The truth about the death of riot police from Sergiev Posad in Chechnya. Perm riot police held out until the last bullet A riot policeman died

In 2000, or more precisely on March 2, another tragedy occurred in Chechnya: a riot police convoy from Sergiev Posad was attacked at the approach to Grozny, as a result of which 22 riot police officers were killed and 31 more were injured.

In April 2000, a special meeting of the Security Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation was held to analyze the causes of the tragedy. This meeting was preceded by a devastating article in Novaya Gazeta, where Vyacheslav Izmailov, a military observer for the publication, argued that their own military personnel were to blame for the deaths of Russian riot police. It was this article that became the reason for a committee meeting, where responsible officials from such departments as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Internal Troops and the Main Military Prosecutor's Office were invited.

Sergiev Posad OMON

Almost 12 years have passed since the tragedy, during which the soldiers’ loved ones managed to cry all their tears and argue about this topic. Since that moment, a lot has happened, because we live in a time when something you shouldn’t get used to suddenly becomes commonplace. And what cannot be forgotten is simply forgotten, like an incident from a distant past life.

Today I want to tell the truth about those events, about how high-ranking government officials were able to hide the whole truth from Russian society, about how they blatantly lied to State Duma deputies and all members of the Security Committee.

Do not be surprised at the course of these thoughts, because today for the first time we will present selected passages from the transcript of the meeting a year ago to let you understand how this process proceeded with distortions of the truth.

So, again we go back a year and find ourselves on April 6, 2000 at a special meeting chaired by A.I. Gurov, chairman of the security committee.

To understand what happened, we present part of the transcript from that meeting. The first to make a report is Mikhailov, a major general who is a senior consultant to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation:
“So, the gist of the events is something like this. At 10:00 on March 2, 2000, in 11 vehicles, a column of riot police of the Moscow Region Central Internal Affairs Directorate entered the village. Podgornoye, Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny. While the first Ural vehicle was standing 130 meters from the turn to the OMON base of the Podolsk Internal Affairs Directorate, its driver was killed with an accurate shot from a sniper’s rifle. After which the car, having lost control, turned sharply to the left and, having traveled some distance, stopped, crashing into the concrete pillars of the industrial zone; as a result of the falling pillars, 2 police officers of the fire covering group were seriously injured.

Following the first single shot, fire from a machine gun was opened from the side of residential buildings in the village of Podgornoye, followed by 2 shots from a grenade launcher immediately from the side of the industrial zone...

That is, massive fire was opened on the convoy from sniper rifles and automatic weapons from approximately 8 points. These points were: the mullah's houses numbered 53 and 63, a cistern that was located behind the vegetable gardens and two points that were located behind the fences of the vegetable gardens, as well as an elevator located in the direction of travel on the left rear. The cover group of the Staropromyslovsky department opened massive fire in response towards the attackers...

At 10:15, Major General Manyuta, who at that time led the group of Internal Troops in Grozny, arrived at the battlefield. The general and his group immediately entered the battle...

What can you say about the results of the internal audit regarding the article? This means that it was as if the fire was fired from behind the fence by our units. This allegedly happened because they mistook this column for a column of militants. But this point is easily refuted by the fact that the places where the shooting took place were reliably established, where cartridges and abandoned ammunition were found, including those from grenade launchers.

Further. The leaders of the temporary department of internal affairs, near which this battle took place, knew about the arrival of the convoy, so it was impossible to make a mistake. In addition, measures have been taken to enhance the security of the route, which also eliminates the possibility of error. Among other things, the column had clear signs that qualified it as belonging to the federal forces.”

Everything that police general Mikhailov told the deputies was a lie, which he knew very well. Besides him, another speaker, Maksin, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Internal Troops, also knew the truth, who confirmed the words of the police general, adding that as a result of the operation, about 60 people were detained on suspicion of involvement in gangster groups.

Next, at the meeting, a debate took place between Mikhailov and a member of the Security Committee, former Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation A. S. Kulikov, as a result of which it became clear that:
In connection with the death of 20 soldiers, the military prosecutor's office carried out only an official check on the correctness of the command's actions in this situation, and not an investigation as required by law.
The inspection was carried out by representatives from the military prosecutor's office, and not from the ministry.
Violations were made during the passage of the column to the place of deployment and the immediate change of the detachment.

As a result, the military prosecutor's office independently decided not to initiate criminal proceedings against the officials.
Further, during the meeting, the order of the minister was read out, according to which one of the guilty persons, deputy. The head of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Moscow Region, who was responsible at that time for the passage of the riot police column, was only given a warning about his incomplete suitability for his position. Such “punishment” threatened him with a kind of demotion - he was appointed head of the traffic police near Moscow! That's it!

Subsequently, at the meeting, deputies and committee members asked Mikhailov, in order to clarify the facts of what happened and the measures taken to prevent this from happening in the future, answering which, the general continued with the same zeal to convince everyone present of the correctness of the military prosecutor’s assessment of the incident.

The participants of the meeting drew the attention of all those present to the fact that the top management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs practically did not react at all to the article in Novaya Gazeta, which caused a public outcry.

Mikhailov also said that there were some detained militants who took part in the attack on the riot police.

During the meeting, some members of the committee doubted the competence of the author of the article in Novaya Gazeta, Major Izmailov, who, allegedly without understanding, gave out “hot” material to the public, already tense to the limit. Their conclusion was terrible - the title of the article is unethical, and it was made up!
The final line was drawn by Kulikov A.S., who pointed out how the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs treats such facts superficially. He drew attention to the fact that the same leadership did not carry out an analysis of what happened in order to prevent this from happening in the future and punish the perpetrators.

A year after the meeting, after re-reading the transcript and understanding what happened, it becomes clear that the defendants from the military departments were outright lying to everyone present. Those who came to the meeting knew the whole truth perfectly well, but continued to lie, but, as happens in life, everything secret will someday become apparent. Luckily it happened this time too.

On March 2, Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation G. N. Seleznev received an official response from the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation V. V. Ustinov that the information that was drawn attention to in the program “Moment of Truth” of the TV channel on February 18, 2000, on the “alleged execution” in Chechnya OMON, when 22 OMON officers were killed, were carefully checked by the prosecutor's office.

The response provided information from an official investigation that on March 1, 2000, the leadership of the Staropromyslovsky temporary police department received operational information about the possible arrival of a convoy of unknown armed people in Grozny, who were supposed to be dressed in police uniforms and have Gantamirovtsy ID cards.

According to the order of the leadership of the VOVD, in order to neutralize unknown armed persons, employees of the military commandant’s office and the Staropromyslovsky District Department of Internal Affairs located near checkpoint No. 53 in the courtyards of houses in the village of Podgornoye.

On March 2, 2000, a convoy of vehicles (“ZIL”, “GAZ”, “Ural” and the bus “Ruslan”) of the riot police of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate of the city of Sergiev Posad, when approaching Podgorny, was fired upon near checkpoint No. 53.

Employees of the patrol service of the Staropromyslovsky district department of internal affairs of the city of Grozny, Dakaev A.N., Umarov M.S. and Asakaev B.U., who were on the firing lines, opened fire on the lead vehicle of the convoy, since it did not stop near checkpoint number 53.

The OMON personnel of the Sergiev Posad Municipal Internal Affairs Directorate, who were in the convoy, opened fire in response, after which fire was opened on the convoy from the territory of the Podolsk OMON base, which is located next to checkpoint No. 53.

As a result of the battle, 22 Sergiev Posad riot police officers were killed, and another 31 people were injured.

Based on the incident, the following penalties were applied to those responsible:
Fadeev B.V., major general of the police, was charged under Art. 293, part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: negligence, failure to fully perform official duties, resulting in grave consequences. The major general, being the head of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate of the Moscow Region, did not provide escort for the convoy with helicopters and armored vehicles, without coordinating the movement of the convoy with the Joint Headquarters of the OGV in Chechnya, while being in the city of Mozdok.

Levchenko M.L., police colonel, was charged under Art. 293, part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: negligence, failure to fulfill one’s official duties, which led to the death of people. At the time of the incident, he was the head of the control group of the Joint Group of Forces in Chechnya from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. In addition, he was the person responsible for organizing the management of funds and forces from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation to ensure the safety of personnel.

Tikhonov I. S., . police major was also charged under Art. 293, part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: negligence. The major, being in the position of acting commander of the Podolsk riot police, was unable to organize the service of personnel based at checkpoint No. 53, which resulted in the unhindered and safe passage of federal forces transport in his area of ​​responsibility.

Today is the day of remembrance of the Sverdlovsk riot police officers who died 21 years ago in the Chechen Republic. On a spring day in 1996, riot police were ambushed in the Zavodskoy district of Grozny. As a result of an armed clash with Chechen militants, ten police officers were killed. Senior police lieutenant and deputy company commander Oleg Varlakov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia, and the other nine were awarded the Order of Courage.

Soldiers of the Sverdlovsk riot police in Chechnya in 1996.

Ural riot police arrived on their next business trip to the territory of Chechnya on February 5, 1996. The number of policemen on that business trip was 100 people. One half of the Sverdlovsk residents guarded the commandant’s office of the Zavodsky district in Grozny, and the other served at three checkpoints.

Checkpoint No. 13 was located next to the existing bridge over the Sunzha River, and checkpoints No. 18 and No. 19 were located at the entrance to Grozny from the western side.

List of soldiers of the Sverdlovsk special police detachment who died on March 7, 1996:

Oleg Varlakov

Alexey Burdin

Alexey Vyatkin

Aleksandr Kuznetsov

Andrey Makarkin

Vadim Panov

Albert Podkorytov

Sergey Savchenkov

Vyacheslav Chernetsky

Sergey Chesnokov

As the soldiers of our riot police recall, at first the situation in Grozny was quite calm - markets and shops were open, people gradually got used to peaceful life. Fighting at that time took place more often in mountainous and wooded areas. But since March 3, the fighters noticed that many more people were leaving Grozny than entering the city. In addition, many Chechens looked at the riot police as if they were saying goodbye to them forever. On March 4, people left the capital of Chechnya in whole lines. The market is empty. An alarming silence hung in Grozny.

On the morning of March 5, it froze a little and fog descended. Suddenly, the lights went out throughout Grozny, and then shooting began in all areas of the city - militants attacked checkpoints and commandant's offices of the federal forces. Of the positions of the Sverdlovsk riot police, checkpoint No. 13 was the first to be attacked - its strategic importance was more important, and the position of this strong point turned out to be the most vulnerable. Two units of armored vehicles (infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers), assigned to the riot police for reinforcement, took part in the defense of the checkpoint.

First of all, Chechen militants fired at the kitchen of the checkpoint. According to them, at this time the riot police were supposed to have breakfast. But, by luck, the meal ended a little earlier, and the militants’ strike did not harm the police. The militants attempted to storm the checkpoint, but were repulsed.

On March 6, the number of dead Russian security forces in Grozny was already in the dozens. All commandant's offices were blocked. In total, about 2 thousand militants entered Grozny. As it later turned out, they arrived in the city on regular trains, gradually accumulated their forces and attacked the federal forces from inside Grozny.

By the evening of March 6, checkpoint No. 13 began to run out of food and water. Although there were no casualties, many riot police were wounded and felt increasingly unwell. The checkpoint garrison risked losing radio communications - the batteries were running low, and, naturally, there were no new ones.

On March 7, Colonel Vladimir Golubykh (commander of the Sverdlovsk OMON) set the task of evacuating people from the 13th checkpoint. 15 Russian security forces boarded two combat vehicles. Four more fighters were supposed to open heavy fire on the militants, creating the appearance of an active defense, and then also join the retreating ones.

The covering fighters began shooting, and a smoke screen was set up. The infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers broke through the checkpoint fence and rushed towards the commandant's office. The militants fired after them from machine guns and grenade launchers. They also fired at the building of the commandant's office itself, but the defenders of the facility were saved by the fact that on the side of the industrial zone of Grozny the commandant's office was planted with local acacia. Strong tree trunks took a significant portion of the militants' bullets and grenades. The thick walls of the commandant's office also helped the riot police.

The equipment and people reached the commandant's office without losses. But on the spot it turned out that the four fighters left to distract the militants were not on the armor. At first, the command decided that the riot police were thrown off the armored vehicles when the armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were passing the tram tracks. Ten riot police, led by senior lieutenant Oleg Varlakov, went on the search in the same infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers with crews of soldiers of the Internal Troops. Varlakov himself served at checkpoint No. 13 and knew all the approaches to it. He was given the task of getting to those same tram tracks and conducting reconnaissance.

Varlakov’s group reached the tracks without incident. The riot police made sure that there was no one in the area - no missing comrades, no militants. The search group continued towards the checkpoint. A couple of minutes later, the defenders of the commandant’s office heard a sharp explosion and heavy shooting. Oleg Varlakov reported that the armored vehicles had been hit and the group had accepted the battle.

The garrison of the commandant's office, left without armored vehicles, could do nothing to help their colleagues - the militants did not allow them to leave the fence of the commandant's office. And the intensity of the battle increased. The group commander said that there were militants all around, and he already had wounded. Then Oleg Varlakov said that he was seriously wounded and had nowhere to go. “Looks like that’s it...” he said.

As it later turned out, riot policemen disembarked from the damaged armored vehicles, ran out towards the militants and found themselves literally face to face with them. At first, the bandits were even confused by such an unexpected contact. But then their advantage in manpower took its toll. Almost one of the headquarters of the Chechen gangs was located in this area.

Soldiers of the Sverdlovsk riot police, occupying positions in high-rise buildings near the Factory Commandant's Office, saw through optics how the militants loaded the corpses of their comrades into a truck. In total, more than two dozen killed militants were loaded. The police opened fire with sniper rifles and engaged the militants in battle. The enemy responded with massive fire, pinning the riot police to the ground. It was on the evening of March 7th. By that time, the commandant’s office was already running out of water and food supplies. Fighting continued throughout the city.

The militants used passenger cars (“Volgas”, “heels” IZH) to transport people and ammunition in the area of ​​the industrial zone of Grozny. It so happened that the only road passed right next to the commandant’s office of the Zavodsky district. Therefore, the soldiers of the Sverdlovsk riot police had to constantly destroy vehicles going for a breakthrough.

On March 8, fighting was still taking place, and on the 9th the situation began to calm down. A scout was sent from the commandant's office, dressed in civilian clothes and looking like a Chechen. The scout successfully reached the site of the last battle of the riot police and returned with Oleg Varlakov’s service ID.

A column of Airborne troops approached the commandant's office. Together with the paratroopers, riot police moved to checkpoint No. 13. The bodies of ten dead policemen and four soldiers of the Internal Troops were soon discovered. Another soldier was captured, but was later released. Many of the dead showed signs of torture. The militants who remained at the checkpoint did not get involved in the battle and quickly retreated. But the missing soldiers could not be found on the territory of the 13th checkpoint.

The lost riot police were found on their own, coming out of the industrial zone directly towards the paratroopers. As it turned out, four police officers covering the retreat then left the checkpoint and disappeared into the industrial zone. In two days they only once ran into militants, managed to throw grenades at them and broke away.

On March 10, Ural police officers reported to Yekaterinburg about the tragedy that had occurred. The bodies of the dead riot police were taken to Yekaterinburg, only Oleg Varlakov was buried in Pyatigorsk, where his family lived. The soldiers who died posthumously were awarded. Senior Lieutenant Varlakov was awarded the title of Hero of Russia, and the remaining nine riot policemen were awarded Orders of Courage.

Farewell to the dead fellow countrymen took place in the Yekaterinburg Youth Palace, with a huge crowd of people. In total, during those March battles in Grozny, representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs alone (these are riot police, SOBR and Internal Troops) lost over 200 people killed. And the militant attack itself turned out to be just a rehearsal for a more organized attack in August 1996.

Since then, March 7 has become the Day of Remembrance in the Sverdlovsk riot police. The heroic death of brothers in arms became an example and a lesson for the soldiers of the detachment. And 21 years after the death of their comrades, the special forces remember and honor their friends.

The time of change has chosen them.
Let us remember the fallen riot policemen and remember HOW IT HAPPENED.

On the eve of the 9th anniversary of the death of seventeen soldiers of the Sergiev Posad OMON in Chechnya, I met with the widow of the deceased OMON commander, Lyubov Alexandrovna Markelova. Memory is all that is left for her, so she lives by it and carefully protects the good name of her husband, Colonel Dmitry Afanasyevich Markelov, the founder of the Sergiev Posad OMON.
They wrote and spoke a lot about this tragedy, but no one could give a complete picture of what happened on March 2, 2000 in the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny. I think it is possible to get closer to a true story that reflects what actually happened now, but only get closer, and only with a careful, detailed analysis of eyewitness testimony. About a hundred participants in this clash testified at three trials, in which they tried to establish at least a partial chronology of the chain of events. Participants and eyewitnesses of this event, as well as those who were involved in everything that happened, or rather those from whom it was possible to extract at least some testimony at the trials, spoke about the following:

The departure of the train with police units of the Moscow City Main Internal Affairs Directorate and the Moscow Region Main Internal Affairs Directorate to their duty stations in the North Caucasus region was scheduled for February 29, 2000 from the first track of the Kazansky railway station at 16:13. Arrival at Mozdok station (North Ossetia - Alania) was planned for 3 hours 00 minutes on March 2, 2000. The departure of the train in the opposite direction from Mozdok was planned for March 3, 2000 (replaced detachments were supposed to leave on it). According to the order, the personnel were provided with everything necessary locally: Kalashnikov assault rifles, Makarov pistols (for commanders), triple ammunition, night vision and shooting devices, flares, binoculars, personal protective equipment, special communication equipment, flashlights, painkillers, hemostatic and disinfectant medications and other property according to the time sheet. In the declaration for weapons, ammunition, communications and logistics equipment transported by riot police of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Moscow Region (Sergiev Posad) on the route Moscow - Mozdok, riot police commander D. A. Markelov indicated: the total weight of the cargo is 20 tons. All this cargo was sent from Sergiev Posad on February 28 on 4 vehicles. They arrived in Mozdok on the evening of March 1 and awaited the arrival of a train with fighters. The deputies of the Sergiev Poad and Podolsk OMON reissued documents at the headquarters for the remaining basic equipment.
The echelon that arrived in Mozdok was disbanded according to orders: a detachment of the Moscow City Internal Affairs Directorate remained in Mozdok, one detachment of the police department of the Moscow City Internal Affairs Directorate was sent to the village. Rubezhnoye, the second detachment - in the city of Urus-Martan, the riot police of the city of Sergiev Posad - in the city of Grozny, two more detachments as part of the echelon were sent to Gudermes. In total, 10 detachments passed through Mozdok on March 2, and 17 detachments on March 1 (this is if we talk about the readiness of the top military leadership to provide armored escort and air cover to each detachment - for this it would be necessary to additionally maintain an entire army). To deliver the personnel of the Sergiev Posad OMON in Mozdok to Grozny, the headquarters allocated 6 Urals. The column of 11 vehicles was headed by the Ural, which contained 8 Podolsk riot police. By order of the commander of the Mobile detachment and the commandant of the Staropromyslovsky district of the city of Grozny, they arrived in Mozdok on March 1 to meet and accompany their replacement - the Sergiev Posad riot police. Before being sent to the base, D. A. Markelov submitted to the headquarters the declaration for armament and lists of personnel (from March 2, “combat” money began to be awarded), and briefed the personnel. Communication within the detachment was maintained via the “seventh” channel. The deputy commander of the riot police, Maslentsev S.A., who was in the last vehicle of the column, in addition to his walkie-talkie, had a walkie-talkie tuned to the “eighth” channel - the wave of the Podolsk riot police - to communicate with their commander Tikhonov, who was in the lead vehicle. He, in turn, also had a Kenwood radio station, which allowed him to contact the Mobile Detachment and other units in Chechnya. The second Kenwood radio station was located at the base of the Podolsk riot police - in the Staropromyslovsky district of the city of Grozny. Tikhonov was obliged to hand over his radio station to Markelov upon arrival at the place of deployment. Markelov knew the main call signs of the Federal Forces units: “Baikal - 100” - headquarters in Khankala, “507” - commander of the Mobile detachment, “Chelny” - headquarters of the Mobile detachment, “Grad - 4” - riot police in Shchelkovo, “Fergana” - post in Grozny. Markelov demanded armored escort, but he was refused (until March 2, 2000, armor and air escort were not allocated for columns). On that day, March 2, all the formed columns from the echelon moved out of Mozdok without any cover. The route of movement (Mozdok - Goragorsk - Grozny) was determined for the Sergiev Posad OMON by the commandant of the Staropromyslovsky district of the city of Grozny. An hour later, a detachment of the Ministry of Defense PPS also set off along this route to Urus-Martan, located south of Grozny.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning, Markelov received permission to move the detachment to the location. At 8 o'clock we stopped at the first checkpoint - to present documents when entering the Chechen Republic. The pass was a personal ID, which was presented by the commander of the Podolsk OMON Tikhonov - he was leading a column to relieve his fighters. Markelov was in the penultimate car of the convoy, a UAZ. He brought up the rear of the ZIL column, in which Maslentsev was located. On the way to Grozny we stopped at checkpoints several more times. At the Goragorsk pass we overtook a column of “nalivniks” (they were delivering fuel to Grozny) and a column of the Sofrinsky brigade, which were also marching without armored escort. The last checkpoint was located 5 km from the location. Next, the column walked through the territory controlled by the Podolsk OMON, under the supervision of a platoon of Podolsk OMON fighters located at height “319”. To the left, twenty meters from the road, reinforced concrete fences stretched in three rows, behind which there were dilapidated industrial buildings and then the Podolsk OMON base (checkpoint No. 53). On the right along the direction of travel there was a settlement called Podgornoye. The column was supposed to drive along the fence, turn left at the end and stop at checkpoint No. 53. Stretching 700 meters in a straight line, the chain of cars became a target for shooting.
At the Podolsk base, the riot police were waiting for the Sergiev Posad soldiers any minute. We had to unload them, load ourselves, and arrive in Mozdok before dark before 4 p.m. 9 hours 26 minutes. The commander of the Podolsk OMON Tikhonov, at the entrance to checkpoint No. 53, reports on the radio to his base: “We are approaching.” At this moment, single shots are heard. Later it would become clear: snipers were hitting the windshields, aiming for the heads of the drivers of the first and last cars. Two shots from a grenade launcher from the direction of the village - and two Urals were engulfed in fire. Then heavy fire began on the column from all sides and the riot police, at Markelov’s command, left their vehicles and began to fire back. Flashes of gunfire at a distance of 30 - 40 meters are now and then visible from the windows of private houses located in the village. A machine gun fires from the attic. The driver of the fourth Ural was killed. The car drove a short distance and blocked the passage. Alexey Shilikhin is firing a machine gun at the house opposite. He will be killed when help arrives - armored personnel carriers to shield the soldiers lying on the road with armor. It was the intelligence chief, who received the “ring” signal on the radio, sent a reconnaissance patrol to checkpoint No. 53, formed two groups: one to evacuate the wounded, the other to cover the fighters who were firing back. They completed 4 flights. The covering group fired at enemy firing points. They fire from the guns of the approaching infantry fighting vehicle, the AGS 17 grenade launcher is working. Meanwhile, the Podol residents, having received the “attack” command by radio about 10 o’clock, take their places according to the combat crew. The gate and the entire base of the Podolsk riot police are under heavy fire. From the industrial zone, unknown people are shooting not only towards the base, but also at the backs of Sverdlovsk residents behind the fence. Podolsk residents are also being shot at from the mountain village opposite. You could see 2 cars burning, and cries for help were heard over the radio. A group of Podolsk fighters tried to move towards the column under fire, but in vain - the fire on the base was even more intense. Only with the arrival of infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and the 22nd brigade of the SNVV (Sofrintsev) is it possible to provide decent resistance, provide assistance to the wounded and begin evacuation. The battle lasted more than 3 hours, during which 57 people were injured of varying degrees of severity. Among the 17 killed Sergiev Posad residents - 2 died from loss of blood, five burned in the Urals, or rather under the cardan shafts of the vehicles, 1 person died later (March 11) from blood poisoning, 9 people died from sniper shots (almost all from targeted through wounds to the head). One of the first to die was the commander of the Sergiev Posad riot police, Dmitry Markelov.
When the shooting started, Markelov gave the command: “Everyone leave the car! Take up a perimeter defense." He himself takes a position at the rear left wheel of the UAZ and fires from a machine gun towards the elevator, from where fire is fired at the tail of the column. Tikhonov reports through Maslentsev: “Our people are nearby. We have to break through!” Markelov duplicates the command to the detachment: “We must break through, here in a bare place, they will destroy us all!” They jump into cars. The GAZ in front stalled. I had to start it from a tug - push it with an UAZ. Over the radio, Markelov shouted: “The detachment was ambushed! Send help! Then he ordered everyone to go to the channel of the Podolsk riot police. The driver of the car in which Markelov was driving stopped it to pick up the dead soldier from the road. He got out of the car, pulled the guy to the open door of the passenger compartment: “Afanasyich, help!”... And he was bleeding like a fountain from his left cheek. The commander tried to assess the situation, but a sniper bullet came from the direction of the mountains and interrupted his life. The Ural was burning ahead. The column stood up. About 10 minutes have passed since the start of the battle. The indiscriminate shooting stopped, and now only targeted fire was conducted from the side of the mountain village at the riot police lying on the open road. Some were luckier - having rolled into a ditch, they found hollows where they could take cover and fire back from there. Eight people lay in a small trench, pressed tightly against each other. When the shooting died down, the groans of the wounded soldier, whose hands were already numb from loss of blood, could be heard. Sergei Klishin crawled out of cover to bandage the wounded man. While still at home, getting ready for the trip, he transferred the tourniquet from his bag to his sleeve pocket, telling his wife: “It might come in handy.” Sergei died saving the life of a comrade. The bullet hole in the forehead became noticeable only after the funeral service. The snipers calmly kept at gunpoint anyone who tried to help the fighters. Understanding the militants’ tactics, Denis Morozov warned the rest of his comrades: “Don’t crawl towards me! I'm under sniper!
The Moscow RUBOP, which arrived to help, recorded on videotape after the battle how a group of people (mostly women, many with infants) of 80 people approached the fence of the industrial zone, and several men ran behind the fence. A little later the men ran into the crowd again. The group stood for 25-30 minutes, then left the same way. Apparently these people helped the militants who were shooting from the industrial zone escape the “cleansing operation.” In the village, about 40 people were detained who were suspected of participating in the clash.
On the same day, March 2, 2000, a criminal case was opened into an attack on a riot police column in the city of Sergiev Posad. During the investigation, it was revealed that on the night of March 1-2, someone neutralized the mines laid by Podolsk miners around their base. The method of demining showed that the enemy had experienced sappers. Investigators at the scene found spent cartridges and dressing material.
We found the house from where the sniper was shooting from a sports small-caliber rifle. A total of 7 firing points were discovered in houses and on heights in the form of earthen fortifications. Firing points were found both on the right side of the road (in the village of Podgornoye) and on the left - inside the industrial zone. It was from there that fire was fired at the Podolsk riot police base, at Height 319, and at the Sverdlovsk policemen involved in the provocative shooting. Investigators identified eyewitnesses - local residents, who then disappeared somewhere. People became afraid to testify. But investigators have established reliably that the shelling of a column of riot police was a carefully worked out and prepared in advance operation. It is not possible to legalize this information, due to the fact that a real war was going on on the territory of Chechnya, and in a war it is impossible to apply the norms of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR.
General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Golubev, who came to the anniversary of the memory of the soldiers of the Sergiev Posad riot police, said at the monument to those killed on Glinka Street: “We avenged such great losses: the gang of militants was destroyed.” Whether this gang was involved in the executions of three more federal columns (Pskov paratroopers, Perm and Khanty-Mansiysk riot police) - one can only assume that it was, since no more such losses were reported in Chechnya.
In response to L.A. Markelova’s request about the progress of the criminal investigation into the murder of her husband D.A. Markelov, she received a response from the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation dated April 8, 2005: “The criminal case is currently suspended due to failure to identify persons subject to prosecution. In the case, operational-search measures are being carried out aimed at identifying the persons who committed the murder of riot police officers of the Moscow Region and bringing them to criminal responsibility. If the perpetrators are identified, the preliminary investigation will be resumed immediately, and you will be notified.”
Let's go back to the end of the last century. August 2, 1995. A third special purpose police detachment is being created in the Moscow region: in the Sergiev Posad district, the head of the criminal police of the city of Khotkovo, Dmitry Afanasyevich Markelov, was appointed its commander. Podolsk and Shchelkovo riot police were previously formed. In addition to the main tasks inherent in the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, riot police went to the “problem” regions of the country to restore and maintain constitutional order. The Sergiev Posad riot policemen stabilized the situation in our area as well, significantly pacifying the revelry and bravado of criminal elements. By this time, the political leadership of Chechnya declared the sovereignty of its territory, declaring itself the independent republic of Ichkeria. The laws of Russia ceased to apply there, and the rights of citizens were grossly violated. Illegal armed groups began to take hostages, hijack planes, etc. using threats and blackmail. Particularly dangerous recidivists were released from prison. The militants' atrocities knew no bounds. A blood feud arose among the people. Russia suffered enormous damage. In fact, the economy of Chechnya was destroyed. Eighty percent of the oil processed in Chechnya came through pipelines from Russia. After which the processed petroleum products were sold abroad by the Chechen leadership on their own. Money from the sale was used to purchase modern foreign weapons, communications equipment, equipment, and payments to mercenaries. Illegal armed groups began to threaten not only the neighboring constituent entities of the Russian Federation (Stavropol Territory, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Dagestan), but also the integrity and stability of all of Russia.
Therefore, on December 11, 1994, according to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of Russia were introduced into the Chechen Republic. The Sergiev Posad riot police were sent on their first business trip to Chechnya in October 1996. By this time, seven of our fellow countrymen, conscripts, had died in the fighting in Grozny; by 2000, four more had died there.
Relatives and friends of the Sergiev Posad riot police tried to persuade them not to go on another business trip, but received the same answer: “We are well trained, well armed, experienced. Is it possible to compare us with 18-year-old boys who are sent to war?!” And fate protected our fighters for the time being - the detachment returned from three missions without losses. In 1999, the detachment was sent to Karachay-Cherkessia (July - August) and to the Shelkovskaya region of Chechnya, liberated from gangs (October - December). In February 2000, only one Sergiev Posad fighter out of ninety-eight went to a “hot spot” for the first time. The rest have two or even three business trips to the Caucasus under their belts.
Before leaving, many had a premonition of trouble. Or maybe it was fatigue? People didn't have time to rest. But an order is an order, and according to the order, on March 2, 2000, at 8 a.m., the Sergiev Posad riot police entered the territory of Chechnya. Not only Podolsk riot police were preparing for the meeting with the detachment.
Even the day before, that is, on March 1, the leadership of the Staropromyslovsk commandant’s office was fed misinformation about the arrival of a group of Chechen police officers with heavy weapons in Grozny. The reliability of this information was probably beyond doubt since it was decided to detain this group and disarm it at the entrance to Grozny in the area of ​​responsibility of the Podolsk riot police (in the area of ​​checkpoint 53). Subordinate to the commandant of this area were: Podolsk OMON, a subdivision of the military unit, the district department of the Chechen police and seconded police officers from the Sverdlovsk region. Until March, all these units jointly participated in public order activities. People who had recently fought against federal forces often came to the district department of the Chechen police. Tired of the 6-year war, they decided to accept the offer of the new leadership of the republic to restore peaceful life. But there were others among them...
By order of the commandant, Sverdlovsk residents headed to checkpoint No. 53 to disarm Chechen policemen allegedly coming from Urus-Martan. They took up positions to the left of the road, behind the first ten meters of a reinforced concrete fence. Following them, a group of Chechen policemen arrived from Grozny, who dispersed in the mountain village - to the right of the road and to the left - in industrial buildings behind the fence.
When the column of Sergiev Posad riot police began to slow down at checkpoint No. 53, the militants holed up behind the Sverdlovsk residents opened fire on them: from a small platoon of Sverdlovsk residents, two were killed and six were wounded. Out of surprise, the Sverdlovsk residents began to fire from machine guns at our column, without figuring out who was in front of them and where they were shooting from. But after 5-6 minutes the command comes that the friendly and Sverdlovsk troops in the column should stop firing. “Random” bullets from Sverdlovsk residents wounded 2 soldiers. After some time, they will die from loss of blood. It was not possible to provide timely qualified assistance. After 20-30 minutes, armored vehicles arrived, but the Sergiev Posad soldiers could not rise to their full height for another 3 hours. The snipers were still keeping the fighters at gunpoint. It will become known later that this is not the first time that Russians have been attacked from this village. Two weeks before the arrival of the Sergiev Posad soldiers, a Podolsk riot policeman was killed from a grenade launcher. Numerous checks established that an illegal group of armed formations, previously not identified by federal forces, was concentrated in Podgorny. As one of the generals will say at the trial: “There is no doubt that they were waiting for the column of Sergius Posaders.” 15 minutes before the convoy arrived, a general drove along this road in an UAZ. And no one touched him. Unfortunately, this general was not on any of the ships. One of Markelov’s deputies, who was traveling with him in the same car, was also not on the ships. What is this? Indifference, cowardice or betrayal? After all, while Markelov was trying to see the militants’ firing positions in the village from his slightly open car, this someone was lying on the floor of the UAZ, covering his head with his hands. In the official response from the Prosecutor General’s Office dated 07/08/2005 to Markelova’s request: “Who is to blame for the death of my husband?”, they will write: “Significant losses of personnel were facilitated by the negligent attitude of officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation to their duties.”
But it turned out that by the time the trials were held, the main persons who could give a complete picture of the state of affairs were no longer on the lists of the living: the commander of the Mobile detachment died with 14 officers of the command staff - the helicopter in which they were flying exploded over the Shelkovsky district of Chechnya , Deputy Minister for the North Caucasus and commander of the Podolsk riot police, died suddenly from cancer. Gradually, this tragedy began to fade into the background or even third place. Due to the lack of evidence regarding the murder, a case of negligence was opened. The defendants stubbornly denied their guilt, fortunately there is someone to blame, and the dead have no shame. It was much easier to investigate the version of negligence, especially since violations of any instructions (some were written urgently after the tragedy) can always be found in abundance. Perhaps the interested parties are striving for complete oblivion of this story. The real culprits will probably never be found.
The trials left the most painful impressions on the relatives of the victims. They lasted a total of 10 months: 1st trial – 2 months, 2nd – 2 months, 3rd – 6 months. And if you put someone in the dock, then you need to put all the generals who are organizing the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya in this way. But only on these ships did Markelov’s widow learn how the soldiers of the detachment behaved, how they helped each other, winning every life from death, and she is proud of them just as commander Markelov himself, “father,” was proud of them. She is proud of her husband, who did not lose his composure, but tried to lead the squad out of the ambush. All those who died are worthy of the memory of their descendants and the Order of Courage, which they were awarded posthumously, and even more so for individual fighters. Therefore, through the efforts of caring people, our small homeland remembers and increases the memory of them in the name of the living.

The death of the brave, in a battle in the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny on March 2, 2000, 17 soldiers of the Sergiev Posad riot police died:
1. Vaganov Alexander
2. Varlamov Sergey
3.Vinakov Roman
4.Volkov Oleg
5. Ipatov Alexander
6. Klishin Sergey
7.Dmitry Korolev
8. Lavrenov Eduard
9.Lazarev Alexander
10. Markelov Dmitry
11.Morozov Denis
12. Mikhailov Vladimir
13. Tikhomirov Grigory
14. Terentyev Mikhail
15.Fedin Dmitry
16. Chernysh Vladimir
17. Shilikhin Alexey
57 Sergiev Posad riot policemen were injured of varying degrees of severity in this battle. Also killed were 2 Podolsk riot policemen, 2 Sverdlovsk policemen and one conscript soldier, a Far Easterner - one of the 6 drivers driving the Ural.

Materials provided by L. Markelova,
prepared by N. Ivanova
(Article entitled “The Death of the Riot Police: How It Happened”
published in March 2009 in the newspaper “Forward” - Sergiev Posad district)

Yesterday, the bodies of Perm riot police were brought to Rostov-on-Don from Chechnya for identification. They were discovered on the night of May 1 near the Chechen village of Dargo. We are talking about ten fighters who were reported missing after the battle in the Dzhanoi-Vedeno area, where on March 29 a riot police column was ambushed by militants.
The battle of Dzhanoi-Vedeno was one of the bloodiest during the second Chechen campaign. On March 29, a column of 41 Perm riot police and seven internal troops was ambushed near a mountain village. 32 policemen were killed and ten more were missing.
Later, on the Kavkaz website, the militants reported that all ten riot policemen were captured and offered to exchange them for Colonel Budanov, accused of murdering a Chechen woman. Having failed to obtain agreement to the exchange, the militants announced that the prisoners had been shot. True, the names of those riot policemen who were killed near Dzhana-Vedeno and buried in their homeland were given.
All this time, the search for the missing was ongoing. Finally, on the night of May 1, graves containing the bodies of Russian soldiers were discovered near the village of Dargo. “Based on characteristic features, it was established that these were most likely the bodies of Perm riot police,” said Gennady Alekhin, head of the press center of the joint group of federal forces.
The riot police did not immediately fall into the hands of the militants. A group of policemen, firing back, made their way to the location of the federal forces. They only managed to reach a small river, the name of which the military did not know. Here they apparently ran out of ammunition. Many spent cartridges and an unexploded grenade were found around.
The first riot policeman, whose body was found near the bridge over the river, was struck by machine gun fire. The militants finished off their victim with rifle butt blows to the head. The rest were killed nearby. The soldiers who found the bodies reported that eight of the dead had their throats cut and their faces disfigured. Four riot policemen's ears were cut off. The military suggests that the bodies of several victims were beaten even after death. “The killers were not just militants. They were notorious criminals, scumbags. I don’t remember such cruelty from the last war. And this is the first time I’ve seen this,” said Vedensky District Department of Internal Affairs officer Alexander Romanov.
The found bodies were sent to Rostov-on-Don, where identification will be carried out in the laboratory. As doctors say, it is almost impossible to identify several riot policemen. Four were identified on the spot: police warrant officers Yuri Avetisov, Sergei Malyutin, Evgeniy Prosvirnev and private Evgeniy Rzhanov.
“Our employees are now in Rostov,” the officer on duty at the Berezniki OMON detachment in the Perm region told Kommersant. “They should help forensic experts identify the dead. After all, in Chechnya the bodies were examined by people who saw ours only in the war and for a very short time. They could have been mistaken ".
Currently, measures are being taken in Chechnya that should help avoid ambushes on the roads. Security zones will be created along the main routes, including in the Argun and Vedeno gorges: forest belts will be cleared for at least 100 meters around the roads, and there will be no place to organize ambushes.

CRIME DEPARTMENT