When did the 2nd Chechen company begin? Chechen war (briefly). Attack on Dagestan

After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Central Government and Chechnya became especially tense. At the end of 1991, General Dzhokhar Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Expressing the will of the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), Dudayev dissolved the Supreme Council of Checheno-Ingushetia and announced the creation of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

In connection with the reorganization of the former Soviet Army, Dudayev managed to take control of a significant part of the property and weapons of the Soviet troops in Chechnya, including aviation. Russia declared the “Dudaev regime” illegal.

Soon, a struggle for spheres of influence began among the Chechens themselves, which, with the intervention of federal authorities and security forces, resulted in a kind of civil war in 1994. On December 11, 1994, the operation of federal troops to capture Grozny began. The assault on Grozny on New Year's Eve, which killed hundreds of Russian troops, was a disaster.

The development and material support of the operation were extremely unsatisfactory. 20% of the military equipment of the federal troops in Chechnya was completely faulty, 40% was partially faulty. What came as a surprise to Russian politicians and military officers was that Dudayev had a well-trained army. But most importantly, Dudayev skillfully played on national feelings and portrayed Russia as the enemy of the Chechen people. He managed to win over the population of Chechnya to his side. Dudayev turned into a national hero. Most Chechens perceived the entry of federal troops as an invasion by an enemy army seeking to take away their freedom and independence.

As a result, the operation to restore the rule of law, preserve the integrity of Russia, and disarm the bandits turned into a protracted, bloody war for Russian society. In the Chechen issue, the Russian government did not show statesmanship, patience, diplomatic skill, or understanding of the historical, cultural and everyday traditions of the mountain peoples.

1. The Russian government sought to eliminate the “independence” of General Dudayev and wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia.

2. With the loss of Chechnya, Chechen oil was lost and the supply of oil from Baku to Novorossiysk was disrupted. Oil exports decreased.

3. The outbreak of the war was facilitated by criminal financial structures interested in this war for “money laundering.”

Thus, oil and money became the real cause of the war.

First Chechen War (December 1994 - June 1996) was not supported by Russian society, which considered it unnecessary, and its main culprit was the Kremlin government. Negative attitudes rose sharply after the major defeat of Russian troops on New Year's Eve from 1994 to 1995. In January 1995, only 23% of respondents supported the use of the army in Chechnya, with 55% against. Most considered this action unworthy of a great power. 43% were in favor of an immediate cessation of hostilities.

A year later, the protest against the war reached an extremely large level: at the beginning of 1996, 80-90% of Russians surveyed had a purely negative attitude towards it. For the first time in the history of Russia, a significant part of the media systematically took an anti-war position, showed the monstrous destruction, disasters and grief of the population of Chechnya, and criticized the authorities and law enforcement agencies. Many socio-political movements and parties openly opposed the war. The mood of society played a role in ending the war.

Realizing the futility of a military solution to the Chechen problem, the Russian government began to look for options for a political settlement of the contradictions. In March 1996, B. Yeltsin decided to create a working group to end hostilities and resolve the situation in Chechnya. In April 1996, the withdrawal of federal troops to the administrative borders of Chechnya began. It is believed that Dudayev died in April 1996.

Negotiations began between the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic A. Lebed(he was the secretary of the Security Council) and the head of the headquarters of the armed formations A. Maskhadov. On August 31, in Khasavyurt (Dagestan), Lebed and Maskhadov signed a joint statement “On the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya” and “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” An agreement was reached to hold presidential elections in Chechnya. The final decision on the issue of the political status of Chechnya was postponed for five years (until December 2001). In August, federal troops began to withdraw from Grozny, which was immediately captured by militants.

In January 1997, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov was elected President of the Chechen Republic- former chief of staff of the Chechen armed forces. He proclaimed a course for the national independence of Chechnya.

Russia lost the first Chechen war, suffering significant human losses and enormous material damage. The national economy of Chechnya was completely destroyed. The problem of refugees has arisen. Among those leaving were a lot of educated, qualified workers, including teachers.

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and A. Maskhadov coming to power, a real catastrophe began in Chechnya. For the second time in a short period of time, the Chechen Republic was handed over to criminal elements and extremists. The Constitution of the Russian Federation on the territory of Chechnya ceased to be in force, legal proceedings were eliminated and replaced by Sharia rule. The Russian population of Chechnya was subjected to discrimination and persecution. In the fall of 1996, the majority of the population of Chechnya lost hope for a better future and hundreds of thousands of Chechens left the republic along with the Russians.

After the end of the war in Chechnya, Russia was faced with the problem of terrorism in the North Caucasus. From the end of 1996 to 1999, criminal terror was accompanied by political terror in Chechnya. The Ichkerian parliament hastily adopted the so-called law, on the basis of which not only those who actually collaborated with federal authorities were persecuted, but also those who were suspected of sympathizing with Russia. All educational institutions found themselves under the strict control of self-appointed Sharia courts and all kinds of Islamic movements, which dictated not only the content of educational programs, but also determined personnel policies.

Under the banner of Islamization, the teaching of a number of disciplines was stopped both in schools and universities, but the basics of Islam, the basics of Sharia, etc. were introduced. Separate education for boys and girls was introduced in schools, and in high schools they were required to wear a burqa. The study of the Arabic language was introduced, and this was not provided with personnel, teaching aids and developed programs. The militants considered secular education to be harmful. There has been a noticeable degradation of an entire generation. Most Chechen children did not study during the war years. Uneducated youth can only join criminal groups. Illiterate people are always easy to manipulate by playing on their national and religious feelings.

Chechen gangs pursued a policy of intimidation of the Russian authorities: taking hostages, bombing houses in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buinaksk, and attacks on Dagestan. As a response, the Russian government led by V.V. Putin decided to use force in the fight against terrorists.

The Second Chechen War began in September 1999.

She appeared completely different in all major indicators:

By nature and method of conduct;

In relation to it, the population, citizens of the Russian Federation, including the civilian population of Chechnya itself;

In relation to citizens towards the army;

By the number of victims on both sides, including the civilian population;

Media behavior, etc.

The war was caused by the need to ensure security and tranquility in the Caucasus.

60% of the Russian population was for the war. It was a war in the name of protecting the integrity of the country. The Second Chechen War caused a mixed reaction in the world. Public opinion in Western countries regarding the second Chechen war was at odds with all-Russian opinion. It is typical for Westerners to perceive the events in Chechnya as Russia’s suppression of an uprising of a small people, and not as the destruction of terrorists. It was widely believed that Russia was guilty of human rights violations and that there was “ethnic cleansing” in Chechnya.

At the same time, the Western media hid the criminal actions of Chechen extremists, kidnapping and trafficking in people, the cultivation of slavery, medieval morals and laws. The Russian government made it clear to world public opinion that the actions of the federal troops are aimed, first of all, at carrying out a counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. When entering the second Chechen war, Russia also took into account the fact that Turkey, the United States and NATO are pursuing their own interests in this region.

The group of federal forces in Chechnya numbered 90 thousand people, of which about 70 thousand were in military service, the rest served under contract. According to press reports, the number of militants was 20-25 thousand, the basis of which was 10-15 thousand professional mercenaries. A. Maskhadov was on their side.

By March 2000, the active phase of the Chechen war was over. But now the militants were actively carrying out terrorist attacks and sabotage on the territory of Chechnya, and launched partisan actions. Federal forces began to pay special attention to intelligence. Cooperation between the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established.

By mid-2000, federal troops defeated most of the organized combat forces of the separatists and took control of almost all the cities and villages of Chechnya. Then the bulk of the military units were withdrawn from the territory of the republic, and power there passed from the military commandant’s offices to the Chechen Administration created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation and its local bodies. They were led by Chechens. A huge work has begun to revive the economy and culture of the republic from the ruins and ashes.

However, this creative work began to be hampered by the remnants of militant gangs who had taken refuge in the inaccessible mountainous areas of Chechnya. They adopted the tactics of sabotage and terrorism, systematically organizing explosions on roads from around the corner, killing employees of the Chechen Administration and Russian military personnel. Only in the first half of 2001. More than 230 terrorist attacks were carried out, resulting in the death of hundreds of people.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian leadership continued its policy of establishing peaceful life on Chechen soil. The task was set to solve the problem of restoring socio-economic life and constitutional authorities in Chechnya in the shortest possible time. And in general, this task is being successfully accomplished.

BACKGROUND The Chechen war, in short, became the most terrible and cruel event for Russia after the collapse of the USSR. Opinions about her are still ambiguous. Some historians and analysts support the authorities’ decision to send in troops, while others say that this difficult conflict could have been prevented and terrible losses could have been avoided. Be that as it may, when talking about the Chechen war, first of all you need to find out the reasons for its outbreak. It should be remembered that this war is divided into two stages. First Chechen War. Second Chechen War.

Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, in September 1991, an armed coup took place in the republic, led by Dzhokhar Dudayev. As a result, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria arose, which immediately declared its independence from the RSFSR. This event occurred on November 1, 1991. Dudayev introduced martial law in the country and refused to negotiate with the Kremlin until the independence of Ichkeria was officially recognized by him. The forces of the republic also captured military bases of Russian troops on its territory.

FIRST CHECHEN WAR () Date - December 11, 1994 - August 31, 1996 Place - Chechnya Result - Khasavyurt agreements Opponents - UNO-UNSO volunteers (Chechen separatists), Arab separatists

PROGRESS OF THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR Deployment of troops (December 1994) Storming of Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995) Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March-April 1995) Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995) Terrorist attack in Budennovsk ( June 1995) Terrorist attack in Kizlyar (January 9–18, 1996) Militant attack on Grozny (March 6–8, 1996) Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996) Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996) Negotiations with separatists (May - July 1996) Operation Jihad (August 6 - 22, 1996) Khasavyurt Agreement (August 31, 1996)

PROGRESS OF THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR In September 1991, “The United Committee of the Chechen People, headed by Dudayev, seized power in Chechnya, announcing the creation of the Republic of Ichkeria. He formed his own army and began to pursue an anti-federal policy. In November 1994, Yeltsin issued an order to suppress the armed rebellion in Chechnya. The war has begun. The Russian command underestimated the enemy. In winter there were bloody battles for Grozny. In the summer of 1995, Prime Minister V.S. Chernomyrdin entered into negotiations with terrorists, and as a result, the bandits left the city and went to Chechnya. At the end of 1995, hostilities intensified throughout the republic. The war became protracted. Moscow has finally realized that it is impossible to solve the problem of Chechnya through military confrontation. On August 31, 1996, a peace treaty was signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first war. The first president of Chechnya, A. Maskhadov, was elected. Chechnya became de facto independent. Both in the center and in Chechnya they understood that the signed agreement did not resolve the conflict.

LOSSES IN THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR Russia lost: people killed missing/deserted/captured people wounded Chechnya lost: people killed thousands killed civilians Almost the entire non-Chechen population left the Chechen Republic.

Russia 1999 15 military operations 2000 4 major military operations 2001 2 major military operations 2002 1 military operation 2003 no major military operations 2004 2 military operations 2005 4 military operations 2006 7 military operations 2007 3 military operations 2008 2 military operations Chechnya 1999 7 terrorist attacks 2000 - 4 terrorist attacks 2001 - 1 terrorist attack 2002 - 6 terrorist attacks 2003 - 6 terrorist attacks 2004 - 9 terrorist attacks 2005 - 1 terrorist attack 2006 - 2 terrorist attacks 2007 - 1 terrorist attack 2008 – 2 terrorist attacks PROGRESS OF THE SECOND CHECHEN WAR

In 1999, Chechen militants attacked Dagestan. Russia unilaterally terminated the 1996 peace treaty. During this time, the Chechen leadership established connections with international terrorist networks, formed special troops, organized the supply of weapons and the flow of funds. The goal is to capture the North Caucasus. The Russian leadership turned out to be powerless. In fact, Chechnya fell out of the Russian Federation. None of the center's peace initiatives had any effect. On September 23, Yeltsin signed a decree on the start of hostilities in Chechnya, and on October 18, federal troops surrounded Grozny. Civilians fled the city. In February 2000, Grozny was captured, but fighting continued until 2003. In March 2003, the Constitution of Chechnya was adopted, and A. Kadyrov was elected president. Gradually, economic life improved, but the political situation still remained difficult: terrorist attacks continued.
THE UNFINISHED WAR After the end of the first Chechen campaign, the fate of more than 1,200 Russian military personnel remained unknown. Some of them were captured by Chechen militants, some lay in foreign soil, and the bodies of more than 500 soldiers were kept in the refrigerators of the 124th forensic laboratory in Rostov until the identification procedure. Thus, politicians and generals actually lost an entire regiment in Chechnya (and this is not counting more than 4 thousand soldiers and officers officially declared dead). At one time, Novaya Gazeta launched a campaign to search for missing people and release prisoners and hostages. This action was called "Forgotten Regiment". As a result, with the help of journalists and readers of the newspaper, it was possible to free more than 150 captured military personnel and hostages from captivity in Chechnya, and to help mothers find and identify the remains of many dead children. In August 1999, after the attack of the Basayev and Khattab gangs on Dagestan, the second Chechen campaign began. And again the problem of prisoners, hostages, and missing persons arose. The authorities, as always, turned out to be unprepared to fully solve these problems.

The first Chechen war (1994-1996): briefly about the main events

25 years ago, on December 11, 1994, the First Chechen War began. In the information, the Caucasian Knot briefly recalls the main milestones of this bloody and destructive conflict.

On May 27-28, 1996, at negotiations in Moscow, the parties managed to agree on a ceasefire. On May 28, while the Ichkerian delegation was still in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin made a blitz visit to Chechnya, where he congratulated Russian military personnel on their victory in the war. However, after Yeltsin was re-elected president (July 3), the new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities in Chechnya.

On August 6, 1996, separatist forces under the command of the Chief of the General Staff of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov captured Grozny, Gudermes and Argun (Operation Jihad). On August 20, General Pulikovsky presented an ultimatum to the Chechen side, demanding that they leave the capital of the republic within 48 hours and lay down their arms, promising otherwise to strike the city. The shelling, however, began on the night of August 20. By August 22, Alexander Lebed managed to achieve a ceasefire and separation of the warring parties in Grozny.

Historians have an unspoken rule that at least 15-20 years must pass before giving a reliable assessment of certain events. However, in the case of the First Chechen War, everything is completely different and the more time passes from the beginning of those events, the less they try to remember them. It seems that someone is deliberately trying to make people forget about these bloodiest and most tragic pages in the newest Russian history. But society has every right to know the names of the people who started this conflict, in which about three thousand Russian soldiers and officers died and which actually marked the beginning of a whole wave of terror in the country and the Second Chechen War.

The events leading to the First Chechen War must be divided into two stages. The first is the period from 90 to 91, when there was still a real opportunity to overthrow the Dudayev regime bloodlessly and the second stage from the beginning of 92, when the time to normalize the situation in the republic had already been lost, and the question of a military solution to the problem became only a matter of time.

Stage one. How it all began.

The first impetus for the start of events can be considered Gorbachev’s promise to give all autonomous republics the status of union and Yeltsin’s subsequent phrase - “Take as much independence as you can carry.” Desperately fighting for power in the country, they wanted to gain support from the residents of these republics in this way and probably did not even imagine what their words would lead to.

Just a few months after Yeltsin’s statement, in November 1990, the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, headed by Doku Zavgaev, adopted a declaration on the state sovereignty of Checheno-Ingushetia. Even though in essence it was only a formal document adopted with an eye to gaining greater autonomy and powers, the first signal had already been given. At the same time, the hitherto little-known figure of Dzhokhar Dudayev appeared in Chechnya. The only Chechen general in the Soviet Army, who was never a Muslim and had state awards for military operations in Afghanistan, began to quickly gain popularity. Perhaps even too quickly. In Chechnya, for example, many are still convinced that behind Dudayev there were serious people sitting in Moscow offices.

Perhaps these same people helped Dudayev to overthrow the Supreme Council with its chairman Doku Zavgaev on September 6, 1991. After the dissolution of the Supreme Council, power as such no longer existed in Chechnya. The warehouse of the KGB of the republic, in which there were riflemen for an entire regiment, was looted, and all the criminals who were there were released from prisons and pre-trial detention centers. However, all this did not prevent the presidential elections to be held on October 26 of the same year, which, as expected, Dudayev himself won, and a declaration on the sovereignty of Chechnya to be adopted on November 1st. It was no longer a bell, but a real ringing of a bell, but the country seemed not to notice what was happening.

The only person who tried to do something was Rutskoy, it was he who tried to declare a State of Emergency in the republic, but no one supported him. During these days, Yeltsin was at his country residence and did not show any attention to Chechnya, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR never accepted the document on the emergency. This was largely due to the aggressive behavior of Rutskoi himself, who literally stated the following during the discussion of the document: “these black-assed people must be crushed.” This phrase of his almost ended in a fight in the Council building and, naturally, there could no longer be any talk of adopting a state of emergency.

True, despite the fact that the document was never adopted, several planes with internal troops, totaling about 300 people, still landed in Khankala (a suburb of Grozny). Naturally, 300 people had no chance of completing the task and overthrowing Dudayev and, on the contrary, they themselves became hostages. For more than a day, the fighters were actually surrounded and were eventually taken out of Chechnya on buses. A couple of days later, Dudayev was inaugurated as president, and his authority and power in the republic became limitless.

Stage two. War becomes inevitable.

After Dudayev officially assumed the post of President of Chechnya, the situation in the republic was heating up every day. Every second resident of Grozny walked freely with weapons in his hands, and Dudayev openly declared that all weapons and equipment located on the territory of Chechnya belonged to him. And there were a lot of weapons in Chechnya. The 173rd Grozny training center alone contained weapons for 4-5 motorized rifle divisions, including: 32 tanks, 32 infantry fighting vehicles, 14 armored personnel carriers, 158 anti-tank installations.

In January 1992, there was practically not a single soldier left in the training center, and this entire mass of weapons was guarded only by the officers who remained in the military camp. Despite this, the federal center did not pay any attention to this, preferring to continue to share power in the country, and only in May 1993, Defense Minister Grachev arrived in Grozny for negotiations with Dudayev. As a result of negotiations, it was decided to divide all weapons available in Chechnya 50/50, and already in June the last Russian officer left the republic. Why it was necessary to sign this document and leave such a mass of weapons in Chechnya still remains unclear, because in 1993 it was already obvious that the problem could not be solved peacefully.
At the same time, due to Dudayev’s extremely nationalistic policies in Chechnya, there is a mass exodus of the Russian population from the republic. According to the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Kulikov, up to 9 Russian families per hour crossed the border every day.

But the anarchy that was happening in the republic affected not only the Russian residents in the republic itself, but also the residents of other regions. So, Chechnya was the main producer and supplier of heroin to Russia, also, about 6 billion dollars were seized through the Central Bank as a result of the famous story with fake Advice notes and, most importantly, they made money from this not only in Chechnya itself, they received financial benefits from it in Moscow. How else can one explain that in 92-93, famous Russian politicians and businessmen arrived in Grozny almost every month? According to the recollections of the former mayor of Grozny, Bislan Gantamirov, before each such visit of “distinguished guests,” Dudayev personally gave instructions on the purchase of expensive jewelry, explaining that this is how we solve our problems with Moscow.

It was no longer possible to turn a blind eye to this, and Yeltsin instructs the head of the Moscow Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), Savostyanov, to carry out an operation to overthrow Dudayev using the forces of the Chechen opposition. Savostyanov placed his bets on the head of the Nadterechny district of Chechnya, Umar Avturkhanov, and money and weapons began to be sent to the republic. On October 15, 1994, the first assault on Grozny by opposition forces began, but when less than 400 meters remained to Dudayev’s palace, someone from Moscow contacted Avturkhanov and ordered him to leave the city. According to information from the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Ruslan Khasbulatov, this “someone” was none other than the organizer of the assault on Savostyanov.
The next assault attempt by opposition forces was carried out on November 26, 1994, but it also failed miserably. After this assault, Defense Minister Grachev will in every possible way disown the Russian tank crews who were captured and declare that the Russian Army would have taken Grozny within an hour with the forces of one airborne regiment.

Apparently, even in the Kremlin itself they did not really believe in the success of this operation, because a couple of weeks before this assault, a secret meeting of the Security Council had already taken place in Moscow, entirely devoted to the Chechen problem. At this meeting, Minister of Regional Development Nikolai Egorov and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev made two polar reports. Egorov stated that the situation for sending troops into Chechnya is extremely favorable and 70 percent of the republic’s population will undoubtedly support this decision and only 30 will be neutral or will resist. Grachev, on the contrary, emphasized in his report that the introduction of troops would not lead to anything good, and we would meet fierce resistance and proposed postponing the introduction to the spring, so that there would be time to prepare the troops and draw up a detailed plan for the operation. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in response to this, openly called Grachev a coward and stated that such statements were not acceptable for the Minister of Defense. Yeltsin announced a break and, together with Rybkin, Shumeiko, Lobov and several other unknown members of the government, held a closed meeting. Its result was Yeltsin’s demand to prepare an operation plan for the deployment of troops within two weeks. Grachev could not refuse the president.

On November 29, the second meeting of the Security Council was held in the Kremlin, at which Grachev presented his plan, and the decision to send troops was finally made. Why the decision was made in such a hurry is not known for certain. According to one version, Yeltsin personally wanted to solve the problem of Chechnya before the new year and thus raise his extremely low rating. According to another, a member of the international committee of the State Duma, Andrei Kozyrev, had information that if the Russian Federation solves the problem of Chechnya in the near future and in a short period of time, this will not cause any particular negative reaction from the US administration.

One way or another, the deployment of troops took place in extreme haste, which led to the fact that five generals, to whom Grachev proposed to lead the operation, refused this and only in mid-December did Anatoly Kvashnin agree to this. There were less than two weeks left before the New Year's assault on Grozny...

The first Chechen war of 1994-1996: briefly about the causes, events and results. The Chechen wars claimed many lives.

But what initially caused the conflict? What happened in those years in the troubled southern regions?

Causes of the Chechen conflict

After the collapse of the USSR, General Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Large reserves of weapons and property of the Soviet state ended up in his hands.

The general's main goal was the creation of an independent republic of Ichkeria. The means used to achieve this goal were not entirely loyal.

The regime established by Dudayev was declared illegal by the federal authorities. Therefore, they considered it their duty to intervene. The struggle for spheres of influence became the main cause of the conflict.

Other reasons stemming from the main one:

• Chechnya's desire to secede from Russia;
• Dudayev's desire to create a separate Islamic state;
• Chechen dissatisfaction with the invasion of Russian troops;
• The source of income for the new government was the slave trade, trade in drugs and oil from the Russian pipeline passing through Chechnya.

The government sought to regain power over the Caucasus and restore lost control.

Chronicle of the first Chechen war

The first Chechen campaign began on December 11, 1994. It lasted almost 2 years.

It was a confrontation between federal troops and the forces of an unrecognized state.

1. December 11, 1994 - entry of Russian troops. The Russian army advanced from 3 sides. The very next day, one of the groups approached settlements located near Grozny.
2. December 31, 1994 – storming of Grozny. The fighting began a few hours before the New Year. But at first luck was not on the side of the Russians. The first assault failed. There were many reasons: poor preparedness of the Russian army, uncoordinated actions, lack of coordination, the presence of old maps and photographs of the city. But attempts to take the city continued. Grozny came under full Russian control only on March 6.
3. Events from April 1995 to 1996 After the capture of Grozny, it was gradually possible to establish control over most of the lowland territories. In mid-June 1995, a decision was made to postpone hostilities. However, it was violated many times. At the end of 1995, elections were held in Chechnya, which were won by a protege from Moscow. In 1996, the Chechens attempted to attack Grozny. All attacks were repelled.
4. April 21, 1996 – death of the separatist leader Dudayev.
5. On June 1, 1996, a truce was declared. According to the conditions, there should have been an exchange of prisoners, the disarmament of militants and the withdrawal of Russian troops. But no one wanted to give in, and fighting began again.
6. August 1996 – Chechen operation “Jihad”, during which the Chechens took Grozny and other significant cities. The Russian authorities decide to conclude a truce and withdraw troops. The first Chechen war ended on August 31, 1996.

Consequences of the first Chechen campaign

Brief results of the war:

1. Following the results of the first Chechen war, Chechnya remained independent, but no one still recognized it as a separate state.
2. Many cities and settlements were destroyed.
3. Earning income through criminal means has begun to occupy a significant place.
4. Almost the entire civilian population fled their homes.

There was also a rise in Wahhabism.

Table “Losses in the Chechen War”

It is impossible to name the exact number of losses in the first Chechen war. Opinions, assumptions and calculations vary.

The approximate losses of the parties look like this:

In the “Federal Forces” column, the first figure is the calculations immediately after the war, the second is the data contained in the book on the wars of the 20th century, published in 2001.

Heroes of Russia in the Chechen war

According to official data, 175 soldiers who fought in Chechnya received the title of Hero of Russia.

Most military personnel who took part in hostilities received their rank posthumously.

The most famous heroes of the first Russian-Chechen war and their exploits:

1. Victor Ponomarev. During the battles in Grozny, he covered the sergeant with himself, which saved his life.
2. Igor Akhpashev. In Grozny, he neutralized the main firing points of Chechen thugs with a tank. After which he was surrounded. The militants blew up the tank, but Akhpashev fought in the burning car until the last. Then detonation occurred and the hero died.
3. Andrey Dneprovsky. In the spring of 1995, Dneprovsky’s unit defeated the Chechen militants who were at the height of the fortification. Andrei Dneprovsky was the only one killed in the ensuing battle. All the other soldiers of this unit survived all the horrors of the war and returned home.

Federal troops did not achieve the goals set in the first war. This became one of the reasons for the second Chechen war.

Combat veterans believe that the first war could have been avoided. Opinions differ about which side started the war. Is it true that there was a possibility of a peaceful resolution of the situation? Here the assumptions are also different.