Battle for Grozny. Dead city. Battle of Grozny December 31, 94 Chechnya

The Chechen war started poorly for Russian troops. The operation was initially poorly planned, and the United Group encountered unexpected resistance, even outside of Chechnya. The troops suffered their first battles and first losses in Dagestan and Ingushetia. However, the flat part of Chechnya, in the center of which Grozny stands, is itself small. By the end of December, troops concentrated around the capital of Chechnya. Back then, no one could predict how its assault would turn out.

The planning of the operation bore the stamp of haste and chaos. The final decision on the assault was made only on December 26, 1994. Just a few days later the army had to go on the offensive.

The defense of Grozny was led by former career officer of the Soviet army Aslan Maskhadov. A serious problem for him was the anarchy in the ranks of the militants. The most combat-ready groups - the detachments of Gelayev and Basayev - were more likely to obey their atamans, and many detachments were groups of relatives and friends of several people, and it was impossible to even properly count them.

However, the militants managed to cut up defense sectors for at least the largest and most stable groups, create many dumps with ammunition for grenade launchers and mortars, and also adapt their units for a small-scale war in the city. A huge amount of weapons, previously captured from the arsenals of the former Soviet army, allowed Dudayev’s troops to press down with fire in battle, even shooting at individual soldiers with grenade launchers.

An important difference between militant detachments and subsequent campaigns is that in Grozny they had a certain amount of armored vehicles and even artillery. Grozny is the only place from which the use of tanks by the Dudayevites was regularly reported. But, contrary to the popular stereotype, there were almost no foreign mercenaries. But there were such “exotic” things as Russian mercenaries who came to earn extra money. When meeting with compatriots of such “native blood” one could not count on mercy.

If the defense plan of the Dudayevites had weak points, then the offensive plan consisted only of weak points. There was practically no reconnaissance of the enemy's defenses, and the level of combat effectiveness of the militants was chronically underestimated. Moreover, the group that was to storm the city was very weak in numbers. This thesis may be surprising when looking at the long list of regiments, brigades and battalions that participated in the assault. However, the United Group was hastily assembled from units of the “deep districts” of the former Soviet army. Its basis was made up of “framed” units, which had only the minimum number of people necessary to service the equipment.

As a result, a huge amount of armored vehicles and many soldiers who were supposed to service them, from drivers to repairmen, went to Grozny. This contingent had impressive firepower, but it was fatally short of people capable of going into courtyards and entrances, conducting clean-up operations, and controlling the territory. Moreover, a huge percentage of the soldiers were 18-year-old boys who did not have time to receive even the most necessary combat training. It is difficult to say why Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, who commanded the operation, did not take this into account, but the fact is that forces entered the city that were not ready for a serious battle. Apparently, it was assumed that the Chechens would be overwhelmed by the sight of numerous armored vehicles and would not offer serious resistance. Carelessness was costly.

Purgatory

On December 31, the columns were drawn into Grozny from four sides - east, west, north and northeast. The general destination was the Presidential Palace, a large building in the city center.

At first the city looked extinct, but within the first hours it became clear that resistance would be fierce. Groups "West" and "East" immediately became involved in a difficult battle. The Westerners managed to break into the city, but soon the troops stalled under fire. The eastern group also entered into a difficult battle, but soon received a severe blow from its own aircraft. The air force performed catastrophically poorly throughout the battle and often hit its own. The raid had catastrophic consequences: up to fifty people were immediately out of action, killed or wounded, and the Vostok offensive actually collapsed.

Against this background, the actions of the northeastern group of General Lev Rokhlin look truly encouraging. He acted wisely and quickly. The original plan called for an attack through the industrial zone. However, the general - unlike his colleagues - carefully conducted reconnaissance and found out that ambushes awaited him on the main route. Therefore, Rokhlin’s detachment maneuvered and entered the city along an unexpected route, ruining the militants’ plans. Rokhlin's detachment quickly and without catastrophic losses managed to capture a cannery and a hospital complex. In a word, here the soldiers could congratulate themselves on their success.

In the east the offensive floundered, in the northeast it was successful, and in the west the troops slowly dug into the depths of Grozny. However, the most dramatic events occurred with the North group of General Pulikovsky.

The main striking force of the group consisted of detachments of the 131st Maikop brigade and the 81st Samara regiment. It would be appropriate to call them detachments of a brigade and a regiment; they frankly did not reach the regular strength. Be that as it may, both units began to be drawn into the streets. Initially, the group's tasks were set at not very great depth. Already during the advance, “North” began to fight a difficult battle. Flying squads of Dudayev's men fired at the equipment from ambushes. Due to the lack of properly trained infantry, the cleansing was not carried out properly. A tank in a city is much less vulnerable than it might seem, but it needs infantry cover.

Tankers and BMP gunners did not see targets or could not raise the barrel enough to hit the targets that they saw. In the battle, the Samara commander was quickly seriously wounded, and the regiment was led by a political officer, who led the regiment through the hell of the battle. The Dudayevites suffered some losses, but it was difficult to talk about the success of the offensive; a correct assault was required. And, however, at about 11 o’clock Colonel Savin’s Maykop brigade receives an unexpected order: to move to the railway station. To do this, she had to break far into the depths of the city.

This was a strange order that clearly did not correspond to the situation. However, the command was in the most optimistic mood. It was assumed that the brigade would become a crowbar that would undermine the defense of the Dudayevites. Be that as it may, the Maykop residents came out to the square in front of the station and occupied the station itself. Their rear was not really covered; nearby there were only Samarans who were already waging their desperate battle.

From the station, the Maikop brigade could not control the private sector and even the nearest five-story buildings. Why they weren’t occupied, you can’t ask, but, most likely, there weren’t enough people. However, now the brigade was actually surrounded. At about five in the evening, when it got dark, the Maykop positions were attacked from all sides.

The equipment was burning in the square, set on fire by grenade launchers. The militants fired from five-story buildings and the private sector. At the same time, a battle was going on nearby for the freight station. Many young conscripts fell into a stupor. Officers and soldiers who did not lose their heads fought for everyone at once. The militants' advantage in firepower turned out to be overwhelming. Moreover, the Dudayevites even brought an armored group to shell the station. Colonel Savin continuously asked for help by radio - and did not receive it. The brigade commander himself was already wounded by a grenade fragment.

Chechen detachments had the opportunity to change people in front of the Maykop positions. They didn’t even have the opportunity to take out the wounded, who were eventually pulled out only thanks to the tanks of Captain Igor Vechkanov. No one was able to break through from the outside: all the troops were tied up in battle, there were no free forces.

In the end, realizing that help would not come, Savin decided to pull himself out. The encirclement managed to retreat from both the station and the freight station nearby, but Savin died during the battle when he personally went to throw grenades at the firing point. It was a monstrous defeat: in two days of fighting, the Maykop people lost 162 people dead. Samara residents fighting in the neighborhood reported 63 killed and 75 missing. About 80 people were captured as a result of the New Year's assault. The number of prisoners could have been higher. Both the Maykop people and the paratroopers surrounded in the west of Grozny received delegations of militants led by deputy and human rights activist Sergei Kovalev, offering surrender. However, the Maikop residents did not surrender, and the paratroopers generally decided that they were being mocked.

The New Year's assault ended in monstrous failure. The "North" group was virtually destroyed. However, no one canceled the main task: Grozny still had to be taken.

Stand up and fight

The remnants of the "North" group were added to Rokhlin's group. It was the united “North” that was to play the main role in the assault on Grozny. The Russians were in a truly catastrophic situation. However, now we understand what is happening and how to act. Rokhlin first focused on clearing his communications of flying militant squads. The 45th Airborne Regiment played a major role in this matter. In just a few days, the paratroopers defeated Chechen raiding parties in their rear. At the same time, a battle was raging in the city in front of the Sunzha River.

Both sides suffered heavy losses. However, the militants had a lower safety margin. In addition, the Russians received reinforcements: marine units entered the city. Against the backdrop of the general collapse of the army, combat-ready battalions had to be recruited literally everywhere. This is how Marines from the Northern Fleet, the Baltic and even the Pacific Ocean appeared in Grozny.

This time Grozny was subjected to a proper assault without attempts at a cavalry attack. Tactical techniques were developed on the fly. Many tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were lost in the New Year's assault; now the survivors acted in a new way. For example, one of the techniques was the use of a tank, accompanied by infantry - and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, which cleaned attics and upper floors with automatic guns. The shortcomings of combat training did not disappear, but now they were mitigated not so much by blood as by iron: targets that showed signs of life were mercilessly shot from all available weapons.

This style of warfare led to heavy casualties among the inhabitants. However, the general mood was expressed by one of the platoon commanders: “I have 18 people, I am responsible for their lives, I am not going to be responsible for the lives of all the other people on the planet.” It was at this time that the first signs of panic appeared on the side of the militants. The radio intercept recorded, in particular, the following passage: “Cowards have appeared. They must be shot.”

In mid-January, troops broke through from several sides to the center of Grozny and the complex of government buildings. The stubborn defense of the Presidential Palace looks strange for the usually tactically flexible Dudayevites. However, Russian troops made full use of this gift. Thanks to the militants' attempts to hold a static front, their positions became much better known to the attackers, and now the artillery of the Russian troops found victims. On January 19, the Dudayevites left the palace after heavy losses. After this, the epicenter of the battle moved beyond Sunzha, to the Minutka Square area. By this time, the exhaustion of the militants began to take its toll. Their units fought a long, difficult battle, and Russian troops learned on the fly to operate effectively in the city. Dudayev himself had already left Grozny, realizing that it would not be possible to hold the city.

Oddly enough, it was only during this period, at the end of January and beginning of February, that the military decided to surround Grozny and block the flow of reinforcements to the militants. In early February, militants in the city began to be cut off from the rest of Chechnya. This belated decision was a success: it was in early February that the militants began to retreat from Grozny. The threat to the rear had an effect. Basayev's "Abkhaz battalion" - one of the main opponents of the Rokhlinites - was ambushed during this retreat and suffered heavy damage.

The withdrawal of a significant part of the comrades led to the breakdown of the militants in Grozny. In the second half of February the city was completely blocked. The Russian troops were sorely short of men, so small detachments of Dudayev’s men could safely slip through the ruins. However, large groups came out with great difficulty, they were blocked and inflicted heavy damage. True, even then a bad trait of Russian politicians emerged - organizing negotiations over the slightest reason. On February 16, a three-day truce for the exchange of prisoners came into force. In fact, the militants used the respite to withdraw the bulk of their battered troops to the south, to the mountains. By the end of February, resistance was completely broken. At the beginning of March, the last microdistricts of the Chechen capital were cleared of Dudayevites. In conditions of a monstrous shortage of supplies, confusion, and horrific losses, the Russian army won the battle on sheer character.

The storming of Grozny became a monstrous baptism of fire for the modern Russian army. The criminally poorly prepared and carried out assault cost the troops more than a thousand dead, almost half of which occurred in the very first days. The militants' losses are extremely difficult to estimate due to the irregular nature of their units. In addition to the disgusting preparation of the assault itself, the lack of experience affected. So, very little was done to save the city's inhabitants. These unfortunate people, both Russians and Chechens, were left to their own devices. At the same time, the militants, who wanted to get more civilian victims to demonstrate to the press, even sometimes blocked the exit of residents when they tried to get out of the city on their own. In a word, the residents of Grozny found themselves caught between the millstones of a ferocious and uncompromising war.

The casualties and intensity of the fighting in Grozny were unprecedented. Alas, the storming of the city was not the end of military horrors, but only the completion of one of the first chapters in this book of sorrow.

The true interpretation is the calendar date December 31st.

• The zodiac symbol of people born on December 31, 1994 is Capricorn (from December 23 to January 20).
• Eastern calendar, 1994 ›› Blue Wooden Dog.
• Element of the zodiac sign Capricorn, born on December 31, 1994. > Earth.
• The suitable planet for people born on this date is Saturn.
• Today is week 52.
• According to the calendar, this month of December has 31 days.
• Length of day on December 31 – 7 hours 06 minutes(the length of daylight hours is indicated according to the Central European latitude of Moscow, Minsk, Kyiv.).
• Orthodox Easter was ››› May Day.
• According to the calendar, the season is winter.
• According to the Gregorian calendar › there is no leap year.
• It is better to wear colors according to the zodiac, for people who were born on the day December 31, 1994#›Shiny Purple and White.
• Trees suitable for the combination of the horoscope sign Capricorn and 1994 according to the eastern animal calendar #› Magnolia and Elderberry.
• Stones are amulets for people whose birthday is today › Euclase, Coral.
• Particularly favorable numbers for people born on December 31, 94 ›››› Six.
• The very best days of the week for people born on the day December 31, 1994 Tuesday.
• Reliable symbols of the soul, the horoscope sign of Capricorns born on this number is cheerful and fastidious.

Characteristics of men born on December 31st.

The characteristics of a Capricorn guy include loyalty, caring, reliability, decency and truthfulness. Due to excessive isolation and self-discipline, men born on the calendar on December 31, 1994, are very constrained in intimate terms. Prefers not to arouse interest in himself, to keep aside, choosing the position of a gray mouse. Despite the apparent simplicity, he will not miss the chance to take advantage of other people's shortcomings to his advantage. According to the eastern calendar, a man born on December 31, 1994 is a Blue Wood Dog, is quite practical and has a rational view of things.

He loves his job. Man by calendar for December 31, 1994 birth, will not miss the opportunity to get a good education, then will systematically and steadily move up the career ladder. He does this quite well, since Capricorn has the necessary perseverance, hard work and incredible patience. If love has not yet appeared on their life path, they begin to show one of their worst qualities - the thirst for power. This person is ready to sacrifice himself for the interests of his family.

Complete information about women born today, December 31, 1994, the eastern year of the animal.

These Women, born on December 31, 1994, extremely do not like to dissolve their marriages. The status of a divorcee is humiliating for them and they will immediately rush to look for another man who will reliably cover him with his shoulder. They quickly find a common language, always get away with it, and treat their colleagues and students with respect. They know how to help and listen. Reason will prevail over feelings - a representative of this horoscope sign will certainly choose a person who is self-sufficient, strong in character and certainly financially secure. A good mother and a wonderful housewife is a Capricorn woman born on December 31, 1994.

Even with age, the skin of a woman is 12/31/94. birth, continues to remain youthfully attractive. They always monitor their appearance, persistently trying to create the image of an ideal woman. They prefer no jewelry and a minimum of cosmetics. Fresh as a spring breeze, women according to the calendar for December 31, 1994. births usually look somewhat younger than their age. Family for them is a necessity for complete female happiness and a sense of harmony in life. It is quite difficult for others to guess what exactly is going on in this woman’s soul, so many stop communicating with her without even starting it, she is strict and unapproachable, and can be hard-hearted.

Famous people were born under the Capricorn horoscope sign:

politician Gamal Abdel Nasser, writer Jack London, politician Richard Nixon, singer Elvis Presley, Giacomo Puccini, politician Helmut Schmidt, scientist Isaac Newton, politician Anwar Sadat, politician Mao Tse-tung, scientist Louis Pasteur, writer R. Kipling, actor Gerard Depardieu , politician Lyndon Johnson, politician Martin Luther King, poet Jean Moliere, Charles Louis Montesquieu, politician Benjamin Franklin, King Henry IV.

20 years ago, December 31, 1994... Grozny, you held the ENEMY.

Terrible, you held the enemy.

20 years ago, on December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny by Russian federal forces began. The siege of the capital of separatist Ichkeria lasted for three months. As a result, after long fierce battles, the city was taken by Russian troops. The losses of the parties during the assault amounted to more than 8 thousand people; according to various estimates, the number of civilians killed in Grozny ranged from 5 to 25 thousand people.

On December 18, 1994, the bombing of Grozny began. Bombs and rockets fell mainly on neighborhoods where residential buildings were located and, obviously, there were no military installations. Despite the Russian President's statement on December 27, 1994, to stop bombing the city, aviation continued to carry out strikes on Grozny.

December 19, 1994 units of the Pskov Airborne Division under the command of Major General I. Babichev, they bypassed Samashki from the north and, together with other units of the federal forces, reached the western outskirts of Grozny, where they entered into battles with Chechen armed forces.

The decision to send troops to Grozny was made on December 26, 1994 at a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, where Pavel Grachev and Sergei Stepashin reported on the situation in the republic. Before this, no specific plans were developed to capture the capital of Chechnya.

On December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny by Russian army units began. It was planned that four groups would carry out “powerful concentric attacks” and unite in the city center.

The plan provided for the actions of military groups, under the cover of front-line and army aviation, to advance in three directions to Grozny and blockade it. The total number of troops involved was 15 thousand 300 people, 195 tanks, over 500 infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles, 200 guns and mortars. Of these, more than 500 personnel, 50 tanks and 48 guns and mortars of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment were allocated to the reserve.

The troops, in cooperation with the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSK, advancing from the northern, western and eastern directions, were supposed to capture the presidential palace, government buildings, and the railway station.

The troops that entered the city immediately suffered heavy losses. Advancing from the northwestern direction under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky, the 131st (Maikop) separate motorized rifle brigade and the 81st (Samara) motorized rifle regiment were almost completely destroyed. More than a hundred military personnel were captured.

On January 2, 1995, the press service of the Russian government reported that the center of the Chechen capital “is completely blocked by federal troops”, the “presidential palace” is blocked." The head of the press service of the Russian government admitted that the Russian army suffered casualties during the New Year's offensive on Grozny strength and technique.

After the New Year's offensive on Grozny, Russian troops changed tactics - instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they began to use air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.

By the beginning of February 1995, the strength of the Joint Group of Forces was increased to 70 thousand people. Colonel General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Losses during the "Grozny operation"
According to the General Staff, from December 31, 1994 to January 1, 1995, 1,426 people were killed, 4,630 military personnel were wounded, 96 soldiers and officers were captured by illegal armed groups, and more than 500 went missing.

On the morning of December 11, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Russian troops crossed the official border of Chechnya and moved in three directions towards Grozny. Thus began the operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya.

Preparing for the assault

On December 12, 1994, the holiday of the Constitution of the Russian Federation was celebrated, and on this day it was announced that war had begun. A hasty transfer of troops began to Mozdok, a town in North Ossetia-Alania. Confusion, carelessness and vanity - this is how one could characterize the regrouping of troops. Every half hour one plane after another landed, and right on the runway there was a reorganization. Regiments are divided into marching battalions and companies. The hastily assembled parts had one question - what to do next? The task was unclear. With whom and how to fight?

Oleg Dyachenko, commander of the 1st Airborne Company, recalls that due to uncertainty there was no unity in his unit. Some soldiers refused to storm Grozny, others agreed. But in the end, those who resisted also flew. Everyone secretly hoped that everything would work out, and this was just an “action of intimidation.” We gathered as if for regular maneuvers. There was another problem, psychological. Russian troops were greeted with posters saying “hands off Chechnya!” Petr Ivanov, a senior officer of the Airborne Forces Directorate notes that for a Russian soldier the enemy was always abroad, but in the case of the Chechen operation, his own people suddenly became strangers. Therefore, it was difficult to make the decision to open fire on a populated area, knowing that there were civilians there. Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev promised that the assault on Grozny would take no more than two hours. But only two weeks later, with battles and losses, Russian troops reached the borders of Grozny. Intelligence showed that the road to Grozny would be the road to hell. Two people, one of whom was a journalist, filmed the entire route to Grozny, in which the location of Dudayev’s checkpoints and the approximate amount of weapons were visible. Intelligence showed that the militants were waiting for Russian troops and were preparing for battle. But subsequent orders and actions of the command showed that the information “did not reach them.” A few days before the assault, the Minister of Defense negotiated with General Dudayev, which led nowhere. But Pavel Grachev naively believed that Dudayev would throw out the white flag. The Dudayevites didn’t even think about giving up; they were well prepared. In Grozny they were preparing for defense; they organized three lines of defense. [С-BLOCK] The first is around the Presidential Palace, the second with a radius of one kilometer around the first line, and the third, with a radius of 5 kilometers. The outer line was built on the outskirts. According to intelligence data, there were up to 10 thousand Dudayevites. Weapons include heavy armored vehicles, artillery and mortars. What forced Pavel Grachev to carry out an unprepared assault? First, he gave the order to postpone the date of the assault on the Chechen capital. I boarded the plane and almost flew to Moscow. “Almost” - because I left the cabin before takeoff and stayed in Mozdok. Gathered all the group commanders. Lieutenant Colonel Valery Brightly recalls: “the task was set - to capture and solve the problem with the Chechen Republic by the holiday, by the New Year. That is, to capture the Presidential Palace. Flags were issued and on December 31 the commanders were taken to their combat positions.” Grachev promised that whichever general would be the first to hoist the flag over the Presidential Palace would receive the title “Hero of Russia.” This encouraged the commanders, but divided the team spirit - everyone dreamed of a rank. Now Grachev had no doubt about the success of the operation. Four offensive groups were identified: “North” under the command of K. Pulikovsky, “North-East” under the command of L. Rokhlina, “West” under the command of V. Petruk and east under the command of N. Staskov. The number of attackers is a little more than 15 thousand people. Equipment: 200 tanks, 500 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 200 guns and mortars. The operation was planned to be completed within a few days. But according to calculations, in order to successfully storm Grozny, there had to be at least 60 thousand military men. Some commanders understood this and tried to prevent the assault. Alexey Kirilin, platoon commander of the communications battalion of the 131st brigade, recalls: “Kulikovsky formed our platoon and said that he would ask the Minister of Defense for at least a month to prepare for the assault.” What Grachev said is unknown. But the very next morning Kulikovsky gave the order to move towards the city.

How the operation began

Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles of the "North" group entered Grozny. 2 battalions of the 131st Maykop brigade were moving along Staropromyslovskoye Highway. The 81st Samara Motorized Rifle Regiment was moving in parallel. The commander of the 131st brigade, Savin, was instructed to gain a foothold at the intersection of the street. Mayakovskoye and Staropromyslovskoye highways and ensure the approach of the rest of the group. Ignorance of the city and lack of modern detailed maps played a fatal role. Without encountering resistance, the Maikop brigade passed the required turn. Brigade commander Savin realized his mistake when the presidential palace appeared, and the headquarters rejoiced at the quick capture of the city. The brigade received a new order - to occupy the railway station in the city center. There was a battalion of the 81st Samara Regiment. Without firing any shots, the Maikop brigade reached the station and stopped.

Grozny railway station. The tragedy of the Maikop brigade

The Maikop brigade found itself surrounded by 2 rings of militant defense. Brigade commander Savin realized late that the brigade was not protected from the flanks, and the Chechen mousetrap could slam shut at any moment. Other units of the troops were bogged down in battles on the outskirts of Grozny. The battle of the 131st Maikop brigade lasted all night, and all this time brigade commander Savin asked for help to escape from the ring of militants. By morning, he realized that help would not come, loaded the wounded and dead onto 2 infantry fighting vehicles and went for a breakthrough. Savin commanded the brigade until he was shot. The remaining part of the 131st brigade continued to wait for help and fired back from the militants. At night, a column was formed from the reserve of the 131st brigade, but it was unable to break through to its own - the militants met them with a barrage of fire. The 131st brigade and the 81st regiment will fight surrounded for another week. Of the 26 tanks that entered Grozny, 20 were burned. Of the 120 infantry fighting vehicles, 18 left the city. In the first minutes of the battle, 6 anti-aircraft systems were destroyed - everything that was prepared. The bodies of the dead 131st brigade were collected for more than a month. The body of brigade commander Savin was found only in March 1995.

Secrets of the tragic assault of '95

According to Vasily Krisanov, head of the RAV of the 131st brigade, for a long time they used the lists of the brigade to determine who went to storm Grozny. This means that individual company and battery commanders did not have time to count the people or compile surname lists of who was in which vehicle. Who will be responsible for the death of the Maikop brigade? They decided to place the blame on the deceased brigade commander Savin, and this information was picked up by the Russian media. General Rokhlin says: “The defeat was complete. The command was in shock." The main concern of the command was finding those to blame for the tragedy. Rokhlin has not received a single order since that moment. The main reasons for the failure of the New Year's assault were the lack of a clear plan and assigned tasks. Uncoordinated combat operations due to competition for the title of “Hero of Russia” among commanders. In addition, they did not take into account poor material security and poor training of personnel. General Gennady Torshev gave his assessment of the operation: “According to some generals, the “celebratory” assault was organized for Grachev’s birthday. This information is unconfirmed, but the fact that the assault was prepared in a hurry, without really assessing the situation, is a fact. We didn’t even have time to come up with a name for the operation.” The technical equipment was unreliable. Of the five hundred infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 36 were faulty. Of the 18 howitzers, 12 were faulty, and of the 18 self-propelled guns, only 4 were suitable for combat. On the morning of January 1, the 693rd motorized rifle regiment from the “West” group tried to break through to help the Maikop residents. But the paratroopers were met with hurricane fire in the Andreevskaya Valley area. Having not gone even five hundred meters, they retreated and entrenched themselves on the southern outskirts of the city. Although they broke through to the Central Market, they were stopped by militants. Under pressure, the regiment began to retreat and by 6 p.m. it was surrounded near Lenin Park. Contact with the regiment was lost. Like the Maikopians, they had to break out of encirclement and suffered heavy losses. They learned about the tragedy the next day, and this time Major General Petruk turned out to be the culprit. He was accused of causing the death of units and was removed from command. Major General Ivan Babichev took his place.

During one New Year's Eve, more than 70 soldiers and officers were captured by Dudayev's men. Valery Mychko, captain of the 81st Samara Regiment, recalls: “The Chechens pulled me out of the burning car. Then, half-forgotten, I answered their questions, and later lost consciousness. I woke up from a blow to the chest - it turns out that the Chechens provided first aid. The Chechen lying next to me was already raising a knife over me.” The prisoners were mocked, their eyes were gouged out, their ears were cut off. To intimidate, the militants handed over such prisoners to the Russian side.

Capture of the Presidential Palace, Operation Retribution

Following in the footsteps of the 131st brigade, the 276th Ural Motorized Rifle Regiment from the North-East group was sent to Grozny. The regiment entered along the parallel streets of Lermontov and Pervomaiskaya Street. The residents of the Urals left checkpoints at every intersection and cleared streets and houses. As a result, the Ural regiment settled there. The losses of personnel were large, but the Urals did not leave the conquered territory. Fighters from the “West” group broke through to them and took the railway station with heavy losses. Consolidating the success, they abandoned units of the 8th Army Corps from the “North” group under the command of Lev Rokhlin. They captured a hospital and a cannery. Rokhlin's headquarters was organized at the cannery, and this was the first success. From this bridgehead, further advance of the units became possible. There was little left before Dudayev's headquarters; groups of troops North, West and East were moving towards the presidential palace. The fighting was fierce, they fought for every street. The militants did not surrender, and the paratroopers requested artillery assistance. There were tens of meters left to the target, so sometimes they hit their own people. Aviation was also powerless, because the incoming troops stood in a zigzag pattern, and it was difficult to figure out where they were and where they were. The command reported to Moscow that the center of Grozny was blocked. In fact, the militants were preparing for the second wave of the assault, anticipating the defeat of troops like the Maykop brigade. The trench generals changed their battle tactics on the move. Now the new units reflected the structure of the militants. On January 5, the Vostok group of forces crossed the Sunzha, which divided Grozny into two parts. The troops captured strategic points and three bridges. Groups of troops West and North were approaching closer to the Presidential Palace. At this time, the Russian military agreed with the militants on a ceasefire for 48 hours. Russian soldiers, militants, and civilians were removed from the streets. In a week and a half of fighting, both sides lost more than a thousand people, excluding the wounded and civilians. During these 48 hours, the militants were able to regroup their forces, bring up reinforcements, and replenish ammunition. The commanders and soldiers were perplexed: they had almost occupied the presidential palace, and they were receiving orders to cease fire. After the moratorium ended, the fighting intensified. On January 13, the Marines of the Northern Fleet were sent to help the thinned troops. On January 14, the West grouping of troops secured a foothold in the building of the Council of Ministers. The Rokhlinites joined them, they pushed out the militants and surrounded the Presidential Palace. On January 19, the Presidential Palace was captured. Dudayev left the building the night before to avoid being captured. On this day, the commander of the joint group Anatoly Kvashnin from Mozdok reported to Pavel Grachev that the task had been completed. But the battles for Grozny continued until February 26. It seemed that the Chechen conflict was over. But the first Chechen war ended only two years later; in 1999, the Second Chechen War began.