Chechens of war. Chechen War. Preparing for war

The Chechen War is an armed confrontation between the Russian Armed Forces and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. These events are among the darkest in the modern history of Russia. Events unfolded in two campaigns, sometimes two Chechen wars are distinguished: the first - from 1994 to 1996, the second - from 1999 to 2009.

In the fall of 1991, during a coup d'etat, the parliament of the Chechen-Ingush Republic was removed from power. At the same time, the Chechen-Ingush Republic was divided into Chechen and Ingush. Elections were held in Chechnya, which were declared illegal by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, since they were more of a performance than an actual election. Thus, separatists led by Dzhokhar Dudayev broke through to power in Chechnya. On October 27, Dudayev was declared president, and on November the independence of Chechnya was proclaimed. Chechnya was named Ichkeria. In the spring of 1992, the constitution of the republic was adopted. This state was not recognized by any state in the world.

Chechnya was in an economic and political crisis: during 1991-1994, a criminal economy flourished (kidnappings and human trafficking, arms trafficking, drug trafficking), there was an armed confrontation between Dudayev and the opposition, ethnic cleansing took place against the non-Chechen population, primarily against Russians. The Russian leadership tried to declare a state of emergency, but to no avail. Several rounds of negotiations also came to nothing. Chechen leaders wanted the central authorities to recognize an independent Chechnya. Meanwhile, Chechen militants were seizing weapons and military warehouses, and this took place with the consent of the Russian Minister of Defense Grachev.

On December 11, 1994, Russian troops entered the territory of Chechnya. has begun. The army came from three directions and was aimed at Grozny. On New Year's Eve, troops began to storm Grozny. On February 22, 1995, the city was taken, and Russian troops began moving deeper into Chechnya. By the summer of 1995, Dudayev’s troops were in a very difficult situation. On June 14, hostages were taken in Budenovsk (Stavropol Territory), which led to the start of negotiations between the Russian authorities and the separatists and a delay in military action on the part of Russia. In April 1996, the leader of the Chechen militants, Dudayev, was eliminated. In August 1996, the separatists managed to capture Grozny. On August 31, 1996, the parties signed an agreement called the Khasavyurt Agreements. Under the terms of the agreement, a truce was declared, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, and the question of independence was postponed until 2001.

After the completion of the first campaign, a regime was established in Chechnya, characterized by a criminal economy of drug trafficking, arms trafficking), officially sanctioned blood feud, and genocide of people of non-Chechen nationality. The ideas of Islamic extremists were spreading in the republic; Chechen militants carried out terrorist attacks outside the territory of Chechnya in Russia. In August 1999, separatist troops led by Basayev and Khattab invade Dagestan. Russian troops repulse the attack and enter Chechnya.
The second Chechen war begins with the battles with Basayev and Khattab. On September 30, 1999, troops were brought into Chechnya. The end of this war is considered to be April 16, 2009, when the CTO regime was abolished in Chechnya. Sometimes they say that the Chechen war is still going on.

The war brought enormous damage to the Russian people. This is, first of all, expressed in the human losses of Russian soldiers and officers, as well as civilians. Losses cannot be calculated accurately. Data vary from 10 to 26 thousand killed military personnel. In any case, the Russian-Chechen war became a personal tragedy for a huge number of people.

Exactly 20 years ago the First Chechen War began. On December 11, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government that justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya as consistent with the Constitution.

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different directions - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia, from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan.

The famous St. Petersburg political scientist, Doctor of Philosophy, discusses the causes and consequences of the First Chechen War in an interview with the Russian People's Line Sergey Lebedev :

Why did the First Chechen War begin? I discussed this topic in my book “Russian Ideas and Russian Cause.” Everything cannot be blamed on personal hostile relations between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov, and then Dudayev. Some have suggested that they fought over “black gold,” but this is not true, because large reserves of oil are extracted in Siberia and processed in the Urals. Moreover, at that time there was a shortage of oil in the Chechen Republic, so it was delivered to Grozny even during the war.

What are the true reasons for the war?! In my opinion, everything is simple and tragic. It was 1994, Parliament was shot last fall, an American dictatorship reigned in the country - dozens of all-knowing and all-knowing Washington advisers sat in every ministry. What problem did they face?! It was necessary to finally dispose of the Russian state. But how can this be achieved if Russia still has powerful armed forces capable of challenging the United States?! Let me remind you that in those days China was weak, although now it is not so strong. And Saddam Hussein was given a demonstrative flogging back in 1991. What should American advisers do? After all, it will not be possible to simply disband the powerful armed forces. Therefore, it was decided to carry out a reform that would destroy the Russian army, but present it as a necessary and urgent decision. What is needed for this?! Little dirty shamefully lost war! As a result of this action, demand reforms, since allegedly everything in the army is poorly and incorrectly organized. In addition, defeat in Chechnya would foreshadow a “parade of sovereignties” and then the collapse of Russia. Chechnya would be followed by the rest of the country's republics. It was precisely these deep-reaching plans that the American advisers nurtured.

Until then, Dudayev’s Ichkeria had been fed for three years, starting in the fall of 1991, when the Maidan took place in Grozny and the former leader of the republic was overthrown, and Dudayev seized power. For all three years, Chechnya did not recognize itself as part of Russia, although money regularly flowed into the republic for the social needs of the population - salaries, pensions, benefits. In turn, Russia did not receive a penny from Chechnya; the oil was sent to an oil refinery in Grozny. The republic in those days became a zone where the mafia had its own territorial and political entity. The puppeteers understood that the Chechens were courageous and wonderful warriors. It was in Latvia in August 1991 that 140 Riga riot police calmly established Soviet power on the territory of the republic. However, such a scenario will not work in Chechnya. The Americans counted on the military impulse of the Chechens, filling them with weapons and choosing the right time - the sunset of 1994. Military operations began in the winter, when the numerical and technical superiority of the federal forces, otherwise called “federals,” came to naught in the mountainous areas. Starting a war in December in the mountains is very difficult. But, nevertheless, it was for this reason that the war was started. The puppeteers were counting on a shameful defeat of the Russian army, after which they would sign a peace treaty and the purge of the armed forces would begin. The Chechen war was intended to be a huge defeat for Russia, so it began in December, at the worst possible time. For unknown reasons, not only Yeltsin, who was undergoing surgery, but also the generals were not at the post of Commander-in-Chief. The guys who were drafted into the army in the spring and autumn of 1994 were thrown into the war! The calculation was based on the defeat of the armed forces, but as always, when the headquarters calculate how to defeat Russia, what comes out is not at all what was intended.

From a military point of view, there were no defeats in the First Chechen War. Of course, there were failures at the start of the assault on Grozny, but, although with heavy losses, the city was taken and cleared of terrorists. At that time, there were also suspicious nuances when they demanded that the military take off their body armor, etc. If there were private military failures, they were all explained by betrayal at headquarters, because the Chechens knew almost everything. A special forces officer who participated in the First Chechen War told me a story about how the Chechens hung up a poster congratulating the unit commander on his birthday, his last name, first name, patronymic, and the name of the military unit that had just arrived in Grozny. They knew not only secret information, but also the personal data of the commanders.

The most important headquarters was the first traitor in the war, which was started with the goal of a shameful loss of the federal forces. But it didn't work out. As General Lebed said, this was a custom-made military campaign. The Kremlin sometimes declared a truce in order to not defeat the Chechens so quickly. At one time he announced the introduction of a moratorium on aviation flights, although from the point of view of common sense it was possible in the spring, when there was no dense greenery, to destroy gangs using aerial bombing. Human rights activists were unleashed on the military like dogs. The entire Russian “fourth estate” fought for Dudayev, and the soldiers were called “federals.” This word has an ironic connotation; at that time the population was not yet accustomed to this term. Also, puppeteers created legends about bandits, they were glorified as freedom fighters, constantly spitting in the back of Russian soldiers!

This is an indicator of how our society has changed because of that war. Many people began to recover from the intoxication that had been going on since the times of glasnost and perestroika. The attempt to create an anti-war movement failed. Government figures - Gaidar, Yavlinsky - suddenly began speaking at rallies against the war in Chechnya! One of two things: if you are against the war, then resign, if you are for it, then don’t interfere. The calculation was for the emergence of an anti-war movement along with the dispersal of the army, which would throw a hysteria that would lead to the collapse of the army. But eighteen-year-old conscripts took and broke the backs of the Chechen wolves. What about military generals?! Let's remember Rokhlin, Babichev, Kvashnin! All these generals of the First Chechen War showed extraordinary abilities while fighting against the Chechens.

After the start of finishing off the bandits, the famous strange provocation followed - the Chechens captured Grozny while our troops were out on maneuvers, and only the police remained in the city. Newspapers write at lightning speed about the imminent capture of Grozny by the Chechens. But when General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov blocked the city, intending to destroy the militants with artillery fire, General Lebed arrived and signed the surrender in Khasavyurt. In the First Chechen War there was only one defeat - political. In military terms, despite a number of frequent setbacks, the war was won. The surrender in Khasavyurt was signed after the almost complete destruction of the gang. The media and traitors at the top played a shameful role in this matter.

From 1996 to 1999, Chechnya was again stewing in its own juice. By this time, “Russification” had occurred in Russia, after a decade of rabid glorification of liberalism. The press covered the beginning of the Second Chechen War (1999-2000) in a completely different way. Is this war over, given the recent terrorist attack in Chechnya? Unfortunately, wars have been going on in the Caucasus for tens and hundreds of years.

To some extent, the opinion that the Kremlin feeds the Caucasus is partly true. Masses of people with weapons were busy with something in these small conditions. No matter how we finance Chechnya, where over 90% of the revenue comes from the federal budget, no matter how it sounds, it is still cheaper than war.

Nowadays an interesting situation has developed in the Caucasus. On the one hand, they were beaten well, but, on the other hand, they began to be appeased and respected. After a certain time, they will forget how they got hit in the neck. Placating sooner or later will lead to them saying - not enough, give us more money! To avoid war, the Kremlin pursued a policy that was initially effective and brought good results - it relied on local figures, including Akhmat and Ramzan Kadyrov. So far it's effective. He managed to quite calmly integrate many militants into normal life. In the Caucasus, as the tsarist and Soviet experience shows, the most effective was the general government headed by a Russian general. Why Russians?! Chechens are people of a clan society, and when one of the Chechens is in power, the rest of the clans can feel offended. So far, the current policy in Chechnya is producing good results, but it cannot be continued for long. Care must be taken to avoid war, which could break out with renewed vigor!

Security officials have drawn conclusions from two Chechen wars. Vladimir Putin came to power in the 1999-2000s with considerable support, primarily from the security forces. Among them there were many people associated with the Chechen war, so they were determined that entities like Ichkeria would not appear on Russian territory. It must be admitted that a number of military leaders who made a career in both Chechen wars entered the military-political elite. Of course, there are not many of them, but they exist. Let us remember that Shamanov was not very effective, but still a governor, and General Troshev was engaged in the revival of the Cossacks. These are the proponents of two Chechen wars.

The Kremlin made a conclusion about the media and public organizations, such as Soldiers' Mothers. The conclusions are correct - it is impossible to completely ban and close such organizations, creating an aura of martyrdom for them, otherwise the Kremlin will be suspected of hiding something. The Kremlin has put them on a short leash. Now a certain citizen Vasilyeva is trying to repeat the experience of human rights activists of the 90s. She created the “Gruz-200” society, gives interviews and tries to prove something about the huge number of soldiers who died in the Donbass. Vasilyeva’s imagination has run out, so she lists all sorts of football teams where everyone died, or simply takes numbers from a lantern. Such individuals must be deftly neutralized by directing them to the marginal sphere.

If we compare the information field of 1994 and the current one, it’s heaven and earth. Of course, the victory is not final, but Putin’s rating is known, which is recognized with gnashing of teeth by Western figures speaking from the position of Chechen terrorists, “white ribbon activists,” liberals and other anti-Putin opposition. Who are these pussies, writers who have declared their desire to emigrate?! For example, Akunin wants to be expelled from the country in disgrace, like Solzhenitsyn was in his time. They told Akunin - go! Who needs him over the hill?! It is very awkward to merge the opposition, showing what it is, without banning it.

In Soviet times, everything was prohibited; many people spoke in glowing terms about Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. But then they read what Sakharov wrote. Some brave souls who are trying to overcome the burden of Solzhenitsyn’s novels are perplexed, what did these authors want to say, did they really have such an influence on minds?! Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov would not have had the same influence if they had not been silenced, but had been allowed to speak, as they say, to the side.

The Kremlin has learned the lessons of the First Chechen War. It was by relying on the security forces that a change of regime took place with the arrival of Putin. The Kremlin has realized the role of the media, and the fight against them should not be so primitive, in the spirit of “take it and shut it down.” In pathetic language, the guys who died in Chechnya did not die in vain! In Russia, it was possible to overcome the real collapse of the country and preserve the armed forces, which received a certain training and experience. As often happens, they wanted to destroy Russia, but everything turned out the other way around, the country grew stronger in spite of its enemies.

On December 11, 1994, the 1st Chechen War began. The background to the conflict and chronicle of the fighting in Chechnya in the Voenpro review dedicated to the anniversary of the start of the war. This conflict can be called a sad symbol of a Russia that had not yet found itself, which was at a crossroads, in the timelessness between the collapse of one great power and the birth of a new Russia.

Historically, the Caucasus has been and remains one of the complex, problematic regions of Russia. This is determined by the ethnic characteristics of the territories where many nationalities live within a fairly limited space.

Therefore, various problems of a socio-political, economic and legal nature were refracted in this space through the prism of interethnic relations.

Hence, after the collapse of the country, the contradictions in the “center-periphery” system became most acute in the regions of the North Caucasus and were most clearly manifested in Chechnya.

The rapid deterioration of the economic situation in the country and, as a consequence, the emergence of political confrontation between national regions and the “center” led to the natural consolidation of the population in various regions along ethnic lines.

It was in this specific unity of national communities that people saw the opportunity to exert effective influence on the state system to ensure a fair distribution of public goods and the formation of better living conditions.

During the perestroika period, the North Caucasus turned into a region of stable interethnic clashes and conflicts, objectively caused by the high level of accumulated socio-political contradictions. The presence of intense competition between national and politicized groups for power and resources has significantly aggravated the situation.

Additional factors were the protest initiatives of the peoples of the North Caucasus, aimed at the rehabilitation of those repressed, the desire to establish a higher status for national formations and the secession of territories from the Russian Federation.

The situation on the eve of the 1st Chechen War

The perestroika declared in 1985 by M. Gorbachev significantly, especially at its initial stage, encouraged society for a possible radical improvement in the situation in the field of rights and freedoms, the restoration of deformed social and national justice.

However, the restoration of humane socialism did not take place, and waves of separatism swept the entire country, especially after the adoption by the first Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR in 1990 of the “Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation.”

Similar acts were very soon adopted by the parliaments of 10 union and 12 autonomous republics. The sovereignization of autonomous entities posed the greatest danger to Russia. Despite this, B. Yeltsin short-sightedly declared that the people of the country are free to acquire “that share of power that they themselves can swallow.”

In fact, interethnic conflicts in the Caucasus ushered in the process of disintegration of the USSR, whose leadership was no longer able to control the development of negative trends directly on its territory, much less in neighboring regions. The Soviet people, as a “new historical community,” ordered to live long.

Almost all regions of the former empire very soon experienced terrible degradation, a decline in living standards and the collapse of civil institutions. It was the political factor that dominated as the main reason, which led, in particular, to the intensification of the national movement in Chechnya.

At the same time, at the initial stage, the Chechens did not strive to become a separate independent republic.

The forces opposing the leadership of the USSR skillfully used separatist tendencies to their advantage, naively hoping that this process was controllable.

During the first two years of perestroika, socio-political tension in Chechnya grew and, in 1987, the Chechen-Ingush society only needed a reason for a spontaneous explosion. This is what led to the construction of an environmentally harmful biochemical plant for the production of lysine in Gudermes.

Very soon, the environmental issue received a political overtones, giving rise to a number of informal associations, independent printed publications and the activation of Muslim spiritual governance - the process began.

Since 1991, the national elite has been intensively renewed, consisting of functionaries of the old party nomenklatura, former military men and national leaders. D. Dudayev, R. Aushev, S. Benpaev, M. Kakhrimanov, A. Maskhadov appeared on the scene as national heroes, around whom the most radical ethnic formations rallied.

The capabilities of nationally oriented functionaries and strata are strengthened and expanded.

At the instigation of the Vainakh Democratic Party (VDP), the First Chechen Congress was held, at which Major General D. Dudayev of the USSR Armed Forces was elected head of the Executive Committee of the Congress and L. Umkhaev as his deputy. The congress adopted the “Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic,” which expressed Chechnya’s readiness to remain an object of the Union of Sovereign Republics.

After which, already at the state level, the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic approved the Act on State Sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (ChIR), which declared the primacy of the Constitution of the Chechen-Ingush Republic over the Constitution of the RSFSR. Natural resources on the territory of the republic were declared the exclusive property of its people.

The Act did not contain a provision on the withdrawal of the ChIR from the RSFSR, however, the leadership and supporters of the VDP and the ChNS clearly interpreted the document in a separatist context. Since that time, a well-known confrontation arose between apologists of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic and members of the Executive Committee of the ChNS. By the fall of 1991, the whole of Chechnya was actually in a pre-revolutionary state.

In August 1991, radical structures held a mass rally in Grozny demanding the resignation of the Armed Forces of the ChIR, which resigned on August 29, 1991. Already in the first ten days of September, OKCHN, headed by Dudayev, completely controlled the situation in the capital, and the National Guard formed by him took possession of the television center and the building of the Council of Ministers of the Republic.

During the storming of the House of Political Education, where meetings of the Supreme Council were held, dozens of deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the capital city council was killed. At this moment, it could still cost a little blood, but Moscow chose not to interfere in these events.

The ensuing dual power led to a significant increase in illegal and outright criminal acts, and the Russian population began to leave the country.

On October 27, 1991, D. Dudayev won the presidential elections. At the same time, elections took place only in 6 of the 14 regions of the republic and, in fact, under martial law.

On November 1, 1991, Dudayev published a decree “On declaring the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic,” which meant the state’s secession from the Russian Federation and the creation of the independent Republic of Ichkeria. (“Ichkeria” is a part of Chechnya where the main structures of the Chechen tribal ethnic group, teips, exist).

In November 1991, at the V Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, elections in Chechnya were declared illegal. By decree (remaining on paper) of B. Yeltsin dated November 7, 1991, a state of emergency was introduced in the Chechen Republic. In response to this, the Chechen parliament delegates additional powers to Dudayev and intensifies the creation of self-defense units. The post of Minister of War is occupied by Yu. Soslambekov.

Having shown obvious incompetence in political forecasting and ability to resolve the situation, the Russian political elite continued to hope that the Dudayev regime would ultimately discredit itself, but this did not happen. Dudayev, ignoring the federal authorities, was already in full control of the situation in the country. In the USSR, since the fall of 1991, there was virtually no real political power, the army was falling apart, and the KGB was going through a period of reorganization.

The Dudayev regime in Chechnya continued to strengthen and was characterized by terror against the population and the expulsion of Russians from the territory of the country. Only during the period from 1991 to 1994 inclusive, about 200 thousand Russians left Chechnya. The Republic was becoming "a smoldering torch of an undeclared war."

Opponents of the Dudayev regime were unable to organize alternative elections and, not recognizing Dudayev’s power, began to form self-defense units - the situation became tense.

In 1992, in Chechnya, the property of military installations of the Russian Armed Forces was forcibly seized. However, oddly enough, soon the weapons of the Dudayev regime take on legal forms. The directive of the commander of the North Caucasus District dated May 26, 1992 prescribes the division of weapons between Chechnya and Russia in equal shares. The transfer of 50% of weapons was legalized by P. Grachev in May 1992. The list of weapons transferred from military depots included:

• 1. launchers (tactical missiles) - 2 units;
• 2. tanks T-62, T-72 - 42 units, BMP-1, BP-2-2 - 36 units, armored personnel carriers and BRDM - 30 units;
• 3. anti-tank weapons: Konkurs complexes - 2 units, Fagot - 24 units, Metis - 51 units, RPG - 113 units;
• 4. artillery and mortars - 153 units;
• 5. small arms - 41538 units. (AKM - 823 units, SVD - 533 units, "Plamya" grenade launchers - 138 units, PM and TT pistols - 10581 units, tank machine guns - 678 units, heavy machine guns - 319 units;
• 5. aviation: about 300 units. different types;
• 6. air defense systems: ZK "Strela"-10 - 10 units, MANPADS-"Igla" - 7 units, anti-aircraft guns of various types - 23 units;
• 7. ammunition: shells - 25740 units, grenades - 154500, cartridges about 15 million.

Mainly due to such a “gift”, and taking into account foreign assistance, Dudayev in a short time managed to create a fully capable army and, in the literal sense, challenged the Russian Federation. In July 1992, units of the Soviet Army located in the republic withdrew from its territory, leaving, with the knowledge of B. Yeltsin, significant reserves of Soviet weapons.

In a political sense, the attempts of Boris Yeltsin's team to resolve the situation in Chechnya were fruitless. The idea of ​​giving it the status of a “special autonomous republic” was not accepted by Dudayev. He believed that the status of the republic should be no lower than that of the CIS members. In 1993, Dudayev announced that Chechnya would not take part in the upcoming elections of the Russian parliament, and in the referendum on the new Constitution of the Russian Federation. To which Yeltsin, on December 7, 1993, announced the closure of borders with the rebellious republic.

Realistically speaking, Moscow benefited from the civil war in Chechnya; the leadership hoped that the majority of the population of the Chechen Republic would be disappointed in the Dudayev regime. Therefore, money and weapons were sent from Russia to the opposition forces.

However, the desire to pacify Ichkeria led to the opposite result. The Chechen war was a huge problem for Russia both in military and economic senses, and for the population it was a real disaster.

Reasons for the start of the Chechen War

In the course of these showdowns, private “oil” issues, aspects of control over cash flows, etc. were resolved. It is for this reason that a number of experts call this conflict a “commercial war.”

Chechnya produced products of almost 1000 items, and the city of Grozny had the highest degree of industrial concentration (up to 50%). Chechen associated petroleum gas was of great importance (1.3 billion cubic meters were produced in 1992). Of particular value are the natural reserves of hard and brown coal, copper and polymetals, and various mineral springs. But the main wealth is, of course, oil. Chechnya is a long-standing center of the Russian oil industry, organized back in 1853.

In the history of oil production, the republic has consistently ranked third after Azerbaijani and American (USA) developments. In the 60s, oil production reached, for example, its maximum level (21.3 million tons), which amounted to about 70% of all Russian production.

Chechnya was the main supplier of fuel and lubricants for the regions of the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia and a number of regions of Russia and Ukraine.

Possession of a developed processing industry has made the republic a leading supplier of aviation oils (90% of all production in the CIS) and a wide range of other processed products (more than 80 items).

Despite this, in 1990, the standard of living in Checheno-Ingushetia was the lowest among other regions of the USSR (73rd place). At the end of the 80s. the number of unemployed in rural areas, where most Chechens lived, reached 75%. Therefore, a considerable part of the population, out of necessity, went to work in Siberia and Central Asia.

Against this background, the complex of causes of the Chechen conflict and its outcome are:

• oil interests of political and economic elites;
• Chechnya's desire for independence;
• low standard of living of the population;
• collapse of the Soviet Union;
• ignoring by the leadership of the Russian Federation the sociocultural characteristics of the population of Chechnya when making a decision on the deployment of troops.

In 1995, the Constitutional Court called the Center’s position in 1991 irresponsible, since “Dudaevism” was generated precisely by its actions, and often simply by inaction. Having destroyed the federal power structures in the republic, Dudayev and his nationalist-minded henchmen promised the population a “new Kuwait”, and “camel milk” from the taps instead of water.

The armed conflict in the Chechen Republic, in terms of the nature of the fighting there, the number of combatants on both sides and the losses that occurred, was a real, bloody war.

The course of hostilities and the main stages of the 1st Chechen War

In the summer of 1994, civil war began. The Dudayevites were opposed by detachments of opposition forces of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic, which were unofficially supported by Russia. Military clashes with mutual, significant losses occurred in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions.

Armored vehicles and heavy weapons were used. With approximately equal forces, the opposition was unable to achieve any significant results.

On November 26, 1994, opposition forces again tried to take Grozny by storm - to no avail. During the assault, Dudayev’s men managed to capture several military personnel and contract soldiers of the Federal Grid Company of the Russian Federation.

It is important to note that by the time the United Forces entered Chechnya, the Russian military leadership had a simplified opinion both about the military potential of Dudayev’s forces and on issues of strategy and tactics of warfare.

This is evidenced by the facts that some generals refused offers to lead the campaign in Chechnya due to their lack of preparation. The attitude of the country's indigenous population to the Russian Federation's intention to send troops was also clearly underestimated, which undoubtedly had a negative impact on the course and outcome of the war.

On December 1, 1994, before the announcement of the decree on the deployment of troops, an air strike was carried out on airfields in Kalinovskaya and Khankala. Thus, it was possible to disable the separatist aircraft.

On December 11, 1994, B. Yeltsin issued Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” The Joint Group of Forces (OGV), with units of the RF Ministry of Defense and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the Chechen Republic in three groups in 3 directions: western (through Ingushetia), northwestern (through the Mozdok region of North Ossetia), eastern (from the regions of Dagestan, Kizlyar ).

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces E. Vorobyov was offered to lead the campaign, but he did not accept the offer, citing unpreparedness for the operation, which was followed by his resignation letter.

Already at the beginning of the entry, the advance of the Eastern (Kizlyar) group in the Khasavyurt area was blocked by residents of Dagestan (Chechens-Akkins). On December 15, she reached the village. Tolstoy-Yurt. The Western (Vladikavkaz) group, which came under fire in the area of ​​the village. Badgers, entered the Chechen Republic. The Mozdok group, having reached the settlement. Dolinsky (10 km from Grozny) fought with the enemy, while coming under fire from the Grad RAU.

12/19-20/1994 The Vladikavkaz group managed to blockade the capital from the west. The Mozdok group succeeded, capturing the settlement. Dolinsky, blockade Grozny from the north-west, Kizlyarskaya - from the east. 104-vdp. blocked the capital of the Chechen Republic from the Argun side, the southern side of the city remained unblocked. In other words, at the entry stage, the OGV engulfed the city from the north.

On December 20, the command of the OGV was entrusted to the First Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces A. Kvashnin.

In the second ten days of December, artillery shelling of the suburban part of Grozny began. On December 19, 1994, bomb attacks were carried out on the center of the capital. At the same time, civilians died, including Russians.

The assault on the capital began on December 31, 1994. The armored vehicles that entered the city (up to 250 units) turned out to be extremely vulnerable on the streets, which could have been foreseen (it was enough to recall the experience of conducting street battles in 1944 in Vilnius by the armored forces of P. Rotmistrov).

The low level of training of the Russian troops, unsatisfactory interaction and coordination between the OGV forces and the lack of combat experience among the fighters also had an impact. What was missing were accurate plans of the city and aerial photographs of it. The lack of closed communication equipment made it possible for the enemy to intercept communications.

The units were ordered to occupy exclusively industrial sites, without invading residential buildings.

During the assault, the western and eastern groups of troops were stopped. In the north are the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st Omsbr. (300 soldiers), battalion and tank company of the 81st infantry regiment. (commander General Pulikovsky), reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. Being surrounded, units of the 131st Omsbr. suffered losses: 85 soldiers were killed, about 100 were captured, 20 tanks were lost.

The eastern group, led by General Rokhlin, also fought under encirclement. Later, on January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groups went under the leadership of Rokhlin. The West group was headed by I. Babichev.

Taking into account considerable losses, the OGV command changed its combat tactics, replacing the massive use of armored vehicles with maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce fighting on the streets of the capital continued.

By 01/09/1995, the OGV took possession of the oil institute and the airport. Somewhat later, the Presidential Palace was captured. The Seperatists were forced to retreat across the river. Sunzha, defending along the periphery of Minutka Square. As of January 19, 1995, only a third of the capital was under the control of the OGV.

By February, the strength of the OGV, now under the leadership of General A. Kulikov, reached 70,000 people.

Only on 02/03/1995, with the formation of the “South” group, full-fledged planned measures began to ensure the blockade of Grozny from the south. On February 9, the OGV forces occupied the line along the Rostov-Baku highway.

In mid-February, a meeting between A. Kulikov and A. Maskhadov took place in Ingushetia, where they discussed a temporary truce. Lists of prisoners were exchanged, and the procedure for removing the dead and wounded was discussed. This relative truce took place with mutual violations of previously reached conditions.

In the third ten days of February, the fighting continued and on 03/06/1995, Sh. Basayev’s units left Chernorechye - Grozny completely came under the control of the OGV. The city was almost completely destroyed. The new administration of the republic was headed by S. Khadzhiev and U. Avturkhanov.

March-April 1995 - the period of the second stage of the war with the task of taking control of the flat part of the Chechen Republic. This stage of the war is characterized by active explanatory work with the population on the issue of criminal activities of militants. Using the pause, units of the OGV were located in advance at dominant, tactically advantageous heights.

By March 23, they captured Argun, and a little later - Shali and Gudermes. However, the enemy units were not eliminated and skillfully took cover, often enjoying the support of the population. Local fighting continued in the west of the Chechen Republic.

In April, a detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reinforced by SOBR and OMON units, fought for the village. Samashki, where Sh. Basayev’s “Abkhaz battalion” was supported by local residents.

On April 15-16, 1995, the next assault on Bamut began, which took place with varying success until the beginning of summer.

In April 1995, the OGV units managed to capture the mostly flat part of the country. After which the militants began to focus on sabotage and guerrilla combat tactics.

May-June 1995 - the third stage of the war for mountain territories. 04/28-05/11/1995 combat activity was suspended. Offensive operations were resumed on May 12, 1995 in the Shali region near the villages of Chiri-Yurt and Serzhen-Yurt, covering the entrances to the Argun and Vedenskoye gorges.

Here, the superior forces of the OGV encountered stubborn resistance from the militants and were able to complete the combat mission only after prolonged artillery shelling and bombing.

Some change in the direction of the attacks made it possible to pin down the enemy forces in the Argun Gorge, and by June the village was taken. Vedeno, and somewhat later Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt.

And at this stage, the separatists did not suffer any significant defeat; the enemy was able to leave a number of villages and, using the “truce,” managed to transfer most of his forces to the north.

On June 14-19, 1995, a terrorist attack occurred in Budyonnovsk (up to 2000 hostages). Losses on our side are 143 people (46 security forces), 415 wounded. The terrorists' losses were 19 killed, 20 wounded.

On June 19-22, 1995, the 1st round of negotiations with the militants took place, and an indefinite moratorium on the conduct of hostilities was concluded.

At the second round (06/27-30/1995), the parties reached an agreement on the procedure for the exchange of prisoners, the disarmament of militants, the withdrawal of the United Forces and the implementation of elections. The truce again turned out to be unreliable and was not respected by the parties. The militants who returned to their villages formed “self-defense units.” Local battles and clashes were occasionally interrupted by formal negotiations.

Thus, in August, separatists under the leadership of A. Khamzatov captured Argun, but the subsequent intense shelling forced them to leave the city. Similar events occurred in Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk, where the militants called themselves “self-defense units.”

On October 6, 1995, there was an attempt on General Romanov’s life, after which he fell into a deep coma. On October 8, 1995, in order to eliminate Dudayev, an airstrike was carried out on the village. Roshni-Chu - dozens of houses were destroyed, 6 residents were killed and 15 were wounded. Dudayev remained alive.

Before the elections in the Russian Federation, the leadership decided to replace the heads of the CHIR administration; D. Zavgaev became a candidate.

10-12.12.1995 Gudermes, where the OGV units were located, was captured by the detachments of S. Raduev and S. Gelikhanov. Within a week they managed to retake the city.

12/14–17/1995 D. Zavgaev wins the elections in Chechnya, receiving more than 90% of the votes. Election events were held with violations, and UGA military personnel also took part in them.

On January 9-18, 1996, a major terrorist attack took place in Kizlyar, with the seizure of the ferry "Avrasia". 256 militants took part in it. Losses on our side were 78 killed and several hundred wounded. On the night of January 18, the terrorists broke out of the encirclement.

On March 6, 1996, the militants managed to capture the Staropromyslovsky district of the capital; several detachments blocked and fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. As they retreated, the militants replenished their supplies with food, medicine and ammunition. Our losses are 70 killed, 259 wounded.

On April 16, 1996, a convoy of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment en route to Shatoi was ambushed not far from the village. Yaryshmards. Having blocked the convoy, the militants destroyed armored vehicles and a significant part of the personnel.

Since the beginning of the campaign, the special services of the Russian Federation have repeatedly made attempts to destroy Dzhokhar Dudayev. It was possible to obtain information that Dudayev often uses the Inmarsat satellite phone for communication.

And finally, on April 21, 1996, Dudayev was eliminated by a missile strike using direction finding of a telephone signal. By a special decree of B. Yeltsin, the pilots who took part in the action were awarded the title of Heroes of the Russian Federation.

The relative successes of the United States Forces did not bring a significant change in the situation - the war became long-lasting. Taking into account the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to re-enter negotiations. At the end of May, in Moscow, the parties reached a truce and determined the procedure for the exchange of prisoners of war. After which, having specially arrived in Grozny, Boris Yeltsin congratulated the OGV on the “victory”.

On June 10, in Ingushetia (Nazran), in continuation of the negotiations, the parties reached an agreement on the withdrawal of the United Forces from the Chechen Republic (excluding two brigades), the disarmament of the separatists and the holding of free elections. The topic of the status of the Czech Republic remained postponed. However, these conditions were not mutually observed. Russia was in no hurry to withdraw troops, and militants carried out a terrorist attack in Nalchik.

06/03/1996 B. Yeltsin was re-elected as president, and the new Secretary of the Security Council A. Lebed announced the continuation of hostilities. Already on July 9, air strikes were carried out against militants in a number of mountainous regions of the Chechen Republic.

On August 6, 1996, the enemy, numbering up to 2,000 militants, attacked Grozny. Without pursuing the goal of capturing Grozny, the separatists blocked a number of central administrative buildings and fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Grozny garrison could not resist the enemy onslaught. The militants managed to capture Gudermes and Argun.

According to experts, it was precisely this outcome of the fighting in Grozny that was the prologue to the Khasavyurt agreements.

On August 31, 1996, in Dagestan (Khasavyurt), representatives of the warring parties signed a truce agreement. Chairman of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed participated on the Russian side, and A. Maskhadov on the Ichkerian side. According to the agreement, the OGV was withdrawn from Chechnya in its entirety. The decision on the status of the Chechen Republic was postponed until December 31. 2001

The beginning of the Chechen War in 1994 was accompanied not only by military operations in the North Caucasus, but also by terrorist attacks in Russian cities. In this way, the militants tried to intimidate the civilian population and force people to influence the government in order to achieve the withdrawal of troops. They failed to sow panic, but many still have difficulty remembering those times.

The disastrous start of the First Chechen War in 1994 forced the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to urgently introduce additional forces and establish interaction between all branches of the military. After this, the first victories began, and federal forces began to quickly advance deeper into the separatist possessions.

The result was access to the suburbs of Grozny and the beginning of the assault on the capital on December 31, 1994. In bloody and fierce battles that lasted until March 6, 1995, Russia lost about one and a half thousand soldiers killed and up to 15 thousand wounded.

But the fall of the capital did not break the resistance of the separatists, so the main tasks were not completed. Before the start of the war in Chechnya, the main goal was the liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev, since the resistance of the militants was largely based on his authority and charisma.

Chronology of the first Chechen war

• December 11, 1994 - troops of the United Group of Russian Forces enter Chechnya from three directions;
• December 12 - The Mozdok group of the OGV takes positions 10 km from Grozny;
• December 15 - Kizlyar group occupies Tolstoy-Yurt;
• December 19 - The Western group bypasses the Sunzhensky ridge and seizes Grozny from the west;
• December 20 - The Mozdok group blocks the capital of Chechnya from the north-west;
• December 20 - The Kizlyar group blocks the city from the east, 104th Guards. The traffic police are blocking the Argun Gorge. Lieutenant General Kvashnin becomes the commander of the OGV;
• December 24 - 28 - Battle of Khankala;
• December 31, 1994 - the beginning of the assault on Grozny;
• January 7, 1995 - change of tactics of federal forces. Airborne assault maneuver groups, supported by aviation and artillery, replaced armored groups that were ineffective in urban combat;
• January 9 - the airport is busy;
• January 19 - the Presidential Palace was taken;
• February 1 - Colonel General Kulikov becomes commander of the OGV;
• February 3 - creation of the southern group of the OGV, the beginning of attempts to block Grozny from the south;
• February 9 - exit to the federal highway Rostov-Baku;
• March 6, 1995 - Grozny came under the full control of the Federal Forces;
• March 10 - the beginning of the battles for Bamut;
• March 23 - Argun was captured;
• March 30 - Shali was taken;
• March 31 - Gudermes was captured;
• April 7 - 8 - operation in the village of Samashki;
• April 28 - May 11 - suspension of hostilities;
• May 12 - the beginning of the battles for Chiri-Yurt and Serzhen-Yurt;
• June 3 - capture of Vedeno;
• June 12 - Nozhai-Yurt and Shatoy were taken;
• June 14 - 19, 1995 - terrorist attack in Budennovsk;
• June 19 - 30 - 2 stages of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides, a moratorium on combat operations, the beginning of a guerrilla and sabotage war throughout Chechnya, local battles;
• July 19 - Lieutenant General Romanov becomes commander of the OGV;
• October 6 - assassination attempt on Lieutenant General Romanov;
• December 10 - 20 - active battles for Gudermes;
• January 9 - 18, 1996 - terrorist attack in Kizlyar;
• March 6 - 8 - fighting in the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny;
• April 16 - an ambush on a convoy of the Russian army in the Argun Gorge (the village of Yaryshmardy);
• April 21, 1996 - liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev;
• May 24 - final capture of Bamut;
• May - July 1996 - negotiation process;
• July 9 - resumption of hostilities;
• August 6 - 22 - Operation Jihad;
• August 6 - 13 - militants invade Grozny, blockade of federal forces in the city;
• from August 13 - unblocking of OGV checkpoints, encirclement of Maskhadov's forces;
• August 17 - ultimatum of General Pulikovsky;
• August 20 - return from vacation of the OGV commander, Lieutenant General Tikhomirov. Condemnation in Moscow of Pulikovsky's ultimatum;
• August 31 - signing of the Khasavyurt agreements. The end of the First Chechen War.

Khasavyurt agreements of 1996

After the events of August and their controversial coverage in the media, society once again spoke out for an end to the war. On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt Peace Agreement was signed, according to which the issue of the status of Chechnya was postponed for 5 years, and all federal forces were to immediately leave the territory of the republic.

The outbreak of the First War in Chechnya should have brought a quick victory, but instead the Russian army lost more than 5 thousand people killed, approximately 16 thousand wounded and 510 missing. There are other figures in which irretrievable losses vary from 4 to 14 thousand military personnel.

Killed militants number from 3 to 8 thousand, and civilian casualties are estimated at 19-25 thousand people. The maximum losses, therefore, can be estimated at 47 thousand people, and of the assigned tasks, only the liquidation of Dudayev was completed successfully.

The 1st Chechen War still serves as a symbol of “Yeltsin’s Russia” - a troubled period in our modern history. We do not undertake to judge unequivocally whether the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreement (and the events preceding it in August 1996) was a betrayal, but it is obvious that it did not solve the problems in Chechnya.

Lessons and consequences of the 1st Chechen War

In fact, after Khasavyurt, Chechnya became an independent state, legally unrecognized by the world community and Russia.

The first Chechen war was not supported by Russian society, which for the most part considered it unnecessary. The negative attitude of Russians towards this war increased extremely after a series of unsuccessful military operations, which led to large casualties.

Many social movements, party associations, and representatives of scientific circles spoke out from harsh, condemning positions. Numerous signatures of people advocating an immediate end to the war were collected in regions and districts of the country.

In some regions, sending conscripts to the Chechen Republic was prohibited. Many generals and officers openly and categorically opposed the war, preferring the tribunal to participation in this particular war.

The results, the course of the war and its consequences were evidence of the extreme short-sightedness of the policy of the country's leadership and the army, since not all possible and effective economic, technological, scientific and political peaceful instruments for resolving the conflict were fully used.

The leadership of the Russian Federation has crossed the line of acceptable measures to localize separatist tendencies. Through its decisions and actions, it largely contributed to the emergence and development of such trends, while revealing a lightweight approach to resolving the issue, bordering on irresponsible.

The main losses in the war were suffered by civilians - more than 40,000 dead, among them about 5,000 children, a lot of people maimed both physically and psychologically. Of the 428 villages in the Chechen Republic, 380 were subjected to air strikes, more than 70% of housing, almost all industry and agriculture were destroyed. There is simply no need to talk about the unjustification of losses among the military.

After the war, houses and villages were not rebuilt, and the collapsed economy was completely criminalized. Due to ethnic cleansing and war, more than 90% of the non-Chechen population completely left the republic (and was destroyed).

The severe crisis and the boom of Wahhabism subsequently led reactionary forces to the invasion of Dagestan and, further, to the beginning of the 2nd Chechen War. The Khasavyurt agreement tightened the knot of the Caucasian problem to the limit.

Nowadays, December 11 in Russia is the Day of Remembrance for those killed in Chechnya. On this day, civilians and military personnel who died during the fighting in the Chechen Republic are remembered. In many cities and towns of the country, commemorative events and mourning rallies are held with the laying of wreaths and flowers at monuments and memorials.

2019 marks the 25th anniversary of the beginning of the 1st Chechen War, and many local district administrations are presenting memorial awards to veterans of military operations in the Caucasus.

Corpses in the back of a truck in Grozny. Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Exactly 23 years ago, on December 11, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety in the territory of the Chechen Republic.” On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs) began military operations in Chechnya. Perhaps some participants in the first clashes were mentally prepared for death, but hardly any of them suspected that they would be stuck in this war for almost two years. And then he will come back again.

I would not like to talk about the causes and consequences of the war, about the behavior of the main characters, about the number of losses, about whether it was a civil war or an anti-terrorist operation: hundreds of books have already been written about this. But many photographs certainly need to be shown so that you never forget how disgusting any war is.

Russian Mi-8 helicopter shot down by Chechens near Grozny. December 1, 1994


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Despite the fact that the Russian army officially began hostilities in December 1994, the first Russian soldiers were captured by the Chechens back in November.


Photo: AP Photo / Anatoly Maltsev

Dudayev's militants pray against the backdrop of the Presidential Palace in Grozny


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

In January 1995, the palace looked like this:


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Dudayev's militant with a homemade submachine gun in early January 1995. In Chechnya in those years, various types of weapons, including small arms, were collected.

Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Destroyed BMP-2 of the Russian army


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Prayer against the backdrop of a fire caused by shrapnel hitting a gas pipe

Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Action


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Field commander Shamil Basayev rides on a bus with hostages


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Chechen militants ambushed a convoy of Russian armored vehicles


Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING

On New Year's Eve 1995, clashes in Grozny were especially brutal. The 131st Maykop Motorized Rifle Brigade lost many soldiers.

Militants fire back at advancing Russian units.


Photo: AP PHOTO / PETER DEJONG

Children play in the suburbs of Grozny


AP PHOTO / EFREM LUKATSKY

Chechen militants in 1995


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev / AFP

Photo: Christopher Morris

Minute Square in Grozny. Evacuation of refugees.

Gennady Troshev at the stadium. Ordzhonikidze in 1995. The lieutenant general led the Joint Group of Troops of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, during the Second Chechen War he also commanded Russian troops, then was appointed commander of the North Caucasus Military District. In 2008, he died in a Boeing crash in Perm.

A Russian serviceman plays a piano left in the central park of Grozny. February 6, 1995


Photo: Reuters

The intersection of Rosa Luxemburg and Tamanskaya streets


Photo: Christopher Morris

Chechen fighters run for cover


Photo: Christopher Morris

Grozny, view from the Presidential Palace. March 1995


Photo: Christopher Morris

A Chechen sniper holed up in a destroyed building takes aim at Russian soldiers. 1996


Photo: James Nachtwey

Chechen negotiator enters neutral zone


Photo: James Nachtwey

Children from an orphanage play on a wrecked Russian tank. 1996


Photo: James Nachtwey

An elderly woman makes her way through the destroyed center of Grozny. 1996


Photo: Piotr Andrews

Chechen militant holds a machine gun during prayer


Photo: Piotr Andrews

A wounded soldier in a hospital in Grozny. 1995


Photo: Piotr Andrews

A woman from the village of Samashki is crying: during an operation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, helicopters or RZSO shot her cows.


Photo: Piotr Andrews

Russian checkpoint at the Council of Ministers, 1995


Photo: AP Photo

People left homeless after the bombing of Grozny cook food on a fire in the middle of the street


Photo: AP Photo/Alexander Zemlanichenko

People fleeing a war zone


Photo: AP Photo/David Brauchli

The CRI command stated that at the height of the conflict up to 12 thousand soldiers fought for it. Many of them were, in fact, children who went to war after their relatives.


Photo: AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky

On the left is a wounded man, on the right is a Chechen teenager in military uniform


Photo: Christopher Morris

By the end of 1995, most of Grozny was ruins


Photo: AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis

Anti-Russian demonstration in the center of Grozny in February 1996


Photo: AP Photo

A Chechen with a portrait of separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, killed in a rocket attack by federal troops on April 21, 1996


Photo: AP Photo

Before the 1996 elections, Yeltsin visited Chechnya and, in front of the soldiers, signed a decree reducing the length of military service.


Photo: AP Photo

Election campaign


Photo: Piotr Andrews

On August 19, 1996, the commander of the group of Russian troops in Chechnya, Konstantin Pulikovsky, issued an ultimatum to the militants. He invited civilians to leave Grozny within 48 hours. After this period, the assault on the city was supposed to begin, but the military leader was not supported in Moscow, and his plan was thwarted.

On August 31, 1996, agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, according to which Russia pledged to withdraw troops from the territory of Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed for 5 and a half years. In the photo, General Lebed, who was then the presidential envoy to Chechnya, and Aslan Maskhadov, the field commander of Chechen militants and the future “president” of the Chechen Republic of Ichnia, are shaking hands.

Russian soldiers drink champagne in the center of Grozny

Russian soldiers are preparing to be sent home after the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements

According to human rights activists, up to 35,000 civilians died during the First Chechen War.


Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING

In Chechnya, the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements was perceived as a victory. In fact, that's what she was.


Photo: AP Photo/Misha Japaridze

Russian troops left with nothing, losing many soldiers and leaving behind ruins.

In 1999, the Second Chechen War will begin...

Throughout my school years, television showed reports about the war in Chechnya - at that time television still covered such things quite objectively, showing this war through the eyes of both sides of the conflict. From the outside, it looked like the Chechens were fighting for the right to live according to their customs and pursue a policy independent of Moscow, and Moscow wanted to deprive them of this right and force them to live according to its own rules.

And then the First Chechen War died down, and then the second. "Wikipedia" in the column "results of the Second Chechen War" writes: "The result is the victory of Russia, the restoration by Russia of full control over the territory of Chechnya." One can agree with the “restoration of full control” (albeit with reservations), but I would argue about the “victory of Russia”.

Let's look at the facts:

— De jure Federal legislation is in force in Chechnya, but de facto there are many legislative nuances, this is noted by many Russian journalists and political scientists, for example, a quote from Yaroslav Trofimov: “Theoretically, Chechnya - although it is predominantly Muslim - is an integral part of the secular Russian Federation, and in "It has the same laws as in Moscow. However, in practice, this North Caucasus republic with a population of 1.4 million people, destroyed and tormented by two wars in a row, lives by completely different rules."

These rules apply, for example, to weddings and other aspects of civil life - at the internal level, even those laws apply that may run counter to federal legislation.

— The leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, pursues a largely independent policy, this is noted by many researchers of the issue. This is what Mikhail Khodorkovsky said in one of his interviews published in The New York Times: “In many respects, Chechnya is a practically independent Islamic republic, where Sharia law is widespread. Some neighboring republics have only the appearance of belonging to a federal structure.”

That is, in essence, the Chechens retained the right to live the way they want and resolve issues in their own way.

— From the 2000s to the present, the Chechen Republic has been one of the most subsidized regions of Russia; colossal funds are sent there. I have come across different figures, but in general, all the graphs put Chechnya in the top 5 among the subsidized regions of Russia; only Dagestan, Kamchatka and Crimea are higher than Chechnya (data for 2016). In my opinion, this state of affairs suits both the central Russian government and the Chechens themselves, this is what Chechen parliament member Magomet Khambiev (former assistant to Dudayev) says: “If Dudayev were alive now, he would like everything he saw . He would say: “Ramzan managed to do what I couldn’t do.”

In this regard, I have a question - why were two Chechen wars needed and what was their real outcome?

Because now everything looks as if Chechnya did not lose in that struggle for independence, but won - the Chechens live the way they want, and even receive colossal funds from Moscow.