August militant invasion of Dagestan (1999). Invasion of Dagestan: Beginning of the Second Chechen War Attacks on Dagestan in 1999

Militant invasion of Dagestan (1999)

Exactly 20 years ago, on August 7, 1999, militants led by Shamil Basayev and Khattab invaded the territory of Dagestan. Fighting continued in the republic for more than a month. And just this year, Russia signed a law granting militias from Dagestan opposing militants the status of combat veterans.

Background

After the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements in 1996 and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, Salafi Islam (Wahhabism) rapidly turned into a noticeable military-political force in the republic. This was facilitated by the course of the President of Ichkeria Zelimkhan Yandarbiev towards the accelerated Islamization of the Chechen state.

Not all Chechen leaders welcomed this course. In particular, Aslan Maskhadov, who served as prime minister during Yandarbiev’s reign, was against the hasty declaration of Islam as the state religion. However, at the beginning of 1999, Maskhadov himself, while serving as president and trying to strengthen his position, introduced “full Sharia rule” in Chechnya.

In April 1998, the Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan took place in Grozny ( KNID, ), the chairman of which was elected the famous Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev. The purpose of creating the organization was stated to be “the liberation of the Muslim Caucasus from the Russian imperial yoke.” And it is under the auspices of Congress ( the organization is recognized as terrorist in Russia, its activities are prohibited by the court - approx. "Caucasian Knot") armed formations were created, which became the main striking force during the invasion of Dagestan.

In Dagestan itself, attempts to dissociate itself from Russia under Islamist slogans were made a year before the raid by militants from Chechnya.

In the spring of 1998, the Islamic Shura of Dagestan was created. It included representatives of Salafi jamaats, several ulama and imams of mosques in mountainous Dagestan, who belong to supporters of “traditional” Islam.

IN In August 1998, local Salafis in Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi and Kadar (Buinaksky district) declared that these villages were uniting into an independent community, the life of which was regulated by the Sharia court and shura. A checkpoint was set up on the road leading to Chabanmakhi, and a green Muslim flag was hung on one of the mountains. A sign was installed nearby with a warning: “Sharia law applies in this territory.” Thus,was created in the Kadar GorgeWahhabi autonomous enclave known as the Kadar Zone.

One of the leaders of the Dagestan Islamists, Bagautdin Kebedov (Magomedov), expressed the opinion that the government of Dagestan is in a state of “shirk” (paganism) and called himself an adherent of the Islamic state. The prototype of such a state, from the point of view of the “Wahhabis,” was a separate Islamic territory in the Kadar zone.

In September 1998, the head of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Sergei Stepashin, held negotiations with Islamist leaders. Having visited the village of Karamakhi, the minister said: “I would warn everyone against labeling them ‘Wahhabis’, ‘extremists’. We have freedom of religion. ... we will all help you peacefully, I give you my word of honor. No one will fight with the civilian population.” Stepashin promised not to take forceful action against the community in exchange for the surrender of the weapons they had. The weapons were not surrendered, but until August 1999 the authorities did not take any measures to suppress the enclave.

On August 1, 1999, a week before the large-scale invasion from Chechnya, the introduction of Sharia rule was also announced in the villages of Echeda, Gakko, Gigatli and Agvali in the Tsumadinsky district.

Beginning of the invasion

The massive penetration of Chechen militants into Dagestan began on August 7, 1999. On this day, more than a thousand armed fighters from Chechnya entered the territory of the republic. The villages of Ansalta, Rakhata, Shoroda and Godoberi in the Botlikh district were immediately captured, and over the next few days other settlements in the Botlikh and Tsumadinsky districts were captured.

The core of the illegal armed formation group consisted of foreign mercenaries and fighters "Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade", created under the auspices of the KNID ( the organization is recognized as terrorist in Russia, its activities are prohibited by the court - approx. "Caucasian Knot") and associated with al-Qaeda. The group was led by Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev and an Islamist military leader originally from Saudi Arabia known as Khattab. (Khattab himself lived for some time in the village of Karamakhi in the mid-1990s. A native of the village, Darginka Fatima Bidagova was one of his wives.)

On August 10, the Islamic Shura of Dagestan distributed an “Address to the Chechen state and people”, “An appeal to the parliaments of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan”, “Declaration on the restoration of the Islamic state of Dagestan” and “Resolution in connection with the occupation of the state of Dagestan”. The documents spoke about the formation of an Islamic state on the territory of the republic.

Appointment of Vladimir Putin as head of government

On August 8, the head of the Russian government, S. Stepashin, visited Dagestan. The next day he was dismissed. At a meeting of the Presidium of the Cabinet of Ministers on the day of his resignation, Stepashin said: “The situation is very difficult, perhaps we can really lose Dagestan.”

Stepashin's place as head of government was taken by FSB director Vladimir Putin. On August 9, appointing Putin as acting Prime Minister, President Yeltsin expressed the hope that this very person will be elected as the new head of state in a year.

Displacement of militants into Chechnya

On August 11, a military operation began to push back militants from Dagestan. At the same time, not only Russian security forces, but also Dagestani militias took the side of the federal center. The militia was led by the Deputy Chairman of the Government of Dagestan, Gadzhi Makhachev. The militia involved the paramilitary Avar organization “Popular Front of Dagestan named after Imam Shamil”, headed by Makhachev.

Artillery and aviation were used against the militants. On August 12, the first reports were receivedrumors about the air bombing of illegal armed formation bases in Chechnya, and a day later - about the short-term advance of columns of Russian armored vehicles into Chechen territory.

On August 12, Deputy Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation I. Zubov announced that a letter had been sent to the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Maskhadov with a proposal to conduct a joint operation with federal troops againsttive Islamists in Dagestan. He also suggested that Maskhadov “resolve the issue of liquidating bases, storage and rest areas of illegal armed groups, which the Chechen leadership is trying to disavow in every possible way.”

On August 16, Maskhadov introduced a state of emergency in the republic. And on the same day, at a rally in Grozny, he said:“We have nothing to do with what is happening in Dagestan, and regard this as a purely internal matter of Russia.” The resolution of the meeting stated that “neither the leadership nor the people of Chechnya are responsible for the actions of individual volunteers,” and Russia was accused of seeking to use Dagestan “as a springboard for unleashing a bloody war in Chechnya.”

On August 24, the command of the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus reported that federal troops had liberated the last villages captured by militants - Tando, Rakhata, Shoroda, Ansalta, Ziberkhali and Ashino. Shamil Basayev with the surviving militants went to Chechnya.

On August 25, the Russian Air Force launched its first bombing attacks on Chechen villages near Grozny, where, according to intelligence reports, Basayev and Khattab had bases.

Liquidation of the enclave in the Kadar zone

On August 29, after the end of the fighting in the Botlikh region, a military operation began to liquidate the Wahhabi enclave in the Kadar zone. The operation was led by the Commander-in-Chief of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Colonel General V. Ovchinnikov and the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Dagestan, Major General A. Magomedtagirov.

On August 31, the villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, Kadar, Durangi, adjacent farmsteads and Mount Chaban were blocked by federal units. Since the mountain heights and approaches to villages were mined by militants, the area was cleared with the help of artillery and aviation from federal forces. Both sides of the conflict suffered losses. .

As a result of the operation in the Kadar zone, 1,850 houses of local residents were completely destroyed.

Fighting in the Novolaksky district

On September 5, about 2 thousand militants under the command of Basayev and Khattab again crossed the Chechen-Dagestan border and occupied villages and dominant heights in the Novolaksky region of Dagestan.

Internal troops and armored vehicles were deployed to the combat zone, and the Russian Air Force carried out a number of combat sorties in the Nozhai-Yurt region of Chechnya, where, according to the military, they bombed exclusively militant formations heading to help in Dagestan.

On September 7, federal troops, Ministry of Internal Affairs forces and Dagestani militias stopped the advance of militants 5 km from the city of Khasavyurt.

On September 14, federal forces recaptured the village of Tukhchar, Novolaksky district. A cleanup was carried out in the regional center of Novolakskoye, the villages of Shushiya and Akhar.

According to eyewitnesses, operating in the Novolaksky region, federal forces relied on the support of the population and felt like liberators. In this regard, the situation was different from the Kadar zone. After all, in the “Wahhabi” enclave, the security forces felt themselves “not liberating their own territory, but rather occupying a hostile one.”

Completion of the campaign in Dagestan

On September 15, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev reported that the territory of Dagestan had been completely liberated.

After ousting the militants from Dagestan, Russian troops continued to fight in Chechnya.

On September 29, 1999, negotiations between the Chairman of the State Council of Dagestan Magomedali Magomedov and the President of Chechnya Aslan Maskhadov were to take place in Khasavyurt. However, the meeting was disrupted. According to the official version, the negotiations did not take place due to the fact that local residents blocked the road in the area of ​​Khasavyurt and the Dagestan-Chechen border, not allowing both the Chechen delegation and Magomedali Magomedov’s motorcade to enter the regional center. The protesters opposed such negotiations, saying that Aslan Maskhadov should have met with the Dagestan side when militants from Chechnya attacked Dagestan.

Magomedali Magomedov himself also condemned the Chechen leader for not expressing his attitude towards the attack by militants on the Dagestan regions from Chechnya. However, as a result of the negotiations, Maskhadov should have publicly condemned the act of armed invasion of Dagestan and handed over to law enforcement agencies the Dagestani Islamist leaders Adallo Aliyev, Sirazhutdin Ramazanov, Bagautdin Magomedov (Kebedov) and Magomed Tagaev. In addition, it was planned to discuss measures to organize joint work to combat banditry, terrorism and crime.

When discussing the reasons for the breakdown of the meeting, the media put forward different versions. The picket of local residents, according to some sources, was organized with the direct participation of the head of the Khasavyurt administration, Saygidpasha Umakhanov. And either Umakhanov got out of the control of Makhachkala, or Magomedali Magomedov himself did not strive to get to the meeting due to some unexpected circumstances.

Magomedov went to meet with Maskhadov on the instructions of Prime Minister Putin, that is, the failed meeting actually became a disruption of the federal center’s plans to resolve the situation around Chechnya.

Before the incident, the Russian prime minister expressed hope that the leadership of Chechnya would “show constructivism and a desire for business dialogue,” and also “declare its readiness to liberate its territory from international gangs.” However, after the meeting broke down, Vladimir Putin’s entourage hastened to declare that the leader of Dagestan should only have listened to Maskhadov and received first-hand information, but the powers of Moscow’s official representative in the negotiations with Grozny were not delegated to him.

Subsequently, in an interview with Kommersant Vlast magazine, an unnamed Dagestan minister said that the meeting between Magomedov and Maskhadov was disrupted by Akhmat Kadyrov, who was “friends with Umakhanov.”

Terrorist attacks

The armed invasion of Dagestan by militants was accompanied by a series of terrorist attacks in Russian cities. As a result of the explosions of residential buildings in September 1999, 315 people were killed.

The first explosion occurred in the early morning of September 4 in the Dagestan city of Buinaksk, in a house where mostly military families lived (64 dead). The next day, another bomb planted near the Buinaksk military hospital was defused. This was followed by two explosions in Moscow - on Guryanov Street (109 dead) and on Kashirskoye Highway (124 dead). On September 16, a truck filled with explosives was blown up near a residential building in Volgodonsk (18 dead).

In addition, on August 31, 1999, an explosion occurred in an underground shopping complex on Manezhnaya Square in Moscow, which killed one person and injured several dozen. The explosion, initially declared a criminal showdown, was later reclassified as a terrorist attack.

On September 22, 1999, in Ryazan, several people were seen placing bags of hexogen in a residential building. According to the official version, these were exercises organized by the FSB.

Consequences of the invasion

During the Dagestan campaign, 275 Russian soldiers and officers were killed and 937 were wounded. In addition, 37 militiamen were killed and over 720 were wounded. The militants' losses amounted to about 2,500 people.

On September 19, 1999, Dagestan adopted the law “On the prohibition of Wahhabi and other extremist activities on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan,” which prohibited the propaganda of the ideology and practice of Wahhabism in the republic. Similar regulations were also adopted in Ingushetia, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Chechnya. However, none of these legislative acts contain specific mention of the characteristics of Wahhabism.

Three months after the liberation of Dagestan, on December 19, 1999, the next elections of State Duma deputies were held in Russia. The Unity party, supported by Vladimir Putin, took second place (23% of the votes), only slightly behind the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (24%). On December 31, 1999, President Yeltsin left office early. On March 26, 2000, in the presidential elections, Vladimir Putin won the first round.

The last president of Ichkeria, Doku Umarov, in 2007 announced the creation of the Islamic state “Caucasus Emirate” in the North Caucasus. Dagestan and Chechnya were included in the components of this self-proclaimed entity. In Russia and the United States, the Caucasus Emirate organization is recognized as terrorist.

The counter-terrorism operation (CTO) in Chechnya continued in its active phase until the summer of 2000. The pro-Russian administration created in the republic was headed by Akhmat Kadyrov. The CTO regime was completely abolished in Chechnya only in April 2009. In some settlements of Dagestan, the CTO regime is sometimes introduced to this day.

According to the results of a Levada Center poll conducted in 2004, 2007, 2009 and 2010, Russians mostly believe that the militant invasion of Dagestan in 1999 was made possible by those who wanted to “profit” from this war.

Dagestan militias sought the status of combat veterans in court. Thus, in 2013, the Kazbekovsky District Court granted the claim of nineteen residents of Dagestan who asked to recognize their status as combat veterans.

Such a bill was adopted only in 2019. On July 23, the draft amendments to the law on veterans were adopted by the State Duma, and on July 26 - by the Federation Council. The original draft law envisaged only non-material benefits, but during the discussion in the State Duma it was supplemented with provisions on material ones. On August 3, it was signed by the President of Russia.

Notes

1. Kudryavtsev A.V. “Wahhabism”: problems of religious extremism in the North Caucasus // Central Asia and the Caucasus. - No. 9. - 2000.
2. Shermatova S. So-called Wahhabis // Chechnya and Russia: societies and states. M.: Polinform-Talburi, 1999.
3. Islamic revolution in Dagestan // Kommersant, 08/18/1998.
4. Wahhabism // Caucasian Knot.
5. News // RTR, 09/03/1998. (Quoted from: Cherkasov A. Tango over the abyss // Polit.ru, 09/07/2004.)
6. From Dagestan to Moscow via Grozny // Kommersant Power, 02.08.2004.
7. From Dagestan to Moscow via Grozny // Kommersant Power, 02.08.2004.
8. Terrorist Organization Profile // National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland.
9. Roshchin M. Fundamentalism in Dagestan and Chechnya // Otechestvennye zapiski, No. 5 (14), 2003.
10. The mystery of the black Arab // Interlocutor, No. 40, 10/14/1999.
11. From Dagestan to Moscow via Grozny // Kommersant Power, 02.08.2004.
12. ITAR-TASS, 08/09/1999.
13. Program "Today" // NTV, 09.08.1999.
14. During the period of the militant invasion, Gadzhi Makhachev was appointed special commissioner of the State Council and the government of the Republic of Dagestan for the Botlikh region. (Gadzhi Makhachev was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Republic of Dagestan. - RIA "Dagestan", 09/23/2013)
15. From Dagestan to Moscow via Grozny // Kommersant Power, 02.08.2004.
16. Dagestan: who and when // Rossiyskaya Gazeta.
17. A state of emergency has been introduced in Chechnya // ORT, 08/16/1999.
18. From Dagestan to Moscow via Grozny // Kommersant Power, 02.08.2004.
19. Temporary press center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Dagestan, 1999.
20. From Dagestan to Moscow via Grozny // Kommersant Power, 02.08.2004.
21. Homeland of War // Izvestia, 05.29.2003.
22. Press center of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 09/07/14.
23. Dagestan: chronicle of the conflict // Independent Military Review, 09/18/1999.
24. Press conference of representatives of the Memorial society: “The invasion of Dagestan and its consequences: humanitarian aspects”, 09/27/1999.
25. From Dagestan to Moscow via Grozny // Kommersant Power, 02.08.2004.
26. Thus, the planned content of the failed meeting was described in Nezavisimaya Gazeta. () Similar information was reported by the Kommersant newspaper. (The Chechen “peaceful landing” in Dagestan was met fully armed // Kommersant, 09/30/1999.) Lenta.ru outlined the expected agenda for the negotiations in a slightly different form. According to materials from Lenta.ru, at the meeting three questions were supposed to be raised with Maskhadov: "1. Recognition of the fact of aggression from Chechnya; 2. Extradition of the bandits, regardless of their nationality - Chechen or Dagestan; 3. Joint measures to ensure the security of the administrative border." (The meeting of the leaders of Dagestan and Chechnya failed // Lenta.ru, 09.29.1999.)
27. Magomedov did not meet with Maskhadov // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 09.30.1999.
28. Magomedov did not meet with Maskhadov // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 09.30.1999.
29. The meeting of the leaders of Dagestan and Chechnya failed // Lenta.ru, 09.29.1999.
30. Magomedov did not meet with Maskhadov // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 09.30.1999.
31. Magomedov did not meet with Maskhadov // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 09.30.1999.
32. “Magomedali Magomedovich cannot remove me” // “Kommersant Power”, 08/30/2004.
33. Chronicle of terror // Website of the Human Rights Center "Memorial".
34. Newsletter No. 28. The war in Chechnya and its echo. Chronicle of Terror // Website "HRC Memorial".
35. For the period August 2 – September 20, 1999 (Dagestan: chronicle of terror (1996-2014) // Caucasian Knot.)
36. Data from the regional public organization "Union of Persons Participating in the Defense of the Constitutional System "Dagestan - 1999" (ROO "Dagestan-1999").
37. Data from the General Staff of the Russian Defense Ministry. Losses in Dagestan and in the border zone for the period from August 2, 1999 to May 4, 2000. (Losses of Russian troops and militants in Chechnya // Kommersant Power, 05/10/2000.)
38. From Dagestan to Moscow via Grozny. - "Kommersant Power", 02.08.2004.
39. “Why did the invasion of Chechen militants into Dagestan in August 1999 become possible, which served as the beginning of the second “Chechen war”?” // Levada Center website.

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20 years ago, militants under the command of the terrorist Shamil and the Arab mercenary A. invaded Dagestan from the territory then not controlled by the central authorities of Chechnya. Units of illegal groups with a total number, according to various sources, from 400 to 1.5-2 thousand fighters, freely entered the Botlikh region of Dagestan and captured several villages, announcing the start of Operation Imam Gazi-Magomed. These events are considered the beginning of the Second Chechen War.

The reasons for the Basayev raid were rooted in the suspended but unfinished first armed conflict in Chechnya. Over the course of the few years when the republic actually lived its own life, terror intensified in it towards representatives of the Russian administration and security forces who had not moved to other regions. With funds from international terrorist organizations, camps for training militants were created, mercenary detachments were formed, and the influence of Islamist extremists increased. Attempts to incite the population of other republics of the North Caucasus against Russia have sharply intensified.

The ideas of “liberating the Muslim Caucasus from the Russian imperial yoke” were heard again.

In 1997-1998, several dozen (according to other sources - several hundred) Dagestani Islamists, adherents of the radical Wahhabi movement, received political asylum in Chechnya. Some of them took part in the First Chechen War on the side of the separatists, others were in the Dagestan underground and were on the wanted list. In 1999, militants who received funding began to penetrate into Dagestan in small groups, creating caches and weapons depots in hard-to-reach mountain villages, recruiting young people. In June and July, the first clashes between gangs and the police occurred, as a result of which the security forces suffered losses. The authorities of Dagestan called on federal troops to conduct a large-scale military operation against the Islamists.

In Dagestan itself, attempts to dissociate themselves from Russia under Islamist slogans were made by extremists a year before the raid by militants from Chechnya. In the spring of 1998, the Islamic Shura of Dagestan was created. It included representatives of Salafi jamaats, several ulama and imams of mosques in mountainous Dagestan, who were supporters of “traditional” Islam.

One of the ideologists of the North Caucasian militants, Bagautdin Kebedov, played a significant role in preparing the action. Referring to his supporters in Dagestan,

he argued that if armed detachments came to the republic, the overwhelming majority of the population would support them and raise a general anti-Russian uprising.

In addition, Kebedov convinced well-known field commanders to unite, including Basayev, Khattab and Arbi Barayev. The decision to attack Dagestan provoked a conflict in the leadership of Ichkeria (banned in Russia) between supporters of the “moderate” course pursued by “president” Aslan and the opposition radicals of Basayev.

So, on August 7, 1999, a massive infiltration of armed fighters from Chechnya began. The villages of Ansalta, Rakhata, Shoroda and Godoberi in the Botlikh region were immediately captured, and over the next few days other settlements in this and Tsumadinsky regions were captured. There were no federal troops there, and the local police were unable to resist the superior forces of the militants. True, the terrorists did not receive the expected support from local residents. The core of the group included foreign mercenaries and members of extremist organizations banned in Russia. The bandits were led by Basayev and Khattab. Kebedov led one of the detachments.

“The invasion of Chechen militants into Dagestan had been in preparation for several months, if not years,” the journalist noted. “The military was then indignant at the behavior of the local authorities, who did not notice anything. Were you surprised how the preparations for the invasion of Dagestan were missed? But in the heat of those days, these questions remained unanswered.”

At the highest level, it was decided that the internal troops and police would cope with the militants without the involvement of regular army forces.

“We will not repeat the mistakes that were made in 1994. Enough is enough, no more Russian soldiers will die there,”

- the Prime Minister stated on this matter.

On August 8, he arrived in Dagestan, but on the 9th he was dismissed by decree of the President of Russia. Other people had the chance to lead the operation to cleanse the republic.

The invasion, meanwhile, kept growing. Extremists spread provocative “decrees” about the “overthrow” of the republican authorities. Calls for gazavat grew ever stronger. On August 11, militants fired at and shot down a helicopter of federal troops with generals on board. On the same day, a military operation began to oust members of illegal armed groups from Dagestan. The soldiers were assisted by militias recruited from the local population who expressed a desire to fight the terrorists. Recently, these people were given the status of combat veterans at the legislative level.

In mid-August, rumors began to circulate about a possible attack by large gangs of Chechen militants and international terrorists on the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. In fact, the tension did not spread to other regions. On August 12, the Russian Air Force bombed militant positions in the areas of the settlements of Gagatli and Andi in Dagestan, and on the 16th it decided

On the same day, the “president” of Ichkeria Maskhadov disowned any connections with what was happening in Dagestan, calling it “a purely internal matter of Russia.”

“Neither the leadership nor the people of Ichkeria are responsible for the actions of individual volunteers,” his resolution stated. At the same time, Russia was accused of seeking to use Dagestan “as a springboard for unleashing a bloody war in Chechnya.”

Air raids continued. The military said that they were pursuing retreating militants, and then clarified that they were actually bombing terrorist bases.

On August 23, the Basayevites left the territory of Dagestan and returned to Chechnya. The next day, the command of the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus reported on the liberation of the villages captured by the Wahhabis. The Minister of Defense announced the final cleansing of the republic on September 15. Five days later, Basayev announced in Grozny the beginning of the formation of a battalion of martyrs.

In the second half of September, illegal armed groups attempted a new campaign against Dagestan.

“Having lost more than a hundred people, dozens of armored vehicles, and ammunition depots alone, the extremists were forced to retreat deeper into Chechnya,” states Maxim Fedorenko’s book “General Kazantsev’s Russian Gambit.”

After the August events, the State Council of Dagestan adopted a law banning Wahhabism as an extremist movement.

Even the Wahhabis who did not take part in the hostilities were condemned. Mostly for short periods of time. All those involved or sympathizing with this movement shaved their beards.

The armed invasion of Dagestan by gangs had extremely dire consequences for the population. Dozens of people were killed and injured. The economy, social and cultural spheres suffered serious damage. According to unofficial data, the losses of federal forces by September 9 amounted to 150 people killed and 522 wounded. These data do not include losses of Dagestan and the republican militia.

In September 1999, the phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was a massive invasion from the territory of Chechnya under the overall command of an Arab mercenary.

Units of the so-called “Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade” of Basayev and Khattab (according to various sources, numbering from 400 to 1.5 thousand militants) freely entered the Botlikh region of Dagestan and captured five settlements (Ansalta, Rakhata, Tando, Shoroda, Godoberi).

On September 5, 1999, about two thousand militants occupied commanding heights in the Novolaksky region of Dagestan, hoping to capture the cities of Khasavyurt and Buynaksk with subsequent access to Makhachkala. Large forces of illegal armed groups (IAF) concentrated in the Kizlyar direction. The total number of militants on the Dagestan-Chechen border has reached 10 thousand people.

Russian security forces deployed units of the 136th Brigade of the Ministry of Defense, the 102nd Brigade of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and police units of local and central subordination to the invasion area. The command of the United Group was entrusted to the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Colonel General Viktor Kazantsev.

On these same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks - explosions of residential buildings - were carried out in several Russian cities (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk).

In mid-September, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy militants in Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops.

On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a Decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation,” providing for the creation of a Joint group of troops (forces) in the North Caucasus to conduct counter-terrorism operations.

By September 25, federal forces drove out the illegal armed groups from Dagestan, continuing their liquidation on the territory of Chechnya.

On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naur and Shelkovsky regions of the republic.

The entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 5 thousand people) and settled in Grozny.

On February 7, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groups operating in the mountains, a new group “Center” was created.

The last large-scale operation was the liquidation of a group in the village area (March 5-20, 2000). After this, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and federal forces countered the terrorists with the actions of special forces and operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

On April 20, 2000, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Valery Manilov, announced the end of the military unit of the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya and the transition to special operations.

In January 2001, the gradual withdrawal of Defense Ministry troops from Chechnya began. It was announced that only the Ministry of Defense (15 thousand people) and the brigade of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (7 thousand people) remained here on a permanent basis. The leadership of the CTO was entrusted to the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation. The primary task was to conduct special operations to destroy the remaining small illegal armed groups and their leaders.

During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002 in Moscow, it was carried out at the Theater Center on Dubrovka. In 2004, a series of terrorist attacks occurred: terrorists blew up a metro car filled with people at the Avtozavodskaya station in Moscow,

On May 9, during festive events in Grozny dedicated to Victory Day, the President of Chechnya was killed in a terrorist attack; in August, female suicide bombers blew up two planes in the air - Tu-154 and Tu-134; on September 1, hostages were taken at school No. 1 of the city Beslan in North Ossetia.

In 2005, after the destruction of Khattab, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of the militants' sabotage and terrorist activities decreased significantly. The only large-scale operation of the militants (the raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.

From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, abolished the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

During two years of active military operations within the framework of the CTO (from October 1999 to October 2001), the losses of federal forces are estimated at 3,438 people killed and 11,661 wounded, the losses of militants are about 11 thousand people.

The irretrievable losses among the civilian population are estimated to be 5.5 thousand people, of which about 4 thousand people were killed. The number of people missing cannot be accurately estimated.

The second Chechen campaign began with an attack by militants led by Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan. Initially, detachments of Chechen militants entered the territory of the Botlikh region. Active fighting in this direction continued from August 7 to August 23, 1999. During these battles, militant groups were driven into the territory of Chechnya. From August 29 to September 13, Russian troops carried out an operation to capture and destroy the Wahhabi enclave that had formed in the so-called Kadar zone. On September 5, 1999, the detachments of Basayev and Khattab entered Dagestan for the second time, this time the blow was struck in the Novolaksky region of the republic. The strike was supposed to divert the forces of the Russian army and police from the rebellious villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi in the Kadar zone.

The operation, which the militants called “Imam Gamzat-bek,” began on September 5 and lasted until September 14. During this time, government troops were able to completely restore control over the Kadar zone; in a military sense, the operation of Bassayev and Khattab lost all meaning. They were unable to provide significant assistance to the Wahhabis in Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi, and the overwhelming majority of the population of Dagestan did not support the militants, and were ready to defend their republic in their hands. On September 14, government troops regained control over the village of Novolakskoye, and on September 15, 1999, then Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev reported to Putin that the entire territory of Dagestan had been completely liberated from Chechen gangs.

Battle for the TV Tower

By the beginning of September 1999, the militants were driven out of the Botlikh district. The only villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi supporting the bandits, which were also a stronghold of Wahhabis from among the local population, were surrounded by the federals. The outcome of the fighting in this direction was obvious. However, the leadership of the militants decided to launch a surprise attack in the Novolaksky region of Dagestan, which had not previously been involved in hostilities. When planning this operation, Basayev and Khattab counted on the fact that the main forces of the Russian troops would be drawn into hostilities in the Kadar zone. They relied on speed of action and surprise, and at the first stage this bore fruit for them.

Militant detachments numbering up to two thousand people, again crossing the border with Dagestan, were able to occupy the border villages of Tukhchar, Gamiyakh (Khasavyurt district), as well as Chapaevo and Akhar (Novolaksky district) and the regional center of Novolakskoye itself. The militants’ breakthrough was stopped only 5 kilometers southwest of Khasavyurt, which was the second largest city in Dagestan. With this strike, the enemy not only tried to pull part of the Russian troops away from the Kadar zone, but also still counted on destabilizing the situation in the republic itself. These plans of the militants failed, and even in the initial phase they encountered certain difficulties.

The battle for the dominant height “Televyshka” near the village of Novolakskoye turned out to be unexpectedly stubborn. From this height, not only the regional center, but also most of the territory’s districts and main roads were clearly visible. For this reason, already on the morning of September 5, 1999, the militants sent several dozen of their fighters to the height. However, it was not possible to take the height immediately, although it was defended by only 6 people - 5 Dagestan police officers of the Novolaksky District Department of Internal Affairs, led by Lieutenant Khalid Murachuev, and one soldier of the internal troops.

The group, which consisted of local police officers, was reinforced by one Russian machine gunner from the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. From the sounds of gunfire coming from the village, the police realized what was happening in Novolakskoye. Lieutenant Murachuev managed to organize a perimeter defense and distributed the available ammunition. The TV Tower garrison successfully repelled the first attack of the militants with dagger fire at close range. The second and third attacks by militants on the heights also failed. As a result, only 6 fighters held more than 100 militants at the height for 24 hours.

Enemy attacks followed one another, and between attacks the heights were attacked by militants using mortars. In total, the militants launched 7 attacks, which were unsuccessful, leaving the approaches to the heights filled with dead. However, the defenders were also running out of strength. During one of the attacks, a policeman was killed, and in the next a machine gunner was wounded. The two policemen who carried him out were surrounded and captured as they retreated from the heights. And at the height, Lieutenant Murachuev and Junior Sergeant Isaev were still resisting, both of whom were also wounded by that time. They were able to hold out through the night. The last report from above was received in the early morning of April 6, 1999: “The cartridges have run out, Mutei is wounded, he gives grenades, I throw them.” In the end, the militants were able to break into the heights and inflict brutal reprisals on its last seriously wounded defenders. The militants cut off the head of Lieutenant Khalid Murachuev.

Captured militants spoke about the details of the feat of the defenders of the height and their death in September 2000, indicating the burial places of the heroes. In that battle, up to 50 members of illegal gangs were killed and wounded. At the same time, the militants lost a day to take the TV tower height, losing the effect of surprise. The battle at the heights had not yet subsided, and units of Russian troops were already deployed around the village of Novolakskoye. For the courage and heroism that were shown in the performance of their official duty, Lieutenant Khalid Murachuev and Junior Sergeant Mutey Isaev were posthumously presented with the title of Hero of the Russian Federation on January 31, 2002.

Destruction of a checkpoint and execution of Russian military personnel in the village of Tukhchar

On September 5, 1999, during the repeated invasion of Dagestan by militants, they brutally murdered Russian military personnel in the village of Tukhchar. They filmed this murder, which later fell into the hands of federal forces, and the tragedy itself became widely known. A gang of Chechen militants led by Umar Karpinsky was advancing on Tukhchar. The road to the village was covered by a checkpoint manned by Dagestani policemen. A little higher on the mountain stood an infantry fighting vehicle and 13 soldiers from the 22nd separate special purpose brigade of the Russian Interior Ministry from Kalach-on-Don.

Having entered the village of Tukhchar from the rear, the gang members were able to take the village police department and began shelling the heights on which the brigade fighters were located. Quite quickly, a shot from a grenade launcher disabled an infantry fighting vehicle of internal troops, while the gunner died on the spot and the driver was shell-shocked. The soldiers who survived the battle fled to the village, trying to hide from the militants. However, on Karpinsky’s orders, members of his gang conducted a search, inspecting both the village and the surrounding area. In one of the houses, the militants found a shell-shocked BMP driver, and in the basement of another 5 more Russian servicemen. After firing a warning shot at the house from a grenade launcher, they had to surrender.

By order of Umar Karpinsky, the prisoners were taken to a clearing next to the checkpoint. Here the militants executed six prisoners - one senior lieutenant and five conscript soldiers. The militants cut the throats of five Russian servicemen, Karpinsky personally dealt with one of the victims, and another soldier was shot while trying to escape. Later, a video recording of this terrible crime fell into the hands of employees of the operational services of Dagestan. Over time, all participants in this murder were punished. The organizer of the murder and the leader of the militants, Umar Edilsultanov (Karpinsky), was killed 5 months later during an attempt to break out of the militants from Grozny. Another 5 people involved in the murder were sentenced to various prison terms, three of them to life imprisonment.

Fight in Novolakskoye

In the regional center of Novolakskoye, more than 60 employees of the local regional police department, as well as members of the Lipetsk riot police stationed in the village, were blocked by militants. The soldiers did not lay down their arms and fought with the enemy surrounded for about a day. An armored group from the 22nd separate special purpose brigade of the Russian Interior Ministry was sent to the village to help, but it was unable to get through to the encircled people and was stopped by militant fire. According to the version of the commander-in-chief of the internal troops (at that time) General V. Ovchinnikov, he was personally involved in coordinating mortar fire on enemy positions in order to provide the surrounded riot police and police officers with the opportunity to break out of the encirclement.

At the same time, another version was presented by direct participants in those battles; it was published in the magazine “Soldier of Fortune” No. 2 for 2001. That article contained the version of the Lipetsk riot police about the battle for Novolakskoye. According to them, after an unsuccessful attempt was made to release those surrounded with the help of a formed armored group, they were essentially abandoned to their fate. They made the decision to break out of the encirclement on their own, and, according to them, no diversionary mortar strike was carried out by federal forces. According to official data, Lipetsk riot police were able to leave Novolakskoye with minimal losses - 2 killed and 6 wounded. At the same time, the total losses of the Russian side during the battle in Novolaksky officially amounted to 15 people killed and 14 wounded.

In total, during the month and a half of fighting on the territory of Dagestan in August-September 1999, the losses of federal forces, according to official data, amounted to 280 people killed and 987 wounded. The militants' losses were estimated at 1.5-2 thousand killed. However, federal forces were able to achieve real results only in the Buynaksky region of Dagestan, where the Wahhabi group in the Kadar zone was completely defeated. At the same time, in the regions bordering Chechnya, the troops failed to encircle and destroy all the militant detachments that invaded Dagestan, who, after the battles in Botlikhsky (August) and Novolaksky (September), were able to leave for the territory of Chechnya.

Having ousted the militants from the territory of Dagestan, the leadership in the Kremlin was given a choice: to strengthen the border with Chechnya and continue to repel further attacks by Basayev, while at the same time trying to negotiate with the President of Chechnya Maskhadov, or to repeat the force operation on the territory of Chechnya, in order to defeat the militants on their territory, simultaneously solving the problem of returning Chechnya to the Russian Federation. The second option for the development of events was chosen, and the second Chechen campaign began.

Information sources:
http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=7082
http://www.vestnikmostok.ru/index.php?categoryid=17&id_item=154&action=view
http://terroristica.info/node/245
http://otvaga2004.ru/fotoreportazhi/voyny-i-goryachie-tochki/oborona-dagestana-1999
https://ru.wikipedia.org

Completely freed from terrorists. The large-scale invasion of illegal armed groups into the republic began on August 7, 1999. Relying on members of the local gang underground, the extremists planned to create a single terrorist “state” on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan. However, they encountered fierce resistance from security forces and local militias. Having made several unsuccessful attempts to gain a foothold in Dagestan, on September 11 the terrorists began to retreat to the territory of Chechnya, which at that time was not controlled by the federal center. Four days later, Dagestan was completely liberated. Experts call the events of September 1999 a turning point in the fight against international terrorism in the North Caucasus.

In the second half of the 1990s, from several dozen to several hundred radicals from Dagestan were hiding in Chechnya. Among them was Bagautdin Kebedov, who became one of the ideologists of the North Caucasian militants. In the spring of 1998, he created the Islamist radical organization “Islamic Shura of Dagestan”, and also took part in the formation of the terrorist structure “Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan” (KNID) *, which was headed by terrorist Shamil Basayev. Extremists promoted the idea of ​​seizing the entire North Caucasus, including Dagestan, and creating a single “state” in the region.

In addition, in 1997-1998, Islamist emissaries began to arrive in the so-called Kadar zone of Dagestan (Wahhabi unrecognized autonomous enclave - RT ) and form an underground in the village of Karamakhi, Buinaksky district.

In 1999, small groups of terrorists infiltrating from Chechnya began attempting to create weapons caches in Dagestan and clash with Russian security forces. And Kebedov called on the Islamists for a massive invasion of the territory of the republic, while enlisting the support of several dozen field commanders.

The terrorists’ actions were supported abroad, and they were given large-scale tasks, allocating significant sums for military operations,” said the head of the department of political science and sociology of the Russian Economic University in an interview with RT. Plekhanov, expert of the Association of Military Political Scientists, reserve colonel Andrei Koshkin.

Beginning of the invasion

On August 7, 1999, units of the terrorist organization “Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade”, formed under the auspices of the KNID, invaded the territory of Dagestan. Direct leadership of the forces of the terrorist “brigade” was exercised by Basayev.

The total number of militants ranged, according to various sources, from 400 to 1.5 thousand people. Their initial target was the settlements of the Botlikh region of Dagestan - Ansalta, Rakhata, Tando and others.

On August 10, terrorists from the Islamic Shura began spreading statements about the creation of the so-called “Islamic State of Dagestan” and the overthrow of the legitimate authorities of the republic. The Shura announced Basayev, as well as the Arab terrorist Khattab, as temporary “commanders” of the armed detachments.

On August 9, militants captured one of the dominant heights of the Botlikh district - Donkey Ear, located to the west of the district center. This allowed them to establish fire control over a large area. Three days later, Russian troops launched an artillery strike on the height, and on August 13, an assault began on it by soldiers of the 108th Guards Parachute Regiment and other units of the Russian Armed Forces. The paratroopers were led by battalion commander Major Sergei Kostin.

Federal troops attracted large forces of militants. Terrorists repeatedly attacked positions occupied by paratroopers, and each time met fierce resistance. Major Kostin died during battles with superior terrorist forces. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia. In addition to him, more than ten more Russian servicemen gave their lives in the battle for Donkey’s Ear. A few days later, the militants were finally driven out from the heights by units of the 247th Air Assault Regiment and the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade.

Within a few days, the populated areas of the Botlikh region of Dagestan were cleared of terrorists. On August 23, Basayev withdrew his troops to the territory of Chechnya.

Militias from among the residents of Dagestan also fought shoulder to shoulder with the security forces in battles against terrorists, taking up arms to protect their homes from bandits.

“The local militia demonstrated a desire to fight terrorists, which supported the security forces, who understood that they were not solving the problem alone. In that situation, this support was extremely important,” Koshkin said.

“We restored the territorial integrity of the country”

On August 27, representatives of the official authorities of Dagestan demanded that representatives of the Islamist underground in the Kadar zone lay down their arms. After peaceful calls were ignored, a large-scale military operation began on August 29 to liquidate the enclave. About 500 terrorists under the command of Emir Jarullah dug in in the Kadar zone. The fighting was hard. While taking wounded soldiers from the front line, a nurse, sergeant of internal troops Irina Yanina, died. She was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia and included in the lists of personnel of the military unit.

Trying to divert the attention of the Russian authorities and security forces from the Kadar zone, the militants organized several large-scale terrorist attacks directed against the civilian population of the Russian Federation. On September 5, terrorists under the command of Basayev and Khattab again invaded the territory of Dagestan. Now their goal was the Novolaksky district of the republic. On the same day, up to 200 bandits attacked a Russian security checkpoint in the village of Tukhchar, where, according to media reports, 13 internal troops and 18 Dagestani riot police were stationed. Russian security forces put up fierce resistance and inflicted painful losses on the militants. However, the extremists managed to capture several military personnel. They were subsequently executed.

On September 5-6, they gave battle to the invaders, and then fighters from the Dagestan and Lipetsk riot police, located in the village of Novolakskoye, broke through to the main forces of the federal troops.

On September 8, government forces and the Dagestani militia regained control over the village of Karamakhi. Four days later, the Islamists were completely driven out of the Kadar zone. Basayev was forced to order his troops to leave Dagestan.

On September 14, federal forces took control of the village of Novolakskoye. The next day, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev reported to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that Dagestan had been completely freed from terrorists.

Subsequently, the fight against gangs of radicals continued on the territory of Chechnya.

During the battles with terrorists in Dagestan in August-September 1999, 226 military personnel, 53 internal affairs officers, 25 militias and 108 civilians were killed. According to various estimates, 2-2.5 thousand militants were eliminated.

As Vladimir Shapovalov, deputy director of the Institute of History and Politics at Moscow State Pedagogical University, noted in an interview with RT, the actions of the security forces were aimed exclusively at protecting the population of Russia and Dagestan and eliminating the terrorists who committed an act of aggression.

“From the point of view of efficiency, both the Russian army and security forces were going through hard times and, accordingly, the problems that existed during the First Chechen War (1994-1996) have not disappeared. The security forces had many problems, both domestic and related to weapons, equipment, and training. However, law enforcement agencies and the armed forces fulfilled their duty and, together with the people of Dagestan, with the militias who were the first to take the blow, did not allow the gangs to develop an offensive, and then eliminated the breakthrough and restored the territorial integrity of the country, defeating the terrorists,” the expert emphasized.

On September 11, 2019, in the village of Botlikh, a monument to participants in the Great Patriotic War, local wars and militias who took part in the fighting in Dagestan in 1999 was unveiled. On September 12, during a visit to Dagestan, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the militias who defended the republic from terrorists.

“September 15, 1999 is an important and turning point date in every sense, since it was those events that became the point of ending the territorial and political crisis, which ultimately could lead to the collapse of the country. It was about the revival of its statehood and territorial integrity,” says Shapovalov.

According to him, “events related to the defense of Dagestan from gangs of separatists and terrorists indicate the desire of the overwhelming majority of the republic’s population to protect not only their territory, but also the territorial integrity of Russia.”

As Andrei Koshkin notes, the actions of the authorities and security forces of the Russian Federation in September 1999 were aimed at “overcoming a serious threat to the country.”

“In those conditions, there was a tough question about how to maintain integrity, what idea to unite the Russians. In this case, the events that took place in Dagestan became a serious test. The current president of the Russian Federation flew there and personally studied the situation, took adequate measures that made it possible to overcome this difficult period,” Koshkin noted.

From his point of view, in 1999 the Russian Federation experienced a kind of reset.

“Today, those events have become a symbol of the beginning of the country’s development and the restoration of its former glory as the successor to the traditions of the Soviet Union, which allowed Russia to occupy its niche. Nowadays, Russia is viewed throughout the world as a state without which it is impossible to resolve global issues, especially in the field of security,” concluded Koshkin.

* “Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan” - the organization was recognized as terrorist by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated February 14, 2003.