War in Chechnya ambushes. "set-ups" of special forces in the Chechen mountains. Detection of positions of the ChRI detachment

This was one of the first major clashes in . Was it a war or the establishment of constitutional order?

Of course, war. If you look at the composition of the groups on both sides of the conflict, it becomes obvious that there were no spontaneously formed militias and peaceful shepherds who came down from the mountains to protect the self-named Ichkeria. Of course, there may have been a number of them, but the backbone of Dudayev’s army was clearly not something that arose spontaneously and was militia.

Start

On December 12, 1994, a column of the combined parachute regiment of the 106th Airborne Division and the 56th Airborne Assault Brigade was fired upon from the BM-21 Grad MLRS. During the shelling, 6 people were immediately killed, another died later on December 29, 1994 in the hospital named after. Burdenko, 13 people were injured of varying severity.

Surprisingly, the very next day an article about the events of December 12, 1994 was published not just anywhere, but in the English edition of The Guardian. The article is still preserved and is available at . What follows from the article:

Firstly, the data was provided by the famous Ukrainian nationalist journalist Taras Protsyuk (this is the one who died from wounds in 2003, when American tank crews fired at the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad).

Secondly, judging by Protsyuk’s information, the BM-21 installations were located next to the oil depot (a number of eyewitnesses, by the way, claimed that there was a ban on shelling this facility).

Thirdly, the turntables appeared later and worked. Photographer Georgy Tambulov saw how the Chechens tried to shoot down the helicopters, but to no avail.

Fourthly, the same photographer spoke about 2 Chechen T-72s firing machine guns, as well as a pair of Su-25s covering Chechen positions.

What did the battle look like through the eyes of eyewitnesses?

Column composition:

Tank of the 141st separate tank battalion of the 19th MSD
Combined parachute battalion 137 RDP
Combined parachute battalion 51 RDP
Self-propelled artillery division of the 1142nd artillery regiment
Anti-tank artillery battery of the 1142nd artillery regiment
Anti-aircraft missile battery of the 56th separate airborne brigade
Combined parachute battalion of the 56th separate airborne brigade

The leadership of the Chechen forces was carried out by a former police captain, who received the rank of division general in the ChRI. At that moment he was appointed commander of the Northwestern Front of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria.

On December 11, as the column of federal forces approached the village of Dolinsky, it was accompanied by several of Arsanov’s fighters, who were collecting information about the forces of the column and its route.

In particular, one of the militants in his own Zhiguli drove through all the checkpoints under the guise of a local resident, collected the necessary information and calmly returned to Arsanov. Arsanov turns to him to assign him BM-21 "Grad" installations and strike the moving column. On the night of December 11-12, militant units, on the orders of Arsanov, occupied a commanding height near the village. Everything was ready for the ambush.

Until December 20, 1994, the Commander of the United States Military Forces in the Chechen Republic (as well as the Commander of the North Caucasus Military District) was Colonel General Alexey Nikolaevich Mityukhin.

A few characteristics about Mityukhin:

Lieutenant General Lev Yakovlevich Rokhlin:

“Take, for example, the district commander, General Mityukhin. This is a strong leader who knew how to get his orders carried out. He did a lot for the improvement of the district. And for a period of peace he was a good commander. But at the same time, he was a product of the era. He had no experience leading troops in war. He was easily doubted when it came to solving direct problems of the army. As a witness to its collapse, the flight (there is no other word for it) from Germany and other countries of Eastern Europe, he was not ready for decisive action. Having experienced all the tyranny of politicians, he saw no opportunity to resist it. He was taught to think only about how not to set himself up..."

Head of Airborne Intelligence, Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh:

“The commander of the group of troops, Mityukhin, I’ll call him again, did not give any instructions or orders at all at that time. The only thing he was honored to say to the commanders of the units that were to enter Chechnya tomorrow was: “There is no need to steal straw from the fields from the Chechens. I, I have some money, I’ll give it to you as a last resort, pay.” I swear it really happened."

Detection of positions of the ChRI detachment

On December 12, shortly before the strike, reconnaissance discovered Chechen BM-21 Grad installations, but the command was unable to take advantage of the intelligence.

Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh - head of airborne intelligence in 1990-1997:

At that time, the North Caucasian Military District and the United Group of Forces were commanded by Colonel General Mityukhin. The northern group under the command of the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Alexei Alekseevich Sigutkin, approached Dolinskoye, a village on the northwestern outskirts of the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny. Sigutkin did not lead the group along the roads, but walked along the Tersky Range, bypassing all posts and ambushes. Therefore, he was the first to approach Grozny from the northern direction.

The convoy was accompanied by a pair of MI-24 helicopters, which conducted aerial reconnaissance and, if necessary, could carry out strikes with NURS. The helicopter flights were controlled by the commander of aviation of the North Caucasus Military District, General Ivannikov, who was in Mozdok at the Central Bureau of Aviation of the North Caucasus Military District. In addition to the crews, the helicopters included reconnaissance officers from the 45th Airborne Special Forces Regiment. The head of the operational intelligence department of the regiment, Major V.L., maintained radio contact with them. Ersak.

Under those conditions, this was a very effective method of reconnaissance. After all, pilots are mainly involved in controlling the helicopter and its weapons. And scouts are aimed specifically at observing the terrain and the enemy on the ground. Naturally, they see further and understand more about ground tactics. On the outskirts of Dolinskoye, it was our scouts who discovered an enemy detachment, a couple of tanks and a BM-21 Grad launcher, which were hidden behind buildings.

Pilots and reconnaissance officers, each through their own channels, report to the group’s command about the enemy, including the BM-21 installation and tanks, and indicate their location. General Alexey Sigutkin immediately deploys the column into battle formation and gives the command to the helicopters to engage the identified targets. But helicopter pilots have their own direct superior!.. The flight commander reports to General Ivannikov and asks him for permission to strike to kill. Ivannikov replies: “Wait, I’ll ask the Chief.” Ivannikov’s chief was General Mityukhin.

Literally a minute later, Ivannikov conveys Mityukhin’s order to the pilots, prohibiting them from striking identified targets, citing the presence of an oil pipeline in that place as the reason for this decision. Sigutkin gives the command to his scouts and artillerymen to conduct additional reconnaissance and suppress targets. But the rugged terrain and distance did not allow us to immediately see the enemy directly and immediately give target designation to fire weapons.

At this time, helicopters, which according to the plan should be changed every two hours, are replaced. While the other pair has not yet taken their place in the battle formation, one enemy tank comes out from behind cover and stands on the opposite slope of the ridge from Sigutkin, showing the crew of the BM-21 “Grad” installation the direction of fire. After all, the Chechen tank crews see our battle formations from the tower, but the tank itself remains hidden from observation over the crest of the hill, and our observers do not see it! The crew of the installation can only turn in the direction that the tank sets with its position, and set the range to our troops on sight. After this, the installation fires a salvo of all forty 122 mm missiles each...

If the column had not turned into a chain in time, the losses could have been very large. Grad missiles always land in a highly elongated ellipse. If you cover the column lengthwise with such an ellipse, then every third projectile can find a target.

This salvo caused a direct hit by a rocket shell on the Ural vehicle and the artillery fire control vehicle. It contained Colonel Frolov, the chief of artillery of the 106th Airborne Division, the crew of the vehicle itself, and a senior officer from the headquarters of the airborne troops, Colonel Alekseenko. So six people died at the same time. These were the very first combat losses suffered by the Joint Group of Forces in Chechnya.

At the CBU, Mityukhin’s general team immediately tried to blame the paratroopers of General Alexei Sigutkin for everything. He allegedly did not conduct reconnaissance, hesitated, did not control the troops... But all reports, negotiations and commands in the helicopter radio network were recorded on tape by Major Ersak.

They clearly stated that the installation was discovered on time and could have been destroyed on the spot at the command of General A. Sigutkin, if Mityukhin’s direct order had not followed, prohibiting helicopter pilots from opening fire to kill. I was forced to present these records and show the true culprit in the death of our soldiers and officers (soon Mityukhin was replaced as commander of the group by General Anatoly Kvashnin, the future chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces).

However, our “disappointments” with everything that happened that day were not over yet. A few hours later, the evening news of the NTV television company broadcasts a report from Chechnya, made by a correspondent of this television company. There, the operator, accompanied by a commentator’s voice choking with delight, shows how this most ill-fated BM-21 “Grad” installation comes out of cover into a firing position and launches rockets at our group. The crew of the installation left the position, standing on the step of a car driving past the camera lens. I still remember the excited and joyful Chechens, filmed in close-up, shouting: “Allahu Akbar!”

About two weeks later I found myself on that hillock, and from the landscape familiar from the TV program I realized that I was in the very place where the NTV cameraman was.

By the way, three days later, scouts from the 45th Airborne Special Forces Regiment found this BM-21 Grad installation. She was hiding in a hangar, so it was impossible to detect her from the air. But we knew that it was located in the Staropromyslovsky district. And this area is one long, long street, or rather a highway. On both sides of it there are mainly production and warehouse premises.

The scouts under the command of Colonel Boris Aleksandrovich Kozyulin, using one old portable radio direction finder (the second one was broken, and there was no one to repair it), took a bearing on the radio station used by the crew of this installation. Then they drew it on the map and determined its location at the intersection of the bearing with the highway. There was just a hangar there. They attacked it with artillery and aircraft. Everything was demolished - along with the crew...

From the description of the battle: “Having stopped 8 kilometers from Dolinskoye to decide on further actions, we suddenly saw through binoculars something similar to the installation of a multiple launch rocket system. “The Chechens are loading the Grad,” the helicopter’s crew confirmed their fears.

“The column usually walked across the highlands along a wet clay road. Suddenly we heard very loud explosions, it was nearby. The command “to fight” was not long in coming, but after leaving the transport we saw nothing. There were about 50 meters left to the top of the hill. And then we noticed fast-flying lights on the horizon - it was the next salvo, about 4 rockets. They fell behind a hill, and the road along which we were traveling led there. Everyone rushed to the heights.

The picture was gloomy. Despite the fact that the column had stretched out, 3 BMDs, 2 Urals and a GAZ-66 with a ZU-23 were under fire (this was the first crew of our battery). One BMD stood torn apart, the second with a broken track was trying to move somewhere, and the third was completely on fire. The Urals showed no signs of life, but the shishiga, on the contrary, was actively trying to leave the crater. The abandoned charger stood on wheels, there were no fighters in sight, only someone’s corpulent figure was energetically waving its arms. To the right, 5-7 km away, the pipes of an oil depot could be seen. We couldn’t see much detail; we were still at a height, but a bit far away.

Our platoonman (at that time senior lieutenant Kobzar) awakened our numb faces, mesmerized by the spectacle, with his cry “to fight.” We immediately deployed the rifle and within 20 seconds I was sitting behind the barrels. Through the ground camera I was able to see both the fighters and this corpulent figure, which belonged to Lieutenant Colonel Kaverin (chief of air defense of the 56th Brigade). Who organized the withdrawal of equipment and personnel from under fire. There were only three volleys. The one we saw was the last one.

By that time, the Ural was able to reach our altitude, apparently with the Tula people - it was an LNG crew, and the Ural with a howitzer. The rest of the column stood still. The last one to arrive at our high-rise was a communications UAZ. Lieutenant Colonel Vartsaba was in the cockpit. Looking through binoculars at what was happening, he ordered the howitzer to deploy its gun and prepare for battle. The signalman should contact the command. It was impossible not to hear his conversation.

I don’t remember it verbatim, but the meaning is as follows: Our convoy was fired upon from the direction of the oil depot, may we allow us to return fire? The answer was no. He repeated the request again. This time he jumped out of the cab, throwing the phone at the signalman. He quickly approached the gun. Follow him, shouted the signalman - Comrade Colonel, the order is not to open fire on the oil depot! In response, he said: “Shut up!” I didn't hear this order. Break your barrel organ. And turning to the howitzer - Load! There was a direct hit from the second shot, one of the pipes swayed and fell.”

Major 1182 ap A. Yuknikov:

“On December 12, the unit in which Sasha Mineev served, as part of a column of several units, made a forced march to the specified area. The column was moving between two mountains, its head was already emerging onto a flat plateau. At this time, Colonel Alekseenko on the mountain, at a distance of about seven kilometers, noticed the tanks and gave the order to deploy into battle formation. But at that moment the shelling began. No one could make out where the shells were coming from, since the distance was very large and it was not visible where the shooting was coming from.

As it turned out later, the fire was carried out by four Grad launchers, which fired three salvos. One of the shells hit the second car in the direction of travel... Sasha was in the fourth car. Their car was not damaged. But during the shelling, the personnel began to leave the equipment and disperse on the ground, since it was unsafe to be in the equipment; it was too vulnerable in a convoy. Apparently at that moment Sasha was wounded..."

Senior gunner ZRBATR 56 OVDBR:

“The lieutenant colonel’s adjustment was interrupted by the captain’s cry: “We’re being attacked!” I turned the trunks and looked down. Because of the smoke it was not very visible, but it was obvious that to the left, just where the survivors were pulling back, equipment was moving quite quickly from under the hill, turning into a chain. Vartsaba ordered the LNG to fight, and the howitzer and I to go to direct fire. I clearly distinguished the outline of the tank; it was coming first and straight towards us. I considered the rest of the armor to be an infantry fighting vehicle, which I immediately reported. The only answer is - I see...

Fortunately, this technique turned out to be ours (or rather yours, Tula). The head of the column turned around and returned to the place of shelling, going around the hill. We considered them a ground group after artillery preparation and almost opened fire. Well, someone noticed a mine trawl in front of the tank, as it was on ours.

And only after about 30 minutes the helicopters arrived. A pair of MI-24. We flew around the oil depot, then somewhere to the forest and released several nurses there. In general, not far from the place of shelling, we took up defensive positions and hung around there for a couple of days.”

Thus, after the shelling, federal forces took up defensive positions in the area of ​​the village. On December 17, Dudayev’s troops attacked units of the 106th Airborne Division. The defense of the rear part of the column was organized by Major Anikushkin A.V. During the battle, the BMD was hit. Anikushkin covered it in an attached tank and ensured the evacuation of the crew. Using fire from a combat vehicle, he destroyed four militants and suppressed an enemy firing point.

Anikushkin himself, however, received a severe concussion and burns, but remained in service until the end. In the same area, a mine was blown up (IMR) (crew: senior lieutenant G. L. Dedkov, privates A. R. Latypov, A. A. Varlamov, A. A. Goncharov).

Vehicle commander Art. Lieutenant Dedkov received multiple shrapnel wounds and was evacuated by his crew to a safe place.

Privates Latypov and Goncharov went to the nearest checkpoint for help, and Private Varlamov remained with the wounded officer. Seeing this, the militants tried to capture the wounded senior lieutenant. For half an hour, Private Varlamov, defending his commander, fought a fire battle against seven militants, destroying two of them, until help arrived.

“For four days, the 51st GvPDP fought fierce battles with the rebels near Dolinskoye, repelled up to a dozen militant attacks, destroyed two tanks, one armored personnel carrier, and about 60 rebels. An artillery battery under the command of Major V.M. Kulikov destroyed three Grad installations.”

There were several military vehicles parked in the prison yard on the outskirts of Dolinskoye. It was from here, apparently, that three Grad launchers taxied out, managing to snap back before they were destroyed by the battery of Major Vladimir Kulikov. A police major, the head of the prison, came out to meet me: “I am an officer just like you. There are only rapists and murderers in the cells, we have already released everyone who was imprisoned...”

The prisoners said something else: “Yes, they shot at you.” Who was to be trusted? I had to lock all the jailers in a cell, and take one with the key with me, letting me go about fifteen kilometers later. How offensive it was to later find out that the head of the prison was the leader of the gang that fought near Dolinsky. At the end of December we stopped near Grozny. Ahead is a city crammed with militants, behind there are no rear lines, no supply routes...”

Dead:

Colonel Evgeny Petrovich Alekseenko (from the headquarters of the Airborne Forces commander)
Beginning RViA 106 Airborne Division Colonel Nikolai Petrovich Frolov
Private 1182 AP Alexander Valerievich Mineev (12/12/94)
ml. Sergeant 56th Regiment Sergei Mikhailovich Shcherbakov (12.12.94)
ml. Sergeant 56th Regiment Sergei Nikolaevich Kovylyaev
Private 56th Regiment Pavel Vladimirovich Oborin
Sergeant 1182 AP Leonid Vladimirovich Meshanenko (died 12/29/1994 in the Burdenko Hospital)

According to the head of intelligence of the Airborne Forces, Colonel P.Ya. Popovskikh, 12 people were injured.

Losses of Chechen fighters

According to scattered data, the Chechens lost up to 60 militants, 2 tanks, 1 armored personnel carrier, up to 3 MLRS BM - 21

Well, what about the village of Dolinsky? Well, the Dolinsky village was restored and inaugurated in July 2015: In the Grozny region of the Chechen Republic, after large-scale construction and restoration work, the Dolinsky village was opened in a solemn atmosphere.

The opening ceremony of the village on Saturday was attended by the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, Deputy of the State Duma of Russia Adam Delimkhanov, Head of the Administration of the Head and Government of the Chechen Republic Magomed Daudov and other officials.

After the official opening ceremony of the reconstructed village, 300 local children received gifts from the Regional Public Foundation named after the Hero of Russia: boys received bicycles and girls received dolls. The head of the Chechen Republic rode around the village on a bicycle and got acquainted with the work done.

It should be noted that 47 multi-apartment residential buildings have been restored in the village, in which 560 apartments have been renovated. A mosque with 200 seats, a gym and an administrative building were built. A major overhaul of the school, medical clinic, kindergarten for 120 children and the housing and communal services building was carried out. Intra-village roads with a length of about 6 kilometers have been repaired, covered with asphalt and surrounded by curbstones. Utilities have been completely updated - sewerage and gas, light and water supply systems. The reconstruction was carried out at the expense of the Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov Foundation.

The urban-type settlement Dolinsky was founded in 1972 for workers of the Grozny Gas Processing Plant (GPP). In 1989, after the earthquake, many houses were in disrepair. Since then, no major repairs have been carried out in the village. In 1994, during the fighting, the gas processing plant was destroyed, and housing facilities, road facilities, utility networks, administrative and social buildings of the village were also damaged. Currently, about one and a half thousand people live in Dolinskoye.

This was one of the first major clashes in the First Chechen War. Was it a war or the establishment of constitutional order? Of course, war. If you look at the composition of the groups on both sides of the conflict, it becomes obvious that there were no spontaneously formed militias and peaceful shepherds who came down from the mountains to protect the self-named Ichkeria. Of course, there may have been a number of them, but the backbone of Dudayev’s army was clearly not something that arose spontaneously and was militia. If I have time and the mood, I will complete the post about the number and composition of forces before December 11, 1994 (the day the entry of troops into the Chechen Republic began).

Start.

On December 12, 1994, a column of the combined parachute regiment of the 106th Airborne Division and the 56th Airborne Assault Brigade was fired upon from the BM-21 Grad MLRS. During the shelling, 6 people were immediately killed, another died later on December 29, 1994 in the hospital named after. Burdenko, 13 people were injured of varying severity.

Surprisingly, the very next day an article about the events of December 12, 1994 was published not just anywhere, but in the English edition of The Guardian. The article is still preserved and is available here (https://www.theguardian.com/world/1994/dec/13/chechnya). What follows from the article. Firstly, the data was provided by the famous Ukrainian nationalist journalist Taras Protsyuk (this is the one who died from wounds in 2003, when American tank crews fired at the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad). Secondly, judging by Protsyuk’s information, the BM-21 installations were located next to the oil depot (a number of eyewitnesses, by the way, claimed that there was a ban on shelling this facility). Thirdly, the turntables appeared later and worked. Photographer Georgy Tambulov saw how the Chechens tried to shoot down the helicopters, but to no avail. Fourthly, the same photographer spoke about 2 Chechen T-72s firing machine guns, as well as a pair of Su-25s covering Chechen positions.

What the battle looked like through the eyes of eyewitnesses.

Direction of movement in general (http://www.ljplus.ru/img4/b/o/botter/1994_12_12_14_20.jpg)

Column composition:

• Tank of the 141st separate tank battalion of the 19th MSD
• Combined parachute battalion 137 RDP
• Combined parachute battalion 51 RDP
• Self-propelled artillery division of the 1142nd artillery regiment
• Anti-tank artillery battery of the 1142nd artillery regiment
• Anti-aircraft missile battery of the 56th separate airborne brigade
• Combined parachute battalion of the 56th separate airborne brigade

The leadership of the Chechen forces was carried out by Vakha Arsanov, a former police captain who received the rank of division general in the Chechen Republic. At that moment he was appointed commander of the Northwestern Front of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria. On December 11, as the column of federal forces approached the village of Dolinsky, it was accompanied by several of Arsanov’s fighters, who were collecting information about the forces of the column and its route. In particular, one of the militants in his own Zhiguli drove through all the checkpoints under the guise of a local resident, collected the necessary information and calmly returned to Arsanov. Arsanov turns to Aslan Maskhadov to assign him BM-21 Grad installations and strike the moving column. On the night of December 11-12, militant units, on the orders of Arsanov, occupied a commanding height near the village. Everything was ready for the ambush.

The commander of the OGV in the Chechen Republic (as well as the Commander of the North Caucasus Military District) until December 20, 1994 was Colonel General Alexey Nikolaevich Mityukhin, Several characteristics

Lieutenant General Lev Yakovlevich Rokhlin:

“Take, for example, the commander of the district, General Mityukhin. He is a strong leader who knew how to get his orders carried out. He did a lot for the development of the district. And for the peace period he was a good commander. But at the same time, he was a product of the era. He did not have no experience in leading troops in war conditions. He was easily subject to doubts when it came to solving the immediate tasks of the army. As a witness to its collapse, the flight (there is no other way to call it) from Germany and other countries of Eastern Europe, he was not ready for decisive action. Having experienced to himself all the tyranny of politicians, he did not see the opportunity to resist it. He was taught to think only about how not to expose himself..."

Head of Airborne Intelligence, Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh:

“The commander of the group of troops, Mityukhin, I’ll call him again, did not give any instructions or orders at all at that time. The only thing he was honored to say to the commanders of the units that were supposed to enter Chechnya tomorrow was: “There is no need to steal straw from the fields from the Chechens.” . I, I have some money, I’ll give it to you as a last resort, pay.” I swear, it really happened.”

Detection of positions of the ChRI detachment.

On December 12, shortly before the strike, reconnaissance discovered Chechen BM-21 Grad installations, but the command was unable to take advantage of the intelligence. Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh, head of airborne intelligence in 1990-1997, tells the story.

At that time, the North Caucasian Military District and the United Group of Forces were commanded by Colonel General Mityukhin. The northern group under the command of the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Alexei Alekseevich Sigutkin, approached Dolinskoye, a village on the northwestern outskirts of the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny. Sigutkin did not lead the group along the roads, but walked along the Tersky Range, bypassing all posts and ambushes. Therefore, he was the first to approach Grozny from the northern direction.

The convoy was accompanied by a pair of MI-24 helicopters, which conducted aerial reconnaissance and, if necessary, could carry out strikes with NURS. The helicopter flights were controlled by the commander of aviation of the North Caucasus Military District, General Ivannikov, who was in Mozdok at the Central Bureau of Aviation of the North Caucasus Military District. In addition to the crews, the helicopters included reconnaissance officers from the 45th Airborne Special Forces Regiment. The head of the operational intelligence department of the regiment, Major V.L., maintained radio contact with them. Ersak.

Under those conditions, this was a very effective method of reconnaissance. After all, pilots are mainly involved in controlling the helicopter and its weapons. And scouts are aimed specifically at observing the terrain and the enemy on the ground. Naturally, they see further and understand more about ground tactics. On the outskirts of Dolinskoye, it was our scouts who discovered an enemy detachment, a couple of tanks and a BM-21 Grad launcher, which were hidden behind buildings.

Pilots and reconnaissance officers, each through their own channels, report to the group’s command about the enemy, including the BM-21 installation and tanks, and indicate their location. General Alexey Sigutkin immediately deploys the column into battle formation and gives the command to the helicopters to engage the identified targets. But helicopter pilots have their own direct superior!.. The flight commander reports to General Ivannikov and asks him for permission to strike to kill. Ivannikov replies: “Wait, I’ll ask the Chief.” Ivannikov’s chief was General Mityukhin.

Literally a minute later, Ivannikov conveys Mityukhin’s order to the pilots, prohibiting them from striking identified targets, citing the presence of an oil pipeline in that place as the reason for this decision. Sigutkin gives the command to his scouts and artillerymen to conduct additional reconnaissance and suppress targets. But the rugged terrain and distance did not allow us to immediately see the enemy directly and immediately give target designation to fire weapons.

At this time, helicopters, which according to the plan should be changed every two hours, are replaced. While the other pair has not yet taken their place in the battle formation, one enemy tank comes out from behind cover and stands on the opposite slope of the ridge from Sigutkin, showing the crew of the BM-21 “Grad” installation the direction of fire. After all, the Chechen tank crews see our battle formations from the tower, but the tank itself remains hidden from observation over the crest of the hill, and our observers do not see it! The crew of the installation can only turn in the direction that the tank sets with its position, and set the range to our troops on sight. After this, the installation fires a salvo of all forty 122 mm missiles each...

If the column had not turned into a chain in time, the losses could have been very large. Grad missiles always land in a highly elongated ellipse. If you cover the column lengthwise with such an ellipse, then every third projectile can find a target.

This salvo caused a direct hit by a rocket shell on the Ural vehicle and the artillery fire control vehicle. It contained Colonel Frolov, chief of artillery of the 106th Airborne Division, the crew of the vehicle itself and a senior officer from the headquarters of the airborne troops, Colonel Alekseenko. So six people died at the same time. These were the very first combat losses suffered by the Joint Group of Forces in Chechnya.

At the CBU, Mityukhin’s general team immediately tried to blame the paratroopers of General Alexei Sigutkin for everything. He allegedly did not conduct reconnaissance, hesitated, did not control the troops... But all reports, negotiations and commands in the helicopter radio network were recorded on tape by Major Ersak. They clearly stated that the installation was discovered on time and could have been destroyed on the spot at the command of General A. Sigutkin, if Mityukhin’s direct order had not followed, prohibiting helicopter pilots from opening fire to kill. I was forced to present these records and show the true culprit in the death of our soldiers and officers (soon Mityukhin was replaced as commander of the group by General Anatoly Kvashnin, the future chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces).

However, our “disappointments” with everything that happened that day were not over yet. A few hours later on the evening news The NTV television company is hosting a report from Chechnya made by a correspondent for this television company. There, the operator, accompanied by a commentator’s voice choking with delight, shows how this most ill-fated BM-21 “Grad” installation comes out of cover into a firing position and launches rockets at our group. The crew of the installation left the position, standing on the step of a car driving past the camera lens. I still remember the excited and joyful Chechens, filmed in close-up, shouting: “Allahu Akbar!”

About two weeks later I found myself on that hillock, and from the landscape familiar from the TV program I realized that I was in the very place where the NTV cameraman was.

By the way, three days later, scouts from the 45th Airborne Special Forces Regiment found this BM-21 Grad installation. She was hiding in a hangar, so it was impossible to detect her from the air. But we knew that it was located in the Staropromyslovsky district. And this area is one long, long street, or rather a highway. On both sides of it there are mainly production and warehouse premises.

The scouts under the command of Colonel Boris Aleksandrovich Kozyulin, using one old portable radio direction finder (the second one was broken, and there was no one to repair it), took a bearing on the radio station used by the crew of this installation. Then they drew it on the map and determined its location at the intersection of the bearing with the highway. There was just a hangar there. They attacked it with artillery and aircraft. Everything was demolished - along with the crew...

From the description of the battle:

“Having stopped 8 kilometers from Dolinskoye to decide on further actions, we suddenly saw through binoculars something similar to the installation of a multiple launch rocket system. “The Chechens are loading Grad,” the helicopter’s crew confirmed their fears.

At this time, the rest of the column is pulled up to the head of the column.

Senior gunner ZRBATR 56 OVDBR

“The column usually walked, crossing the highlands along a wet clay road. Suddenly we heard very loud explosions, it was nearby. The command “to fight” was not long in coming, but after leaving the transport we saw nothing. There were 50 meters left to the top of the hill. And then We noticed fast-flying lights on the horizon - this was the next salvo, about 4 rockets. They fell behind the hill, which is where the road we were traveling on led. Everyone rushed to the height.

The picture was gloomy. Despite the fact that the column was stretched out, 3 BMDs, 2 Urals and a Gas 66 with a ZU-23 were under fire (this was the first crew of our battery). One BMD stood torn apart, the second with a broken track was trying to move somewhere, and the third was completely on fire. The Urals showed no signs of life, but the shishiga, on the contrary, was actively trying to leave the crater. The abandoned charger stood on wheels, there were no fighters in sight, only someone’s corpulent figure was energetically waving its arms. To the right, 5-7 km away, the pipes of an oil depot could be seen. We couldn’t see much detail; we were still at a height, but a bit far away.

Our platoonman (at that time senior lieutenant Kobzar) awakened our numb faces, mesmerized by the spectacle, with his cry “to fight.” We immediately deployed the rifle and within 20 seconds I was sitting behind the barrels. Through the ground camera I was able to see both the fighters and this corpulent figure, which belonged to Lieutenant Colonel Kaverin (chief of air defense of the 56th brigade). Who organized the withdrawal of equipment and personnel from under fire. There were only 3 volleys. The one we saw was the last.

By that time, the Ural was able to reach our altitude, apparently with the Tula people - it was an LNG crew, and the Ural with a howitzer. The rest of the column stood still. The last one to arrive at our high-rise was a communications UAZ. Lieutenant Colonel Vartsaba was in the cockpit. Looking through binoculars at what was happening, he ordered the howitzer to deploy its gun and prepare for battle. The signalman should contact the command. It was impossible not to hear his conversation.

I don’t remember it verbatim, but the meaning is as follows: Our convoy was fired upon from the direction of the oil depot, may we allow us to return fire? The answer was no. He repeated the request again. This time he jumped out of the cab, throwing the phone at the signalman. He quickly approached the gun. Follow him, shouted the signalman - Comrade Colonel, the order is not to open fire on the oil depot! In response, he said: - shut up! I didn't hear this order. Break your barrel organ. And turning to the howitzer - Load!

There was a direct hit from the second shot, one of the pipes swayed and fell."

Major 1182 ap A. Yuknikov:

“On December 12, the unit in which Sasha [Mineev] served, as part of a column of several units, made a forced march to the indicated area. The column was moving between two mountains, its head was already reaching a flat plateau. At this time, Colonel Alekseenko was on the mountain, on about seven kilometers away, noticed the tanks and gave the order to turn around in battle formation. But at that moment the shelling began. No one could make out where the shells were coming from, since the distance was very large and it was not visible where the shooting was coming from. As it turned out later, the fire were fired by four Grad launchers, which fired three salvos. One of the shells hit the second vehicle in the direction of travel... Sasha was in the fourth vehicle. Their vehicle was not damaged. But during the shelling, the personnel began to leave the equipment and concentrate on terrain, since it was unsafe to be in the vehicle, it was too vulnerable in the convoy. Apparently at that moment Sasha was wounded..."

Removal of the column head
Senior gunner ZRBATR 56 OVDBR

“The lieutenant colonel’s adjustment was interrupted by the captain’s cry: “We’re being attacked!” I turned my guns and looked down. Because of the smoke it wasn’t very visible, but it was obvious that on the left, just where the survivors were pulling back, equipment was moving quite quickly from under the hill, turning into a chain. Vartsaba ordered LNG for battle, and the howitzer and I to go to direct fire. I clearly distinguished the outline of the tank, it was coming first and straight towards us. I considered the rest of the armor to be an infantry fighting vehicle, which I immediately reported. The only answer was - I see...
Fortunately, this technique turned out to be ours (or rather yours, Tula). The head of the column turned around and returned to the place of shelling, going around the hill. We considered them a ground group after artillery preparation and almost opened fire. Well, someone noticed a mine trawl in front of the tank, as it was on ours.
And only after about 30 minutes the helicopters arrived. A pair of Mi 24. We flew around the oil depot, then somewhere to the forest and released several nurses there. In general, we took up defensive positions not far from the place of shelling, and hung around there for a couple of days.”17

Thus, after the shelling, federal forces took up defensive positions in the area of ​​the village. On December 17, Dudayev’s troops attacked units of the 106th Airborne Division. The defense of the rear part of the column was organized by Major Anikushkin A.V. During the battle, the BMD was hit. Anikushkin covered it in an attached tank and ensured the evacuation of the crew. Using fire from a combat vehicle, he destroyed four militants and suppressed an enemy firing point. Anikushkin himself, however, received a severe concussion and burns, but remained in service until the end. In the same area, a mine was blown up (IMR) (crew: senior lieutenant G. L. Dedkov, privates A. R. Latypov, A. A. Varlamov, A. A. Goncharov). Vehicle commander Art. Lieutenant Dedkov received multiple shrapnel wounds and was evacuated by his crew to a safe place. Privates Latypov and Goncharov went to the nearest checkpoint for help, and Private Varlamov remained with the wounded officer. Seeing this, the militants tried to capture the wounded senior lieutenant. For half an hour, Private Varlamov, defending his commander, fought a fire battle against seven militants, destroying two of them, until help arrived.

“For four days, the regiment fought fierce battles with the rebels near Dolinskoye, repelled up to a dozen militant attacks, destroyed two tanks, one armored personnel carrier, and about 60 rebels. An artillery battery under the command of Major V.M. Kulikov destroyed three Grad installations.”

There were several military vehicles parked in the prison yard on the outskirts of Dolinskoye. It was from here, apparently, that three Grad launchers taxied out, managing to snap back before they were destroyed by the battery of Major Vladimir Kulikov. A police major, the head of the prison, came out to meet me: “I am an officer just like you. There are only rapists and murderers in the cells, we have already released everyone who Dudayev imprisoned...” The prisoners said something else: “Yes, they shot at you.” Who was to be trusted? I had to lock all the jailers in a cell, and take one with the key with me, letting me go about fifteen kilometers later. How offensive it was to later find out that the head of the prison was the leader of the gang that fought near Dolinsky. At the end of December we stopped near Grozny. Ahead is a city crammed with militants, behind there are no rear lines, no supply routes..."

Dead

As a result of the shelling, the following were killed:

1. Colonel Evgeny Petrovich Alekseenko (from the headquarters of the Airborne Forces commander)
2. Beginning RViA 106 Airborne Division Colonel Nikolai Petrovich Frolov
3. Private 1182 AP Alexander Valerievich Mineev (12/12/94)
4. ml. Sergeant 56th Regiment Sergei Mikhailovich Shcherbakov (12.12.94)
5. ml. Sergeant 56th Regiment Sergei Nikolaevich Kovylyaev
6. Private 56th Regiment Pavel Vladimirovich Oborin
7. Sergeant 1182 AP Leonid Vladimirovich Meshanenko (died 12/29/1994 in the Burdenko Hospital)

Militant losses

According to scattered data, the Chechens lost up to 60 militants, 2 tanks, 1 armored personnel carrier, up to 3 MLRS BM - 21

During the collection of information, LiveJournal was used

Well, what about the village of Dolinsky? Well, the village of Dolinsky was restored and inaugurated in July 2015, yes. https://chechnyatoday.com/content/view/285512

In the Grozny region of the Chechen Republic, after large-scale construction and restoration work, the village of Dolinsky was officially opened.

The opening ceremony of the village on Saturday was attended by the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, Deputy of the State Duma of Russia Adam Delimkhanov, Head of the Administration of the Head and Government of the Chechen Republic Magomed Daudov and other officials.

After the official opening ceremony of the reconstructed village from the Regional Public Foundation named after Hero of Russia Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov, 300 local children received gifts: boys - bicycles, and girls - dolls. The head of the Chechen Republic rode around the village on a bicycle and got acquainted with the work done.

It should be noted that 47 multi-apartment residential buildings have been restored in the village, in which 560 apartments have been renovated. A mosque with 200 seats, a gym and an administrative building were built. A major overhaul of the school, medical clinic, kindergarten for 120 children and the housing and communal services building was carried out. Intra-village roads with a length of about 6 kilometers have been repaired, covered with asphalt and surrounded by curbstones. Utilities have been completely updated - sewerage and gas, light and water supply systems. The reconstruction was carried out at the expense of the Regional Fund named after Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov.

The urban-type settlement Dolinsky was founded in 1972 for workers of the Grozny Gas Processing Plant (GPP). In 1989, after the earthquake, many houses were in disrepair. Since then, no major repairs have been carried out in the village. In 1994, during the fighting, the gas processing plant was destroyed, and housing facilities, road facilities, utility networks, administrative and social buildings of the village were also damaged. Currently, about one and a half thousand people live in Dolinskoye.

“Ambush is a method of action of troops (forces), in which they, positioned secretly, wait for the enemy, and then suddenly attack him with the aim of destroying (incapacitating), capturing weapons, documents and prisoners, as well as causing disorganization and panic in communications in his rear."

Glossary of military terms

Once, in a conversation with special forces officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I heard from one of them something like the following: “It’s an ambush, it’s an ambush in Africa too, what else can you come up with that’s new?” I strongly disagree. Ambush tactics are a highly creative matter, and a commander who begins to repeat himself risks, at best, not completing the task, and at worst, putting his own life and that of his subordinates at risk.

For trophies

Afghanistan made the first adjustments to the classic ambush tactics. The main criterion for assessing military activity here was trophies. Only they were considered indisputable proof of the successful actions of the scouts. And since the Mujahideen formed quite large caravans and convoys, it was impossible for the group to remove the captured weapons and had to remain in place until helicopters or an armored group arrived. Therefore, ambush tactics were born, in which the battle formation consisted only of a fire subgroup, and sometimes mining and support subgroups. The capture subgroup was replaced by a caravan inspection subgroup. The task of the support subgroup became different: it was supposed to cover the rear of the fire subgroup, since the group (on average 20–25 people) occupied a perimeter defense in an ambush. However, according to the usual “allied” concepts, this was rather a detachment or, at a minimum, a reinforced group. It included the crew of the AGS-17, and since 1986, the NSV-12.7 “Utes”.

Carrying out the task, the group secretly landed, went out to the ambush area, hid during daylight hours, and with the appearance of the caravan, struck, clinging to the prey with a death grip. Often, reconnaissance officers had to fight hard, surrounded by a significantly superior enemy, repelling numerous attacks (typical of 1984-1985) and hiding from fire from mortars, rockets, recoilless rifles and snipers. The motto is like on the Volga in 1942: “Not a step back.” However, in such a situation there was often nowhere to go.

Twelve Apostles

Last year, I met one of the most successful, thoughtful and therefore effective commanders, Dmitry L., serving in the 173rd separate special forces detachment, and inquired about ambush tactics in Chechnya. In his opinion, the order of their organization and conduct since the Second World War and the Afghan campaign (they are apparently equally distant in time for him) was influenced by the emergence of silent weapons, night vision devices and reliable means of communication. Since the groups in Chechnya worked in the VHF range, there was no need for a radio operator of a low-power HF radio station. Sometimes, as a means of communication, even a cell phone was used, on which, as Dmitry said, while in an ambush, he could call his wife at home and tell all sorts of nonsense about the fact that he was basking in the bathtub, drinking Coke.

The targets of ambushes in Chechnya, according to Dmitry, were mainly single off-road passenger cars with a small number of guards. I argue that this last thing, and only it, influenced the order of operations of special forces groups, since in Afghanistan we had both night sights and silent weapons. But they did not “make the difference” in the fight against large forces of the Mujahideen. Tactics are dictated by the target of the ambush, that is, the task that the scouts have to solve.

Dmitry interestingly explained the preferred size of his group: “When I went out on ambush missions, I took 12 people with me. Firstly, this is not 13, secondly, Christ has 12 apostles, and most importantly, this is the most convenient number for division. Divided into six pairs, four threes, three fours and two sixes. That is, the most convenient number of people for operational use.”

In the PPD, before leaving, he practiced the group’s actions on the march to the ambush area and especially carefully trained the patrolmen. “As a rule, I had three people in my head and rear patrols - one in front, two behind, or vice versa. I appointed three to the head patrol, because if one of the patrolmen is wounded, the second one will be able to pull him out under the cover of the third, but it is highly controversial that he will be able to do this if there is no cover.”

Hit – gone

The terrain also greatly influenced the organization of the ambush. In Chechnya, we had to operate on a plain among open fields, where the only shelter was the plantings along the roads. Sometimes the terrain did not allow us to position ourselves and wait for the target in battle formation. The group hid in a secluded place, jumped out at the observer’s command and took pre-designated positions.

When moving along the road to land, if necessary, the marching order easily turned into a combat one. The head patrol was transformed into observers, who also performed the task of a support subgroup, the rear patrol acted similarly, and a scout from each patrol returned to the core of the group. The remaining 8 people were divided as follows: a fire subgroup - 3 people, a capture subgroup - 3 people, a commander and a radio operator covering the rear. Almost everyone took part in the fire raid. They retreated in the following sequence: the capture subgroup, observers, then the fire subgroup, which assumed the functions of the support subgroup and covered the retreat.

All ambushes were carried out according to the “hit and leave” principle: the high population density did not allow getting involved in a long battle. How quickly self-defense forces gathered in case of danger is demonstrated by the following example.

Ambush near Grushev

On the night of May 8, 1996, two kilometers south of Grushevoy, part of the forces of RGSpN No. 322 of the 173rd Special Operations Forces carried out an operation, the official report of which, submitted by the command to the headquarters of the OGV, read: “RGSpN No. 322, under the command of Senior Lieutenant S., organized an ambush in the ford area. As a result, a UAZ car and 5 militants were destroyed. The car contained: RPO-A - 8 pcs., TM-62 mines - 4 pcs., F-1 grenades - 1 box, RGD-5 grenades - 1 box, AK assault rifles - 20 pcs. One of the killed was in a NATO camouflage uniform with shoulder straps of a colonel of the Russian Defense Ministry, wearing a Borz beret, and had photographs and separate notes with him... During the battle, Akaev Zaindym Magametovich was killed, registered in the village. Alkhazurovo, Urus-Martan district, and Chupalaev Saidamin Sudaevich, registered in the village. Alkhazurovo, Urus-Martan district. The other three militants did not have any documents with them.

During the seizure of weapons and documents at the site of the ambush from the settlement. Up to 80 militants, BMP-2, and 4 UAZ vehicles moved in our direction from Grushevoe. The group directed artillery fire at the advancing militants, but was forced to retreat to the base area. The vehicle with weapons and ammunition was destroyed. Five small arms were seized. During the battle, squad leader V. was wounded - a perforating gunshot wound to the right half of the chest. By 5.00 on 05/08/96, the group arrived at the base area of ​​the reconnaissance detachment, where the evacuation of the wounded, weapons samples and captured documents was organized.”

And here is what ensign V., who commanded the ambush, said.

“On May 7, we, as part of a detachment, moved along the ridge from the Bamut area. We walked around the settlement and stood on the “bald spot”, opposite Grushevoy. As it got dark, we took up a perimeter defense and began to dig in, although this is said loudly. The deepest of all the trenches is mine with my brother. With the onset of darkness, the movement of spirits under our hill intensified. They walk about 150 meters away with flashlights, but we lie down and don’t reveal ourselves. By this time, Goyskoye had not yet been taken, and the spirits from there were taking prisoners towards Urus-Martan, and columns with equipment were being driven from Grushevoy. The artillery commander was with us. We asked the artillerymen to cover these columns, and at the same time the spirits right below us, to which we received the go-ahead. The mortars covered the spirits well. They began to rush about, groans were heard. We are lying down and introducing amendments. The mortar men continue to work...

In the morning we had a fighting itch. We knocked out the commander, saying they were going to inspect engineering structures. Let's go with five of us, just double basses, we won't take conscripts. We figured from the map that it wouldn’t be a bad idea to organize an ambush in the area of ​​the ford, so at dawn we set out. The descent to the river was very steep, but we still followed the goat paths. Along the road, we mapped out escape routes - the main one and the backup one. Near the ford they found the most traveled road, dispersed and sat in ambush.

My brother is in the rear, in support, and we decided on the tasks of who does what: who covers the flanks, who goes for inspection. Based on the fact that our strength is small, we decided that if there are a lot of spirits, we will let them through, but if the prey is tough, we will bring them all down.

We decided to sit for an hour. There were 7 minutes left before it ended. And then Boris crawls towards us from the right flank. As soon as he crawled, the UAZ was coming, it was too late to return. We started working. Brother BZshkami immediately put it in the engine. The engine jammed, the car stopped dead before reaching me. According to my calculations, it should have rolled by inertia, but the calculations did not come true. The guys in the UAZ, great fellows, immediately started hitting us through the windows. We shot at the store, the spirits are still shooting back, and just from the back of the car, that is, from the Borino sector. I replaced the store, yelling: “Group, for inspection!” – and I start moving towards the car. And the spirit continues to shoot. I looked closer and there was another fire. I adjust the fire and slowly move closer to the UAZ. Because of his stern, the fire stopped. I thought that the spirit jumped off the cliff and left. There are 15 meters to the car, and then I see: the one behind the stern is standing, and another one is sitting next to him, but you can see in his eyes that he is already leaving for another world. I didn't expect such a situation. It was then that the spirit got ahead of me with a shot, hitting me in the chest. I fell, jumped up... We shoot again: I shoot at him, he shoots at me. Let's smear both. Finally, I killed this one with one burst and finished off the sitting man. Yelling again: “Group, for inspection!” They began to inspect. The guys are sleek, handsome, all wearing Borzov berets, well dressed. There are a lot of weapons in the car. And I’m already bleeding from my nose and throat, but I keep quiet, I think: “If I tell the boys, they’ll be scared for me, they won’t really look at anything.” I collected documents, the guys collected weapons. I feel everything, I can’t really talk anymore. All I had time to say was: “I’m hooked.” And then the spirits come. The BMP roars. We grabbed everything we could. I said to my bro: “Mahmoud, set it on fire!” Gasoline was leaking from the broken tank. It puffed normally. We retreated along pre-selected paths, and when the spirits arrived at the car, the ammunition in it had already begun to explode. The darlings are on our tail. While the guys were carrying me, I had already lost consciousness. We thought they wouldn’t drag us out, but it’s okay, he’s alive...”

Mine war

The transience of the ambush endangered the lives of the fighters, who had to advance to the object to seize weapons and documents before the resistance of the guards was completely suppressed. Dmitry L. commented on this circumstance as follows: “When the criteria for assessing the effectiveness of our actions changed and they stopped requiring us to capture captured guns as proof, but began to blame us more for losses, we switched to the active use of mines in an ambush. The main fire damage to the spirits was now inflicted by them. The fighters in the fire subgroup were needed only for backup. We especially actively used the PD-430 radio links and the more modern versions that later entered service. MON-50 mines were used mainly against transport, OZM-72 - to destroy enemy personnel. There were also mines in use with a sound sensor, which began to go off when the first mine, a radio-controlled one, exploded. If everything went well, then we would only report that so many militants had been killed as a result of an explosion, and the agents would already check the information and report who had been killed.”