The Chechen war began 1994 1996. History of the Chechen war. History of the conflict

The article briefly talks about the first Chechen war (1994-1996), which was waged by Russia on the territory of Chechnya. The conflict led to heavy losses among Russian military personnel, as well as among the Chechen civilian population.

1. The course of the first Chechen war
2. Results of the first Chechen war

Causes of the first Chechen war

• As a result of the events of 1991 and the secession of republics from the USSR, similar processes began in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The nationalist movement in the republic was led by former Soviet general D. Dudayev. In 1991, he proclaimed the creation of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI). A coup d'etat took place, as a result of which representatives of the previous government were overthrown. The nationalists took over the main government institutions. Boris Yeltsin's introduction of a state of emergency in the republic could no longer change anything. The withdrawal of Russian troops begins.
  CRI was an unrecognized republic not only in Russia, but throughout the world. Power relied on military force and criminal structures. The sources of income for the new government were the slave trade, robberies, and trade in drugs and oil from the Russian pipeline passing through the territory of Chechnya.
• In 1993, D. Dudayev carried out another coup d'état, dispersing parliament and the constitutional court. The constitution adopted after this established the regime of personal power of D. Dudayev.
  On the territory of the CRI, opposition to the government arises in the form of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic. The council enjoys the support of the Russian government, it is provided with material assistance, and Russian special forces are sent to provide support. Military clashes between Dudayev’s detachments and representatives of the opposition take place.

The course of the first Chechen war

• Even before the official declaration of hostilities in early December 1991, Russian aviation launched a massive attack on Chechen airfields, destroying all enemy aircraft. B. Yeltsin signs a decree on the start of hostilities. The Russian army begins an invasion of Chechnya. During the first weeks, all northern Chechen regions came under Russian control, and Grozny was practically surrounded.
• From the end of December 1994 to March 1995. Grozny was stormed. Despite the significant superiority in numbers and weapons, the Russian army suffered heavy losses, and the assault took a long time. In the conditions of street fighting, the heavy equipment of the Russian army did not pose a serious threat; the militants easily destroyed tanks with grenade launchers. The soldiers for the most part were untrained, there were no maps of the city, and there was no established communication between the units. Already during the assault, the Russian command changes tactics. With the support of artillery and aviation, the offensive is carried out by small air assault groups. The widespread use of artillery and bombing turns Grozny into ruins. In March, the last groups of militants leave it. Pro-Russian authorities are being created in the city.
• After a series of battles, the Russian army captures key regions and cities of Chechnya. However, retreating in time, the militants do not suffer serious losses. The war takes on a partisan character. Militants carry out terrorist attacks and surprise attacks on Russian army positions throughout Chechnya. In response, airstrikes are carried out, during which civilians often die. This causes hatred towards Russian forces, the population provides assistance to the militants. The situation was complicated by terrorist attacks in Budennovsk (1995) and Kizlyar (1996), during which many civilians and soldiers died, and the militants suffered virtually no losses.
• In April 1996, D. Dudayev was killed as a result of an airstrike, but this no longer affected the course of the war.
• On the eve of the presidential elections, Boris Yeltsin, for political purposes, decided to agree to a truce in a war that was unpopular among the people. In June 1996, an agreement was signed on a truce, the disarmament of the separatists and the withdrawal of Russian troops, but neither side fulfilled the terms of the agreement.
• Immediately after winning the elections, Boris Yeltsin announced the resumption of hostilities. In August, militants storm Grozny. Despite superior forces, Russian troops were unable to hold the city. A number of other settlements were captured by the separatists.
• The fall of Grozny led to the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements. The Russian army was withdrawing from Chechnya, the question of the status of the republic was postponed for five years.

Results of the first Chechen war

• The Chechen war was supposed to put an end to illegal power on the territory of the republic. In general, successful military operations at the first stage of the war, the capture of Grozny did not lead to victory. Moreover, significant losses among Russian troops made the war extremely unpopular in Russia. The widespread use of aviation and artillery was accompanied by casualties among civilians, as a result of which the war acquired a protracted, partisan character. Russian troops held only large centers and were constantly attacked.
• The goal of the war was not achieved. After the withdrawal of Russian troops, power was again in the hands of criminal and nationalist groups.

The collapse of the USSR caused a series of crises in the space of the once united power, often taking the form of armed conflicts. One of the bloodiest and most protracted of them flared up in Chechnya. Former Major General of the Soviet Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev, who came to power in the republic in the fall of 1991 as a result of a coup, established on its territory a brutal military-political dictatorship of a nationalist nature, organically merging with crime. By provoking the authorities of the Russian Federation to use force, Dudayev pursued the goal not only of creating an independent Chechen state, but also, by uniting all the North Caucasian republics on an anti-Russian basis, to achieve their subsequent separation from Russia and ultimately become a regional leader. Chechnya has become a hotbed of instability and banditry. Negotiations with the separatists did not produce results. There is a threat to the territorial integrity and security of the Russian Federation. In the republic itself, a real genocide unfolded against the non-Chechen population - according to some sources, 45,000 people were killed, another 350,000 left their homes in search of salvation and became refugees, whose fate was not much interested in either the authorities or “human rights activists” like S. Kovalev, who a little later they will zealously defend the militants. Many residents were subjected to robbery, rape, insults and humiliation. The Dudayevites unleashed formal terror against Chechens who disagreed with the regime. Chechnya plunged into chaos and lawlessness. By the end of 1994, Dudayev's power found itself in a state of deep crisis. A balanced and thoughtful policy was required on the part of the federal center in order to bring down the rebellious government and win the favor of the Chechens and ultimately restore order and protect its citizens. Instead, the Kremlin supported an ill-considered plan of attack by the forces of the opposition of the Chechen capital, Grozny, formed against Dudayev. The result of the adventure was the defeat of the anti-Dudaev opposition forces on November 26, 1994, and the rebellious regime received a second wind, rallying the population of Chechnya around itself on the platform of the “Russian threat.” It was quite obvious that the use of federal troops/FV in the current situation would be a reckless act, as the military warned about, contrary to popular belief. It took time and extremely careful policy. But the authorities decided to do their own thing.
On November 29, 1994, the “Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the participants in the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic” was published, demanding a ceasefire. On the same day, the Russian Security Council decided to conduct a military operation in the Chechen Republic, and in the evening, Defense Minister P. Grachev gathered the leadership of the ministry and announced it to representatives of the military department, instructing the General Staff to develop a plan for the operation and its support and preparation.
On November 30, Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2137c “On measures to restore constitutional legality and order in the territory of the Chechen Republic,” according to which, in accordance with Art. 88 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the laws “On the State of Emergency” and “On Security” prescribed measures to restore Russia’s sovereignty over Chechnya.
On December 9, Yeltsin issued Decree N 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict,” and the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Decree N 1360 “On ensuring state security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, legality, rights and freedoms of citizens, disarmament of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and adjacent regions of the North Caucasus." These acts assigned a number of ministries and departments the responsibility for introducing and maintaining a special regime on the territory of Chechnya, similar to a state of emergency or martial law, without their formal declaration. Legally, measures designed to implement the introduction of PV are still assessed ambiguously. In fact, military actions were launched contrary to the law.
On December 11 at 7.00 am, the FV was given the order to enter the territory of Chechnya and. According to the directive of the Minister of Defense N 312/1/006ш, they were given the task, under the cover of aviation, to advance in three directions to Grozny, block it and create conditions for the voluntary disarmament of illegal armed groups, and in case of refusal, carry out an operation to capture the city with subsequent stabilization of the situation and transfer of responsibility from the army to the internal troops/VV of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to the original plans, the operation was planned to be carried out in 4 stages over 3 weeks. The plan did not take into account either the degree of resistance of the Dudayevites or the combat readiness of the Russian troops, which were in a deplorable state. In fact, on the same day, Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” thereby formalizing the beginning of the special operation.
At the beginning of the operation, the Combined Group of Forces/OGV consisted of 34 battalions (20 of them were explosives), 9 divisions, 7 batteries, 80 tanks, 208 armored vehicles and 182 guns and mortars. L/s - 23,800 people, of which 19,000 are from the Ministry of Defense and 4,700 are from the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The Chechen illegal armed groups opposing it numbered, according to the most frequently found data, up to 15,000 people. in the “regular” army and 30,000-40,000 militias, i.e. the total number of militants reached approx. 50,000 people However, these figures are questionable. Thus, according to a number of data, the number of “cadre” separatist troops, together with units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Security Service, the presidential guard/regiment, etc., fluctuated between 7,000-10,000 people. (in Troshev’s memoirs: 5,000-6,000 people). The figure of 15,000 most likely owes its appearance to the general payroll of the army of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria/ChRI (as the separatist state began to be called in 1994), where all units and subdivisions of Dudayev’s army were indicated, including those that were understaffed and not ready for combat (according to Troshev, their complement could be completed within 5-7 days). By the end of 1994, a group of armed formations (the “regular” army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, the militia and mercenaries) numbering approx. 5500 people, in other districts of the Chechen Republic there were units of Dudayev’s army and militia with a total number of St. 4,000 people, and in most villages self-defense units numbering more than 3,000 people were formed. By adding these available forces we get a figure of 13 - 15,000 people. This, most likely, is the real number of all Chechen illegal armed groups at the beginning of the First Chechen War. As for the number of 30,000-40,000 militants in the militia/self-defense units, this is perhaps the POTENTIAL number of fighters that Dudayev could field against the FV. At the beginning of the war, the illegal armed formations were in service with 42 tanks, approx. 80 armored vehicles, up to 153 artillery pieces and mortars, including 18 installations of 18 BM-21 Grad MLRS, 278 aircraft and 3 helicopters, as well as a significant number of small arms (40,000-60,000 units). In addition, the militants had 44 units. air defense systems. Later, during the war, illegal armed groups numbered approx. 4,000 people, from 4 to 10 tanks, from 5-7 to 12-14 armored vehicles, from 15-16 to 25 guns and mortars, from 3 to 6-8 MLRS BM-21 "Grad", up to 20 MANPADS and 11-15 ZSU/ZU. In general, the FV was confronted by a well-armed, ideologically motivated enemy that relied on the support of part of the local population and world, as well as partly Russian public opinion. At the same time, the militant detachments included military professionals and mercenaries.
Initially, the forces and means of the FV allocated for the special operation turned out to be small, so they were gradually built up. By December 30, the OGV numbered 37,972 people. and had 230 tanks, 454 armored vehicles and 388 guns and mortars. As of February 1, 1995, the size of the federal forces/FS group reached 70,509 people, of which 58,739 people. - from the Ministry of Defense, 322 tanks, 2104 armored vehicles, 627 guns and mortars. Subsequently, the number of l / s OGV, renamed the Provisional Joint Forces / VOS, was at the level of approx. 50,000 people
The aviation component also grew. At the beginning of the war, 269 combat aircraft were involved, and 79 helicopters from different departments (55 from the Ministry of Defense, 24 from the Federal Guard Service, the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Subsequently, the number of aircraft of all types increased to 518 aircraft (274 of them from front-line aviation, 14 Tu-22MZ from Long-Range [strategic] aviation and 230 support aircraft), and 104 helicopters.
Conceived as a short-term action, the special operation of the Federal Assembly to “restore legality and constitutional order” resulted in a full-scale intrastate local armed conflict, in fact a war, the main content of which was the fight of the Federal Center against national-radical separatists, who relied on the support of part of the population of the republic, objectively aimed to preserve the territorial integrity and strengthen the state security of Russia. The form of use of forces and means of law enforcement agencies in the conflict was a special military operation.
The first Chechen war, in my opinion, can be divided into three stages, each of which is characterized by the peculiarities of combat operations and military-political results.

1st stage: December 11, 1994 - July 30, 1995.
The most fierce period of the war, the main content of which on the part of the FV was the establishment of control over the territory of the republic and the defeat of the main groups of illegal armed groups.
INVFs were characterized by active armed confrontation, leading to positional battles and massive counterattacks using military equipment, a combination of tactics of regular military units with partisan methods of struggle.
The central events at this stage were the battles for Grozny, which began with the infamous New Year's assault, the capture of the FV settlements on the plain (Gudermes, Shali, Argun, Urus-Martan, etc.) and operations in the mountains, which ended with the capture of Vedeno and Shatoy, the terrorist attack in Budennovsk .
The result of the 1st stage, during which the FS took control of most of Chechnya (up to 80% of the territory), was the cessation of hostilities by Russian troops after the events in Budennovsk and the beginning of the negotiation process with the militants, which ended with the signing in Grozny on July 30, 1995 Agreements on a block of military issues. Its terms provided:
- immediate cessation of hostilities;
- separation of FV and illegal armed groups at 4 km;
- withdrawal of the FV from the territory of the Chechen Republic and disarmament of illegal armed groups;
- exchange of prisoners and other forcibly held persons on the principle of “all for all”;
- suppression of terrorist attacks and sabotage;
- the creation of a Special Monitoring Commission/SNK, co-chaired by the Deputy Commander of the Military Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Lieutenant General A. Romanov, appointed as the commander of the Military Forces, and the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI A. Maskhadov.
The concluded truce led to the fact that the militants received a respite and managed to save their formations from complete defeat. Thus, the successes of the FV, achieved by considerable losses, were leveled, which, according to the former Minister of Internal Affairs. commander of the OGV (and VV) General A. Kulikov, as of July 31, 1995 amounted to 1,867 people. killed, 6,481 wounded, 252 missing and 36 captured.

2nd stage: July 31, 1995 - June 10, 1996.
After a five-month truce, accompanied by repeated violations of the ceasefire, attacks and sabotage by Chechen illegal armed groups (for example, on August 8-9, militants attacked the airfield in Khankala, on September 20 they made an attempt on the life of the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic O. Lobov, on October 25 they attacked a convoy 506 MRR in the area of ​​the village of Tsa-Vedeno; on average in August 1995 alone, 2 military personnel per day were killed), disruption of the process of surrender of weapons by the separatists, hostilities were resumed in December 1995. By this time, the losses of the FS in Chechnya, according to some sources, amounted to 2,022 people. killed and 7,149 wounded.
In fact, the negotiations were suspended after a terrorist attack by militants carried out against the commander of the VOS, Mr. A. Romanov, on October 6, 1995. The general was seriously injured and fell into a coma, from which he has not yet recovered. Following this, Russian aircraft launched strikes on the village. Roshni-Chu, Dargo, Belgatoy, Kharsenoy. However, a new round of escalation of the conflict occurred in December, when, in response to the election of the pro-Russian head of the republic, militants carried out a series of attacks on the village. Shatoy, Achkhoy-Martan, Urus-Martan, Novogroznensky and Gudermes. Then in January, S. Raduev’s detachment carried out a terrorist raid in Dagestan on Kizlyar, which resulted in battles in the village. Pervomayskoe. The FV responded by launching active offensive operations. Military actions broke out throughout the republic.
At this stage of the conflict, Chechen illegal armed formations were characterized by the use of predominantly guerrilla methods and methods of combat while maintaining the potential for conducting positional confrontation and the use of military forms of combat operations. At the same time, a number of territories and settlements were under the control of the separatists. republic and retained the support of part of the local population. The most high-profile actions of the militants, in addition to those mentioned above, were the raid on Grozny on March 6-9 and the destruction of the rear column of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment on April 16, 1996.
For the FS, the main way to carry out tasks, after occupying most of Chechnya, was the actions of troops in areas of responsibility, raid detachments from base centers (in June, 12 of them were created from the VV and 8-MO), as well as formed military maneuver groups / VMG (in total there were such 5 groups were organized, which were a combination of army units, explosive units and special forces). From February to May 1996, the VMG carried out successful operations to destroy militant strongholds and bases in Novogroznensky, Sernovodsk, Stary Achkhoy, Orekhovo, Samashki, Urus-Martan, Nozhai-Yurtovsky, Vedeno and Shatoy districts. At the end of May, Bamut, which had been stormed twice unsuccessfully and was considered impregnable by the militants, was captured. A serious propaganda success was the liquidation of the formal leader of the illegal armed formation at that time, Dzhokhar Dudayev, on April 21, 1996, according to the official version - as a result of an airstrike aimed at the signal of his satellite phone in the vicinity of the village. Gekhi-Chu.
The achieved successes of the FS should have been developed by completing the destruction of the remaining illegal armed groups and ensuring complete control over the territory of the republic, however, the approaching presidential elections against the backdrop of the unpopularity of the war among public opinion led to the resumption of the negotiation process. May 27 in Moscow (!), at a meeting of the separatist delegation led by acting. O. President of Ichkeria Z. Yandarbiev and Yeltsin signed another agreement - an agreement “On a ceasefire, hostilities and measures to resolve the armed conflict on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” According to its terms, all hostilities ceased from June 1. Yeltsin, who arrived in Chechnya on May 28, speaking to the 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade, said: “The war is over, you won, victory is yours, you defeated the rebellious Dudayev regime.”
On June 4 - 6 in Nazran (Ingushetia), in development of the Moscow agreements, negotiations were held between the Russian and Chechen delegations, which ended with the signing on June 10, 1996 of two protocols - on a ceasefire, hostilities, the implementation of measures to resolve the armed conflict in Chechnya and the release of all prisoners . The agreements reached provided for:
- cessation of all hostilities and the use of any weapons;
- elimination of FS roadblocks in the period from June 11 to July 7;
- disarmament of illegal armed groups from July 7 to August 7;
- prohibition of terrorist attacks, sabotage, kidnappings, robberies and murders of civilians and military personnel;
- liquidation of filtration points and other places of detention of detained/detained persons;
- exchange of prisoners and forcibly held persons on the principle of “all for all”;
- carry out and complete the withdrawal of the VOS from the territory of the Chechen Republic by the end of August 1996 (it was planned to leave a number of Russian units in Chechnya on a permanent basis).
The militants regarded the outcome of the Nazran negotiations as their success. They were again, as in the previous year, given a break. The achievements of the FS, paid for with considerable blood, were again under threat.

First Chechen War
	Chechnya, also partially Ingushetia, Dagestan, Stavropol Territory
	Khasavyurt agreements, withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya.
Territorial changes:	De facto independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
Opponents
Russian Armed Forces	Chechen separatists
Internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia
Commanders
Boris Yeltsin Pavel Grachev Anatoly Kvashnin Anatoly Kulikov Victor Erin Anatoly Romanov Lev Rokhlin Gennady Troshev Vladimir Shamanov Ivan Babichev Konstantin Pulikovsky Bislan Gantamirov Said-Magomed Kakiev	Dzhokhar Dudayev † Aslan Maskhadov Akhmed Zakaev Zelimkhan Yandarbiev Shamil Basayev Ruslan Gelayev Salman Raduev Turpal-Ali Atgeriev Hunkar-Pasha Israpilov Vakha Arsanov Arbi Baraev Aslambek Abdulkhadzhiev Apti Batalov Aslanbek Ismailov Ruslan Alikhadzhiev Ruslan Khaikhoroev Khizir Khachukaev
Strengths of the parties
95,000 troops (February 1995)	3,000 (Republican Guard), 27,000 (regulars and militia)
Military losses
About 5,500 dead and missing (according to official figures)	17,391 dead and prisoners (Russian data)

First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian government forces (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991. Often called the “first Chechen war,” although the conflict was officially called “measures to maintain constitutional order.” The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of genocide of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.

Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the defeat and withdrawal of federal troops, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya until the second Chechen conflict and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.

Background to the conflict

With the beginning of “perestroika” in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People, created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev.

"Chechen Revolution" 1991

On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.

During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House.

More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.

On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation.

On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted and the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the republic began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: 2 missile launchers of the ground forces, 4 tanks, 3 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 armored personnel carrier, 14 lightly armored tractors, 6 aircraft, 60 thousand units of small automatic weapons and a lot of ammunition. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.

Collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1991-1992)

The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.

The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not been determined to this day (2010). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.

Period of de facto independence (1991-1994)

As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.

In reality, the state system of the ChRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994.

In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994.

A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.

Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.

The period of Dudayev's rule is characterized by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population. In 1991-1994, the non-Chechen (primarily Russian) population of Chechnya was subjected to murders, attacks and threats from Chechens. Many were forced to leave Chechnya, being driven out of their homes, abandoning them or selling their apartments to Chechens at low prices. In 1992 alone, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny, and 300 went missing. The morgues were filled with unidentified corpses. Widespread anti-Russian propaganda was fueled by relevant literature, direct insults and calls from government platforms, and desecration of Russian cemeteries.

1993 political crisis

In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. The constitution adopted last year was amended and a regime of Dudayev's personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament.

Formation of the anti-Dudaev opposition (1993-1994)

After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).

Beginning of the Civil War (1994)

Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between government troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.

The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.

In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, Dudayev’s supporters lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI A. Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, B. Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander R. Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.

On November 26, the opposition unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.

Progress of the war

Deployment of troops (December 1994)

Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), northwest (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya) and east (from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.

Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.

A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Division blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.

Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.

Assault on Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995)

Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops did not even have maps of the city or normal communications.

The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade and the 81st Petrakuv motorized rifle regiment, under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. There they were surrounded and defeated - the losses of the Maykop brigade amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.

The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.

On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.

Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.

Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.

By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the border of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.

In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of ​​Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.

As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.

Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)

After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.

The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.

Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya) and entered into battle with the militant forces. It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). The losses of the militants amounted to more than 100 people, the Russians - 13-16 people killed, 50-52 wounded. During the battle for Samashki, many civilians died and this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk and resumed in February 1996.

By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.

Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.

The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.

Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.

Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times.

Terrorist attack in Budennovsk (June 14 - 19, 1995)

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory (Russian Federation) in trucks and stopped in the city of Budennovsk.

The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.

Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.

After the failure of forceful actions to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded.

The situation in the republic in June - December 1995

After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.

From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.

Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.

On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.

In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to be in accordance with previously reached agreements.

On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made against the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.

On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.

The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.

On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.

On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.

Terrorist attack in Kizlyar (January 9-18, 1996)

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar (Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation). The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.

The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.

Militant attack on Grozny (March 6-8, 1996)

On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.

Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996)

On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoy, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses.

Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996)

From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.

On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of ​​the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.

By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

Negotiations with the separatists (May-July 1996)

Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.

On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.

On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist groups, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.

The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.

On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.

On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.

Operation Jihad (6-22 August 1996)

On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.

Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).

According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.

Khasavyurt Agreements (August 31, 1996)

On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Republic of Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations

On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev”). . “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.

On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,

According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “due to his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.”

In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya.”

As part of the “Kovalyov mission”, representatives of various non-governmental organizations, deputies, and journalists traveled to the conflict zone. The mission collected information about what was happening in the Chechen war, searched for missing persons and prisoners, and contributed to the release of Russian military personnel captured by Chechen militants. For example, the Kommersant newspaper reported that during the siege of the village of Bamut by Russian troops, the commander of the militant detachments, Khaikharoev, promised to execute five prisoners after each shelling of the village by Russian troops, but under the influence of Sergei Kovalev, who participated in negotiations with the field commanders , Khaikharoev abandoned these intentions.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched an extensive relief program, providing more than 250,000 displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance.

In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for residents of the North Caucasus.

In Grozny and other cities of Chechnya, free canteens were opened for the most vulnerable segments of the population, in which 7,000 people were provided with hot food every day. More than 70,000 schoolchildren in Chechnya received books and school supplies from the ICRC.

During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to assist those affected by the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, and provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages shelters.

In the fall of 1996, in the village of Novye Atagi, the ICRC equipped and opened a hospital for war victims. During the three months of operation, the hospital received more than 320 people, 1,700 people received outpatient care, and almost six hundred surgical operations were performed. On December 17, 1996, an armed attack was carried out on a hospital in Novye Atagi, as a result of which six of its foreign employees were killed. After this, the ICRC was forced to withdraw foreign staff from Chechnya.

In April 1995, American humanitarian specialist Frederick Cuney, together with two Russian doctors from the Russian Red Cross Society and a translator, was organizing humanitarian aid in Chechnya. Cuney was trying to negotiate a truce when he went missing. There is reason to believe that Cuney and his Russian associates were captured by Chechen militants and executed on the orders of Rezvan Elbiev, one of the heads of counterintelligence of Dzhokhar Dudayev, because they were mistaken for Russian agents. There is a version that this was the result of a provocation by the Russian special services, who thus dealt with Cuney at the hands of the Chechens.

Various women's movements ("Soldiers' Mothers", "White Shawl", "Women of the Don" and others) worked with military personnel - participants in combat operations, released prisoners of war, wounded, and other categories of victims during military operations.

Results

The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).

Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% from the contract amount. Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.

Losses

According to data released by the OGV headquarters, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, and 19,794 wounded. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen). However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the militants’ losses did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.

Commanders

Commanders of the United Group of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic

1. Mityukhin, Alexey Nikolaevich (December 1994)
2. Kvashnin, Anatoly Vasilievich (December 1994 - February 1995)
3. Kulikov, Anatoly Sergeevich (February - July 1995)
4. Romanov, Anatoly Alexandrovich (July - October 1995)
5. Shkirko, Anatoly Afanasyevich (October - December 1995)
6. Tikhomirov, Vyacheslav Valentinovich (January - October 1996)
7. Pulikovsky, Konstantin Borisovich (acting July - August 1996)

In art

Movies

• “Cursed and Forgotten” (1997) is a feature-journalistic film by Sergei Govorukhin.
• “60 Hours of the Maikop Brigade” (1995) - a documentary film by Mikhail Polunin about the “New Year’s” assault on Grozny.
• “Blockpost” (1998) is a feature film by Alexander Rogozhkin.
• “Purgatory” (1997) is a naturalistic feature film by Alexander Nevzorov.
• “Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1996) is a feature film by Sergei Bodrov.
• DDT in Chechnya (1996): part 1, part 2

Music

• "Dead city. Christmas" - a song about Yuri Shevchuk's "New Year's" assault on Grozny.
• Yuri Shevchuk’s song “The boys were dying” is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
• The songs “Lube” are dedicated to the first Chechen war: “Batyanya Battalion Commander” (1995), “Soon demobilization” (1996), “Step March” (1996), “Ment” (1997).
• Timur Mutsuraev - Almost all of his work is dedicated to the First Chechen War.
• Songs about the First Chechen War occupy a significant part of the work of the Chechen bard Imam Alimsultanov.
• The song of the group Dead Dolphins - Dead City is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
• Blue berets - “New Year”, “Reflections of an officer at the hotline”, “Two turntables on Mozdok”.

Books

• “Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1994) - story (story) by Vladimir Makanin
• “Chechen Blues” (1998) - novel by Alexander Prokhanov.
• May Day (2000) - story by Albert Zaripov. The story of the storming of the village of Pervomayskoye in the Republic of Dagestan in January 1996.
• “Pathologies” (novel) (2004) - novel by Zakhar Prilepin.
• I was in this war (2001) - novel by Vyacheslav Mironov. The plot of the novel is built around the storming of Grozny by federal troops in the winter of 1994/95.

The first Chechen war lasted exactly one year and nine months. The war began on December 1, 1994, with the bombing of all three Chechen air bases - Kalinovskaya, Khankala and Grozny-Severny, which destroyed all Chechen aviation, including several "corn bombers" and a couple of antediluvian Czechoslovak fighters. The war ended on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements, after which the federals left Chechnya.

Military losses are depressing: 4,100 Russian troops were killed and 1,200 missing. 15 thousand militants were killed, although Aslan Maskhadov, who led the military operations, claimed that the militants lost 2,700 people. According to Memorial human rights activists, 30 thousand civilians in Chechnya were killed.

There were no winners in this war. The federals were unable to take control of the territory of the republic, and the separatists did not receive a truly independent state. Both sides lost.

An unrecognized state and prerequisites for war

The only Chechen whom the whole country knew before the start of the war was Dzhokhar Dudayev. The commander of a bomber division, a combat pilot, at the age of 45 he became a major general of aviation, at 47 he left the army and entered politics. He moved to Grozny, quickly rose to leadership positions and became president in 1991. True, the president is just the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. But the President! He was known to have a tough temperament and determination. During the riots in Grozny, Dudayev and his supporters threw the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, out of the window. He crashed and was taken to the hospital, where Dudayev’s men finished him off. Kutsenko died, and Dudayev became a national leader.

Now it has somehow been forgotten, but Dudayev’s criminal reputation was known back in that period in 1993. Let me remind you how much noise the “Chechen advice notes” caused at the federal level. After all, it was a real disaster of the national payment system. Fraudsters, through shell companies and Grozny banks, stole 4 trillion rubles from the Central Bank of Russia. Exactly a trillion! Let me say for comparison that the Russian budget in that very year 1993 was 10 trillion rubles. That is, almost half of the national budget was stolen using Chechen advice notes. Half the annual salary of doctors, teachers, military personnel, officials, miners, half of all government income. Huge damage! Subsequently, Dudayev recalled how money was brought to Grozny by trucks.

These are the marketers, democrats and supporters of national self-determination that Russia had to fight in 1994.

Beginning of the conflict

When did the first Chechen war begin? December 11, 1994. This is what many historians and publicists believe out of habit. They think that the first Chechen war of 1994-1996 began on the day when the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the need to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. They forget that ten days earlier there was an air strike on airfields in Chechnya. They forget about the burnt corn fields, after which no one either in Chechnya or in the Russian armed forces doubted that there was a war going on.

But the ground operation really began on December 11. On this day, the so-called “Joint Group of Forces” (OGV), which then consisted of three parts, began to move:

• western;
• northwestern;
• eastern.

The Western group entered Chechnya from North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Northwestern - from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia. Eastern - from Dagestan.

All three groups moved straight to Grozny.

The OGV was supposed to clear the city of separatists, and then destroy the militant bases: first in the northern, flat part of the republic; then in the southern, mountainous part.

In a short time, the OGV had to clear the entire territory of the republic from Dudayev’s formations.

The North-Western group was the first to reach the outskirts of Grozny, on December 12, and got involved in battle near the village of Dolinsky. In this battle, the militants used the Grad multiple launch rocket system, and that day they did not allow Russian troops to reach Grozny.

Gradually two other groups joined in. By the end of December, the army approached the capital from three sides:

• from the west;
• from North;
• from the east.

The assault was scheduled for December 31st. On New Year's Eve. And the eve of the birthday of Pavel Grachev, the then Minister of Defense. I won’t say that they wanted to predict victory for the holiday, but this opinion is widespread.

Storm of Grozny

The assault has begun. The assault groups immediately encountered difficulties. The fact is that the commanders made two serious mistakes:

• Firstly. The encirclement of Grozny was not completed. The problem was that Dudayev’s formations actively took advantage of the gap in the open encirclement ring. In the south, in the mountains, militant bases were located. The militants brought in ammunition and weapons from the south. The wounded were evacuated to the south. Reinforcements were approaching from the south;
• Secondly. We decided to use tanks on a massive scale. 250 combat vehicles entered Grozny. Moreover, without proper intelligence support and without infantry support. The tanks turned out to be helpless in the narrow streets of urban areas. The tanks were burning. The 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade was surrounded and 85 people were killed.

Parts of the Western and Eastern groups were unable to penetrate deep into the city and retreated. Only part of the North-Eastern group under the command of General Lev Rokhlin gained a foothold in the city and took up defensive positions. Some units were surrounded and suffered losses. Street fighting broke out in various areas of Grozny.

The command quickly learned lessons from what happened. The commanders changed tactics. They abandoned the massive use of armored vehicles. The battles were fought by small, mobile units of assault groups. Soldiers and officers quickly gained experience and improved their combat skills. On January 9, the federals took the building of the Petroleum Institute, and the airport came under the control of the OGV. By January 19, the militants left the presidential palace and organized a defense on Minutka Square. At the end of January, the federals controlled 30% of the territory of Grozny. At this moment, the federal group was increased to 70 thousand people, it was headed by Anatoly Kulikov.

The next important change occurred on February 3rd. To blockade the city from the south, the command formed the “South” group. Already on February 9, it blocked the Rostov-Baku highway. The blockade is closed.

Half the city turned into ruins, but victory was won. On March 6, the last militant left Grozny under pressure from the United Forces. It was Shamil Basayev.

Major fighting in 1995

By April 1995, federal forces had established control over almost the entire flat part of the republic. Argun, Shali and Gudermes were taken under control relatively easily. The settlement of Bamut remained outside the control zone. The fighting there continued intermittently until the end of the year, and even into the next year 1996.

The operation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Samashki received quite a public response. The propaganda campaign against Russia, professionally carried out by Dudayev's Chechen Press agency, seriously influenced world public opinion about Russia and its actions in Chechnya. Many still believe that civilian casualties in Samashki were prohibitively high. There are unverified rumors about thousands of deaths, while the human rights society Memorial, for example, believes that the number of civilians killed during the cleansing of Samashki is in the dozens.

What is true here and what is an exaggeration is now impossible to discern. One thing is certain: war is cruel and unfair. Especially when civilians are dying.

Advancement in mountainous regions was more difficult for federal forces than marching across the plains. The reason was that troops often got bogged down in the defense of militants, and even such unpleasant incidents occurred as, for example, the capture of 40 paratroopers of the Aksai special forces. In June, the federals took control of the regional centers of Vedeno, Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt.

The most socially significant and resonant episode of the first Chechen war of 1995 was the episode associated with events going beyond the borders of Chechnya. The main negative character of the episode was Shamil Basayev. At the head of a gang of 195 people, he carried out a raid on trucks in the Stavropol Territory. The militants entered the Russian city of Budennovsk, opened fire in the city center, broke into the building of the city department of internal affairs, and shot several police officers and civilians.

The terrorists took about two thousand hostages and herded them into a complex of city hospital buildings. Basayev demanded the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya and the start of negotiations with Dudayev with the participation of the UN. Russian authorities decided to storm the hospital. Unfortunately, there was a leak of information, and the bandits managed to prepare. The assault was not unexpected and was unsuccessful. The special forces captured a number of auxiliary buildings, but did not break into the main building. On the same day they made a second assault attempt, and it also failed.

In short, the situation began to become critical and the Russian authorities were forced to enter into negotiations. The then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was on the phone line. The whole country tensely watched the television report when Chernomyrdin spoke into the phone: “Shamil Basayev, Shamil Basayev, I am listening to your demands.” As a result of negotiations, Basayev received a vehicle and left for Chechnya. There he released the 120 remaining hostages. In total, 143 people died during the events, 46 of them were security forces.

Military clashes of varying intensity took place in the republic until the end of the year. On October 6, militants made an attempt on the life of the commander of the United Armed Forces, General Anatoly Romanov. In Grozny, on Minutka Square, in a tunnel under the railway, the Dudayevites detonated a bomb. The helmet and body armor saved the life of General Romanov, who was passing through the tunnel at that moment. As a result of his injury, the general fell into a coma and subsequently became deeply disabled. After this incident, “retaliation strikes” were carried out on militant bases, which, however, did not lead to a serious change in the balance of power in the confrontation.

Fighting in 1996

The New Year began with another hostage-taking episode. And again outside of Chechnya. This is the story. On January 9, 250 militants carried out a bandit raid in the Dagestan city of Kizlyar. First, they attacked a Russian helicopter base, where they destroyed 2 non-combat-ready MI-8 helicopters. Then they captured the Kizlyar hospital and maternity hospital. The militants drove up to three thousand townspeople from neighboring buildings.

The bandits locked people on the second floor, mined it, and barricaded themselves on the first floor, and put forward demands: the withdrawal of troops from the Caucasus, the provision of buses and a corridor to Grozny. Negotiations with the militants were conducted by the authorities of Dagestan. Representatives of the federal forces command did not participate in these negotiations. On January 10, the Chechens were provided with buses, and the militants with a group of hostages began moving towards Chechnya. They were going to cross the border near the village of Pervomaiskoye, but did not get there. Federal security forces, who were not going to put up with the fact that the hostages were taken to Chechnya, opened warning fire, and the convoy had to stop. Unfortunately, as a result of insufficiently organized actions, confusion occurred. This allowed the militants to disarm a checkpoint of 40 Novosibirsk policemen and capture the village of Pervomaiskoye.

The militants fortified themselves in Pervomaisky. The confrontation continued for several days. On the 15th, after the Chechens shot six captured policemen and two negotiators - Dagestan elders, the security forces launched an assault.

The assault failed. The confrontation continued. On the night of January 19, the Chechens broke through the encirclement and fled to Chechnya. They took with them captured police officers, who were later released.

During the raid, 78 people died.

Fighting in Chechnya continued throughout the winter. In March, the militants tried to retake Grozny, but the attempt ended in failure. In April, a bloody clash occurred near the village of Yaryshmardy.

A new turn in the development of events was brought about by the liquidation of Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev by federal forces. Dudayev often used the Inmarsat satellite phone. On April 21, from an aircraft equipped with a radar station, the Russian military located Dudayev. 2 SU-25 attack aircraft were lifted into the sky. They fired two air-to-ground missiles along the bearing. One of them hit the target exactly. Dudayev died.

Contrary to the expectations of the federals, the removal of Dudayev did not lead to decisive changes in the course of hostilities. But the situation in Russia has changed. The presidential election campaign was approaching. Boris Yeltsin was keenly interested in freezing the conflict. Negotiations continued until July, and the activity of both the Chechens and the federals noticeably decreased.

After Yeltsin was elected president, hostilities intensified again.

The final battle chord of the first Chechen war sounded in August 1996. The separatists again attacked Grozny. The units of General Pulikovsky had a numerical superiority, but they could not hold Grozny. At the same time, militants captured Gudermes and Argun.

Russia was forced to enter into negotiations.

The Chechen War has gone down in history as one of the most large-scale military operations. This war was a serious test for Russian soldiers. She did not leave a single heart indifferent, and did not remain without a trace for anyone. The Chechen war was shed not only by the tears of the relatives of the victims, but also by those who sympathized with them. (Appendix 3)

The path of Russian soldiers was long and difficult. A lot of time has passed since those tragic events, but the memory lives in everyone’s heart and the pain of loss reverberates in the heart.

The further the years of the Chechen War go into history, the brighter and more fully the majesty of the exploits of Soviet and Russian soldiers is revealed. They proved that unity and faith in victory overcome injustice and impunity. From the time when these bloody wars passed, the objective and indisputable fact - Victory - has become even more visible and clear. A victory that was achieved at great cost and that cannot be measured by existing metric measures. Here the dimension is non-traditional - human lives. Millions of dead, dead from wounds, missing and burned in the fire of war. They died, died from wounds and illnesses, went missing, perished in captivity... - such concepts are an indispensable companion to the statistics of military losses.

The Chechen War is large-scale military action between the federal troops of the Russian Federation and Chechen armed forces.

Russia's attempts to peacefully resolve the protracted Chechen crisis that arose after Chechnya declared state independence in 1991 and secession from Russia were unsuccessful.

The storming of Grozny by the anti-Dudaev opposition, supported by the federal center with the aim of overthrowing the regime of D.M. Dudayev, ended in failure. On November 30, 1994, President Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to restore constitutionality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” It was decided to use the regular army. The generals expected to easily capture the rebellious republic, however, the war dragged on for several years.

On December 11, 1994, Russian troops crossed the border of Chechnya, and bloody battles for Grozny began. Only by March 1995 did Russian troops manage to oust the Chechen militias from it. The Russian army, using aviation, artillery, and armored vehicles, gradually expanded the radius of its control; the position of the Chechen formations, which switched to guerrilla warfare tactics, worsened every day.

In June 1995, a detachment of militants under the command of Sh. Basayev raided the city of Budennovsk and took hostage everyone who was in the city hospital and other residents of the city. In order to save the lives of the hostages, the Russian government complied with all the militants’ demands and agreed to begin peace negotiations with Dudayev’s representatives. But the complex negotiation process was disrupted in October 1995 as a result of an assassination attempt on the commander of the Russian troops, General A.S. Romanova. Military operations continued. The war revealed the insufficient combat capability of the Russian army and required increasingly large budget investments. In the eyes of the world community, Russia's authority was falling. After the failure of the operation of federal troops in January 1996 to neutralize the militants of S. Raduev in Kizlyar and Pervomaisky, demands to stop military operations intensified in Russia itself. The pro-Moscow authorities in Chechnya failed to win the trust of the population and were forced to seek the protection of the federal authorities.

Dudayev's death in April 1996 did not change the situation. In August 1996, Chechen forces actually captured Grozny. Under these conditions, Yeltsin decided to hold peace negotiations, which he entrusted to the Secretary of the Security Council A.I. Swan.

On August 30, 1996, peace agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, which provided for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya, the holding of general democratic elections, and the decision on the status of Chechnya was postponed for five years.

After the end of the first Chechen campaign of 1994-1996, the fate of more than 1,200 Russian military personnel remained unknown.

Chechnya, 1999 Resumption of war

In 1999, the Chechen War resumed after Chechen militants invaded Dagestan, attempted to seize the highlands and proclaim the creation of an Islamic state. Federal troops re-entered Chechnya and in a short time took control of the most important populated areas.

At the referendum, residents of Chechnya spoke in favor of maintaining the republic as part of the Russian Federation.

The war in Chechnya was the largest military conflict since the Second World War and claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people. This war became a serious warning to the authorities about the dire consequences of civil conflict.

In total, according to official data, about 6 thousand Russian military personnel, border guards, police officers and security officers died or went missing in Chechnya during the entire conflict. Today we do not have any summary data on the irretrievable losses of the Chechen army. One can only assume that due to their smaller numbers and higher level of combat training, the Chechen troops suffered significantly fewer losses than the federal troops. The total number of killed residents of Chechnya is most often estimated at 70-80 thousand people, the overwhelming majority of whom were civilians. They became victims of shelling and bombing by federal troops, as well as the so-called “cleansing operations” - inspections by Russian soldiers and Interior Ministry officers of cities and villages abandoned by Chechen formations, when civilians often died from federal bullets and grenades. The bloodiest “cleansing operations” took place in the village of Samashki, not far from the border with Ingushetia.

The reason for the war

How did this war actually begin, which turned the lives of people of two nations upside down? There were several reasons for its beginning. Firstly, Chechnya was not allowed to secede. Secondly, the oppression of the Caucasian peoples has been going on since ancient times, that is, the roots of this conflict go very far. First they humiliated the Chechens, and then they humiliated the Russians. In Chechnya, after the start of the conflict, the life of Russians could be compared to hell.

Did this war affect the fates of those guys who took part in it? It definitely had an impact, but in different ways: it took the life of some people, the opportunity for others to live fully, and someone, on the contrary, was able to become a man with a capital “H.” The surviving guys, from what they saw and experienced, sometimes went crazy. Some of them committed suicide, perhaps because they felt guilty before those who were gone. Their destinies turned out differently, some were happy and found themselves in life, others, on the contrary. Of course, to a greater extent, war cannot positively influence the future fate of a person; it can only teach one to appreciate life and everything that is in it.