The year the first Chechen war began. The war in Chechnya: history, beginning and results. “As for conscripts, it’s simply a crime to send these guys here to be slaughtered.”

The First Chechen War is a military conflict between government forces of the Russian Federation and Chechen armed forces in 1994-1996. The goal of the Russian authorities was to establish their sovereignty over the territory, which declared the independence of Chechnya. The Russian army managed to establish its control over most of the Chechen settlements, but the task of suppressing the resistance of the Chechen separatists was not solved. The fighting was characterized by a large number of casualties among military and civilians. In 1996, the Russian leadership agreed to sign a peace agreement, according to which government troops were withdrawn from Chechnya, and the separatist leaders agreed to postpone the issue of recognition of independence for the future.

The weakening of state power in the USSR during the years of perestroika led to the intensification of nationalist movements, including in Checheno-Ingushetia. In 1990, the National Congress of the Chechen People was created, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by General Dzhokhar Dudayev. In 1991, a dual power actually developed in the republic: the National Congress of the Chechen People opposed the official party-state apparatus.

During the August events of 1991, the official leadership of Checheno-Ingushetia supported the State Emergency Committee. After the failure of the attempt to remove M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin from power on September 6, 1991, D. Dudayev announced the dissolution of the Chechen republican state structures, his Dudayev supporters stormed the building of the Supreme Council of Checheno-Ingushetia. The Russian authorities initially supported the actions of the Dudayevites, but it soon became clear that the new Chechen authorities did not recognize the supremacy of Russian laws on their territory. A massive anti-Russian campaign began in Chechnya, genocide of the entire non-Chechen population.
On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the President of Chechnya, and nationalist sentiments prevailed among the deputies of parliament. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. The situation in the republic worsened - armed separatist groups blocked the buildings of internal affairs and state security bodies, military camps, and transport arteries. In fact, a state of emergency was not introduced; the withdrawal of Russian military units, internal troops and police units from the republic began, which was completed by the summer of 1992. At the same time, the separatists captured and plundered a significant part of the military warehouses, obtaining large stocks of weapons, including heavy ones.

The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of Checheno-Ingushetia. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and part of the Sunzhensky district, inhabited by Ingush, formed the Republic of Ingushetia, whose authorities advocated the further development of their people within the Russian Federation. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992. After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.

In 1991-1994, Chechnya was a de facto independent state, but not legally recognized by anyone. Officially, it was called the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, had state symbols (flag, coat of arms, anthem), authorities - the president, parliament, government, courts. On March 12, 1992, its Constitution was adopted, declaring Chechnya an independent secular state. The state system of Chechnya turned out to be ineffective and took on a criminal character. Armed attacks on railway trains took on a massive scale, which forced the Russian government to decide to stop railway traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994. Chechen criminal groups received more than 4 trillion rubles using false advice notes. Hostage-taking and slave trading became commonplace. Despite the fact that the Chechen authorities did not transfer taxes to the all-Russian budget, funds from federal sources came to Chechnya, in particular, for the payment of pensions and social benefits. However, Dudayev's leadership spent this money at their own discretion.

The reign of Dzhokhar Dudayev was marked by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population, primarily Russians. Most non-Chechens were forced to leave Chechnya, expelled from their homes, and deprived of their property. Anti-Russian propaganda was fueled in the media, Russian cemeteries were desecrated. Both state and Muslim religious figures of independent Chechnya addressed the Chechens with calls to kill Russians. In the separatist camp, contradictions related to the division of power quickly emerged. Parliament tried to resist the authoritarian leadership style of Dzhakhar Dudayev. On April 17, 1993, the President of Chechnya announced the dissolution of the parliament and the constitutional court. On June 4 of the same year, an armed detachment of Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev finally dispersed a meeting of deputies of the Chechen parliament and the constitutional court. Thus, a coup d'etat took place in Chechnya, establishing the regime of personal power of Dzhokhar Dudayev. It was not until August 1994 that parliament's legislative powers were returned.

After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, the formation of an anti-Dudaev opposition began in the northern regions of Chechnya. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which intended to overthrow Dudayev's power by force. However, his troops were defeated. The CNS was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized by the Russian authorities, who provided it with support, including weapons and volunteers.

Since the summer of 1994, the fighting between Dudayev’s supporters and the forces of the opposition VSChR has become widespread. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by the oppositionists. Tanks and artillery were used in battles. Military operations proceeded with varying degrees of success, relying on Russian assistance; the oppositionists twice (September 12 and October 15, 1994) tried to capture Grozny, but to no avail. The Russian authorities sought to prevent the defeat of the opposition and became increasingly drawn into the intra-Chechen conflict. After another failure in the assault on Grozny (November 26, 1994), Russian President B.N. Yeltsin decided to eliminate the Chechen problem by force.

On December 11, 1994, the decree “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic” was signed. On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Russian army and internal troops, entered the territory of Chechnya from three sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the northwest (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia), from the east (from Kizlyar, from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by residents of Ingushetia, came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but, using force, broke through to Chechnya. On December 12, the Mozdok group approached the village of Dolinsky, 10 km from Grozny. Here Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and entered the battle for the village.

On December 15, the Kizlyar group reached the village of Tolstoy-Yurt. On December 19, the Western group blocked Grozny from the west, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. The next day Dolinsky was occupied, the Mozdok group blocked Grozny from the north-west. The Kizlyar group approached the city from the east. Units of the 104th Airborne Division closed the routes to Grozny from the Argun Gorge. However, the approaches to the city from the south were not cut off.

On December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny began, about 250 armored vehicles entered the city. In street battles, its extreme vulnerability was revealed, Russian troops turned out to be poorly prepared for combat operations, there was no reliable communication between units, there was no interaction and coordination of the actions of individual units. The expectation that the separatists would retreat in front of the armored rampart did not materialize. The western and eastern groups of Russian troops, having lost a significant part of their armored vehicles, were unable to break into the city. In the northern direction, the 131st Maikop Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 81st Petrakuvsky Motorized Rifle Regiment, under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky, managed to break through to the railway station and the Presidential Palace. But there they were surrounded and defeated.

Russian troops had to change tactics - instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, maneuverable air assault groups, supported by artillery and aviation, went into battle. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny. By January 9, 1995, the building of the Grozny Oil Institute and the airport were occupied. By January 19, the city center was cleared of separatists and the Presidential Palace was occupied. Chechen detachments retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Open routes to the south allowed them to transfer reinforcements and ammunition to Grozny and quickly escape from attack.

By early February, the number of Russian troops in Chechnya had increased to 70 thousand people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the commander of the OGV. On February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the blockade of Grozny from the south began. On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between Anatoly Kulikov and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov, on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. Active fighting in Grozny resumed on the 20th of February, but Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city. On March 6, 1995, Shamil Basayev’s detachment retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of ​​Grozny controlled by the separatists. As a result of the assault, the city was turned into ruins. After the fall of Grozny, new government bodies were organized in Chechnya, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, who advocated the preservation of the Chechen Republic as part of the Russian Federation.

Meanwhile, Russian troops were establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya. The Russian command conducted active negotiations with the local population, urging them to expel the militants from populated areas. Federal troops occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to such tactics, on March 15-23, detachments of Chechen militants left Argun (March 23), Shali (March 30), Gudermes (March 31). In the western part of Chechnya, since March 10, there have been battles for the village of Bamut. There, on April 7-8, detachments of internal troops and police carried out an operation to clear the village of Samashki from militants, during which civilians also died. The operation in Samashki caused a stir in the media around the world, had a negative impact on the image of the Russian army, and strengthened anti-Russian sentiment in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the assault on Bamut began. Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. However, the militants retained the commanding heights above the village in their hands. The fighting for Bamut continued until 1996. But, in general, by April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya; the separatists had to limit themselves to purely sabotage and guerrilla operations.
On April 28, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part. On May 12, actions began to establish control over Mountainous Chechnya. The Russian troops struck the villages of Chiri-Yurt (at the entrance to the Argun Gorge) and Serzhen-Yurt (at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge). Significant superiority in manpower and equipment allowed Russian troops, despite difficult mountain conditions and enemy resistance, to capture the regional centers of Vedeno (June 3), Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt (June 12). Thus, by the summer of 1995, most of the settlements in Chechnya came under the control of the federal authorities. Detachments of Chechen separatists switched to guerrilla warfare. They largely retained their fighting strength, enjoyed the support of the population of Chechnya, and the fight against them was to be long and intense. Chechen militants maneuvered widely throughout the republic, and already in May 1995 they reappeared near Grozny.

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by Shamil Basayev, managed to drive into the territory of the Stavropol Territory in trucks. In the city of Budennovsk, after an attack on the building of the city department of internal affairs, the Basayevites occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, about two thousand hostages ended up in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. The leadership of Russian security forces decided to storm the hospital building. The battle lasted about four hours, but the terrorists held the main building of the hospital with most of the hostages. The second assault also ended in failure. After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the Chairman of the Russian Government V.S. Chernomyrdin and Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

After the Budyonnovsk events, on June 19-22, negotiations were held in Grozny between the Russian and Chechen sides, at which it was decided to introduce a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period. At a new round of negotiations (June 27-30), an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners on the “all for all” principle, the disarmament of separatist groups, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, and the holding of free elections. In general, these agreements turned out to be beneficial for the separatists. The moratorium on military operations tied the hands of the Russian army; it could not conduct military operations. There was no real disarmament of the Chechen armed forces. The militants returned to their villages, where “self-defense units” were created.

At the same time, the partisan war against federal forces did not stop, local battles took place throughout Chechnya. From time to time, militant groups occupied large populated areas, which had to be liberated using armored vehicles and aircraft. On October 6, 1995, against the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General A.A. An assassination attempt was made on Romanov and he was seriously wounded. This event contributed to the escalation of tensions and largely dashed hopes for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

On the eve of the elections of new authorities of the Chechen Republic, scheduled for December, the Russian leadership decided to replace Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov with the former leader of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Doku Zavgaev, who seemed more authoritative. On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Hunkar-Pasha Israpilov, and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14, battles for the city broke out, but only by December 20 did Russian troops clear Gudermes of militants. Against this background, on December 14-17, 1995, elections to local authorities were held in Chechnya. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Doku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes.

Hopes for stabilization of the situation in Chechnya as a result of the elections did not materialize. On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar in Dagestan. The militants' target was a helicopter base and an ammunition depot for federal forces. The terrorists managed to destroy two Mi-8 transport helicopters. When units of the Russian army and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, the militants seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about three thousand civilians into them. The federal authorities negotiated with the terrorists and agreed to provide them with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved from Kizlyar. In the village of Pervomaisky, the column was stopped, the militants captured the village. From January 11 to January 14, fruitless negotiations took place, and on January 15, federal troops began the assault on Pervomaisky. On January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of Chechen terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrazia" and threatened to shoot the Russian hostages if the storming of Pervomaisky was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities. The battle for Pervomaiskoye lasted several days; on January 18, under the cover of darkness, the militants broke through the encirclement and fled to Chechnya.

On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city and fired at Russian checkpoints. Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, but when they retreated, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition. By the spring of 1996, it became obvious that the war in Chechnya had become protracted and required large budget investments. In the context of the beginning of the 1996 presidential election campaign, the continuation of hostilities had a negative impact on B.N.’s chances. Yeltsin to retain his post.

On April 21, 1996, Russian aviation managed to destroy the President of Chechnya, Dzhokhar Dudayev, and on May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Chechen delegations was held in Moscow, at which a decision was made on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. On June 10 in Nazran, during the next round of negotiations, a new agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was again temporarily postponed.

After the re-election of B.N. Yeltsin as President of Russia (July 3, 1996), the new Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities in Chechnya. However, by that time, the units of the Russian army in Chechnya had largely lost their combat effectiveness and were disoriented in terms of the goals of the war and the identification of the enemy. The majority of the Chechen population did not trust the local and federal authorities and viewed Russian soldiers as occupiers. The increased power of the military formations of the Chechen separatists was demonstrated by the August 1996 battles, when Russian troops, despite superiority in manpower and equipment, were forced to leave the cities of Grozny, Gudermes, and Argun. These failures prompted the federal authorities to end the war. On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

The Khasavyurt agreements actually granted independence to Chechnya, but legally its sovereignty was not recognized by any country in the world. During the fighting, Russian troops lost 4,103 people killed and 1,231 missing. The losses of the Chechen side are estimated at 17 thousand people; the civilian population lost 30-40 thousand people killed. Almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya. The economy, infrastructure, cities and villages of the republic were largely destroyed. After the end of hostilities, Chechnya entered a period of deep crisis, against the backdrop of which followers of radical and aggressive forms of Islam gained increasing influence.

The Second Chechen War also had an official name - the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus, or CTO for short. But the common name is more known and widespread. The war affected almost the entire territory of Chechnya and the adjacent regions of the North Caucasus. It began on September 30, 1999 with the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The most active phase can be called the years of the second Chechen war from 1999 to 2000. This was the peak of attacks. In subsequent years, the second Chechen war took on the character of local skirmishes between separatists and Russian soldiers. The year 2009 was marked by the official abolition of the CTO regime.
The second Chechen war brought a lot of destruction. Photographs taken by journalists demonstrate this perfectly.

Background

The first and second Chechen wars have a small time gap. After the Khasavyurt Agreement was signed in 1996 and Russian troops were withdrawn from the republic, the authorities expected calm to return. However, peace was never established in Chechnya.
Criminal structures have significantly intensified their activities. They made an impressive business from such a criminal act as kidnapping for ransom. Their victims included both Russian journalists and official representatives, and members of foreign public, political and religious organizations. The bandits did not hesitate to kidnap people who came to Chechnya for the funerals of loved ones. Thus, in 1997, two citizens of Ukraine were captured who arrived in the republic in connection with the death of their mother. Businessmen and workers from Turkey were regularly captured. Terrorists profited from oil theft, drug trafficking, and the production and distribution of counterfeit money. They committed outrages and kept the civilian population in fear.

In March 1999, the authorized representative of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs for Chechen affairs, G. Shpigun, was captured at the Grozny airport. This blatant case showed the complete inconsistency of the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Maskhadov. The federal center decided to strengthen control over the republic. Elite operational units were sent to the North Caucasus, the purpose of which was to fight gangs. From the side of the Stavropol Territory, a number of missile launchers were deployed, intended for delivering targeted ground strikes. An economic blockade was also introduced. The flow of cash injections from Russia has sharply decreased. In addition, it has become increasingly difficult for bandits to smuggle drugs abroad and take hostages. There was nowhere to sell the gasoline produced in underground factories. In mid-1999, the border between Chechnya and Dagestan turned into a militarized zone.

The gangs did not abandon their attempts to unofficially seize power. Groups led by Khattab and Basayev made forays into the territory of Stavropol and Dagestan. As a result, dozens of military personnel and police officers were killed.

On September 23, 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin officially signed a decree on the creation of the United Group of Forces. Its goal was to conduct a counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. Thus began the second Chechen war.

Nature of the conflict

The Russian Federation acted very skillfully. With the help of tactical techniques (luring the enemy into a minefield, surprise raids on small settlements), significant results were achieved. After the active phase of the war had passed, the main goal of the command was to establish a truce and attract the former leaders of the gangs to their side. The militants, on the contrary, relied on giving the conflict an international character, calling on representatives of radical Islam from all over the world to participate in it.

By 2005, terrorist activity had decreased significantly. Between 2005 and 2008, there were no major attacks on civilians or clashes with official troops. However, in 2010, a number of tragic terrorist acts occurred (explosions in the Moscow metro, at Domodedovo airport).

Second Chechen War: Beginning

On June 18, the ChRI carried out two attacks at once on the border in the direction of Dagestan, as well as on a company of Cossacks in the Stavropol region. After this, most of the checkpoints into Chechnya from Russia were closed.

On June 22, 1999, an attempt was made to blow up the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of our country. This fact was noted for the first time in the entire history of the existence of this ministry. The bomb was discovered and promptly defused.

On June 30, the Russian leadership gave permission to use military weapons against gangs on the border with CRI.

Attack on the Republic of Dagestan

On August 1, 1999, the armed detachments of the Khasavyurt region, as well as the citizens of Chechnya supporting them, announced that they were introducing Sharia rule in their region.

On August 2, militants from the ChRI provoked a fierce clash between Wahhabis and riot police. As a result, several people died on both sides.

On August 3, a shootout occurred between police officers and Wahhabis in the Tsumadinsky district of the river. Dagestan. There were some losses. Shamil Basayev, one of the leaders of the Chechen opposition, announces the creation of an Islamic shura, which had its own troops. They established control over several regions in Dagestan. Local authorities of the republic are asking the center to issue military weapons to protect civilians from terrorists.

The next day, the separatists were driven back from the regional center of Agvali. More than 500 people dug in in positions that had been prepared in advance. They made no demands and did not enter into negotiations. It became known that they were holding three policemen.

At noon on August 4, on the road in the Botlikh district, a group of armed militants opened fire on a squad of Ministry of Internal Affairs officers who were trying to stop a car for an inspection. As a result, two terrorists were killed, and there were no casualties among the security forces. The village of Kekhni was hit by two powerful missile and bomb attacks by Russian attack aircraft. It was there, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that a detachment of militants stopped.

On August 5, it becomes known that a major terrorist attack is being prepared on the territory of Dagestan. 600 militants were going to penetrate into the center of the republic through the village of Kekhni. They wanted to seize Makhachkala and sabotage the government. However, representatives of the center of Dagestan denied this information.

The period from August 9 to 25 was remembered for the battle for the Donkey Ear height. The militants fought with paratroopers from Stavropol and Novorossiysk.

Between September 7 and September 14, large groups led by Basayev and Khattab invaded from Chechnya. The devastating battles continued for about a month.

Air bombing of Chechnya

On August 25, Russian armed forces attacked terrorist bases in the Vedeno Gorge. More than a hundred militants were killed from the air.

In the period from September 6 to 18, Russian aviation continues its massive bombing of separatist concentration areas. Despite the protest of the Chechen authorities, the security forces say that they will act as necessary in the fight against terrorists.

On September 23, the forces of central aviation bombed Grozny and its environs. As a result, power plants, oil plants, a mobile communications center, and radio and television buildings were destroyed.

On September 27, V.V. Putin rejected the possibility of a meeting between the presidents of Russia and Chechnya.

Ground operation

Since September 6, Chechnya has been under martial law. Maskhadov calls on his citizens to declare gazavat to Russia.

On October 8, in the village of Mekenskaya, militant Akhmed Ibragimov shot 34 people of Russian nationality. Three of them were children. At the village meeting, Ibragimov was beaten to death with sticks. The mullah forbade his body to be buried.

The next day they occupied a third of the CRI territory and moved on to the second phase of hostilities. The main goal is the destruction of gangs.

On November 25, the President of Chechnya appealed to Russian soldiers to surrender and be taken prisoner.

In December 1999, Russian military forces liberated almost all of Chechnya from militants. About 3,000 terrorists dispersed across the mountains and also hid in Grozny.

Until February 6, 2000, the siege of the capital of Chechnya continued. After the capture of Grozny, massive fighting came to an end.

Situation in 2009

Despite the fact that the counter-terrorism operation was officially stopped, the situation in Chechnya did not become calmer, but on the contrary, it worsened. Incidents of explosions have become more frequent, and militants have become more active again. In the fall of 2009, a number of operations were carried out aimed at destroying gangs. The militants respond with major terrorist attacks, including in Moscow. By mid-2010, there was an escalation of the conflict.

Second Chechen War: results

Any military action causes damage to both property and people. Despite the compelling reasons for the second Chechen war, the pain from the death of loved ones cannot be relieved or forgotten. According to statistics, 3,684 people were lost on the Russian side. 2178 representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation were killed. The FSB lost 202 of its employees. More than 15,000 terrorists were killed. The number of civilians killed during the war is not precisely established. According to official data, it is about 1000 people.

Cinema and books about war

The fighting did not leave artists, writers, and directors indifferent. The photographs are dedicated to such an event as the second Chechen war. There are regular exhibitions where you can see works reflecting the destruction left behind by the fighting.

The second Chechen war still causes a lot of controversy. The film "Purgatory", based on real events, perfectly reflects the horror of that period. The most famous books were written by A. Karasev. These are "Chechen Stories" and "Traitor".

Historians have an unspoken rule that at least 15-20 years must pass before giving a reliable assessment of certain events. However, in the case of the First Chechen War, everything is completely different and the more time passes from the beginning of those events, the less they try to remember them. It seems that someone is deliberately trying to make people forget about these bloodiest and most tragic pages in the newest Russian history. But society has every right to know the names of the people who started this conflict, in which about three thousand Russian soldiers and officers died and which actually marked the beginning of a whole wave of terror in the country and the Second Chechen War.

The events leading to the First Chechen War must be divided into two stages. The first is the period from 90 to 91, when there was still a real opportunity to overthrow the Dudayev regime bloodlessly and the second stage from the beginning of 92, when the time to normalize the situation in the republic had already been lost, and the question of a military solution to the problem became only a matter of time.

Stage one. How it all began.

The first impetus for the start of events can be considered Gorbachev’s promise to give all autonomous republics the status of union and Yeltsin’s subsequent phrase - “Take as much independence as you can carry.” Desperately fighting for power in the country, they wanted to gain support from the residents of these republics in this way and probably did not even imagine what their words would lead to.

Just a few months after Yeltsin’s statement, in November 1990, the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, headed by Doku Zavgaev, adopted a declaration on the state sovereignty of Checheno-Ingushetia. Even though in essence it was only a formal document adopted with an eye to gaining greater autonomy and powers, the first signal had already been given. At the same time, the hitherto little-known figure of Dzhokhar Dudayev appeared in Chechnya. The only Chechen general in the Soviet Army, who was never a Muslim and had state awards for military operations in Afghanistan, began to quickly gain popularity. Perhaps even too fast. In Chechnya, for example, many are still convinced that behind Dudayev there were serious people sitting in Moscow offices.

Perhaps these same people helped Dudayev to overthrow the Supreme Council with its chairman Doku Zavgaev on September 6, 1991. After the dissolution of the Supreme Council, power as such no longer existed in Chechnya. The warehouse of the KGB of the republic, in which there were riflemen for an entire regiment, was looted, and all the criminals who were there were released from prisons and pre-trial detention centers. However, all this did not prevent the presidential elections to be held on October 26 of the same year, which, as expected, Dudayev himself won, and a declaration on the sovereignty of Chechnya to be adopted on November 1st. It was no longer a bell, but a real ringing of a bell, but the country seemed not to notice what was happening.

The only person who tried to do something was Rutskoy, it was he who tried to declare a State of Emergency in the republic, but no one supported him. During these days, Yeltsin was at his country residence and did not show any attention to Chechnya, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR never accepted the document on the emergency. This was largely due to the aggressive behavior of Rutskoi himself, who literally stated the following during the discussion of the document: “these black-assed people must be crushed.” This phrase of his almost ended in a fight in the Council building and, naturally, there could no longer be any talk of adopting a state of emergency.

True, despite the fact that the document was never adopted, several planes with internal troops, totaling about 300 people, still landed in Khankala (a suburb of Grozny). Naturally, 300 people had no chance of completing the task and overthrowing Dudayev and, on the contrary, they themselves became hostages. For more than a day, the fighters were actually surrounded and were eventually taken out of Chechnya on buses. A couple of days later, Dudayev was inaugurated as president, and his authority and power in the republic became limitless.

Stage two. War becomes inevitable.

After Dudayev officially assumed the post of President of Chechnya, the situation in the republic was heating up every day. Every second resident of Grozny walked freely with weapons in his hands, and Dudayev openly declared that all weapons and equipment located on the territory of Chechnya belonged to him. And there were a lot of weapons in Chechnya. The 173rd Grozny training center alone contained weapons for 4-5 motorized rifle divisions, including: 32 tanks, 32 infantry fighting vehicles, 14 armored personnel carriers, 158 anti-tank installations.

In January 1992, there was practically not a single soldier left in the training center, and this entire mass of weapons was guarded only by the officers who remained in the military camp. Despite this, the federal center did not pay any attention to this, preferring to continue to share power in the country, and only in May 1993, Defense Minister Grachev arrived in Grozny for negotiations with Dudayev. As a result of negotiations, it was decided to divide all weapons available in Chechnya 50/50, and already in June the last Russian officer left the republic. Why it was necessary to sign this document and leave such a mass of weapons in Chechnya still remains unclear, because in 1993 it was already obvious that the problem could not be solved peacefully.
At the same time, due to Dudayev’s extremely nationalistic policies in Chechnya, there is a mass exodus of the Russian population from the republic. According to the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Kulikov, up to 9 Russian families per hour crossed the border every day.

But the anarchy that was happening in the republic affected not only the Russian residents in the republic itself, but also the residents of other regions. So, Chechnya was the main producer and supplier of heroin to Russia, also, about 6 billion dollars were seized through the Central Bank as a result of the famous story with fake Advice notes and, most importantly, they made money from this not only in Chechnya itself, they received financial benefits from it in Moscow. How else can one explain that in 92-93, famous Russian politicians and businessmen arrived in Grozny almost every month? According to the recollections of the former mayor of Grozny, Bislan Gantamirov, before each such visit of “distinguished guests,” Dudayev personally gave instructions on the purchase of expensive jewelry, explaining that this is how we solve our problems with Moscow.

It was no longer possible to turn a blind eye to this, and Yeltsin instructs the head of the Moscow Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), Savostyanov, to carry out an operation to overthrow Dudayev using the forces of the Chechen opposition. Savostyanov placed his bets on the head of the Nadterechny district of Chechnya, Umar Avturkhanov, and money and weapons began to be sent to the republic. On October 15, 1994, the first assault on Grozny by opposition forces began, but when less than 400 meters remained to Dudayev’s palace, someone from Moscow contacted Avturkhanov and ordered him to leave the city. According to information from the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Ruslan Khasbulatov, this “someone” was none other than the organizer of the assault on Savostyanov.
The next assault attempt by opposition forces was carried out on November 26, 1994, but it also failed miserably. After this assault, Defense Minister Grachev will in every possible way disown the Russian tank crews who were captured and declare that the Russian Army would have taken Grozny within an hour with the forces of one airborne regiment.

Apparently, even in the Kremlin itself they did not really believe in the success of this operation, because a couple of weeks before this assault, a secret meeting of the Security Council had already taken place in Moscow, entirely devoted to the Chechen problem. At this meeting, Minister of Regional Development Nikolai Egorov and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev made two polar reports. Egorov stated that the situation for sending troops into Chechnya is extremely favorable and 70 percent of the republic’s population will undoubtedly support this decision and only 30 will be neutral or will resist. Grachev, on the contrary, emphasized in his report that the introduction of troops would not lead to anything good, and we would meet fierce resistance and proposed postponing the introduction to the spring, so that there would be time to prepare the troops and draw up a detailed plan for the operation. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in response to this, openly called Grachev a coward and stated that such statements were not acceptable for the Minister of Defense. Yeltsin announced a break and, together with Rybkin, Shumeiko, Lobov and several other unknown members of the government, held a closed meeting. Its result was Yeltsin’s demand to prepare an operation plan for the deployment of troops within two weeks. Grachev could not refuse the president.

On November 29, the second meeting of the Security Council was held in the Kremlin, at which Grachev presented his plan, and the decision to send troops was finally made. Why the decision was made in such a hurry is not known for certain. According to one version, Yeltsin personally wanted to solve the problem of Chechnya before the new year and thus raise his extremely low rating. According to another, a member of the international committee of the State Duma, Andrei Kozyrev, had information that if the Russian Federation solves the problem of Chechnya in the near future and in a short period of time, this will not cause any particular negative reaction from the US administration.

One way or another, the deployment of troops took place in extreme haste, which led to the fact that five generals, to whom Grachev proposed to lead the operation, refused this and only in mid-December did Anatoly Kvashnin agree to this. There were less than two weeks left before the New Year's assault on Grozny...

Russian troops fought in Chechnya under the Tsars, when the Caucasus region was just part of the Russian Empire. But in the nineties of the last century, a real massacre began there, the echoes of which have not subsided to this day. The Chechen war in 1994-1996 and in 1999-2000 are two disasters for the Russian army.

Prerequisites for the Chechen wars

The Caucasus has always been a very difficult region for Russia. Issues of nationality, religion, and culture have always been raised very sharply and were resolved in far from peaceful ways.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the influence of separatists increased in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on the basis of national and religious hostility, as a result of which the self-proclaimed Republic of Ichkeria was established. She entered into confrontation with Russia.

In November 1991, Boris Yeltsin, then the President of Russia, issued a decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic.” But this decree was not supported in the Supreme Council of Russia, due to the fact that most of the seats there were occupied by Yeltsin’s opponents.

In 1992, on March 3, Dzhokhar Dudayev said that he would enter into negotiations only when Chechnya received complete independence. A few days later, on the twelfth, the Chechen parliament adopted a new constitution, self-proclaiming the country as a secular independent state.

Almost immediately all government buildings, all military bases, all strategically important objects were captured. The territory of Chechnya completely came under the control of the separatists. From that moment on, legitimate centralized power ceased to exist. The situation got out of control: the trade in arms and people flourished, drug trafficking passed through the territory, bandits robbed the population (especially the Slavic ones).

In June 1993, soldiers from Dudayev's personal guard seized the parliament building in Grozny, and Dudayev himself proclaimed the emergence of a “sovereign Ichkeria” - a state that he completely controlled.

A year later, the First Chechen War (1994-1996) will begin, which will mark the beginning of a whole series of wars and conflicts that have become, perhaps, the bloodiest and most brutal throughout the entire territory of the former Soviet Union.

First Chechen: the beginning

In 1994, on the eleventh of December, Russian troops in three groups entered the territory of Chechnya. One entered from the west, through North Ossetia, another - through Mozdok, and the third group - from the territory of Dagestan. Initially, command was entrusted to Eduard Vorobyov, but he refused and resigned, citing complete unpreparedness for this operation. Later, the operation in Chechnya will be headed by Anatoly Kvashnin.

Of the three groups, only the Mozdok group was able to successfully reach Grozny on December 12th - the other two were blocked in different parts of Chechnya by local residents and partisan militant groups. A few days later, the remaining two groups of Russian troops approached Grozny and blocked it from all sides, with the exception of the southern direction. Until the start of the assault from this side, access to the city would be free for militants; this later influenced the siege of Grozny by federal troops.

Storm of Grozny

On December 31, 1994, the assault began, which claimed many lives of Russian soldiers and remained one of the most tragic episodes in Russian history. About two hundred units of armored vehicles entered Grozny from three sides, which were almost powerless in the conditions of street fighting. There was poor communication between the companies, which made it difficult to coordinate joint actions.

Russian troops are stuck on the streets of the city, constantly falling under the crossfire of militants. The battalion of the Maykop brigade, which advanced the furthest to the city center, was surrounded and was almost completely destroyed along with its commander, Colonel Savin. The battalion of the Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment, which went to the rescue of the “Maikopians”, after two days of fighting consisted of about thirty percent of the original composition.

By the beginning of February, the number of attackers was increased to seventy thousand people, but the assault on the city continued. It was not until the third of February that Grozny was blocked from the south and encircled.

On March 6, part of the last detachments of Chechen separatists was killed, others left the city. Grozny remained under the control of Russian troops. In fact, little remained of the city - both sides actively used both artillery and armored vehicles, so Grozny was practically in ruins.

In the rest of the area there were continuous local battles between Russian troops and militant groups. In addition, the militants prepared and carried out a series (June 1995) in Kizlyar (January 1996). In March 1996, militants made an attempt to recapture Grozny, but the assault was repelled by Russian soldiers. And Dudayev was liquidated.

In August, the militants repeated their attempt to take Grozny, this time they were successful. Many important facilities in the city were blocked by the separatists, and Russian troops suffered very heavy losses. Along with Grozny, the militants took Gudermes and Argun. On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt Agreement was signed - the First Chechen War ended with huge losses for Russia.

Human losses in the First Chechen War

The data varies depending on which side is doing the counting. Actually, this is not surprising and it has always been this way. Therefore, all options are provided below.

Losses in the Chechen War (table No. 1 according to the headquarters of the Russian troops):

The two numbers in each column indicating the losses of Russian troops are two headquarters investigations that were conducted a year apart.

According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the consequences of the Chechen war are completely different. The number of people killed there alone is about fourteen thousand.

Losses in the Chechen War (table No. 2) of militants according to Ichkeria and a human rights organization:

Among the civilian population, Memorial put forward a figure of 30-40 thousand people, and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation A. I. Lebed - 80,000.

Second Chechen: main events

Even after the signing of the peace agreements, Chechnya did not become calmer. Militants were in charge, there was a brisk trade in drugs and weapons, people were kidnapped and killed. There was anxiety on the border between Dagestan and Chechnya.

After a series of kidnappings of major businessmen, officers, and journalists, it became clear that the continuation of the conflict in a more acute phase was simply inevitable. Moreover, since April, small groups of militants began to probe the weak points of the defense of Russian troops, preparing an invasion of Dagestan. The invasion operation was led by Basayev and Khattab. The place where the militants planned to strike was in the mountainous zone of Dagestan. There, the small number of Russian troops was combined with the inconvenient location of the roads, along which reinforcements could not be transferred very quickly. On August 7, 1999, militants crossed the border.

The main striking force of the bandits were mercenaries and Islamists from Al-Qaeda. The fighting continued for almost a month with varying success, but finally the militants were driven back to Chechnya. At the same time, the bandits carried out a number of terrorist attacks in different cities of Russia, including Moscow.

As a response, on September 23, a powerful shelling of Grozny began, and a week later, Russian troops entered Chechnya.

Human losses in the Second Chechen War among Russian military personnel

The situation changed, and Russian troops now played a dominant role. But many mothers never saw their sons.

Losses in the Chechen War (table No. 3):

In June 2010, the commander in chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs cited the following figures: 2,984 killed and about 9,000 wounded.

Militant losses

Losses in the Chechen War (table No. 4):

Civilian casualties

According to officially confirmed data, as of February 2001, over a thousand civilians were killed. In S. V. Ryazantsev’s book “Demographic and Migration Portrait of the North Caucasus,” the losses of the parties in the Chechen War are called five thousand people, although we are talking about 2003.

Judging by the assessment of the Amnesty International organization, which calls itself non-governmental and objective, there were about twenty-five thousand civilian deaths. They can count for a long time and diligently, but when asked: “How many actually died in the Chechen war?” - hardly anyone will give an intelligible answer.

Results of the war: peace conditions, restoration of Chechnya

While the Chechen war was going on, the loss of equipment, enterprises, land, any resources and everything else was not even considered, because people always remain the main ones. But the war ended, Chechnya remained part of Russia, and the need arose to restore the republic practically from ruins.

Huge amounts of money were allocated for Grozny. After several assaults, there were almost no entire buildings left there, but at the moment it is a large and beautiful city.

The economy of the republic was also raised artificially - it was necessary to give time for the population to get used to the new realities, so that new factories and farms could be built. Roads, communication lines, and electricity were needed. Today we can say that the republic has almost completely emerged from the crisis.

Chechen wars: reflected in films, books

Dozens of films were made based on events that took place in Chechnya. Many books have been published. Now it is no longer possible to understand where are the fictions and where are the real horrors of war. The Chechen war (like the war in Afghanistan) claimed too many lives and swept through an entire generation, so it simply could not remain unnoticed. Russia's losses in the Chechen wars are colossal, and, according to some researchers, the losses are even greater than during the ten years of war in Afghanistan. Below is a list of films that most deeply show us the tragic events of the Chechen campaigns.

• documentary film of five episodes "Chechen Trap";
• "Purgatory";
• "Cursed and Forgotten";
• "Prisoner of the Caucasus".

Many fiction and journalistic books describe the events in Chechnya. For example, the now famous writer Zakhar Prilepin fought as part of the Russian troops, who wrote the novel “Pathologies” specifically about this war. Writer and publicist Konstantin Semenov published a series of stories "Grozny Stories" (about the storming of the city) and the novel "We were betrayed by our homeland." Vyacheslav Mironov’s novel “I Was in This War” is dedicated to the storming of Grozny.

Video recordings made in Chechnya by rock musician Yuri Shevchuk are widely known. He and his group "DDT" performed more than once in Chechnya in front of Russian soldiers in Grozny and at military bases.

Conclusion

The State Council of Chechnya published data from which it follows that almost one hundred and sixty thousand people died between 1991 and 2005 - this figure includes militants, civilians, and Russian soldiers. One hundred sixty thousand.

Even if the numbers are exaggerated (which is quite likely), the volume of losses is still simply colossal. Russia's losses in the Chechen wars are a terrible memory of the nineties. The old wound will ache and itch in every family that lost a man there, in the Chechen war.

After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Central Government and Chechnya became especially tense. At the end of 1991, General Dzhokhar Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Expressing the will of the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), Dudayev dissolved the Supreme Council of Checheno-Ingushetia and announced the creation of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

In connection with the reorganization of the former Soviet Army, Dudayev managed to take control of a significant part of the property and weapons of the Soviet troops in Chechnya, including aviation. Russia declared the “Dudaev regime” illegal.

Soon, a struggle for spheres of influence began among the Chechens themselves, which, with the intervention of federal authorities and security forces, resulted in a kind of civil war in 1994. On December 11, 1994, the operation of federal troops to capture Grozny began. The assault on Grozny on New Year's Eve, which left hundreds of Russian troops dead, was a disaster.

The development and material support of the operation were extremely unsatisfactory. 20% of the military equipment of the federal troops in Chechnya was completely faulty, 40% was partially faulty. What came as a surprise to Russian politicians and military officers was that Dudayev had a well-trained army. But most importantly, Dudayev skillfully played on national feelings and portrayed Russia as the enemy of the Chechen people. He managed to win over the population of Chechnya to his side. Dudayev turned into a national hero. Most Chechens perceived the entry of federal troops as an invasion by an enemy army seeking to take away their freedom and independence.

As a result, the operation to restore the rule of law, preserve the integrity of Russia, and disarm the bandits turned into a protracted, bloody war for Russian society. In the Chechen issue, the Russian government did not show statesmanship, patience, diplomatic skill, or understanding of the historical, cultural and everyday traditions of the mountain peoples.

1. The Russian government sought to eliminate the “independence” of General Dudayev and wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia.

2. With the loss of Chechnya, Chechen oil was lost and the supply of oil from Baku to Novorossiysk was disrupted. Oil exports decreased.

3. The outbreak of the war was facilitated by criminal financial structures interested in this war for “money laundering”.

Thus, oil and money became the real cause of the war.

First Chechen War (December 1994 - June 1996) was not supported by Russian society, which considered it unnecessary, and its main culprit was the Kremlin government. Negative attitudes rose sharply after the major defeat of Russian troops on New Year's Eve from 1994 to 1995. In January 1995, only 23% of respondents supported the use of the army in Chechnya, with 55% against. Most considered this action unworthy of a great power. 43% were in favor of an immediate cessation of hostilities.

A year later, the protest against the war reached an extremely large level: at the beginning of 1996, 80-90% of Russians surveyed had a purely negative attitude towards it. For the first time in the history of Russia, a significant part of the media systematically took an anti-war position, showed the monstrous destruction, disasters and grief of the population of Chechnya, and criticized the authorities and law enforcement agencies. Many socio-political movements and parties openly opposed the war. The mood of society played a role in ending the war.

Realizing the futility of a military solution to the Chechen problem, the Russian government began to look for options for a political settlement of the contradictions. In March 1996, B. Yeltsin decided to create a working group to end hostilities and resolve the situation in Chechnya. In April 1996, the withdrawal of federal troops to the administrative borders of Chechnya began. It is believed that Dudayev died in April 1996.

Negotiations began between the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic A. Lebed(he was the secretary of the Security Council) and the head of the headquarters of the armed formations A. Maskhadov. On August 31, in Khasavyurt (Dagestan), Lebed and Maskhadov signed a joint statement “On the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya” and “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” An agreement was reached to hold presidential elections in Chechnya. The final decision on the issue of the political status of Chechnya was postponed for five years (until December 2001). In August, federal troops began to withdraw from Grozny, which was immediately captured by militants.

In January 1997, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov was elected President of the Chechen Republic- former chief of staff of the Chechen armed forces. He proclaimed a course for the national independence of Chechnya.

Russia lost the first Chechen war, suffering significant human losses and enormous material damage. The national economy of Chechnya was completely destroyed. The problem of refugees has arisen. Among those leaving were a lot of educated, qualified workers, including teachers.

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and A. Maskhadov coming to power, a real catastrophe began in Chechnya. For the second time in a short period of time, the Chechen Republic was handed over to criminal elements and extremists. The Constitution of the Russian Federation on the territory of Chechnya ceased to be in force, legal proceedings were eliminated and replaced by Sharia rule. The Russian population of Chechnya was subjected to discrimination and persecution. In the fall of 1996, the majority of the population of Chechnya lost hope for a better future and hundreds of thousands of Chechens left the republic along with the Russians.

After the end of the war in Chechnya, Russia was faced with the problem of terrorism in the North Caucasus. From the end of 1996 to 1999, criminal terror was accompanied by political terror in Chechnya. The Ichkerian parliament hastily adopted the so-called law, on the basis of which not only those who actually collaborated with federal authorities were persecuted, but also those who were suspected of sympathizing with Russia. All educational institutions found themselves under the strict control of self-appointed Sharia courts and all kinds of Islamic movements, which dictated not only the content of educational programs, but also determined personnel policies.

Under the banner of Islamization, the teaching of a number of disciplines was stopped both in schools and universities, but the basics of Islam, the basics of Sharia, etc. were introduced. Separate education for boys and girls was introduced in schools, and in high schools they were required to wear a burqa. The study of the Arabic language was introduced, and this was not provided with personnel, teaching aids and developed programs. The militants considered secular education to be harmful. There has been a noticeable degradation of an entire generation. Most Chechen children did not study during the war years. Uneducated youth can only join criminal groups. Illiterate people are always easy to manipulate by playing on their national and religious feelings.

Chechen gangs pursued a policy of intimidation of the Russian authorities: taking hostages, bombing houses in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buinaksk, and attacks on Dagestan. As a response, the Russian government led by V.V. Putin decided to use force in the fight against terrorists.

The Second Chechen War began in September 1999.

She appeared completely different in all major indicators:

By nature and method of conduct;

In relation to it, the population, citizens of the Russian Federation, including the civilian population of Chechnya itself;

In relation to citizens towards the army;

By the number of victims on both sides, including the civilian population;

Media behavior, etc.

The war was caused by the need to ensure security and tranquility in the Caucasus.

60% of the Russian population was for the war. It was a war in the name of protecting the integrity of the country. The Second Chechen War caused a mixed reaction in the world. Public opinion in Western countries regarding the second Chechen war was at odds with all-Russian opinion. It is typical for Westerners to perceive the events in Chechnya as Russia’s suppression of an uprising of a small people, and not as the destruction of terrorists. It was widely believed that Russia was guilty of human rights violations and that there was “ethnic cleansing” in Chechnya.

At the same time, the Western media hid the criminal actions of Chechen extremists, kidnapping and trafficking in people, the cultivation of slavery, medieval morals and laws. The Russian government made it clear to world public opinion that the actions of the federal troops are aimed, first of all, at carrying out a counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. When entering the second Chechen war, Russia also took into account the fact that Turkey, the United States and NATO are pursuing their own interests in this region.

The group of federal forces in Chechnya numbered 90 thousand people, of which about 70 thousand were in military service, the rest served under contract. According to press reports, the number of militants was 20-25 thousand, the basis of which was 10-15 thousand professional mercenaries. A. Maskhadov was on their side.

By March 2000, the active phase of the Chechen war was over. But now the militants were actively carrying out terrorist attacks and sabotage on the territory of Chechnya, and launched partisan actions. Federal forces began to pay special attention to intelligence. Cooperation between the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established.

By mid-2000, federal troops defeated most of the organized combat forces of the separatists and took control of almost all the cities and villages of Chechnya. Then the bulk of the military units were withdrawn from the territory of the republic, and power there passed from the military commandant’s offices to the Chechen Administration created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation and its local bodies. They were led by Chechens. A huge work has begun to revive the economy and culture of the republic from the ruins and ashes.

However, this creative work began to be hampered by the remnants of militant gangs who had taken refuge in the inaccessible mountainous areas of Chechnya. They adopted the tactics of sabotage and terrorism, systematically organizing explosions on roads from around the corner, killing employees of the Chechen Administration and Russian military personnel. Only in the first half of 2001. More than 230 terrorist attacks were carried out, resulting in the death of hundreds of people.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian leadership continued its policy of establishing peaceful life on Chechen soil. The task was set to solve the problem of restoring socio-economic life and constitutional authorities in Chechnya in the shortest possible time. And in general, this task is being successfully accomplished.