the militants were testing the reaction and strength of the border guards on the eve of the arrival of the next caravan with weapons. In addition, the foray was supposed to divert attention from Gudermes, where an attempt was being made to legalize one of the most combat-ready gang units. As a result, it is obvious that the Dudayevites do not intend to follow in the wake of agreements on a block of military issues and will carry out “disarmament” actions using their own methods.
Nikolaev’s mission made it possible to involve influential persons, including Aslan Maskhadov, in operational search activities. According to the Federal Border Guard Service, the border guards are alive and are in the village of Shatoy. While it is difficult to talk about their complete release, they will most likely join the Chechen list of prisoners of war for an “all for all” exchange. As for the strengthening of the Dagestan section of the Chechen border, the FPS is especially worried about it. With the departure of Russian border guards from Azerbaijan, the external border of the republic was not replenished with its own forces due to the destruction of the entire infrastructure - lack of personnel, technical means. The situation in Chechnya required reliably covering the Russian-Azerbaijani border from the inside, but the Caucasian special software alone cannot do this.
Reliable cover of the Chechen section of the Russian-Georgian border was the main topic of Andrei Nikolaev’s conversations with the Georgian leadership. According to the agreement of 1994, this function is today performed by 10 outposts of the Georgian border troops with full coordination of interaction with units of the Caucasian Special Police. And although there were no attempts to break through the border on the part of Chechen militants in this area, and only 12 firearms were confiscated over the entire period, the FPS and the leadership of the federal troops in Chechnya do not rule out that the implementation of a block of military agreements may push the militants to direction. Only Georgian mountains can be better than the Chechen mountains. After the meeting with Nikolaev, Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia said that an agreement had been reached “on additional joint measures to cover the Russian-Georgian border in the Chechen sector.” It was decided to create additional mobile posts, and Russian ones will join the Georgian border guards guarding this section of the border.

SERGEY Kommersant-ZHIKHAREV