Corpses of Russian soldiers in Chechnya. Dedicated to the living and those killed in the Chechen war “soldiers are not born.” From the explanatory note of Private Andrei Padyakov

We present to you the release of photographs by Alexander Nemenov about the First Chechen War and the history of this military conflict. (Warning! The issue contains photographs that may be disturbing or disturbing)

1. The First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian troops (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya, and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus, with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991.

2. Officially, the conflict was defined as “measures to maintain constitutional order”; military actions were called the “first Chechen war”, less often the “Russian-Chechen” or “Russian-Caucasian war”. The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of ethnic cleansing of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.

3. Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the withdrawal of Russian units, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya before the Second Chechen War and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.

4. With the beginning of perestroika in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev.

5. On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.

6. During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House. More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. On this occasion, the head of the Chechen Republic D. G. Zavgaev spoke in 1996 at a meeting of the State Duma "Yes, on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (today it is divided) the war began in the fall of 1991, namely the war against a multinational people, when the criminal regime under some support from those who today also show an unhealthy interest in the situation, this nation was filled with blood. The first victim of what was happening was precisely the people of this republic, and the Chechens first of all. The war began when Vitaly Kutsenko, the chairman of the Grozny City Council, was killed in broad daylight , during a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Republic. When Besliev, the vice-rector of a state university, was shot dead on the street. When Kankalik, the rector of the same state university, was killed. When every day in the fall of 1991, up to 30 people were found killed on the streets of Grozny. When, starting in the fall of 1991 and until 1994, the morgues of Grozny were filled to the ceiling, announcements were made on local television with a request to take them away, to establish who was there, and so on. - Zavgaev D.G., Head of the Chechen Republic, transcript of the meeting of the State Duma dated July 19, 1996.

8. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation

9. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991).” After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted; the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Checheno-Ingush Republic (1991)” was canceled on November 11, three days after its signing, after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and from the republic The withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses.

10. Dudayev’s forces received a lot of weapons: Two launchers of an operational-tactical missile system in a non-combat-ready state. 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 trainer aircraft, the aircraft converted into light attack aircraft; three MiG-17 fighters and two MiG-15 fighters; six An-2 aircraft and two Mi-8 helicopters, 117 R-23 and R-24 aircraft missiles, 126 R-60 aircraft; about 7 thousand GSh-23 aerial shells. 42 tanks T-62 and T-72; 34 BMP-1 and BMP-2; 30 BTR-70 and BRDM; 44 MT-LB, 942 vehicles. 18 Grad MLRS and more than 1000 shells for them. 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-30 howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them; as well as self-propelled guns 2S1 and 2S3; anti-tank guns MT-12. Five air defense systems, 25 missiles of various types, 88 MANPADS; 105 pcs. S-75 missile defense system. 590 anti-tank weapons, including two Konkurs ATGMs, 24 Fagot ATGM systems, 51 Metis ATGM systems, 113 RPG-7 systems. About 50 thousand small arms, more than 150 thousand grenades. 27 wagons of ammunition; 1620 tons of fuels and lubricants; about 10 thousand sets of clothing, 72 tons of food; 90 tons of medical equipment.

12. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.

13. The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.

14. The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not been determined to this day (2012). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.

16. As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.

17. In reality, the state system of the CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994. In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994

18. A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.

19. Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.

20. The period of Dudayev's reign is characterized by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population. In 1991-1994, the non-Chechen (primarily Russian) population of Chechnya was subjected to murders, attacks and threats from Chechens. Many were forced to leave Chechnya, being driven out of their homes, abandoning them or selling their apartments to Chechens at low prices. In 1992 alone, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny, and 300 went missing. The morgues were filled with unidentified corpses. Widespread anti-Russian propaganda was fueled by relevant literature, direct insults and calls from government platforms, and desecration of Russian cemeteries[

21. In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. Amendments were made to the constitution adopted last year; a regime of Dudayev’s personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament

22. After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).

23. Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.

24. The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and none of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.

25. In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, Bislan Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander Ruslan Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.

26. On November 26, oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.

27. Deployment of troops (December 1994)
At that time, the use of the expression “the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya,” according to deputy and journalist Alexander Nevzorov, was, to a greater extent, caused by journalistic terminological confusion - Chechnya was part of Russia.
Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government that justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya as consistent with the Constitution.
On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different directions - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan).
The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.
Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.
The Kizlyar group reached the village of Tolstoy-Yurt on December 15.
A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Regiment blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.
Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance

28. Assault on Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995)
In mid-December, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bomb attack was carried out on the city center. The artillery shelling and bombing killed and injured many civilians (including ethnic Russians).
Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops had aerial photographs of the city, outdated plans of the city in limited quantities. The communications facilities were not equipped with closed-circuit communications equipment, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications. The troops were given an order to occupy only industrial buildings and areas and not to invade the homes of the civilian population.
The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade (more than 300 people), a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company of the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment (10 tanks), under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. Federal forces were surrounded - the losses of the battalions of the Maykop brigade, according to official data, amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.
The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.
On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.
Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.
Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.
Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the line of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.
In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.
Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of ​​Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.
A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.
As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.

29. Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)
After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.
The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.
Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya). It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). After Russian soldiers entered the village, some residents who had weapons began to resist, and shootouts broke out on the streets of the village.
According to a number of international organizations (in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights - UNCHR), many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This information, disseminated by the separatist agency Chechen Press, however, turned out to be quite contradictory - thus, according to representatives of the Memorial human rights center, this data “does not inspire confidence.” According to Memorial, the minimum number of civilians killed during the clearing of the village was 112-114 people.
One way or another, this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.
On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk and resumed in February 1996.
By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.

30. Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)
From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.
The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.
Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.
Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times

31. Terrorist attack in Budennovsk (June 14-19, 1995)
On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory in trucks and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.
The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.
Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.
After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.
The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded

32. The situation in the republic in June - December 1995
After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.
From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.
Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.
On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.
In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to remain in accordance with previously reached agreements.
On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.
On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.
The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.
On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.
On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.

33. Terrorist attack in Kizlyar (January 9-18, 1996)
On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar. The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.
On January 18, under the cover of darkness, the militants broke through the encirclement and left for Chechnya.
The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.

34. Attack of militants on Grozny (March 6-8, 1996) On March 6, 1996, several detachments of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded

35. Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996) On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoy, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses - almost all the armored vehicles and half of the personnel were lost.

36. Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996)
From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.
On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of ​​the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.
By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the titles of Heroes of the Russian Federation

37. Negotiations with the separatists (May - July 1996)
Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.
On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.
On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.
The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.
On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.
On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.

38. Operation Jihad (6-22 August 1996)
On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.
Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).
According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements

In memory of Misha Dorozhkin who died in the Chechen war

Literary and musical composition

A geometric decoration is installed on the stage, a candle is burning, and fresh flowers are lying.
The metronome sounds. Against the background of a metronome Narrator's text:
“This war has no history yet. It's not written. We know about it exactly as much as it is not dangerous for us to know, so as not to see ourselves as we are. But this war has witnesses. Thousands of witnesses. They want to be heard before they are invented in such a way that they will be convenient and again needed by someone for something. They want to be needed by the truth.

The ringing of bells is a phonogram.
1 Presenter.
The ringing of a bell, Like a call, like an alarm, like a memory. We dedicate today's composition to Misha Dorozhkin, our fellow countryman who died in the Chechen war.
War is a cruel and terrible phenomenon
But as long as there is evil on earth,
There will be hatred, there will be wars,
Which inflict battle wounds on people,
Children and loved ones are taken away from their lives.

2 Presenter.
Russian people are characterized by love for their native land, where they were born and raised, for their beautiful Motherland. This love from time immemorial is manifested in their readiness to defend, without sparing their lives, their Fatherland. The Russian people live in the belief that a true man and a son of the Fatherland are one and the same. Patriotism is love for the Motherland, devotion to it, the desire to protect it from enemies, to serve its interests with one’s deeds - a great, wonderful feeling.

Lyrical melody.
an excerpt from a poem against the background of music
M. Plyatskovsky “Motherland”

“Motherland” - we say with excitement,
We see a distance without an edge in front of us
This is our childhood, our youth
This is all that fate will bring us,
Motherland! Holy Fatherland
Coppices, Groves, Barega
Golden wheat field
Moon-blue haystacks
Motherland! Land of fathers and grandfathers
We fell in love with these clovers
Having tasted the spring freshness
From the edge of a clinking bucket
It will hardly be forgotten
And will remain holy forever
The land that was called the Motherland
If we have to, we will protect with our hearts.

Against the background of music, a story about M. Dorozhkin.

For Misha, his homeland was the village, friends, sister Nadya, father Viktor Savelyevich, mother Valentina Mikhailovna.
What kind of guy was he?..
...An ordinary curly-haired, mischievous boy. Gathering his peers around him, he kicked a ball in the yard and played war with a toy machine gun.
He, born under the auspices of the sun, was given by nature to lead and do good deeds, so everyone who turned to his responsive heart always achieved what they wanted.
From the memories of fellow villagers, teachers, classmates, relatives, colleagues.
P.I. Krapchatova, distant relative of the Dorozhkin family:
“How do I remember? He answered kindly in kind. Wherever we meet, he will always stop and ask everything. Last summer, when I came on vacation, I said: “Aunt Paul, I’ll be back soon.” In May I was supposed to...

Childhood, youth, unforgettable years. Classmate Tatyana Milutina remembers a friend:
“I studied like all boys. He wasn't the first, but he wasn't the last either. He helped in any way he could, no, he laughed it off. I couldn't be rude. So energetic, cheerful, lively. He always encouraged us with his smile.”

Childhood friend Alexander Pakhomov speaks sadly about Misha:"Ordinary person. Whatever you ask for, it will break into pieces, but it will be done.”

“I studied to the best of my abilities,” says the director of the Ostrovskaya school, V.I. Skachkova. - however, what difference does it make, a good student or a bad one? He is our student, his mother's child. Each has its own flavor."
Briefly based on reviews from colleagues: “World guy” Everyone was there like one fist... Very young, unexploded. It’s a pity for the guy, because even one person is the whole world.
Dorozhkin Mikhail Viktorovich is a soldier who completely fulfilled his duty in this terrible, unfair, unnecessary war.
The good memory of him will forever remain in the hearts of all who knew him.

Misha died on February 24.
The parents learned about their son’s death only on the 28th. This terrible news instantly spread through the homes of fellow villagers and Misha, Mishenka, echoed acute pain in their hearts!
How little fate has given you in this world, just 19-something. Cruel, unfair. Where can I find words to drown out my mother’s pain and calm my father down?

(Next is the poem “Krovinushka - son”, a young man enters, approaches the portrait of M. Dorozhkin, lights a candle).
Little blood, son, you were stolen by the war
Little piece of grass, little leaf, how empty it is for me alone
Trouble croaked like a crow, like in a bad dream
She came to me with funeral paper

I desperately chased the damned crow
I cried my eyes out
And everything was waiting for you

You will come with a light gait
The overcoat is wide open
You'll come back alive, whole
With a smile on your lips

You will come, kissed by fire
With a combat award
Albeit bandaged
But still alive

Week after week
Year after year goes by
I'm tired of eating too much
Only pain lives in me

My son, little blood
So many years have passed
My leaf, blade of grass
You are still not there.

Poem “I was killed in the Chechen war”

I was a smart and lively boy
I was buzzing in the hallway with my friends
Got both A's and D's
But I loved my native school
Don't rush, wait guys
Talk quietly to me
And say: “What fun it was
And how young he is!”
Wait girls laugh
Look at this portrait
I just turned 19
And I’m no longer there, I’m just not there...
I saw this terrible war
I went into battle with a machine gun
So that no one here offends you!
So that no one kills you here
I would like to run across the football field
And meet a friend in the spring
I didn’t return from battle in winter
I was killed in the Chechen war
The mother is crying, grieving, suffering,
Over my early grave.
Yes, he sings in the spring, pouring out
Ostrovsky is our crazy nightingale
Visit your mother's apartment,
Visit my dear
So that she knows what about her son
Someone remembers in their native land
You too are sad over the grave
Bring wild flowers
To make me smell like my dear homeland
On my unearthly roads.

Misha was buried on March 3. The day turned out to be truly spring, the bright sun was shining, drops were ringing, birds were chirping.
How wonderful life is! And my heart is heavy. There is mourning in Ostrovskaya today. The whole village was in motion.
All young and old are moving in the same direction. And here is the house where Misha lived. And all around there are people, people, people, different - those who knew and did not know him.
A beautiful lifeless face with marks of shrapnel, the faces of mother, father, grandmother, sister, black with grief... flowers, wreaths, wreaths, wreaths.
In 2-3 minutes the guard of cadets from the Kamyshinki Military School, the leaders of the district, the village, and friends change. At 12 noon, to the sounds of a military orchestra, Misha leaves his home forever. Many hundreds of people see off Misha on his last journey.

Students take the stage with candles in their hands.
1st. I don't know why and who needs it
who sent them to death with an unshaking hand
just so useless, so evil and unnecessary
released them to eternal rest.
2nd. Cautious spectators silently wrapped themselves in fur coats
and some woman with a distorted face
kissed the dead man on his blue lips
and threw her wedding ring at the priest.
3rd. showered them with fir trees, kneaded them with mud
and went home to talk quietly,
that it's time to put an end to the disgrace,
that soon we will begin to starve
4th. And no one thought to just kneel
and tell these boys that in a mediocre country
even bright feats are just steps
into endless abysses in an incomprehensible war.
A girl wearing a black scarf comes on stage and reads a poem.
N. Nekrasova “Hearing the horrors of war.”
Listening to the horrors of war
With each new battle response
I feel sorry for neither my friend nor my wife,
I'm sorry not for the hero himself

Alas, the wife will be consoled
And the best friend will forget the friend
But there is only one soul in the world
She will remember until death

Among our peaceful affairs
And all sorts of vulgarity and prose
I saw some in the world
Holy, sincere tears

Those are the tears of our mothers
They won't forget their children
Those killed in the bloody field
How not to pick up a weeping willow
Of its drooping branches.
A minute of silence.

1st Presenter.
Russian soldiers returning from the Chechen war bring with them a renewed love for the Motherland. They to some extent returned to us the high concept of patriotism, courage, military and human duty.
Years will pass. Much will be forgotten over time. But there will remain poems and songs that tell about the strength of spirit and courage of the Russian people.

2nd Presenter.
Life is like a spiral going upward. Walk firmly on the ground, soldier, the path is not yet close. Walk harder, because your enemies want trials to knock you down more often. There will still be a lot of them on your way and you need to learn to overcome them. Step by step, and the kilometers run back. The soldier does not count how many of these kilometers have been covered. As long as it takes, as long as it takes.
M. Ischeim's song “No, son!”

Against the backdrop of Schumann's "Reverie" music, children leave fresh flowers on geometric decorations resembling exploding bullet casings. A girl in a black headscarf lowers herself onto a small dais (cube) next to the portrait of the deceased, remaining seated until the curtain closes.

Currently, the development of new combat manuals for the Russian Armed Forces is in full swing. In this regard, I would like to bring up for discussion a rather interesting document that came into my hands during a business trip to the Chechen Republic. This is a letter from a mercenary fighter who fought in Chechnya. He addresses not just anyone, but the general of the Russian Army. Of course, some thoughts expressed by a former member of illegal armed groups can be questioned. But on the whole he is right. We do not always take into account the experience of combat operations and continue to suffer losses. It's a pity. Perhaps this letter, while new combat regulations have not yet been approved, will help some commanders avoid unnecessary bloodshed. The letter is published with virtually no editing. Only spelling errors have been corrected.
- Citizen General! I can say that I am a former fighter. But first of all, I am a former SA senior sergeant who was thrown onto the battlefield in the DRA a few weeks before (as I later learned) the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan.
So, with three fractures of limbs, ribs, and a severe concussion, at the age of 27 I became a gray-haired Muslim. I was “sheltered” by a Khazarian who once lived in the USSR and knew a little Russian. He walked me out. When I began to understand Pashto a little, I learned that the war in Afghanistan was over, the USSR was gone, and so on.
Soon I became a member of his family, but this did not last long. With the death of Najib, everything changed. First, my father-in-law did not return from a trip to Pakistan. By that time we had moved from near Kandahar to Kunduz. And when I returned to my house with spare parts at night, the neighbor’s boy told me in confidence that they were asking and looking for me. Two days later the Taliban took me too. So I became a “voluntary” mercenary fighter.
There was a war in Chechnya - the first. People like me, Arab-Chechens, began to be trained for jihad in Chechnya. They were prepared in camps near Mazar-i-Sharif, then sent to Kandahar. Among us there were Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, many Jordanians, and so on.
After preparation, the final instructions were given by NATO instructors. They transferred us to Turkey, where there are camps for transfer, rest and treatment of “Chechens”. They said that highly qualified doctors were also former Soviet citizens.
We were transported across the state border by rail. They drove us non-stop across Georgia. There we were given Russian passports. In Georgia we were treated like heroes. We went through acclimatization, but then the first war in Chechnya ended.
They continued to prepare us. Combat training began in the camp - mountain training. Then they transported weapons to Chechnya - through Azerbaijan, Dagestan, the Argun Gorge, the Pankisi Gorge and through Ingushetia.
Soon they started talking about a new war. Europe and the USA gave the go-ahead and guaranteed political support. The Chechens should have started. The Ingush were ready to support them. The final preparations began - studying the region, entering it, bases, warehouses (we did many of them ourselves), issued uniforms, satellite phones. The Chechen-NATO command wanted to forestall events. They were afraid that before the start of hostilities the borders with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ingushetia and Dagestan would be closed. The strike was expected along the Terek. Department of the plain part. Destruction enveloping the outer ring and the inner mesh - with a general seizure, a general search of buildings, farmsteads, etc. But no one did this. Then they expected that, having narrowed the outer ring along the Terek with captured crossings, dividing three directions along the ridges, the Russian Federation would move along the gorges to the already tightly closed border. But that didn't happen either. Apparently, our generals, excuse the freethinking, neither in the DRA nor in Chechnya have ever learned to fight in the mountains, especially not in open battle, but with gangs that know the terrain well, are well armed, and most importantly, knowledgeable. Observation and reconnaissance are carried out by absolutely everyone - women, children, who are ready to die for the praise of a Wahhabi - he is a horseman!!!
Even on the way to Chechnya, I decided that at the slightest opportunity I would return home. I took almost all my savings out of Afghanistan and hoped that 11 thousand dollars would be enough for me.
Back in Georgia, I was appointed assistant field commander. With the beginning of the second war, our group was first abandoned near Gudermes, then we entered Shali. Many of the gang were locals. They received money for the fight and went home. You search, and he sits, waits for a signal, and bargains for food from the rear for money received in battle - dry rations, stewed meat, and sometimes ammunition “for self-defense from bandits.”
I was in battles, but I didn’t kill. Mostly he carried out the wounded and dead. After one battle they tried to pursue us, and then he slapped the Arab cashier, and before dawn he left through the Kharami to Shamilka. Then for 250 bucks he sailed to Kazakhstan, then moved to Bishkek. Called himself a refugee. After working a little, I settled in and went to Alma-Ata. My colleagues lived there, and I hoped to find them. I even met Afghans, they helped me.
This is all good, but the main thing is about the tactics of both sides:
1. The bandits know the tactics of the Soviet army well, starting with the Benderaites. NATO analysts studied it, summarized it and gave us instructions back at the bases. They know and directly say that “the Russians do not study or take these issues into account,” but it’s a pity, it’s very bad.
2. The bandits know that the Russian Army is not prepared for night operations. Neither soldiers nor officers are trained to operate at night, and there is no material support. During the first war, entire gangs of 200-300 people passed through the battle formations. They know that the Russian Army does not have PSNR (ground reconnaissance radars), no night vision devices, or silent firing devices. And if so, the bandits carry out all their attacks and prepare them at night - the Russians sleep. During the day, bandits carry out forays only if they are well prepared and for sure, but otherwise they are serving time, resting, collecting information is carried out, as I already said, by children and women, especially from among the “victims,” that is, those whose husband, brother, son, etc. have already been killed. etc.
These children are undergoing intense ideological indoctrination, after which they may even commit self-sacrifice (jihad, ghazavat). And the ambushes come out at dawn. At the appointed time or on a signal - from the cache the weapon and forward. They put up “beacons” - they stand on the road or on a high-rise, from where everything can be seen. How our troops appeared and left is a signal. Almost all field commanders have satellite radio stations. Data received from NATO bases in Turkey from satellites is immediately transmitted to field workers, and they know when which column went where, what is being done in the places of deployment. Indicate the direction of exit from the battle, etc. All movements are controlled. As the instructors said, the Russians do not carry out radio control and direction finding, and Yeltsin “helped” them with this by destroying the KGB.
3. Why the huge losses of our troops on the march? Because you transport living corpses in a car, that is, under an awning. Remove awnings from vehicles in combat areas. Turn the fighters to face the enemy. Seat people facing the board, benches in the middle. The weapon is at the ready, and not like firewood, at random. The bandits' tactics are an ambush with a two-echelon arrangement: the 1st echelon opens fire first. In
The 2nd are snipers. Having killed the airborne ones, they blocked the exit, and no one will get out from under the awning, but if they try, they finish off the 1st echelon. Under the awning, people, as if in a bag, do not see who is shooting and from where. And they themselves cannot shoot. By the time we turn around, we’re ready.
Next: the first echelon shoots one at a time: one shoots, the second reloads - continuous fire is created and the effect of “many bandits”, etc. As a rule, this spreads fear and panic. As soon as the ammunition, 2-3 magazines, is consumed, the 1st echelon retreats, carries out the dead and wounded, and the 2nd echelon finishes off and covers the retreat. Therefore, it seems that there were many militants, and before they knew it, there were no bandits, and if there were, then they were 70-100 meters away, and there was not a single corpse on the battlefield.
In each echelon, carriers are appointed, who do not shoot so much as monitor the battle and immediately pull out the wounded and dead. They appoint strong men. And if they had pursued the gang after the battle, there would have been corpses, and the gang would not have left. But sometimes there is no one left to pursue. Everyone is resting in the back under the awning. That's all the tactics.
4. Taking hostages and prisoners. There are instructions for this too. It says to watch out for "wet chicken." This is what bazaar lovers are called. Since the rear doesn’t work, take a careless, careless scoundrel with a weapon “by the back” and back to the market, get lost in the crowd. And they were like that. This was the same in Afghanistan. Here is your experience, father commanders.
5. Command error - and the bandits were afraid of it. It is necessary to immediately conduct a population census along with the “cleansing operations.” We came to the village and wrote down in each house how many were where, and along the way, through the remains of documents in the administrations and through neighbors, it was necessary to clarify the actual situation in each yard. Control - the police or the same troops came to the village and checked - there were no men. Here is a list of a ready-made gang. New ones have arrived - who are you, “brothers”, and where will you be from? Inspecting them and searching the house - where did he hide the gun?!
Any departure and arrival is through registration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He joined the gang - fuck him! Wait - come - spanked. To do this, it was necessary to assign populated areas to each unit and establish control over any movement, especially at night with night vision devices, and the systematic shooting of bandits going out to gather. No one else will come out at night, no one will come from the gang.
Half of the bandits feed themselves at home thanks to this, so there are fewer problems with food. The rest is decided by our rear people, selling products on the sly. And if there was a zone of responsibility, the army commander, the military and the Ministry of Internal Affairs would control the situation through mutual efforts, and the appearance of any new one would be taken away (look for Khattab, Basayev and others from their wives, they are there in winter).
And again, don't disperse the gangs. You plant them like seedlings in a garden. Example: in the gang I was in, we were once told to urgently go out and destroy a convoy. But the informants gave inaccurate information (the observer had a walkie-talkie about the exit of the first cars, he reported and left, the rest were delayed, apparently). So the battalion hit the gang, “scattered” and “defeated”. Yeah! Each subgroup always has the task of retreating to the general gathering area of ​​the gang. And if they chased us, there was almost “0” ammunition - they fired. You need to drag two wounded and a dead man. If they hadn’t gone far, of course they would have abandoned everyone and then, perhaps, they would have left.
And so in Ingushetia, in a former sanatorium, the wounded were treated - and back into service. This is the result of “dispersion” - sowing - after 1 month the gang, rested, is assembled. This is why warlords remain alive and elusive for so long. There would be rapid response teams, with dogs, in a helicopter, and urgently to the area of ​​​​the collision with the support of the “beaten” - that is, those who were fired upon, and in pursuit. There are none.

Yes, I was Elmir’s mistress, and I’m not going to hide it,” 18-year-old Svetlana Barkova (last name changed - V.E.) said at the court hearing. - In general, I have known both him and his father for ten years - from the time the Guseinovs arrived in Chapaevsk and bought a house on the same street as us. When I was still little, Elmir and I were just friends, and then I grew up - and soon became his mistress. He constantly helped me with money, gave me 500 rubles a week...

Then at the trial, which took place in 2004, other girls from the same Chapaevsk outskirts spoke and also admitted that they were the defendant’s mistresses. Moreover, each of them was well aware that Guseinov Jr. had other girlfriends in his pay besides her, but even under such conditions, all the girls got along well with each other and did not even try to be jealous of each other.

However, sometimes there were exceptions. In particular, the already mentioned Sveta Barkova said during the court hearing that she once had a fight with a certain Katya, another friend of Elmira Guseinova. The fight, as it turned out, was serious, because Katya broke Sveta’s finger in the process. However, the reason for the fight in this case was not jealousy at all, but money: one of the girls told Sveta that this 25-year-old loving Azerbaijani paid Katya more than her...

Apparently, some girls really loved Huseynov in their own way, because on occasion they were ready to do everything he asked. So Elmir once asked Sveta to take a small package from him, find a safe place for it in his house and keep it until he asked. The girl could not resist and begged her friend to show what was in the bag. It turned out that the package contained... a Makarov pistol. True, Huseynov assured his passion that this weapon was not a combat weapon, and, moreover, faulty, and therefore, they say, it would not bring you any trouble.

As a result, the reassured Sveta put the package on her sofa and forgot about it for several weeks. She remembered the pistol only after Elmir asked her to bring it. The next day he usually returned the weapon to the girl, who again hid the blued object in its original place. This lasted until one day the police came to the Huseynovs’ yard and took Elmir away in a yellow car with barred windows. And a few days later, people in civilian clothes came to the Barkovs’ home and asked in an amicable way, without a search, to give them the ill-fated pistol...

It was then that the residents of that quiet street on the outskirts of Chapaevsk, a small town in the Samara region, found out who was really hiding under the guise of a respectable Azerbaijani businessman Elmir Huseynov. It would be more accurate to say that the real commercial activity (grain trading) was carried out by his father, Guseinov Sr., but 25-year-old Elmir, formally listed as a participant in his father’s business, actually got his main income from night robberies and even contract killings. At the same time, the main targets of Guseinov Jr.’s attacks were, as it turned out, farmers from villages neighboring Chapaevsk. Of course, he did not rob alone, but as part of a gang, which, according to his testimony, included three other young gypsies. However, oddly enough, it was not possible to establish their identities and addresses, and therefore Huseynov was subsequently forced to answer alone for bandit raids on farmers.

In addition to the already mentioned Makarov pistol, the criminal group was also armed with three TT pistols, a sawed-off hunting rifle, RGD-5 grenades and an AK-47 assault rifle. The police found this entire arsenal, except for the machine gun, in the Huseynovs’ house during the arrest of their youngest son. However, the operatives were able to find a magazine for the mentioned AK-47 with 30 rounds of ammunition, so the bandits did not even try to deny the absence of this weapon.

During the investigation of the case, the prosecutor's office charged Guseinov with organizing and participating in armed raids on Mayer farmers from the village of Makaryevka, Bezenchuksky district, as well as on farmers Arefyevs from the village of Kuibyshevsky, Krasnoarmeysky district. In these cases, the crime scenarios were very similar. Around midnight, masked bandits burst into the house of unsuspecting farmers, beat the men, and put guns to the heads of women and children. In such a situation, of course, the victims of the attacks were ready to give anything to the robbers if only they would be left alive. Having thoroughly scared the victims, the criminals took money, gold jewelry and other valuables from their house, after which they disappeared into the night. Later, when calculating, it was established that the raiders deprived the Mayers of property worth almost 33 thousand rubles, and the Arefyevs – more than 23 thousand.

After a series of armed raids, the criminal world apparently started talking about Huseynov as a tough gangster. One way or another, soon local Chapaev businessmen began to contact him with the goal of “removing” their unwanted competitor. The young Azerbaijani agreed to this “wet” work, but decided to himself that he himself would not get dirty with blood. By that time, Elmir had already had his eye on a candidate for the role of killer: he turned out to be 23-year-old Musa Kaimov, a resident of the village of Shali in the Chechen Republic, who had recently come from his historical homeland to the banks of the Volga in order to earn money. However, by his age, Musa had never mastered any civilian profession: during the years of the armed conflict in Chechnya, he only learned to wield any weapon well and kill in cold blood. Therefore, the young Chechen willingly agreed to Huseynov’s proposal to carry out specific “orders” for him.

The first victim of this hired killer was a private entrepreneur Bakhriev from the village of Vladimirovka, Bezenchuksky district. A certain competitor “ordered” it from Guseinov for 100 thousand rubles. Having received his “fee”, Elmir gave half of it to Kaimov, and to complete the “task” he supplied him with a TT pistol. Then the mercenaries acted according to the usual pattern. They arrived at Bakhriev's house around midnight, and Huseynov knocked on the door. The owner of the house went out onto the porch - and immediately received a bullet in the temple from Kaimov, who was hiding in the darkness. Bakhriev died on the threshold of his own house within a few minutes, without regaining consciousness.

Then the accomplices, following the same scenario, committed a contract murder of private entrepreneur Magerromov, who lived in Chapaevsk. For this “work” the customer paid Guseinov $1,500, and half of this amount, like last time, went to Kaimov. True, unlike the previous case, the Chechen had to shoot at Magerromov through the window glass, because the cautious businessman, when knocking on the door, did not go out onto the porch, but tried to look at the night visitors from the window. However, this did not save the entrepreneur: a bullet from Kaimov’s pistol pierced his head, causing instant death.

As you know, contract killings are always very difficult to solve, so the fact that the killer ended up in the dock in 2004 should be considered a great success for our law enforcement officers. But the most surprising thing here is not at all that Kaimov was eventually put on trial, but something completely different. It turns out that during the investigation into these murders, the investigators managed to find only the perpetrator, but not the people who ordered the crimes. Huseynov, who received money from them, during interrogations could not say anything intelligible, not only about their names and addresses, but even about their names and portraits. One way or another, during the investigation it was not possible to establish the identities of the businessmen who wanted to remove their competitor from their road with the help of mercenaries.

And Huseynov, after successfully executing his “orders,” apparently decided to expand his criminal business, and even tried to bring it “in line with the times.” In any case, on occasion, a young Azerbaijani purchased a batch of TNT bombs from the former serviceman Piskunov. But then the gang leader, apparently, was “crushed by a toad” - and he decided that it was too expensive to pay the seller for this product. From that moment on, Piskunov’s fate was decided.

This time, Huseynov went to the “wet deal” himself, without intermediaries. The Azerbaijani told the TNT seller that he could pay him only after he received the appropriate amount of money from a certain forester who lived somewhere in the river wilderness behind Chapaevsky. Piskunov agreed to go with Guseinov in order to quickly receive payment for the goods. And what happened next, as you already guessed, happened according to the classical scheme. In a deserted place, Elmir stopped the car under a plausible pretext, and then, seizing the moment, knocked down the unlucky salesman, after which he finished him off with a shot in the head...

During the investigation, the prosecutor's office decided not to prosecute Svetlana Barkova for storing a Makarov pistol in her house, since the girl had absolutely no understanding of weapons and was misled by her friend regarding the lethality and serviceability of the PM. As a result, of all the defendants in this criminal case, only Elmir Huseynov and Musa Kaimov ended up in the dock. At the same time, from the very beginning, the Azerbaijani partially confessed to the crimes he committed, not agreeing only that he took at least some part in the murder of Bakhriev and Magerromov. But Kaimov never admitted a single charge. Moreover, the Chechen petitioned to have an interpreter invited to his trial. However, the court rejected his request, citing the fact that Kaimov is a citizen of Russia, graduated from a Russian school, and, therefore, should be sufficiently fluent in the main language of his state. Then the offended defendant refused to say anything at all in court, and as a result he remained silent until the very end of the trial.