1995 Chechen war. Battles for Grozny (1996). Losses of federal forces

Armed conflict in 1994-1996 (first Chechen war)

The Chechen armed conflict of 1994-1996 - military actions between Russian federal troops (forces) and armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation.

In the fall of 1991, in the context of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic declared the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. The bodies of Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the laws of the Russian Federation were repealed. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, led by Supreme Commander-in-Chief President of the Chechen Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for waging sabotage warfare in mountainous areas.

The Dudayev regime had, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) of regular troops and 30-40 thousand people of armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, and the North Caucasus republics and etc.

On December 9, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.” On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360, which provided for the disarmament of these formations by force.

On December 11, 1994, the movement of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, troops, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, began the assault on Grozny. Russian armored columns were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different areas of the city, and the combat units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.

(Military encyclopedia. Moscow. In 8 volumes, 2004)

The further course of events was extremely negatively affected by the failure of the eastern and western groupings of troops; the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also failed to complete the assigned task.

Fighting stubbornly, federal troops took Grozny on February 6, 1995. After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

From April 28 to May 12, 1995, according to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium on the use of armed force in Chechnya was implemented.

Illegal armed groups (IAF), using the negotiation process that had begun, redeployed part of their forces from mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, and organized terrorist attacks of unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996).

On August 6, 1996, federal troops, after heavy defensive battles, having suffered heavy losses, left Grozny. INVFs also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.

On August 31, 1996, cessation of hostilities agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first Chechen war. After the conclusion of the agreement, the troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in an extremely short period of time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.

On May 12, 1997, a Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was concluded.

The Chechen side, not observing the terms of the agreement, took the line towards the immediate secession of the Chechen Republic from Russia. Terror against employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and representatives of local authorities intensified, and attempts to rally the population of other North Caucasian republics around Chechnya on an anti-Russian basis intensified.

Counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya in 1999-2009 (second Chechen war)

In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan on August 7, 1999 from the territory of Chechnya by militants under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev’s militants.

Fighting between federal forces and invading militants continued for more than a month, ending with the militants being forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya.

On these same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks were carried out in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk) - explosions of residential buildings.

Considering Maskhadov’s inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops. On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a Decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation,” providing for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus to conduct counter-terrorism operations.

On September 23, Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naur and Shelkovsky regions of the republic.

In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groups operating in the mountains, a new group “Center” was created.

On February 25-27, 2000, units of the “West” blocked Kharsenoy, and the group “East” closed the militants in the area of ​​Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoi, and Yaryshmardy. On March 2, Ulus-Kert was liberated.

The last large-scale operation was the liquidation of Ruslan Gelayev’s group in the area of ​​the village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After this, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and federal forces countered the terrorists with the actions of special forces and operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, hostages were taken in Moscow at the Theater Center on Dubrovka. In 2004, hostages were taken at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia.

By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants decreased significantly. The only large-scale operation of the militants (the raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.

From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, abolished the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

The first Chechen war lasted exactly one year and nine months. The war began on December 1, 1994, with the bombing of all three Chechen air bases - Kalinovskaya, Khankala and Grozny-Severny, which destroyed all Chechen aviation, including several "corn bombers" and a couple of antediluvian Czechoslovak fighters. The war ended on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements, after which the federals left Chechnya.

Military losses are depressing: 4,100 Russian troops were killed and 1,200 missing. 15 thousand militants were killed, although Aslan Maskhadov, who led the military operations, claimed that the militants lost 2,700 people. According to Memorial human rights activists, 30 thousand civilians in Chechnya were killed.

There were no winners in this war. The federals were unable to take control of the territory of the republic, and the separatists did not receive a truly independent state. Both sides lost.

An unrecognized state and preconditions for war

The only Chechen whom the whole country knew before the start of the war was Dzhokhar Dudayev. The commander of a bomber division, a combat pilot, at the age of 45 he became a major general of aviation, at 47 he left the army and entered politics. He moved to Grozny, quickly rose to leadership positions and became president in 1991. True, the president is just the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. But the President! He was known to have a tough temperament and determination. During the riots in Grozny, Dudayev and his supporters threw the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, out of the window. He crashed and was taken to the hospital, where Dudayev’s men finished him off. Kutsenko died, and Dudayev became a national leader.

Now this has somehow been forgotten, but Dudayev’s criminal reputation was known back in that period in 1993. Let me remind you how much noise the “Chechen advice notes” caused at the federal level. After all, it was a real disaster of the national payment system. Fraudsters, through shell companies and Grozny banks, stole 4 trillion rubles from the Central Bank of Russia. Exactly a trillion! Let me say for comparison that the Russian budget in that very year 1993 was 10 trillion rubles. That is, almost half of the national budget was stolen using Chechen advice notes. Half the annual salary of doctors, teachers, military personnel, officials, miners, half of all government income. Huge damage! Subsequently, Dudayev recalled how money was brought to Grozny by trucks.

These are the marketers, democrats and supporters of national self-determination that Russia had to fight in 1994.

Beginning of the conflict

When did the first Chechen war begin? December 11, 1994. This is what many historians and publicists believe out of habit. They think that the first Chechen war of 1994-1996 began on the day when the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the need to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. They forget that ten days earlier there was an air strike on airfields in Chechnya. They forget about the burnt corn fields, after which no one either in Chechnya or in the Russian armed forces doubted that there was a war going on.

But the ground operation really began on December 11. On this day, the so-called “Joint Group of Forces” (OGV), which then consisted of three parts, began to move:

• western;
• northwestern;
• eastern.

The Western group entered Chechnya from North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Northwestern - from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia. Eastern - from Dagestan.

All three groups moved straight to Grozny.

The OGV was supposed to clear the city of separatists, and then destroy the militant bases: first in the northern, flat part of the republic; then in the southern, mountainous part.

In a short time, the OGV had to clear the entire territory of the republic from Dudayev’s formations.

The North-Western group was the first to reach the outskirts of Grozny, on December 12, and got involved in battle near the village of Dolinsky. In this battle, the militants used the Grad multiple launch rocket system, and that day they did not allow Russian troops to reach Grozny.

Gradually two other groups joined in. By the end of December, the army approached the capital from three sides:

• from the west;
• from North;
• from the east.

The assault was scheduled for December 31st. On New Year's Eve. And the eve of the birthday of Pavel Grachev, the then Minister of Defense. I won’t say that they wanted to predict victory for the holiday, but this opinion is widespread.

Storm of Grozny

The assault has begun. The assault groups immediately encountered difficulties. The fact is that the commanders made two serious mistakes:

• Firstly. The encirclement of Grozny was not completed. The problem was that Dudayev’s formations actively took advantage of the gap in the open encirclement ring. In the south, in the mountains, militant bases were located. The militants brought in ammunition and weapons from the south. The wounded were evacuated to the south. Reinforcements were approaching from the south;
• Secondly. We decided to use tanks on a massive scale. 250 combat vehicles entered Grozny. Moreover, without proper intelligence support and without infantry support. The tanks turned out to be helpless in the narrow streets of urban areas. The tanks were burning. The 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade was surrounded and 85 people were killed.

Parts of the Western and Eastern groups were unable to penetrate deep into the city and retreated. Only part of the North-Eastern group under the command of General Lev Rokhlin gained a foothold in the city and took up defensive positions. Some units were surrounded and suffered losses. Street fighting broke out in various areas of Grozny.

The command quickly learned lessons from what happened. The commanders changed tactics. They abandoned the massive use of armored vehicles. The battles were fought by small, mobile units of assault groups. Soldiers and officers quickly gained experience and improved their combat skills. On January 9, the federals took the building of the Petroleum Institute, and the airport came under the control of the OGV. By January 19, the militants left the presidential palace and organized a defense on Minutka Square. At the end of January, the federals controlled 30% of the territory of Grozny. At this moment, the federal group was increased to 70 thousand people, it was headed by Anatoly Kulikov.

The next important change occurred on February 3rd. To blockade the city from the south, the command formed the “South” group. Already on February 9, it blocked the Rostov-Baku highway. The blockade is closed.

Half the city turned into ruins, but victory was won. On March 6, the last militant left Grozny under pressure from the United Forces. It was Shamil Basayev.

Major fighting in 1995

By April 1995, federal forces had established control over almost the entire flat part of the republic. Argun, Shali and Gudermes were taken under control relatively easily. The settlement of Bamut remained outside the control zone. The fighting there continued intermittently until the end of the year, and even into the next year 1996.

The operation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Samashki received quite a public response. The propaganda campaign against Russia, professionally carried out by Dudayev's Chechen Press agency, seriously influenced world public opinion about Russia and its actions in Chechnya. Many still believe that civilian casualties in Samashki were prohibitively high. There are unverified rumors about thousands of deaths, while the human rights society Memorial, for example, believes that the number of civilians killed during the cleansing of Samashki is in the dozens.

What is true here and what is an exaggeration is now impossible to discern. One thing is certain: war is cruel and unfair. Especially when civilians are dying.

Advancement in mountainous regions was more difficult for federal forces than marching across the plains. The reason was that troops often got bogged down in the defense of militants, and even such unpleasant incidents occurred as, for example, the capture of 40 paratroopers of the Aksai special forces. In June, the federals took control of the regional centers of Vedeno, Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt.

The most socially significant and resonant episode of the first Chechen war of 1995 was the episode associated with events going beyond the borders of Chechnya. The main negative character of the episode was Shamil Basayev. At the head of a gang of 195 people, he carried out a raid on trucks in the Stavropol Territory. The militants entered the Russian city of Budennovsk, opened fire in the city center, broke into the building of the city department of internal affairs, and shot several police officers and civilians.

The terrorists took about two thousand hostages and herded them into a complex of city hospital buildings. Basayev demanded the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya and the start of negotiations with Dudayev with the participation of the UN. Russian authorities decided to storm the hospital. Unfortunately, there was a leak of information, and the bandits managed to prepare. The assault was not unexpected and was unsuccessful. The special forces captured a number of auxiliary buildings, but did not break into the main building. On the same day they made a second assault attempt, and it also failed.

In short, the situation began to become critical and the Russian authorities were forced to enter into negotiations. The then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was on the phone line. The whole country tensely watched the television report when Chernomyrdin spoke into the phone: “Shamil Basayev, Shamil Basayev, I am listening to your demands.” As a result of negotiations, Basayev received a vehicle and left for Chechnya. There he released the 120 remaining hostages. In total, 143 people died during the events, 46 of them were security forces.

Military clashes of varying intensity took place in the republic until the end of the year. On October 6, militants made an attempt on the life of the commander of the United Armed Forces, General Anatoly Romanov. In Grozny, on Minutka Square, in a tunnel under the railway, the Dudayevites detonated a bomb. The helmet and body armor saved the life of General Romanov, who was passing through the tunnel at that moment. As a result of his injury, the general fell into a coma and subsequently became deeply disabled. After this incident, “retaliation strikes” were carried out on militant bases, which, however, did not lead to a serious change in the balance of power in the confrontation.

Fighting in 1996

The New Year began with another hostage-taking episode. And again outside of Chechnya. This is the story. On January 9, 250 militants carried out a bandit raid in the Dagestan city of Kizlyar. First, they attacked a Russian helicopter base, where they destroyed 2 non-combat-ready MI-8 helicopters. Then they captured the Kizlyar hospital and maternity hospital. The militants drove up to three thousand townspeople from neighboring buildings.

The bandits locked people on the second floor, mined it, and barricaded themselves on the first floor, and put forward demands: the withdrawal of troops from the Caucasus, the provision of buses and a corridor to Grozny. Negotiations with the militants were conducted by the authorities of Dagestan. Representatives of the federal forces command did not participate in these negotiations. On January 10, the Chechens were provided with buses, and the militants with a group of hostages began moving towards Chechnya. They were going to cross the border near the village of Pervomaiskoye, but did not get there. Federal security forces, who were not going to put up with the fact that the hostages were taken to Chechnya, opened warning fire, and the convoy had to stop. Unfortunately, as a result of insufficiently organized actions, confusion occurred. This allowed the militants to disarm a checkpoint of 40 Novosibirsk policemen and capture the village of Pervomaiskoye.

The militants fortified themselves in Pervomaisky. The confrontation continued for several days. On the 15th, after the Chechens shot six captured policemen and two negotiators - Dagestan elders, the security forces launched an assault.

The assault failed. The confrontation continued. On the night of January 19, the Chechens broke through the encirclement and fled to Chechnya. They took with them captured police officers, who were later released.

During the raid, 78 people died.

Fighting in Chechnya continued throughout the winter. In March, the militants tried to retake Grozny, but the attempt ended in failure. In April, a bloody clash occurred near the village of Yaryshmardy.

A new turn in the development of events was brought about by the liquidation of Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev by federal forces. Dudayev often used the Inmarsat satellite phone. On April 21, from an aircraft equipped with a radar station, the Russian military located Dudayev. 2 SU-25 attack aircraft were lifted into the sky. They fired two air-to-ground missiles along the bearing. One of them hit the target exactly. Dudayev died.

Contrary to the expectations of the federals, the removal of Dudayev did not lead to decisive changes in the course of hostilities. But the situation in Russia has changed. The presidential election campaign was approaching. Boris Yeltsin was keenly interested in freezing the conflict. Negotiations continued until July, and the activity of both the Chechens and the federals noticeably decreased.

After Yeltsin was elected president, hostilities intensified again.

The final battle chord of the first Chechen war sounded in August 1996. The separatists again attacked Grozny. The units of General Pulikovsky had a numerical superiority, but they could not hold Grozny. At the same time, militants captured Gudermes and Argun.

Russia was forced to enter into negotiations.

Almost four months - from the end of January to the second half of May 1995 - the brigade units spent in “winter quarters”, preparing for new business trips to war in Chechnya.

Back to Chechnya

On May 23, a train with people and equipment from the Shumilovsky explosive brigade began unloading in Khasavyurt. And a week later, an order was given from the commander of the “Vostok” group: to march from Khasavyurt through Gerzel-Aul to Suvorov-Yurt and take positions on the northern outskirts of the village of Novogroznensky.

The tasks set were very serious. However, during the first Chechen war there were no others. Having taken up defensive positions near Novogroznensky, the brigade was supposed to block the main directions of movement of large gangs in the northern direction from the Chechen capital. That is, in essence, to become one of the posts of federal forces in this part of the republic.

It was through the roads and trails of these places that the main flow of weapons, military equipment, ammunition and materiel, and reinforcements from overseas mercenaries, went to the rebels. Many bases and locations of militant detachments were located in the brigade’s area of ​​responsibility. And this meant that major special operations would have to be carried out to block and destroy all this evil spirits, as, indeed, this happened during the second Chechen war.

The daily routine of war

In addition to serious work, what awaited them was what in war is considered, and rightly so, in general, the usual daily routine: escorting and guarding convoys with military supplies and humanitarian aid, serving at checkpoints and roadblocks for inspecting vehicles, reconnaissance, mine clearance roads, assistance to local administration and population.

Where does any military unit begin when it arrives in the specified area? That's right, from the equipment of the place where you are standing. This order is ancient, established by Roman legionnaires. A military camp is both a home and a fortress for soldiers. Arriving at the new PVD, they tore out trenches and shelters for equipment, adapting any terrain fold for defense, be it a ravine, a ditch or a small hill. Moreover, all this had to be done under regular shelling.

Everyday life of the Chechen war

On the day of arrival “at the point of standing,” the militants gave a warm reception. In the full sense of the word: from the hills, densely covered with vegetation, red-green chains of tracer bullets stretched towards the slowly crawling column, and automatic and machine-gun bursts rattled. But due to the great distance, the shooting, although very intense, was not aimed and did not cause any harm to either the equipment or people. Representatives of the local, far from peace-loving population staged all these fireworks for the sole purpose of demonstrating to those who arrived who the real boss was here. But it had the opposite effect: instead of hesitating and retreating back home, the brigade so combed the green stuff from the Zushkas and heavy machine guns of the armored personnel carriers that they immediately discouraged the militants that day from testing our patience and testing our combat readiness.

Confrontation between militants

But it soon became clear that we were opposed by really serious forces of illegal armed groups, who considered themselves the rightful masters of these places. And they do not want to share their power with anyone else. Two days later, the militants decided to repeat the raid on the brigade’s positions.

Simultaneously with the temporary deployment point, “the large base, as we called it, the construction of outposts was underway. One of them, on the nights of May 31 and June 1, 1995, had to fight a protracted battle that lasted several hours. The positions were not yet fully equipped; soldiers and officers held their defenses in half-open trenches. It was hard for them!

Roadside check

The units of the Volga brigade began to carry out the tasks assigned to them. The main one was control of the federal highway in the section from Gerzel-Aul to Gudermes.

There was enough work for everyone, the route was protected in every possible way. Permanent stationary and mobile checkpoints are a given. Behind them, secrets, patrols, and observation posts were placed, which had to be moved to the highway area on the eve of the passage of the columns, sometimes several days in advance. Often the columns themselves included brigade armored groups, ZILs with Zushkas in their bodies. And in the areas most convenient for attack, reinforced reconnaissance and special forces units took up defensive positions ahead of time. And if in those days the news from newspaper pages or television screens did not report attacks by militants and losses of federal troops in the east of Chechnya, this meant only one thing: the soldiers and officers of the brigade of internal troops worked perfectly, calculating the enemy’s actions many moves ahead and making it on time take effective countermeasures.

Meanwhile, the activity and cunning of the militants increased day by day. Or it would be more accurate to say – night after night. And rarely did they take place without shelling or harassing fire.

It was not easy to serve on the roads either. Let's remember: the summer of 1995 was a period of truce, when the world and Russian public, having played with democracy, suddenly became inflamed with love and pity for the militant groups driven into the mountains and almost destroyed. And a stream of humanitarian aid poured into Chechnya from all over the world, under the cover of which (and sometimes instead of it) weapons, military uniforms, and medicines were transported. All this went directly to the militant bases. Therefore, convoys and single heavy vehicles carrying humanitarian aid were inspected especially carefully.

In addition to checks on the roads, the brigade, using its scouts and special forces, carried out several effective ambushes, as a result of which small detachments of militants were captured and destroyed, or, simply put, gangs that were terrorizing people in nearby settlements.

Dry statistics of the war in Chechnya

For four months in a row, the brigade carried out combat missions in Chechnya near Novogroznensky. Here are just a few numbers showing the results of that work.

Dry statistics. But think about it: Behind each line below are sleepless nights, monstrous strain of physical strength and nerves, danger lurking every day:

— On average, the brigade’s military personnel inspected 385 vehicles per day;

1. The First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian troops (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya, and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus, with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991.

2. Officially, the conflict was defined as “measures to maintain constitutional order”; military actions were called the “first Chechen war”, less often the “Russian-Chechen” or “Russian-Caucasian war”. The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of ethnic cleansing of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.

3. Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the withdrawal of Russian units, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya before the Second Chechen War and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.

4. With the beginning of perestroika in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev.

5. On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.

6. During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House. More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. The head of the Chechen Republic, D. G. Zavgaev, spoke on this issue in 1996 at a meeting of the State Duma."

Yes, on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (today it is divided) the war began in the fall of 1991, it was the war against a multinational people, when the criminal regime, with some support from those who today also show an unhealthy interest in the situation, flooded this people with blood. The first victim of what was happening was the people of this republic, and the Chechens first of all. The war began when Vitaly Kutsenko, chairman of the Grozny City Council, was killed in broad daylight during a meeting of the Supreme Council of the republic. When Besliev, the vice-rector of a state university, was shot on the street. When Kancalik, the rector of the same state university, was killed. When every day in the fall of 1991, up to 30 people were found killed on the streets of Grozny. When, from the autumn of 1991 until 1994, the morgues of Grozny were filled to the ceiling, announcements were made on local television with a request to take them away, to establish who was there, and so on.

8. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation

9. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991).” After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted; the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Checheno-Ingush Republic (1991)” was canceled on November 11, three days after its signing, after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and from the republic The withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses.

10. Dudayev’s forces received a lot of weapons: Two launchers of an operational-tactical missile system in a non-combat-ready state. 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 trainer aircraft, the aircraft converted into light attack aircraft; three MiG-17 fighters and two MiG-15 fighters; six An-2 aircraft and two Mi-8 helicopters, 117 R-23 and R-24 aircraft missiles, 126 R-60 aircraft; about 7 thousand GSh-23 aerial shells. 42 tanks T-62 and T-72; 34 BMP-1 and BMP-2; 30 BTR-70 and BRDM; 44 MT-LB, 942 vehicles. 18 Grad MLRS and more than 1000 shells for them. 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-30 howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them; as well as self-propelled guns 2S1 and 2S3; anti-tank guns MT-12. Five air defense systems, 25 missiles of various types, 88 MANPADS; 105 pcs. S-75 missile defense system. 590 anti-tank weapons, including two Konkurs ATGMs, 24 Fagot ATGM systems, 51 Metis ATGM systems, 113 RPG-7 systems. About 50 thousand small arms, more than 150 thousand grenades. 27 wagons of ammunition; 1620 tons of fuels and lubricants; about 10 thousand sets of clothing, 72 tons of food; 90 tons of medical equipment.

12. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.

13. The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.

14. The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not been determined to this day (2012). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.

16. As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.

17. In reality, the state system of the CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994. In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994

18. A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.

19. Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.

21. In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. Amendments were made to the constitution adopted last year; a regime of Dudayev’s personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament

22. After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).

23. Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.

24. The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and none of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.

25. In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, Bislan Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander Ruslan Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.

26. On November 26, oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.

27. Deployment of troops (December 1994)

At that time, the use of the expression “the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya,” according to deputy and journalist Alexander Nevzorov, was, to a greater extent, caused by journalistic terminological confusion - Chechnya was part of Russia.

Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government that justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya as consistent with the Constitution.

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different directions - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.

Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.

A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Regiment blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.

Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance

In mid-December, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bomb attack was carried out on the city center. The artillery shelling and bombing killed and injured many civilians (including ethnic Russians).

Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops had aerial photographs of the city, outdated plans of the city in limited quantities. The communications facilities were not equipped with closed-circuit communications equipment, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications. The troops were given an order to occupy only industrial buildings and areas and not to invade the homes of the civilian population.

The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade (more than 300 people), a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company of the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment (10 tanks), under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. Federal forces were surrounded - the losses of the battalions of the Maykop brigade, according to official data, amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.

The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.

On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.

Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.

Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.

By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the line of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.

In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of ​​Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.

As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.

29. Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)

After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.

The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.

Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya). It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). After Russian soldiers entered the village, some residents who had weapons began to resist, and shootouts broke out on the streets of the village.

According to a number of international organizations (in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights - UNCHR), many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This information, disseminated by the separatist agency Chechen Press, however, turned out to be quite contradictory - thus, according to representatives of the Memorial human rights center, this data “does not inspire confidence.” According to Memorial, the minimum number of civilians killed during the clearing of the village was 112-114 people.

One way or another, this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk and resumed in February 1996.

By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.

30. Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.

The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.

Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.

Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory in trucks and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.

The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.

Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.

After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded

32. The situation in the republic in June - December 1995

After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.

From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.

Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.

On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.

In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to remain in accordance with previously reached agreements.

On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.

On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.

The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.

On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.

On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar. The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.

The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.

On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded

On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoy, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses - almost all the armored vehicles and half of the personnel were lost.

From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.

On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of ​​the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.

By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the titles of Heroes of the Russian Federation

37. Negotiations with the separatists (May - July 1996)

Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.

On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.

On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.

The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.

On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.

On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.

On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.

Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).

According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements

On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

40. The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).

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42. Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% of the contract amount. . Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War."

43. According to data released by the OGV headquarters, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, 19,794 wounded

44. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen).

45. However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the militants’ losses did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.

46. ​​On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev "). “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.

47. On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the assault on Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,

48. According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “because of his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.” In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya”

49. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) launched an extensive relief program since the beginning of the conflict, providing more than 250,000 internally displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance. In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for residents of the North Caucasus.

51. During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to assist those affected by the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, and provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages shelters.

And the Russian Empire

Battles for Grozny (1996)- storming of Grozny by detachments of Chechen militants in August 1996, during which units of the Russian Armed Forces located in the city fought heavy battles in Grozny, losing control over most of the city. Chechen detachments attacked simultaneously with Grozny and other major cities of the republic - Argun and Gudermes. Moreover, if in Argun the federal forces managed to hold only the commandant’s office building and the territory of the plant, where the 303rd Separate Battalion of the 101st Brigade was located, then they surrendered Gudermes without a fight at all. After this, the Khasavyurt Agreements were concluded between representatives of the Russian Federation and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which put an end to the first Chechen war.

Number of militants

The total number of units entering the Chechen capital, according to one source, was only 850 people (according to Maskhadov); according to others - 1.5-2 thousand fighters. The general leadership was provided by Aslan Maskhadov, who stated that this operation was undertaken in order to “show the whole world and, above all, Russia, the combat potential of the separatists.”

Tactics

The accumulation of militants in the suburbs of Grozny began long before August, some of them entered the city under the guise of civilians and refugees.

On August 6, at 5:00 am, Chechen troops began to enter Grozny from Chernorechye, Alda and Staropromyslovsky districts and, skillfully using shortcomings in the location of checkpoints (many were sandwiched between houses, not really controlling anything), began to move along uncontrolled routes. Previously, units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs consisting of Chechens were withdrawn from the city, and Chechen checkpoints were also removed. The enemy did not set as its goal the capture or destruction of all city objects. Entering Grozny, he blocked Russian units of internal troops at checkpoints and commandant's offices, isolating them from each other and demoralizing them with constant "harassing" fire. Russian media (TV channel "Russia") reported as of 12 o'clock on August 6 about 5 helicopters of federal forces shot down in the first half of the day.

The main blow was dealt to a complex of administrative buildings in the city center (Government House, Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSB, etc.), where several Russian journalists were blocked along with the military. The journalists were unprepared for such events, they were scared and lost heart. They were placed in the Coordination Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the basement of a bomb shelter located next to the hotel building (the area of ​​the Dynamo stadium, where the most intense fighting took place), and a sign “journalists, women and children” was hung above the entrance.

General Pulikovsky ordered assault troops to be brought into the city to break through the encirclement. But the militants put up fierce resistance - only one of the three detachments broke through. The situation of those surrounded was extremely difficult. The losses were mounting. But by August 13, according to General G.N. Troshev, then commander of the 58th Army, the situation was corrected - of all the surrounded checkpoints, only five were not unblocked. The militants themselves suffered heavy losses. Maskhadov’s daring but adventurous operation failed - the huge forces he gathered in Grozny themselves found themselves surrounded by Russian troops.

“This was the very last attempt of the militants to declare themselves,” Shamanov would later tell Pulikovsky, who then surrounded Grozny with a dead ring. Pulikovsky was determined (considering that on December 14, 1995, his son died near Shatoi) and wanted to destroy the last forces of the Dudayevites in this cauldron.

The militants were given an ultimatum - to surrender within 48 hours, otherwise Pulikovsky promised to deliver a powerful blow to the city using heavy artillery and aircraft. The population was provided with a corridor to exit through Staraya Sunzha. This decision was condemned by a number of Russian publicists, in particular the historian Boris Sokolov, who argued in his book “100 Great Wars” that this would have destroyed not only the militants, but also the encircled Russian soldiers and civilians who were unable to leave the city so quickly. Troshev noted that “the bandits did not doubt the determination of General Pulikovsky; his words truly frightened many field commanders who immediately arrived for negotiations. The militants asked to be given a corridor, to which Pulikovsky replied: “I didn’t surround you so that release. Either surrender, or you will be destroyed! A. Maskhadov could not hide his confusion either."

Gennady Troshev describes what follows:

On the evening of August 20, Lieutenant General V. Tikhomirov returned from a short vacation and again headed the Joint Group of Forces. He told the press that he sees his main task in this post as the complete liberation of the city from militants: “For this we are ready to use all means: both political and forceful.” He also emphasized: “I have not yet canceled Pulikovsky’s ultimatum, but I can say unequivocally that the most serious measures will be taken against the separatists if they do not leave Grozny.”

The militants, as they themselves admitted later in conversations, were in a hopeless situation, they had no reinforcements and were running out of ammunition.

And here the newly appointed Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed appeared on the military-political arena, also endowed with the powers of the representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic. Alexander Ivanovich arrived at the moment when, in fact, the fate of the entire Chechen campaign was being decided.

The militants considered this a manifestation of the “Will of Allah.” Lebed immediately canceled Pulikovsky's order. He stated that the army was demoralized and incapable of fighting. Troshev expresses the following opinion:

Well, you saw a dirty fighter, who was also intimidated in front of a high Moscow official. Is he an indicator of combat effectiveness? Alexander Ivanovich, apparently, expected to see a washed and polished guardsman, like in the Kremlin honor guard company... Yes, I (the general!) sometimes during the war did not wash or shave for several days. There was not always the opportunity, and most importantly, there was no time. You don’t even have time to eat. And what do I look like after this? The Moscow patrol would have arrested him! I wouldn’t believe that the general is some kind of homeless person... And there is nothing surprising here. War is a dirty business, in the literal sense of the word...

Swan wanted the momentary glory of being a “peacemaker.” Now, they say, no one has been able to solve the problem of Chechnya for almost two years, but he can. In one fell swoop, with one stroke of the pen, with just one look and a Bonapartist swoop. We are all in shit, and he is in white. For the sake of exorbitant ambition, for the sake of creating the image of the “savior of the nation,” he betrayed the fighting army, betrayed those who fell in battle and their relatives and friends, betrayed millions of people who expected protection from the state against the lawlessness of bandits...

Pulikovsky and Tikhomirov tried to defend their position, but to no avail. Oligarch Boris Berezovsky and Alexander Lebed, who came with him, insisted on the beginning of the next peace negotiations with the Chechen forces, which ended on August 31 with the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements.

Losses of federal forces

August 10, 1996 was declared a day of mourning in Russia “in connection with the tragic consequences of the terrorist attack against government institutions and residents of the city of Grozny.”

Results

Gennady Troshev wrote about the consequences of this operation:

Perhaps never before in Russia have generals been so powerless and helpless in war due to the pressure of civilians who are complete amateurs in military matters. The profanation of the Chechen campaign has reached its climax. The militants were not able to finish off this time either. A few days after his arrival, Lebed signed an agreement with A. Maskhadov in Khasavyurt “On urgent measures to cease fire and hostilities in Grozny and on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” which in essence was nothing more than a propaganda bluff and which immediately became rude violate the Chechen side.

And if you evaluate the moral side of the matter, then you won’t even find the right words. Because in Chechnya a fighter was only grimy on the outside, but clean on the inside. He recognized himself as a defender of the unity and dignity of the Motherland, his enemies were afraid, he beat them at Shatoi, near Bamut, near Shali, in Grozny... He could hold his grimy nose high with pride. And after escaping from Chechnya (under the stick of Lebed and Berezovsky), I felt spat upon and disgraced. The whole world laughed at him. “Tiny Chechnya defeated great Russia!” - this is the rumor that spread around the world. Thanks to the “compassionate general” - he “washed” the soldier (literally and figuratively)! I washed it so much that I still can’t get it clean, I can’t get it off!

According to the general, if it had been possible to destroy the militants of the Second Chechen War, the “criminal lawlessness in Chechnya”,