Battalion centuries Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. Internal troops. Separate commandant battalions of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia
Preface by Veremeeva Yu.G.
People who are quite far (and not very far) from, as it has now become fashionable to call in the press, security forces, do not particularly distinguish and do not see a significant difference between the Russian Army and the Internal Troops of Russia. As before, they did not see the difference between the military formations of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Moreover, in the nineties of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century, in armed conflicts within the country, units and formations of the RA and VV often performed the same military tasks in the same areas. And often the police (riot police, special forces) and even units of the Ministry of Justice (Special Forces of the GUFSIN) got involved here.
So who and why needed such a division of the armed forces, especially since it did not benefit the cause? Army divisions and regiments are subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, divisions, regiments and battalions of the Internal Troops are subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The subordination of units to various departments in itself creates conditions for mutual misunderstanding, complicates the management of combat operations and coordination of efforts, and even gives rise to certain frictions.
Moreover, war is generally not an area of activity that the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and especially the Ministry of Justice, should deal with. War is the destiny of the Army. Any war. And what happened (and has not ended to this day) in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan cannot be called anything other than war. Although the Russian leadership came up with elegant names for what was happening. Either “establishing constitutional order” or “counter-terrorist operation”. Just not to admit to ourselves that there is a war going on in the country. A kind of ostrich policy. Like, we don’t see any war. Although all citizens and everyone abroad openly call what is happening a war.
All this confusion with the explosives began in the early nineties, when everyone’s “beloved first president of Russia, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin,” for the sake of the feeble-minded Russian intelligentsia, solemnly and loudly proclaimed that “... from now on the Army will never be used against its citizens,” although even It was already clear to ordinary but thinking citizens that this was simply an unscrupulous attempt by the Kremlin cronies to deceive the country. After all, it is enough to announce that since yesterday the N division is subordinate not to the Ministry of Defense, but to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in order to legally assign it to suppress unrest in any region of the country.
Today, the Internal Troops are larger in number than the Russian Army. They are better organized, equipped, trained, armed, including heavy weapons (except for strategic missiles and heavy aircraft).
This gives rise to certain thoughts that today’s democratic leadership of Russia is not at all afraid of an external enemy, and is not going to protect the country and fellow citizens from attack from the outside, but is extremely concerned about the “internal enemy,” i.e. robbed and robbed by the new authorities of their compatriots.
Of course, foreign banks and governments, where the modern Russian aristocracy keeps their money, do not threaten their deposits (as long as they obediently follow the instructions of the US State Department). But the indignant “rabble” within the country may try to call the gentlemen who promised universal prosperity to account. And from here it is clear that in such a case we need an internal army that will suppress any rebellion and protect the villas, estates, Mercedes and yachts of the New Russian landowners. And if someone from outside attacks, and the question of the existence of the Russian state itself arises, the gentlemen will jump into their personal liners and depart for the “beautiful far away”, from where they can very sweetly grieve about the fate of Russia and tell how much they did for the prosperity of the Motherland, which is theirs. I didn’t understand and didn’t appreciate it.
And we can only hope that the Internal Troops will be able to do what the now destroyed Russian Army should have done, i.e. protect the country.
So where did the explosives come from, and what did they do during the existence of the Soviet Union, is what veteran of the Internal Troops Valery Timofeevich Vlasenko is trying to tell. This will help readers understand the place and role of explosives in the past, their difference from the Soviet Army, before they transformed into what we have today.
I in no way want to say that BB is the support and hope of today’s democratic regime, that they are the faithful dogs of Russian oligarchs, deputies and other soon-to-be rich (which they would very much like). I respect the soldiers and officers of the Air Force as much as I do the army, and I flatter myself with the hope that in the event of a threat to the country, both of them will defend Russia shoulder to shoulder, without thinking about departmental affiliation.
End of the preface.
Few people really know anything about what is now commonly written in the press, a “power structure” like the internal troops, what they are intended for and what they do.
In the glorious times of the deceased USSR, there were internal troops (VV), which did not belong to the internal affairs bodies, but existed on their own. Although they were subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and not the Ministry of Defense (MOD).
The tasks of explosives in the Soviet Union were:
1. Protection of public order in large cities (cities with a population of more than 1 million people, as well as the capitals of the union republics).
2. Security of places of detention (correctional labor institutions). Escorting persons under investigation, defendants, as well as convicted persons on their way to places of deprivation of liberty.
3. Protection of particularly important government facilities (nuclear power plants, defense plants, bridges over large rivers, important tunnels, dams, etc.).
4. Protection of particularly important government cargo during their transportation.
Usually, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are known from numerous books, films, songs, etc., which incredibly proliferated during the years of “perestroika,” as troops that exclusively mocked innocent “prisoners.” Few people know what these troops actually were.
In fact, the role of these troops in the Soviet state was quite significant, although not particularly honorable. The functions performed by the explosives were vital to the state.
From the author. After reading the list of tasks of the Internal Affairs, you will agree that in a modern state, these functions need to be performed by someone. After all, in addition to the bank manager and office managers, the staff also includes a cleaner and a janitor, who are necessary for the normal functioning of this bank. These are the realities of life.
The internal troops, although directly part of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, existed separately. For example, military units stationed in any region were not subordinate to the head of the local Internal Affairs Directorate (internal affairs department).
The Internal Troops, like the Soviet Army, were recruited exclusively by conscription, command personnel were trained in military schools of the Ministry of Internal Affairs according to programs close to the programs of combined arms schools (with their own specifics, of course), the structure of the troops was army type. Armament - light small arms (up to a hand grenade launcher).
Equipment such as armored personnel carriers were available in single copies, and even then only when necessary. For example, the operational regiment of the Internal Troops, stationed in Grozny during the Soviet era, was armed with old-style armored personnel carriers such as the BTR-152, although even twenty years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, in 1965-68, this regiment had to catch armed gangs hiding in the mountains.
Task 1."Protection of public order in large cities (cities with a population of more than 1 million people, as well as the capitals of the union republics)."
This means that military patrols were allocated from the Internal Troops to assist territorial police forces. What were the explosive units that performed this task? This was by no means riot police in the modern sense. These are SMChM - specialized motorized police units. Let's see what it is.
Specialized motorized police unit (SMPM).
Organization
A specialized motorized police unit (SMMU) is a battalion of approximately the army staff (350-400 people), but with its own variations.
There were two types of battalions - the so-called "company strength" and "platoon strength". The difference was in the number of personnel and organization.
Usually the need for the number of personnel was justified by the country's highest party leadership. So, for example, in the cities of Kyiv and Leningrad there is a whole regiment. In Moscow, naturally, there are somewhat more - the famous division named after. Dzerzhinsky (OMSDON).
A company battalion was usually stationed in a large city where the population exceeded 1.5 million people. It consisted of two to three patrol companies of three platoons and an automobile company (two or three automobile platoons and a utility platoon).
The platoon battalion was stationed in a large city with a population of over a million. Consisted of 4-5 patrol platoons and one or two automobile platoons.
The rank and file and junior command staff of such battalions were recruited in the same way as regular army units - by conscription.
Officers were trained at the military command schools of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Kharkov Higher Military School of Logistics.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs also had other schools, not entirely military, but rather paramilitary. For example - fire-technical ones.
But the Internal Troops were recruited only from their military schools, although signal specialists and chemists were also sent from the schools of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
Officers and warrant officers, in addition to regular army identification cards, additionally had police identification cards.
Schedule
In the battalion, there were three daily routine options for conscript personnel.
The usual daily routine is patrol duty.
The daily routine on weekends is patrol duty on Saturday and Sunday.
Weekend schedule: Monday. The battalion did not go out for service that day.
A typical day in the battalion began with the personnel getting up at 8.30 am. Therefore, all officers and warrant officers arrived at the battalion by this time.
Then, as usual, exercise, washing, making the beds and breakfast. After breakfast, leave for classes and combat and political training as scheduled. Next - lunch, half an hour of personal time, changing clothes.
Divorce for service at 15.00. All personnel are present at the service. The appearance and equipment of patrols, knowledge of the Charter of the Combat Service of Explosives and the procedure for the use of physical force and special equipment are carefully checked.
After this, the personnel board the vehicles (foot patrols - on trucks, auto patrols - on cars) and columns of vehicles each move to the city police department where they will serve today.
Estimated time of arrival at the police department is 16.00. On duty - until 23.30-00.00.
Dinner, evening check-in, lights out at 00.30 (but no later than 01.00).
Naturally, we get up the next morning at 08.30.
Carrying out service.
Let me remind you that the military units of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR were not directly subordinate to the local chief of the Internal Affairs Directorate. Subordination was only in operational terms. This means that on certain days and times a certain number of patrols were deployed in the city. During service, military detachments were subordinate to the duty officer at the Internal Affairs Directorate, and at the end of the service, the patrols left the subordination of the duty officer.
The main type of activity is patrolling city streets in pairs (a patrol consists of two people, one of them is the patrol leader, the second is a patrol officer). The patrol equipment is standard police equipment - a wearable radio station for the patrol chief and a can of "Cheryomukha-10" (not always issued, but only upon special instructions), the patrolman has a field bag-tablet, everyone has a whistle.
In the early 90s, rubber batons made of white soft rubber, more like whips, came into service. Issued for service by special order. Weapons - pistols in service were only carried by officers and warrant officers. Upon arrival at the police department, the personnel are additionally briefed by the leadership of the police department on the specific situation in the area, orientations are read out, etc.
Note by Veremev Yu.G. It’s even somehow strange. The totalitarian regime, judging by numerous writings of the modern democratic press, is passionately hated by all citizens - and at the same time there are no riot police or special forces in the country, explosive patrols are armed with a maximum of gas canisters. And the number of explosive troops is very, very small. Imagine - for a city with a population of 1.5 million - 400 patrol officers. Today, in democratic Russia, a regime that is “approved” and “loved” by literally everyone, the explosives outnumber the army and are equipped with all types of weapons, with the exception of strategic missiles and strategic bombers.
Who intends to defend themselves and from whom?
Then the patrols disperse into patrol areas. If the patrol area is far away - (15-20 minutes on foot) they are transported in cars.
Previously, while still at the unit’s location, each patrol is assigned a patrol area and is instructed about the specifics of the service, hot spots, and locations of local police officers.
For every 5-8 patrols, a patrol section chief is appointed from among the warrant officers (in a patrol car). For all patrols operating in the area there is a duty officer for military detachments (an officer or warrant officer in a patrol car).
Typically, the patrol area was a block of residential buildings, which can be walked around at a leisurely pace in 1 hour. Each patrol chief had a map of his patrol area on his tablet. The patrol route was laid out in such a way that the patrolled block was located inside the route.
On each patrol route there was a point (the so-called “strong point”), at which (and only there) the patrol processed the detainees.
In addition, there were four “control points” along the route. This meant that when going around the route, the patrol had to be at the first control point at 15 minutes of every hour, at the second at 30 minutes, at the third at 45 minutes, and “at zero” at the fourth control point. The patrol was supposed to stay at the control point for 3-5 minutes, then continue patrolling along the route. Any deviation from the route was prohibited, except in cases of arrest of a violator of public order. But at the same time, the patrol had to immediately report by radio where and why it was leaving the route. Naturally, when the patrol “left” the route, a car immediately drove there either with the head of the patrol station (NPU) or with the officer on duty at military detachments (DVN).
In the normal mode of duty, both the NPU and the DVN had to check all subordinate patrols within an hour with a mark on the patrol checklist, that is, during seven hours of service, each patrol had to be checked 7-14 times. The records of verified patrols were kept by a special patrolman, who worked according to a special method in the vehicle of the corresponding commander (usually a company clerk). He also monitored the departure of patrols from the route via radio traffic. The check was carried out by driving around patrol areas at control points.
The absence of a patrol on a CT without a good reason was considered a grave violation of the rules of service; a thorough investigation was carried out and the perpetrators, usually the patrol chief, were punished.
If the DVN drove along the route of the patrol area and did not detect the patrol, it requested the location of the patrol by radio. The very fact of requesting the location of a patrol was the basis for punishing the patrolmen by the appropriate commander.
Entering shops and cafes for the purpose of purchasing something was also a violation of duty, but if the patrol officers adhered to the time schedule, they turned a blind eye to it.
There was another type of inspection of duty, the most unpleasant for patrol officers - the so-called “secret secret”. During a secret inspection of the service, the observation of the patrol service (or two adjacent ones) was carried out by an officer or warrant officer in civilian clothes. At the same time, he naturally tried to be unnoticed by the patrol.
All patrol actions were recorded with further “debriefing”. Silence was used quite often; only the chief of staff of the battalion knew where and when it would be carried out.
Rewards and punishments were applied only upon completion of service and return to the unit's location. The DVN did not have the right to punish patrol officers, especially since the DVN was often not their direct superior.
When a violator was detained, the patrol chief immediately reported his call sign to the central radio station that he had withdrawn from the route with the detainee to such and such a point (address). For example: “Riga-2, I am 704 on foot, I photographed with a detainee in the Lenin Palace of Culture.”
If necessary, he asked for help. Usually, a motor patrol from the Department of Internal Affairs or the NPU arrived at the same point, who controlled the actions of the patrol, checked the protocol drawn up and delivered the detainee with accompanying documents to the police department. When assistance was requested, nearby patrols usually came running.
After handing over the detainee to the motor patrol, the foot patrol returned to its route according to the time schedule. The patrols carried out their service on the street; burglaries and domestic hooliganism were usually not used, except in cases where citizens directly contacted them. In this case, the algorithm of actions was standard - report by radio, advance to the scene of the incident, if possible, detain the perpetrators, guard the scene of the incident until the arrival of the operational group from the police department. Then - a detailed written report to the head of the police department.
Patrol officers were specially trained in how to deal with citizens, how to introduce themselves, what questions to ask, etc.
At the end of the service (23.00), the patrols returned to the police department, where the results of the service were summed up (5-10 minutes). Then the convoy of vehicles returned to the unit, the immediate commanders summed up the results of the service.
Armament.
The armament of personnel is standard for army motorized rifle units with the exception of heavy weapons:
Officers - PM pistols.
Personnel - AK-74 assault rifle (per squad with an RPK light machine gun).
The battalion had several RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers.
Transport.
There was quite a lot of transport in the battalion, usually 30-40 patrol cars, in connection with this the battalion commander (lieutenant colonel) had a deputy for technical department (major).
*Patrol cars - UAZ-469, with special signals "flash beacon" and "siren". They had special police colors (in police jargon - “canary”).
*GAZ-53 trucks (so-called “combat vehicles”) for transporting personnel.
In addition to them, there were several “household” vehicles such as a refrigerator, a bread truck, etc.
All vehicles had regular civilian license plates. Without exception, all cars had radio stations. 98% of patrol cars were supposed to be on duty every day. , If the machine breaks down due to a malfunction, then after 16 hours it should be running. Only 1 patrol car could be repaired for more than a day (engine repair, etc.).
Connection.
The battalion had about 150-200 radio stations. These were portable radio stations with one radio station per patrol plus backup ones.
In addition, each car had a car radio.
When serving in the duty department of the Internal Affairs Directorate in the city (service 02), an operator was posted at the central radio station, who conducted radio exchanges with all military patrols. All conversations were recorded by sound recording and in a radio log.
Portable radio stations provided communication between foot patrols within a radius of 1-2 km, and between foot and vehicle patrols - up to 5 km.
The central radio station had the power to communicate with all portable and car radio stations.
Typically, the city had radio silence zones, which was due to the peculiarities of urban conditions. But usually patrols were not sent to these places, or measures were taken to ensure stable communications.
Upon entering service, each patrol received a radio station and a fully charged battery for it in the unit. Naturally, all personnel knew how to use radio stations, because One of the first classes with recruits was a lesson on radio business (including the rules of radio communication). Radio exchange was carried out according to a simplified scheme, and the rules of radio exchange differed significantly from the army rules.
Example: “Riga-2, I’m 704, I’m in touch,” “704, I’m in touch with Riga-2.” Numerical data on the radio was pronounced like this: “seven zero four.” If necessary, transfer, for example, the license plate number of the infringing vehicle 29-32 GOSH - “two nine three two Grigory Olga Shura.” To confirm the message, they usually responded with “accepted.” Violation of radio communication rules was punishable by disciplinary procedure.
Outfit.
All personnel of the specialized motorized police battalions of the Internal Troops were dressed in police uniforms, and not in army-type uniforms, which were worn in other parts of the Internal Troops.
The soldiers had a field uniform cut like an army one, but made of gray-blue cotton fabric. This uniform was used only inside the unit, during classes, equipment maintenance and household work, as well as when going on field training (fire training, tactics, etc.).
Uniforms were issued at the rate of 4 sets for 2 years of service. Since the soldiers wore this uniform only about 30% of the time on duty, the preservation of the field uniform was quite good.
Boots are an analogue of tarpaulin boots, but entirely made of leather (yuft). In the capitals of the Union republics and hero cities - officers' chrome ones.
Basically, in specialized motorized police battalions, the explosives wore everyday uniforms. The everyday uniform consisted of untucked trousers and chrome boots or breeches and boots (depending on the weather). Police jacket, shirt, tie. When wearing boots, wear an officer's belt.
Everyday uniforms were issued for a year, and everyone was entitled to two everyday shirts. The ceremonial dress is the same as the everyday dress, but with a white shirt, gold shoulder straps and ceremonial metallic buttonholes.
Police ceremonial belt (military officer type).
The shirt must have shoulder straps.
In winter - a police coat or a police sheepskin coat, as well as boots or felt boots (depending on the weather).
From the author. Externally, the BB patrol differed from ordinary police in its smartness, age, cleanliness and elegance of uniform (this was monitored very strictly). It is impossible to imagine that a serviceman would be sent to serve without a haircut, in unironed uniforms, uncleaned shoes, etc. Naturally, the fitting of the uniform to the figure of the patrolman was carried out especially carefully, even sometimes it was necessary to alter the uniform to the figure of an ordinary patrolman in the military trade studio. By the way, the tailoring of uniforms was carried out not according to army patterns, but according to police ones - the uniform fit the soldier’s figure much better than the army one.
Nutrition.
The food norm from the general army No. 1 differed in the increased amount of meat (by 50g), butter, and sugar.
The food was prepared by civilian cooks, but there were also soldier cooks. The head of the canteen (also known as the chef) is a warrant officer.
The canteen staff from among the soldiers of the battalion was assigned for a day.
From the author. The food was usually prepared very tasty, but there were certain difficulties that no one paid attention to in the army units of the Ministry of Defense, but which had to be taken into account in the Internal Troops.
The fact is that, according to supply standards, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the Ministry of Defense, supplied a certain assortment of cereals, including the less popular pearl barley, oatmeal, and millet. But if the soldiers ate buckwheat and rice porridge with pleasure, then pearl barley, oatmeal, millet - alas!
Seeing pearl barley or oatmeal on the table, the soldiers will simply drink tea with bread and butter, and not touch the porridge. Therefore, the rear officers had to resort to various tricks. For example, pearl barley went well in pickle soup, and millet in soup. The cooks prepared pea soup in such a way that almost everyone ate it with great pleasure. Oatmeal usually had to be used on farms as feed for pigs. Otherwise, while on patrol, a soldier will easily violate the order of duty and find an opportunity to go into a store or cafe.
A special feature of the SMCM was that the soldiers were selected according to special criteria.
The first is nationality. There were mainly Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, a small number of Balts, nationalities of the Volga region - Chuvash, Mordvins, Mari, Tatars. There were no Caucasians or Central Asians at all.
Secondly, everyone spoke Russian, and without an accent.
Third - education of at least 10 grades (complete secondary school). The fact is that the patrolman had to be able to competently draw up a report to the police department about the incident. By the way, special training sessions on report writing were held with the personnel.
The fourth is physical training. The conscript had to be at least 170 cm tall with the appropriate build. Imagine a policeman, a meter tall with a cap, trying to detain a drunken big hooligan 180 tall (with the exception of drivers and cooks, i.e. those who were not directly involved in patrol duty).
By the way, a similar growth qualification still exists today when selecting candidates for service in the police, especially in patrol units.
The fifth is the absence of police records before conscription, as well as the absence of criminal records of relatives.
Such criteria for selecting conscripts meant that the soldiers were truly selected. In addition, compassionate fathers and mothers, by hook or by crook, sought to place their overage children in a “warm place.” Therefore, there were a lot of so-called “sons”. True, the attitude towards the “sons” on the part of the commanders was even harsher than towards all other soldiers.
Parents usually asked commanders to raise their children more harshly, especially the unlucky ones. There were calls when the “sons” made up almost the entire call.
The discipline was strict, but not cruel. Officers and warrant officers in the ranks addressed each other by rank, according to the Charter of the Internal Service. At the same time, outside the ranks - by name and patronymic. But if at a meeting the battalion commander addressed someone by rank, expect trouble. Soldiers naturally addressed their superiors by rank. Let me remind you that the officers were with the soldiers almost constantly and around the clock. Much in the battalion was unusual from the point of view of a person who arrived in the battalion from ordinary explosive units.
So, for example, a monthly service schedule for officers and warrant officers was drawn up, which indicated unit duty and patrol duty, as well as days off. If for some reason an officer or warrant officer was called into service on his scheduled day off, the issue of postponing the day off to a specific day was immediately resolved. Moreover, on the initiative of the boss, and not the subordinate.
On Saturday and Sunday, officers and warrant officers assigned to patrol duty arrived at the unit by 3 p.m. After completing their service, officers and warrant officers were transported home in a specially designated vehicle.
The next day after the service, they arrived at the unit not at 8.30, but at 11.00.
At the end of the service, an officer or warrant officer on duty remained in each unit until the company commander arrived, after which he went home to rest until the next morning.
The daily squad partly entered service in the morning at 09.00, and before that the personnel were not involved in service, resting from 22.00 to 07.00.
After a shift, the unit on duty went home to rest until the next morning, the rest of the personnel of the replaced unit rested (went to bed) until 14.00, after which they began patrol duty.
The unit squad usually consisted of a unit duty officer (an officer or an experienced warrant officer), an assistant duty officer (conscript sergeant), guards for guarding the military camp, internal company squads, a vehicle fleet squad and a canteen squad. The peculiarity was that all the outfits had radio stations.
The unit duty officer was not required to constantly be at the checkpoint in the duty unit. Having taken the radio station, the duty officer constantly walked around the territory of the unit, checking the performance of the duty of the detachment. If necessary, the assistant could find the person on duty at any time.
From the moment they arrived at the unit, the personnel became accustomed to the order of the battalion and considered order and traditions to be completely natural.
By the way, strict discipline was organically combined with concern for personnel.
For example, if a soldier’s mother came to stay with him, then for this period the soldier was granted leave, and if the mother wished, after a meeting with her son she would be taken to the station for the train.
There was a saying in the battalion: a soldier has just thought of doing something, but the commanders already know.
The authority of the sergeants was very high. The fact is that there was order in the battalion - soldiers who served in the battalion for six months and were selected for their business and leadership qualities were sent to sergeant “training”.
For various sins while on patrol duty, the punishment was practically standard - after arriving at the unit, the patrol chief cleaned the company bathroom, the patrolman washed the barracks stairs with soap.
There were practically no unauthorized absences. If a soldier needed to go into the city for some business, the commanders usually resolved this issue positively.
Drunkenness among personnel was generally beyond comprehension. This was usually followed by a transfer from the battalion “to the tower,” that is, to the convoy unit for the protection of the correctional labor colonies. But during the two and a half years of my service in the battalion there were no such cases.
An interesting point - in the army there were the ranks of “warrant officer” and “senior warrant officer”; in the police there were no such ranks yet (they were introduced only in 1994). Therefore, former army warrant officers and senior warrant officers who transferred to serve in the SMChM battalion wore the shoulder straps of a police sergeant. But in the unit everyone knew who was just a warrant officer and who was a senior warrant officer.
There was also the rank of "corporal" in the army. Naturally, there were corporals in the battalion, but they did not wear corporal insignia, because There were no such ranks in the police and there are no such ranks.
Performance results.
Usually, military detachments, by decision of the head of the Internal Affairs Directorate, were deployed to those areas of the city where the criminal situation was complicated. The high density of coverage of the territory by patrols allowed for good control of the city. The very presence of a police squad on the street already has a rather sobering effect on violators of public order. At the same time, the BB patrol units fought quite effectively against street crime, drunkenness and hooliganism on the streets. There were cases of solving street robberies, and the soldiers were encouraged by the leadership of the Internal Affairs Directorate with cash bonuses.
When our battalion left on a business trip to Nagorno-Karabakh in February 1988, according to statistics, the number of offenses on the city streets increased by a third.
Task 2."Security of places of detention (correctional labor institutions). Escorting persons under investigation, defendants, as well as convicts on the way to places of deprivation of liberty."
This task was carried out by escort units of the explosives.
Convoy unit.
These are military units of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, organized approximately like military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, i.e. shelves. The regiments had an army structure: battalion-company-platoon-squad.
However, the specific staff, location and number of personnel depended on the specific tasks performed by the convoy unit, i.e. regiment
Usually, in a large populated area there was a regimental administration, and around the city (depending on the number and location of Correctional Labor Institutions (ITU)) at some distance from it there were several separately stationed units (SDU), of which there could be up to 20.
These units provided security for Correctional Labor Institutions (ITU). The distance of these units from the regiment's control could be up to 300 km.
Several of these separate units could be combined into a battalion, or they could be directly subordinate to the regiment's command. There were many variations, as well as variations in the size of a particular unit.
Separately stationed unit (SDU).
The structure and number of the ODP depended on the size of the protected object (protected perimeter).
The fact is that along the perimeter of the protected object, at certain intervals (about 200 meters), observation towers were installed, on which sentries served.
Based on the number of towers, the required number of personnel of such a separately stationed unit was calculated. It was usually called a convoy company.
Most often, the convoy company had the strength to have two full-fledged guards. The guards served every other day, i.e. Today, one guard takes up duty, the second is resting: doing everyday business, studying.
In addition, the company displayed an internal outfit daily. There was also a service department (drivers, cooks, radio operators).
Typically a company consisted of two or three platoons and a service section.
One of the platoons was a platoon of supervisory controllers. This platoon consisted of warrant officers.
If the soldiers served along the perimeter of the guarded facility and did not have access inside, then the controllers, on the contrary, performed their official duties inside the facility, and during their service were under the direct operational subordination of the DPNK (duty assistant to the head of the colony).
DPNK is the main duty officer inside the protected facility. He is not a soldier of a convoy company, but belongs to the correctional system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, i.e. has a different official subordination.
A convoy company could have up to 100 or more people.
To protect objects with a particularly long perimeter that required a large number of personnel, convoy battalions were created, which were divided directly into platoons, bypassing the company level. Typically, such a convoy battalion had from 4 to 7 platoons.
Separately stationed units formed the basis of the convoy units. At their core, they were a small military unit, with its own barracks, canteen, club, parade ground, and vehicle fleet.
The convoy company was commanded by a captain. In addition to the company commander, the company management staff included a deputy for political affairs (senior lieutenant) and platoon commanders (senior lieutenants).
At the end of the 80s, the position of deputy company commander for general issues was introduced (although it was later reduced). The company sergeant major dealt with all rear issues.
Author's note. In the early 90s, there was a massive reduction in the number of “special contingents”. Many convicts were given amnesty. Correctional labor institutions began to rapidly empty. The leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, obviously not understanding that the convoy units guard not the number of convicts, but the perimeter of the facility, began to reduce the number of convoy units of the explosives, although the guard does not care how many convicts are currently inside the facility - whether it’s one and a half thousand, or one hundred people - the number of posts does not change, since it depends on the length of the perimeter of the object. The reduction in the number of personnel in convoy units led to a sharp decrease in the reliability of security.
And if you take into account that those who fled were mostly those convicted of serious crimes (murder, robbery, robbery, etc.), you can imagine what the reduction in the number of convoy units of the explosives turned out to be for the citizens of the country. And the “dashing nineties” began.
The difference between the convoy unit and the administration of the correctional facility.
Representatives of the ITU administration worked directly with the convicts. Usually these are officers of the so-called “internal service”, who belonged to the penal system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and were subordinate to the head of the local police department. These were semi-civilian employees, but in army-style uniforms with maroon buttonholes. They had no direct relationship with the internal troops, although they collaborated during their service.
The administration of the correctional facility included: - The head of the colony, the deputy head of the colony, employees of the operational part of the colony, the heads of groups of convicts, production workers: shop managers, site foremen, etc.
The daily life of the correctional facility was supervised by the duty assistant to the head of the colony (DPNK), under whose operational subordination a detachment of warrant officers - the so-called supervisory controllers - was allocated from the escort unit of the Internal Troops.
Deployment of the escort company.
Usually companies were located close to the guarded object (at a distance of up to 1 km), but there were cases when the distance from the company to the object was greater - up to 5-10 km.
The fact is that usually the object consisted of two zones - a residential zone and an industrial one. Sometimes the industrial zone was located at a considerable distance from the residential one. For example, the construction of any industrial premises.
In this case, the company constantly guarded the residential area and, in addition, daily escorted convicts to the construction site, guarded them at the work site, and then escorted them back.
The company premises itself did not belong to the troops, but to a protected facility. That is, if repairs were necessary, money and materials were allocated by the protected facility; the management of the convoy unit did not allocate any funds for these purposes.
Armament.
Convoy companies were armed like ordinary motorized rifle units - all soldiers were armed with AK-74 assault rifles, in addition, there were two or three RPK light machine guns per company. There were no heavier weapons.
From the author. So idle fantasies about how poor, unfortunate prisoners were shot from towers with machine guns are complete nonsense of writers and directors. At a distance of about 100-200 meters, a conventional machine gun is no less effective than a light machine gun. In addition, firing inside the zone was strictly prohibited by the Internal Troops Combat Service Charter.
For service, soldiers were usually armed with AK-74 assault rifles with an ammunition load of 2 full magazines of ammunition (60 rounds). In the early 90s, service was issued with 20 rounds of ammunition in 2 magazines (10 rounds each). In addition, in the company's weapons storage room (WW) each soldier had 2 fully loaded magazines in a cell in case of an alarm.
Particular attention was paid to ensure that during service, soldiers did not put a cartridge into the chamber, since in this case the possibility of an accidental shot increased many times over. When a cartridge is chambered, a mark from the firing pin remains on the cartridge primer, the so-called “prick”. For control, after changing the guard and handing over weapons and ammunition to the CWC (weapon storage room), each soldier placed his cartridges in a special block. The company duty officer inspected the cartridges and if he noticed a mark from the firing pin (“puncture”), he immediately reported to the responsible officer. Naturally, corrective measures were immediately taken - moral and in the form of disciplinary action.
Transport.
A separately stationed unit usually had 2-3 units of transport. This is a vehicle for transporting convicts (paddy wagon), a truck for transporting personnel and cargo, and sometimes a passenger car of the UAZ-469 type.
It was strictly forbidden to transport personnel or cargo in paddy wagons. Transport was supplied with fuel and lubricants from the regiment administration (gasoline and oil coupons were issued), maintenance and repairs were carried out by the drivers.
Once every six months, the repair department from the regimental administration traveled by car to separately stationed units and carried out seasonal maintenance. The rest of the time, maintaining transport in good condition was the task of the commander and sergeant major of separately stationed units.
Outfit.
All military personnel were provided with the same uniforms and according to the same supply standards as the military units of the Ministry of Defense.
The difference is in the colors of the shoulder straps and buttonholes (maroon, not scarlet, like those of army motorized riflemen) and on the shoulder straps of conscripts - the letters BB. Field (khaki) shoulder straps were not worn, only colored ones.
In winter, when it was very cold, sheepskin coats (sometimes sheepskin coats) and felt boots were issued to posts. Quilted cotton pants were used.
Sometimes in units, military workshops sewed masks from flannelette fabric, which soldiers wore to protect their faces in severe frosts and winds.
Getting off topic. Where did the maroon color of the internal troops come from?
Reference.
October 2, 1829. The Minister of War assigned edgings (edgings) of maroon color to the ranks of the Separate Corps of the Internal Guard.
Nutrition.
Food supply standards were similar to those in the army.
Each separately stationed unit had a catering unit. Since food was prepared for a small number of personnel, the prepared dishes were always of good quality and the food was tasty.
The cooks were mostly conscripts, but sometimes they were civilian women.
Food was delivered to the guard in thermoses, and they were delivered either manually (if the distance was short) or by transport. In many units, especially in rural areas, there were horses for household needs (not riding).
At night, the guard received the so-called extra ration - usually bread and lard sandwiches and hot tea.
In addition, there was always bread and onions on the table for meals (especially in winter). Food for the day was obtained from the ITU food warehouse, which was always located outside the protected area. Almost every separately stationed unit had a subsidiary farm, which had 1-2 cows, pigs, and sometimes chickens and rabbits. Almost everywhere there were greenhouses, in which green onions were mainly grown, and sometimes greens for seasoning food. This depended on the economic abilities of the company sergeant major.
Internal order and discipline.
The peculiarity of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was that they were recruited on a residual basis. When conscripted into the Armed Forces, the best contingent went to army units, for example, to missile, tank, etc. troops.
The worse contingent is in the military forces, the only selection criterion for which was that the conscript should not have a criminal record (and not have convicted relatives) and not have a history of being in police custody. Therefore, there were a lot of soldiers from Central Asia and the Caucasus, mainly Uzbeks and Azerbaijanis. Sometimes all the soldiers, without exception, were from Central Asia or the Caucasus. This created certain difficulties. Firstly, the language barrier. Many conscripts understood Russian very poorly. The Political Directorate of the Military Forces even published a special book, like an ABC book, for training such soldiers. Secondly, there is a difference in culture. Many soldiers only realized during their service that there were such things as a sheet and a pillowcase. Thirdly, the difference is in food. Upon learning that pork food was prepared for them, many soldiers simply refused to eat. In the first weeks after arriving at the unit, many soldiers suffered from stomach pain due to unusual food. By the way, by the end of their military service, many soldiers ate salted lard with black bread quite normally (a nightly extra ration while on guard).
The biggest problem was the national discord between Central Asians and Caucasians, which they brought from civilian life. Therefore, sometimes there were fights between soldiers of different nationalities.
Note by Veremeev Yu.G. The scale of interethnic hatred and intolerance that existed in the Caucasian and Central Asian republics (for example, between Uzbeks and Turkmens) was carefully hushed up by the authorities and the press of the Soviet Union. This was not particularly difficult, since, as a rule, people of the same nationality usually lived in one locality, and in cities, residents of one nationality lived on one street, and another on another (for example, in Grozny, Russians lived in one area, and Chechens in another ). But in the army, where, one way or another, young people of nations antagonistic to each other (for example, Armenians and Azerbaijanis) found themselves in the same unit, this problem confronted the officers in all its ugliness. Mutual hostility and barracks hooliganism (completely incorrectly called “hazing” in the press) were mainly dictated by nationality, and not at all by length of service. It all depended on which nationality of soldiers were more numerous in the barracks.
Schedule.
6.00 - rise,
6.10 - 6.40 - physical exercises,
6.40 - 7.10 - toilet, filling of beds,
7.10 - 7.20 - morning review (checking the appearance of soldiers),
7.30 - 7.50 - breakfast,
8.00 - 8.30 - leave for classes or household work,
8.30 - 13.00 - training sessions, work,
13.00-13.30 - lunch,
14.00 - 16.00 rest (sleep),
16.00 -16.30 - preparation for joining the service and leaving for service,
17.00 - 18.00 - arrival at the guardhouse, receiving the guard, posting sentries,
18.00 - 19.00 - arrival of the relieved guard at the unit, surrender of weapons,
19.00 - 19.30 - dinner,
19.30 - 20.00 - political information,
20.00 - 21.00 - personal time,
21.00 - 21.30 - watching the TV program "Time",
21.30 - 21.50 - evening walk,
21.50 - 22.00 - evening verification, combat crew and lights out.
During classes on the Combat Service Regulations of the Internal Troops, they studied the duties of a sentry, the peculiarities of serving at specific posts (towers), the procedure for a sentry when a convict escapes from security, and the procedure for using weapons.
Organization and performance of service.
The guard for the protection of the residential and adjacent industrial zone of the facility usually began duty at 17.00. The guardhouse was usually located in the administrative building of the institution, next to the checkpoint (checkpoint).
Guard composition:
*Chief of the guard (conscript sergeant, since the early 90s - warrant officer)
*The assistant chief of the guard is a conscript sergeant.
*The breeding officer is a sergeant or corporal (if the perimeter of the object is large).
*Guards - two to three soldiers for each post.
*Checkpoint sentries are sergeants (later - female military personnel).
*Operators of engineering and technical security equipment (ITSO) - two or three.
*Instructor of service-search dog breeding (SDS) - conscript sergeant.
When the guardhouse was located at a significant distance from the company's location, the guard included a cook who prepared food on guard.
With three guards per post, the guards were changed after two hours, with two - after four. There was an option when five people were appointed to two posts. In this case, the fifth guard was used to replace the sentries at two posts alternately according to the schedule.
It was especially difficult to organize service with a lack of personnel during the period of dismissal of old-timers and training of new conscription soldiers. Some companies switched to a service regime in which the guard did not change for a month.
The guards who were relieved from their posts usually unloaded their weapons, handed them over to the chief of the guard in the pyramid, ate food and went to rest in a specially equipped sleeping area. The guard's sleeping quarters were a separate room, usually with darkened windows, in which there were ordinary soldier's beds.
The guards were allowed to sleep by taking off their shoes (boots or felt boots). With each change of soldiers at their posts, the assistant chief changed the pillowcases on the pillows. Sheets were changed once a week.
The common room had a TV and a table for eating. There was various literature, books, newspapers, dominoes, checkers, and backgammon.
Classes were conducted with the guard - political training, service training, study of Charters, special duties of sentries at specific posts.
The guard yard had a smoking room, a mini sports ground, a place for loading and unloading weapons, and an enclosure for a service dog.
The ITSO operator was usually located in a room on the top floor of the administrative building.
Restricted area equipment. The perimeter of the object was surrounded by a fence 3-5 meters high (the main fence), which was called the security line.
Reference. The security line is a conditional line, the crossing of which by a convicted person is considered an escape from security. Each facility has its own security line.
The fence is equipped with barbed wire obstacles on top, including a canopy, as well as service lighting.
On both sides of the fence there are two restricted areas 10-15 meters wide, internal and external. They also have barbed wire fencing. The internal and external exclusion zones have a control strip (CTB), representing plowed land without any vegetation.
The outer restricted zone has two paths - the squad path, along which the guards change and the inspector passes, and the ITSO path, along which they walk to maintain security systems, repair fence posts, etc.
It is prohibited to walk along the control strip, except when servicing the strip itself (weeding vegetation, loosening the soil). In any case, after passing through the PCB, the tracks behind you are processed with a rake.
Watchtower sentry. The towers could have different designs - wooden, metal, sometimes stone. Usually the towers were located so that the sentry was directly above the guard line. The tower usually had glazing on the sides, sometimes on the front side. Whenever possible, various types of electric heating devices were installed in severe frosts. The tower had a telephone connection with the ITSO operator (central console). The tower door was bolted from the inside.
Checking the duty of sentries. Performed once an hour by the guard chief, assistant chief, or guards. When the inspector approaches, the sentry must stop 50 meters before the tower with the command “Stop, who’s coming?” The inspector must state his position. The sentry asked for the password, calling any number, for example, three. The verifier was obliged to name another number, which in total gave the required numeric password. In addition, the sentry could demand that his face be illuminated. The sentries had to report on duty once every half hour by telephone to the central control panel. All telephone conversations were recorded on a tape recorder, which turned on automatically when the ITSO operator picked up the phone. Time binding was carried out by the operator, who at the beginning of the conversation said the time, after which the conversation took place. The unit commander regularly listened to the recordings.
Actions of a sentry during the escape of a guarded person.
Escaping from security was an emergency.
Reference. Escape is the crossing of the security line by any means by a protected person.
The sentry was obliged to prevent the escape from security by using a weapon. Every soldier knew the procedure for using weapons and cases when using weapons was prohibited by heart. Any use of a weapon by a sentry entailed an investigation by the Prosecutor's Office, which gave an opinion as to whether the weapon was used lawfully or unlawfully. In case of unlawful use of weapons, the serviceman was brought to criminal liability. In addition, any case of escape threatened a lengthy official investigation by the unit’s command, a search for the perpetrators and punishment. For stopping an escape, a conscript soldier was rewarded with 10 days of leave with a trip to his homeland. In any case, a soldier who killed or wounded a convicted person was immediately transferred to another unit.
Escort.
This is the protection of persons under investigation, defendants, and convicts on their way somewhere. For example, transportation of defendants from a pre-trial detention center (pre-trial detention center) to court, transportation from a pre-trial detention center to the place of serving their sentence, etc.
Transportation can be by car, rail, river and air. Most often - by road and rail. Transportation is carried out in a specially equipped vehicle (paddy wagon), a special wagon (commonly called “Stolypin”).
A standard paddy wagon is a van-type body on a truck chassis. Inside there is a common cell, several solitary cells and a place for a guard. Equipped with lighting, ventilation, and an alarm in the driver's cabin. There is only one window, only for the guard. A special requirement is that the exhaust pipe of the car must extend at least 15-20 cm beyond the body. Otherwise, the body of the paddy wagon may turn into a gas chamber. A regular body on a GAZ-53 chassis has a seating capacity of 16 people.
A railway special car is a compartment car, which has a room and a mini-dining room for the guard. The compartments are of an open type, all open towards the corridor and separated from it by bars. There are no windows in the compartment, only in the corridor where the sentry is on duty.
The guard does not feed the transported special contingent. During transportation, convicts receive dry rations from the institution that was the point of departure.
The weapons of the judicial investigation and railway guards are pistols. At the end of the 80s - machine guns with a folding butt.
There is a special method for boarding and disembarking special contingents for both a railway carriage and a car. The presence of a trainer with a service dog is required.
The procedure for performing service is specified in detail in the Charter of the Combat Service of the Internal Troops. So, for example, when a train stops, a guard guards the special car on both sides.
During railway convoy, the approximate composition of the guard:
The head of the guard is a warrant officer.
Assistant Chief of Guard - Sgt.
There are 4-5 guards, one of them is a cook.
Relations between personnel and protected persons.
Apart from official ones, no relations with the protected persons were allowed. There was a concept of “entering into a criminal relationship,” which was strictly punished, even criminal punishment.
Non-official conversations with convicts, transfer of any objects, letters, etc. was strictly prohibited.
It cannot be said that the relationship between the guard personnel and the guards was always the same as required by the Charter. Naturally, there were various violations, both minor and major.
Sources.
1. Charter of the patrol service of the Soviet police (Order of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 200-74). Moscow. 1974.
2. Charter of the combat service of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. (Order of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs dated November 30, 1978). Central Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Fund
3. Charter of the combat service of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. (Order of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs dated October 15, 1986). Central Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.
4. Manual on service and combat activities of units, guards and military detachments
operational units and special motorized military units of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
RF. Central Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Fund 163, inventory 1, units. hr. 139.
5. Charter of the combat service of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR dated December 13, 1968, Central Asia Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Fund No.
48, inventory No. 1, unit. hr. No. 86.
6. Charter of the combat service of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Extract for guards and military detachments) 1967.
7. Charter of the combat service of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Convoying and guarding ITU) 1970
8. Charter of the combat service of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Order of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs dated November 30, 1978, Central Asia Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Fund
No. 48, inventory No. 1, units. hr. No. 617.
9. Charter of the combat service of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Order of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs dated October 15, 1986. Central Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.
Fund 48, inventory 2, units. hr. 222.
10. Manual on service and combat activities of units, guards and military detachments
units of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for escort.
Appendix to the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia dated September 1, 1995 - Moscow, 1996. Central Asia of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Fund 163, inventory 1,
storage unit 140.
The battalion became part of the 46th separate operational brigade of the internal troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. The number of "North" is about 700 people, the battalion commander is Alimbek Delimkhanov - the brother of State Duma deputy and one of Kadyrov's closest associates Adam Delimkhanov and, according to some sources, the cousin of the head of the republic himself, awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.
The North battalion is considered. He has heavy weapons and military equipment at his disposal. Among the daily tasks of the battalion is the fight against the separatist movement in the republic and anti-terrorist operations.
It was in this battalion that Zaur Dadaev, accused of the murder of Boris Nemtsov, served (he quit after killing the politician).
The night before, during a visit by members of the POC (Public Monitoring Commission that monitors the observance of human rights in places of forced detention) of the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center, where the suspects in the Nemtsov murder case are being held, the accused Dadaev declared his innocence, Moskovsky Komsomolets reports.
“They kept shouting: “Did you kill Nemtsov?” I answered no. So I thought they would bring me to Moscow, and then I would tell the whole truth in court. That I'm not guilty. But the judge didn’t even give me a word,” Dadaev said.
Earlier, the judge of the Basmanny Court of Moscow reported that Zaur Dadaev admitted his involvement in the crime.
“Dadaev’s guilt is confirmed by his confession,” the judge said.
Also the day before, Rosbalt, citing a source in law enforcement agencies, reported that the murder of politician Boris Nemtsov was planned by two former members of the Chechen special battalion “North” Zaur Dadaev and Beslan (Bislan) Shavanov. The latter is already dead - he blew himself up with a grenade when the police tried to detain him in Grozny.
– Studying the evidence that is now available in the case, the testimony of witnesses, as well as the main accused, we can draw an unambiguous conclusion: the murder of Nemtsov was the personal initiative of Dadaev and Shavanov. They did not have any other “customers,” said Rosbalt’s interlocutor.
Numerous associates of Nemtsov.
Not much is known about the Sever battalion; Gazeta.Ru publishes some photographs depicting the battalion’s soldiers and its daily life.
Separate special motorized battalions
№№
The basis
formation
Date of formation (reformation), order numbers
Battalion during the period, numbers and dates of orders by regalia
Subordination, resubordination
Dislocation
(administration, republic, region, city, n.p.)
Fate
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
1 osmb
Kuibyshev
Additions: in the summer of 96 PVD Grozny
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
2 osmb
Ulyanovsk
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
3 osmbm
80 cd, 35 arr
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
4 osmb
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
5 osmb
Ekaterinburg/Sverdlovsk
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
6 osmb
Chelyabinsk
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
7 osmb
Novosibirsk
13 or 52 smp
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
8 osmb
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
9 osmb
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
10 osmb
Krasnoyarsk
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
11 osmb
Rostov-on-Don
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
12 osmb
Volgograd
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
13 osmb
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
14 osmb
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
15 osmb
Add-ons
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
16 osmb
91 KD, 98 d USCH
Irkutsk-30 st. Slide
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
17 osmb
Additions:
30.9.66 No. 03 MOOP USSR
18 osmb
Kemerovo
Additions:
42 osmb
Tolyatti
Additions:
43 osmb
Astrakhan
Additions:
Part l/s 11 osmbm
44 osmb
Grozny, 92 Kislovodsk
Additions:
45 osmb
Additions:
46 osmb
83 cd, d BB
Syktyvkar
Additions:
47 osmb
Vladivostok
Additions:
48 osmb
Additions:
49 osmb
Sergiev Posad
Additions:
50 osmb
Vladimir
X 95 l/s with 518 p explosive
Additions:
73 osmb
Additions:
82 osmb
Khabarovsk
Additions: Previously, the battalion had military unit number 5473 (perhaps 82 OSMB became a regiment and after reorganization the unit changed its number to 2665)
84 osmb
Stavropol
Additions:
85 osmb
Orekhovo-Zuev
Additions:
88 osmb
Additions:
90 osmb
Additions:
92 osmb
Murmansk
Additions:
93 osmb
Makhachkala
Additions:
97 osmb
79 cd, d BB
94 linear SMB 621 p BB
Additions:
98 osmb
Naberezhnye Chelny
Additions:
99 osmb
Additions:
107 osmb
Kaliningrad
12.91 +493 okb = 132 p BB
Additions:
111 osmb
Velikiy Novgorod
Additions:
114 osmb
Yaroslavl
Additions:
115 osmb
Additions:
116 osmb
Cheboksary
Additions:
117 osmb
Yoshkar-Ola
Additions:
118 osmb
Orenburg
Additions:
119 osmb
Nizhny Tagil
Additions:
120 osmb
Additions:
122 osmb
Novokuznetsk
Additions:
124 osmb
Additions:
126 osmb
Additions:
127 osmb
Blagoveshchensk
Additions:
128 osmb
Komsomolsk-on-Amur
Additions:
132 p VV Minsk KZN
132 Minsk KZN Osmb
Kaliningrad
02 956 Minsk KZn about explosives
Additions:
139 osmb
Belgorod
Additions:
141 osmb
Additions:
148 osmb
43 KD VV USSR until 11/28/92
28.11.92 No. 000-10.2.92 No. d VV RB
From 10.2.92 No. 06 TsUVV
X 2.8.94 No. 000, lin baht in composition 649 p BB
Additions:
150 osmb
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
Additions:
Additions:
osmb
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
Additions:
159 osmb
Additions:
180 osmb
Additions:
215 osmb
Cherkessk
Additions:
220 osmb
Novorossiysk
Additions:
224 osmb
Additions:
248 OSMB "North"
"named after Hero of the Russian Federation Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov"(14.5.2009)
Grozny district
Additions:
249 OSMB "South"
Vedensky district
Additions:
290 osmb
Additions:
321 osmb
Additions:
326 osmb
Kaliningrad
1.07 Minsk KZn SMP
Additions:
339 osmb
Smolensk
07OSPN "Mercury"
Additions:
390 omsb
Volgograd
Additions:
391 osmb
Additions:
395 osmb
Ekaterinburg
Additions:
397 osmb
On 1.7.06 SIBO BB
Novosibirsk
Additions:
404 osmb
Additions:
405 osmb
Additions:
136 Minsk KZ SMP
406 osmb
07 110 osmbr
Kaliningrad
Additions:
407 osmb
Krasnoyarsk
Additions:
408 osmb
Novokuznetsk
Additions:
409 osmb
Additions: the battalion is possibly based on the SMP, which was previously the 9th OSMB
412 osmb
Khabarovsk
Additions:
414 osmb
Yaroslavl
Additions:
418 osmb
07 110 osmbr
Velikiy Novgorod
Pos. Pankovka
Additions:
419 osmb
Additions:
420 osmb
07 110 osmbr
Petrozavodsk
Additions: or based on 776 pkVV in
421 osmb
07 110 osmbr
Additions:
422 osmb
Additions:
424 osmb
05 Khankala
Additions:
440 osmb
Novocheboksarsk???
Additions:
444 OKB VV Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR
444 osmb
Additions: 96 PVD Grozny
729 osmb
Additions:
738 osmb
Cheboksary
Additions:
132 Minsk KZN osmb
956 about BB
Kaliningrad
05 326 Minsk KZN osmb
Additions:
osmb
Zheleznogorsk
Additions:
osmb
Ussuriysk
Additions:
osmb
Additions:
osmb
Additions:
osmb
Additions:
osmb
Additions:
osmb
Additions:
osmb
Krasnodar
Additions:
osmb
Novocherskask
Additions:
osmb
Ussuriysk
Additions:
osmb
Cherepovets
Additions:
osmb
Kostroma
Additions:
osmb
Gorno-Altaisk
Additions:
osmb
Solikamsk
Additions:
osmb
Additions:
osmb
Mineral water
Additions:
osmb
Pyatigorsk
Additions:
osmb
Additions:
osmb
Nizhnekamsk
Additions:
osmb
Petropavlovsk
Additions:
osmb
Nizhnekamsk
Additions:
osmb
Additions:
osmb
Vladivostok
Additions:
osmb
79 d/rev (from 06)
Additions:
Yenisei district
np. Epishkino
Additions:
Separate USCh battalions
59 about USCH
07 63 obr USCh
Saint Petersburg
Additions: according to the state - 305 military forces - 20 officers, 277 pr., 1 sergeant, 7 soldiers)
67 about USCH
Additions: security of the Institute of High Energy Physics
96 about USCH
Additions: vkh 1 military commandant's office (1 company - 1,2,3 platoons)
98 about USCH
Kamensk-Shakhtinsky
Additions:
165 about USCh
Additions: security of the Kalinin NPP
170 about USCh
Volgodonsk
Add-ons: security of the Volgodonsk NPP, includes marine and emergency units
285 about USCH
20 km from Polyarnye Zori
Add-ons: security of the Kola Nuclear Power Plant. Security of the branch of the Rosenergoatom concern Kola Nuclear Power Plant, Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (Polyarnye Zori).
347 about USCH
Primorsky Krai village Chuguevka
Additions: security of VGO "Pioneer"
622 about USCH
95 d USCh, 66 obr USCh
Additions:
625 about USCh (ozhb)
Additions:
About USCh
Desnogorsk
Additions: security of the Smolensk NPP
Zarechny
Additions: security of Beloyarsk NPP
G. Balakovo
Additions: security of Balakovo NPP
Kurchatov
Add-ons: security of the Kursk nuclear power plant
About USCh
Obninsk
Add-ons: security of the Obninsk nuclear power plant. Stopped in 2002
About USCh
Additions: security of the Siberian nuclear power plant.
Novovoronezh
Additions: security of the Novovoronezh NPP.
Dimitrovgrad
Additions: security of the State Nuclear Reactor Center (research institute of the state atomic energy corporation Rosatom)
928 about USCH
00 P. Miass/Priozerny
Additions: security of State Enterprise "Ural"
About USCh
Chapaevsk
Additions:
About USCh
Additions:
about USCH
66 arr USCH
Additions: security of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR)
Separate operational battalions
193 obon
92 North Caucasus
Additions:
196 obon
Kropotkin
Additions:
204 obon
Additions:
205 obon
Additions:
218 obon
Additions:
221 obon
Additions: in 95 PVD Chechnya
231 obon
Chechnya st. Naurskaya
Additions:
254 obon
47 OBRON???
Krasnodar
Additions:
300 obon
Additions:
301 obon
Astrakhan
Additions:
303 obon
101 OSBRON
Cossack Camps
97 np. Dydymkin
Art. Kursk
Additions: named as "Siberian"
304 obon
101 OSBRON
Cossack Camps
8.96 Urus-Martan
97 np. Dydymkin
Additions: named as "Far Eastern"
305 obon
101 OSBRON
Cossack Camps
8.96 G. Gudermes
97 np. Dydymkin
Additions: named as "Ural"
318 obon
Perm region
Additions:
320 obon
hut. Dydymkin
Additions:
Kazansky pon
329 obon
26 OSN "Bars"
Additions:
330 obon
Additions:
348 obon
Urus-Martan
Additions:
349 obon
Gudermes
Additions:
350 obon
Additions:
351 obon
Additions:
358 obon
Chechnya st. Chervlenaya
Additions:
360 obon
Chechnya st. Chervlenaya
Additions:
Additions:
363 obon
54 DON/48 OBRON?
Astrakhan?
Stavropol?
Additions:
365 obon
Zelenokumsk
OSMB? military unit 6814
Additions:
366 obon
Blagodatny
Additions: after the disbandment of the unit, 346 orbs from Stavropol were stationed in its garrison
367 obon
07-08 ? 102 defense
Neftekumsk
X 07 or 08 or included in 102 armor
Additions:
368 obon
Makhachkala
Additions:
369 obon
Additions:
377 obon
Krasnodar
Additions:
378 obon
Krasnodar
Additions:
383 obon
North Ossetia
Additions:
520 obon
North Caucasus
Additions:
640 obon
North Caucasus
Additions:
743 obon
Kostroma
X 12/10/02 No. 000
Additions:
obon
Additions:
obon
Vladikavkaz
Additions:
mon or kp
obon
Ulyanovsk
Additions: part of sf. 25.1.64 as one KO
Separate motorized rifle battalions
omsbon
01.08.94 8 OSPN
Additions: security of the Central, Moscow city and regional committees of the CPSU and four buildings of the 3rd special department under the USSR Ministry of Finance (gold and diamond fund).
omsbon
90 Leningrad
Additions:
628 omsb
Leningrad
Additions: perhaps this and the top one are the same, the functions are the same as those of the Moscow omsb
Separate reconnaissance battalions
242 orb
99 DON/49 OBRON
Vladikavkaz
Additions:
293 orb "Peresvet"
06 +200 OISB+ SMP
33 OSPN "Peresvet"
Additions:
RB 101 OSBRON
30.08.99 (or 7.6.99)
346 orb
48 OBRON/47 OBRON
Stavropol Blagodatny
np. Shpakovskoe
Additions:
352 orb "Mirage"
Additions:
07 Makhachkala
Additions:
Separate tank battalions of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia
Additions:
np. Kadamovsky
Ret 8 OBRON
Additions:
+ otb 100 DON
Additions:
732 reps
100 don/50 OBRON
np. Kadamovsky
Additions:
Separate communications battalions of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia
97 obs
Novocherkassk
Additions:
8 OUS headquarters of the SibOVV
184 obs
Novosibirsk village Gornoe
Additions:
213 obs
Saint Petersburg
Additions:
243 obs
99 DON/49 OBRON
Vladikavkaz,
Additions:
244 obs
2 DON/47 OBRON
Krasnodar
Additions:
245 obs
VO VV, VRK VV
Khabarovsk
Additions:
270 obs
Additions:
271 obs
96 Nizhny Novgorod
272 obs
Pyatigorsk
Additions:
275 obs
Additions:
353 obs
CR air Northern
Additions:
Ekaterinburg
Additions:
Additions:
Rostov-on-Don
Additions:
Separate engineer battalions
oisb
Additions:
Np. Persianovka
Additions:
200 oisb
Moscow-Kapotnya
06 +293 orb, 108 smp = 33 OSpN
Additions:
281 oisb
Vladikavkaz
np. Dachnoe
Additions:
354 oisb
Chechnya air. Northern
Additions:
oisb
07 Zelenokumsk
Additions:
Separate repair and restoration battalions of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia
ORVB
Additions:
99 orvb
Persianovka
Additions:
247 orvb
Vladikavkaz n. Dachnoe
Additions:
257 orvb
Additions:
282 orvb
2 DON/47 OBRON
Krasnodar
Additions:
355 orvb
Additions:
400 orsb (orvb)
MO VV, GKVV
04 Moscow-Zelenograd
Additions:
Separate medical battalions
omedsb
Additions:
106 omedsb
Rostov region
Np. Persianovka
Additions:
261 omedsb
99 don/49 OBRON
Vladikavkaz
Additions:
322 omedsb
2 don/47 OBRON
Additions:
357 omedsb
Chechnya air. Northern
Additions:
omedsb
54 don/48 OBRON
Additions:
Separate logistics battalions
86 obmo
Rostov region
np. Persianovka
Additions:
255 obmo
99 DON, 49 obron
Vladikavkaz
Additions:
256 obmo
54 don/48 obron
Pyatigorsk
Additions:
343 obmo
Additions:
356 obmo
Additions:
380 obmo
2 DON, 47 OBRON
Krasnodar
Additions:
Separate security and support battalions
343 oboo
ex. SZO VV
Saint Petersburg
Additions:
ooo
ex. MO VV
Additions:
ooo
ex. PRIVO BB
Nizhny Novgorod
Additions:
ooo
ex. SKO VV
Rostov-on-Don
Additions:
ooo
ex. URO explosives
Sverdlovsk
Additions:
ooo
ex. SIBO VV
Novosibirsk
Additions:
ooo
ex. VO VV, VRK VV
Khabarovsk
Additions:
ooo TC
Additions:
OOO of the Central Clinical Hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
Additions:
Separate commandant battalions of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia
344 Ocomb
Additions:
Separate training battalions
Uch. autobat
91 created 60 schools ATP (3152)
935 ob
96-02 SZO VV
Kotlass - G. Koryazhma
Additions: training of chefs 3-4 categories
173 obs
on 1.7.06 SIBO BB
Kemerovo
Myski
Additions:
SMP HF 3910
G. Kostroma
Additions:
Battalions of unspecified specialization
318 rev
Perm region
Additions:
Shield of Our Country
Internal troops - 186.3 thousand people. (16 divisions, 24 brigades, 104 regiments and 5 higher educational institutions)
By 2006, instead of districts, five regional commands and two regional military directorates will be created. 60% of the number of troops are operational units performing missions in Chechnya and the North Caucasus region.
Operational units
Units for the protection of important government facilities
Special motorized police units
In accordance with the reform plan, the number of troops will be reduced several times, instead of districts, five regional commands and two regional departments of internal troops will be created. In addition, special forces will be formed within the structure of the internal troops. In the future, special forces detachments of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation will become the main component of the immediate response forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Currently, the VV special forces comprise 16 mobile units, which are already 90 percent equipped with modern weapons and military equipment, including special purpose ones.
Combat training of explosives includes three main areas: training of operational units; special motorized military units; units for the protection of important government facilities and special cargo. Internal troops are recruited to perform service and combat missions, usually as part of a company or battalion. Therefore, the main efforts in training are aimed at individual training and coordination of small units. The Internal Troops have refused to hold such global events as divisional and even regimental tactical exercises; they are now not relevant in the Internal Troops. The combined arms training of a motorized rifle platoon commander and a platoon commander of the Internal Troops is practically the same. In military training, perhaps the only difference is that in addition to combined arms tactics, cadets study the tactics of the Internal Troops, that is, the methods of action of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the protection of public order, the organization of security forces for the protection of important government facilities and in emergency circumstances.
Internal troops number about 300 thousand people (29 divisions and 15 brigades). The units are better equipped than the army. But can they be called full-blooded? Of the 29 divisions, 19 were transferred to the internal troops from the ground forces, with all the ensuing consequences. Apparently, it was possible to restore some semblance of order in them, but providing such a mass of troops with new weapons and equipment is a disastrous matter. Most senior officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs do not have the necessary training.
Northwestern District - 12053 people, 55 armored fighting vehicles
division-Arkhangelsk
· 33 brigade-Lebyazhye, Lomonosov - 2644 people, 34 infantry fighting vehicles, 12 PM38
· 1st brigade - Syktyvkar (ibid., special forces engineer regiment)
Regiment for guarding the parking of the nuclear icebreaker fleet
· separate battalion for the protection of LNPP
In St. Petersburg - 1607 people, 10 infantry fighting vehicles
Moscow district (4 divisions) - 56222 people, 175 armored fighting vehicles
· 1 separate special purpose division (formerly Dzerzhinsky) (ODON) - Balashikha - central subordination - 1,2,4,5 pon, 1 psn Vityaz - 9982 people, 46 infantry fighting vehicles, according to other data - 9 thousand people. , 60 tanks (93 mechanized regiment-T-62), 400 armored fighting vehicles or 12 and a half thousand people.. 5 regiments, one with BMP-1, four with armored personnel carriers.. separate tank battalion, 31 tanks.. A GS -17 , automatic mounted grenade launcher.. SPG-9.. tank.. mounted.. anti-tank grenade launcher.. combat helicopters. The 1st Red Banner operational regiment ODON was disbanded, the SN "Vityaz" detachment was reorganized into the 118th regiment of the SN VV with the presentation of the banner of the disbanded 1st (magazine "Bratishka" for July-August 2003).
division-Sarov
· 12th division-Tula - units of the Tula division of internal troops are located in 8 regions of Central Russia
division (training) Mulino (Molino)
· 55 division-Moscow (policing in Moscow) - 6 thousand people (2 comrades - officers and warrant officers) - 8 regiments, before that - the OMSDON police regiment, then the police brigade.
· 21 BRON-Sofrino - 2650 people, 36 infantry fighting vehicles, according to other sources - 2 thousand people, 100 armored personnel carriers (4 motorized battalions (in battalion 3 msr, 1 motorized brigade company (BTR-80, Zil-131) , reconnaissance and grenade launcher (AGS-17) platoon))
· 23 BRON (motorized)
The garrison of the Moscow police - together with civilian personnel - numbers about 100,000 people. These are not only departments, internal affairs departments of municipal districts and police departments. These are four regiments of the patrol service, with the 1st regiment of the PPS - a battalion of service-search dogs, with the 4th - a battalion of mounted police. A particularly formidable force is the riot police, which is equipped with infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. By analogy with the riot police, special police units (OMSN) operate under the MUR and RUOP. As part of the Moscow District of Internal Troops: ODON - artillery, armored vehicles, helicopters, Sofrinskaya special forces brigade, 23rd motorized brigade. In special cases, the convoy regiment of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate may also be involved in certain operations. The municipal police are small in number, but well armed and combat-ready - about 3,000 people.
The North Caucasus District is the main group of internal troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the North Caucasus, numbering 26.5 thousand people, 700 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, armed with heavy machine guns and artillery pieces with a caliber of up to 100 mm. Explosive units are deployed in Vladikavkaz, in cities, towns and villages of the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan.
· 2 DON, Krasnodar-451, 66 pon - 1923 people, 34 infantry fighting vehicles
· 54 DON - 8 bron, 59 pon, 81 pon
· 99 DON-Rostov, Persianovka - 1983 people, 33 BMP, 4 BMD-1, 1 D-30, 3 PM38 / regiment in Chermen - 1774 people, 33 BMD-1
· 100 DON-Novocherkassk, Kadamovsky (UC), Cossack Camps ("Cossack camps" are between Shakhty and Novocherkassk. A tank division stood at this place, the division was disbanded and in its place the Special Purpose Division DON 100 was created. The division was copied from the division named after Dzerzhinsky. The division consisted of 4 regiments and 4 battalions) - 46,47, 48, 49, 57 pon, 93 MP (Possibly transferred from ODO or formed in the late 90s using tank equipment disbanded in Novocherkassk division (actually a tank regiment with T-62), there are 60 tanks in the regiment), 7 main Rosich-Novocherkassk - 1859 people, 34 infantry fighting vehicles, Kadamovsky - 1261 people, 69 T-62, 18 D-30, Cossack Camps - 3708 people, 69 infantry fighting vehicles
· 8 BRON-Nalchik - 2368 people, 33 BMP, 22 BRON-Kalach - 2596 people, 27 BMP, 12 PM38 - formed on the basis of a training regiment in 1988
· 26th Armored Forces - Vladikavkaz
· 46 BRON-Chechnya - about 2000 thousand people. 150 armored personnel carriers - before that there was the 101st BRON (Stavropol-div.)
· 102 BRON-Dagestan
· BRON-Vladikavkaz - 2004 people, 12 infantry fighting vehicles
· opn-Nazran - 680 people, 2 baht - formed in 2004
· 7th Special Forces Detachment
· 15th Special Forces Detachment
· ovp-Rostov - 777 people, 2 Mi-24, Mi-8
There are also references to 28 and 31 BRON.
In Labinsk - 1807 people, 34 infantry fighting vehicles, in Kartsa (S. Ossetia) - 2097 people, 34 BMD-1, 6 PM38, in Stavropol - 1830 people, in Blagodarny, Stavropolsky - 1446 people, 31 BMD-1 , 6 PM38, Zelenokumsk - 1819 people, 34 infantry fighting vehicles, Mozdoke - 1716 people, 34 infantry fighting vehicles, 6 PM38 and vertical unit - 439 people, 2 Mi24 and Mi-8
Volga District - In the Volga and Ural Districts - 19831 people, 117 armored fighting vehicles
· division -Kirov- (Kirov, military unit 7487, formerly a convoy division, the division included 5 regiments (Kirov, Glazov, Votkinsk, Izhevsk, Kazan), at different times, units and divisions of the division, in addition to the Vyatka region, were located in the territories of the Kostroma region , the republics of Komi and Udmurtia, the unit is now stationed in Kirov and Kirovo-Chepetsk, the cities of Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Chuvashia and Mari El, recently a military unit was transferred to the division to ensure the protection of the chemical arsenal in the village of Maradykovo)
· 54 division - Gaiva, Perm - 2818 people, 15 infantry fighting vehicles
· 35th brigade (80th division until 1999) - Samara - until 1999, the 80th Samara Internal Troops Division, a separate battalion of the 80th division, before its disbandment in July 1999, was engaged in the protection of defense enterprises in the city of Chapaevsk)
· 34 brigade - Shumilovo, Bogorodsk, Nizhny Novgorod - 2594 people, 30 infantry fighting vehicles
· BRON-Kazan - formerly an explosives convoy regiment stationed in Kazan (military unit 7474), reorganized in the mid-90s
· Chuvashia brigade, now disbanded, previously guarded the Novocheboksarsk chemical plant
In Saratov 1949 people, 4 infantry fighting vehicles
Ural district
· Division-Ozersk, Chelyabinsk
· 12 special forces detachment (Nizhny Tagil)
· 23rd Special Forces Detachment (Chelyabinsk)
Siberian District - Novosibirsk - The tasks of protecting correctional labor institutions have been removed, since 1995. formations and units for the protection of important government facilities and special cargo were subordinated, new units for operational purposes were created.
· 98 division (it includes 18 OSMBM (military unit 5438)) - Kemerovo
· 89th division-Novosibirsk
1) the specificity of internal troops is that explosive divisions can have a unique composition and are deployed on the territory of several territories and regions, for example, it can include not only regiments, but also brigades and individual battalions, and brigades and regiments can include individual battalions and companies (for example, an industrial regiment for the protection of chemical agents at an object may include a separate company to escort special cargo removed from it)
2) units for the protection of OVO and SG are not part of the districts, but are part of the Directorate of the VGO and SG GKVV, and, for example, in Angarsk there are operational and training regiments of the Irkutsk formation of the Eastern District (headquarters in Khabarovsk), and the Angarsk industrial regiment is subordinate and included as part of the Novosibirsk industrial division of the explosives
3) the term industrial itself in relation to parts has not been official for a long time (since Beriev’s times) BUT (!) due to the conservatism and closed nature of the Environment, it is still in circulation among personnel, their entourage (families, journalists) and at the objects/territories where they works. In approximately the same way, in the provinces RUBOPs (RUOPs) are still called the 6th department
Battalion "North"
Special unit of the 46th Separate Operational Brigade of the North Caucasus Regional Command of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. In 2010, the Sever battalion was renamed the 141st Special Motorized Regiment of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.Based in Grozny.
Background
Soon after the death of Chechen President Akhmat Kadyrov on May 9, 2004, it became known about Moscow's plans to reorganize his security service. In July 2004, a special purpose police regiment (PMON) named after Akhmat Kadyrov was formed from more than a thousand of its employees. He was transferred to the leadership of the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs.
In January 2005, the creation of a security service for the new President of Chechnya, Alu Alkhanov, was announced. Alu Alkhanov, until his resignation, relied on the support of the GRU "West" special forces battalions under the command of Said-Magomed Kakiev and his own security service.
In May 2005, on the basis of the armed formations of Kadyrov’s Security Council, which retained their independence, the Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC) of the republic was created. This was an intermediate phase in the process of further reorganization and reassignment of Kadyrov’s fighters. Already in November of the same year, it became known about plans to form two battalions from them, subordinate to the command of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the North Caucasus District. The creation of these battalions, called "South" and "North", was almost completely completed by April 2006.
On May 10, 2006, servicemen of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs battalions “North” and “South” stationed in the Chechen Republic took the military oath.
On May 29, 2006, the activities of the North and South battalions were legalized by order of the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs.
The total strength of both military units was more than 1,200 people. The battalions were staffed exclusively by military personnel serving under contract. The battalions were recruited from specially selected employees of the Anti-Terrorism Center of the Chechen Republic. The peculiarity of the “North” battalion is that its members, from commander to private soldier, are exclusively residents of the Chechen Republic.
The location of the North battalion is the city of Grozny, and the South battalion is located in the Vedeno district of Chechnya. The main task of the battalions "North" and "South" is maintaining law and order on the territory of the republic and fighting gangs. The commanders of the North and South battalions, respectively, were Hero of Russia Colonel Alibek Delimkhanov (brother of Adam Delimkhanov and cousin of Ramzan Kadyrov) and Senior Lieutenant Muslim Ilyasov.
“North” fighters participated in almost all special operations to detain and eliminate members of the underground gang and their leaders. In the period from 2006 to 2008. By the forces of the “North” battalion, more than 1,000 units of various types of weapons were seized from illegal circulation, 49 members of illegal armed groups were destroyed, 43 militants, 4 criminals and five people who had been on the federal wanted list for a long time were detained. P The battalion's service from 2006 to 2009 amounted to ten servicemen, 170 servicemen were awarded state awards, including one star of the Hero of Russia, eight - orders of courage. During reconnaissance, search and special activities, the unit’s fighters neutralized 94 members of illegal armed groups, neutralized more than 180 explosive objects, and seized 213 small arms from illegal circulation.
By the time the battalions “North” and “South” were formed, the battalions “East” (Sulim Yamadayev) and “West” (commander Said-Magomed Kakiev), O organizationally included in the structure of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the Russian armed forces, subordinate the command of the North Caucasus Military District, the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Experts especially emphasized that the head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov “is not able to give the battalions ("East" and "West") any independent order of his own. All wishes and initiatives of the republican authorities regarding the use of armed formations are approved by the relevant military officials.
The President of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has repeatedly expressed his negative opinion about the Vostok battalion, that its employees are allegedly involved in kidnapping, robbery, and that they are the ones to blame for the “turnover into the forests” of Chechen youth.
In 2006, the Highlander group of Movladi Baysarov was liquidated, as a result of which the FSB significantly reduced its capabilities in Chechnya.
Suppression of Vostok Base
In 2008, the "North" battalion, together with other security forces subordinate to Ramzan Kadyrov (the "South" battalion, riot police, SOBR, the Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov regiment, the oil regiment, special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Chechnya), participated in blocking the base of the "Vostok" battalion in Gudermes after the incident with President Kadyrov's motorcade.
At the exits from Gudermes, the special battalion fighters stopped all the cars and checked the people there. Vostok servicemen were detained and taken to the Vega base, located on the outskirts of Gudermes. One of these checks at a checkpoint ended in a shootout. As a result, two soldiers of the fifth company of the special battalion were killed - Taipur Elsanov and Magomed Arsabiev. The acting commander of Vostok, Magomed Bakhaev, tried to resolve the situation on the spot, but was also placed in Vega.
In 2008, the GRU battalions "Vostok" and "West" were disbanded.
141st Special Motorized Regiment
In 2010, the North battalion was transformed into the 141st Special Motorized Regiment. Since the fall of 2010, the North battalion.
In December 2009, a ceremony was held to present the Sever battalion with a battle flag. The ceremony was attended by the head of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Rashid Nurgaliev, who noted: "From the moment of its creation in April 2006 to this day, the personnel of the 248th separate special motorized battalion have courageously and selflessly participated in the performance of service and combat missions on the territory of the Chechen Republic" .
By decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 10, 2011, for mass heroism and courage, fortitude and courage shown by the personnel of the regiment in combat operations to defend the Fatherland and state interests in armed conflicts, and, taking into account the merits in peacetime, to the 141st special motorized The regiment of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia was given the honorary name "named after the Hero of the Russian Federation Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov."
Alexander Cherkasov, “Memorial” about the Chechen battalions: “The basis of these structures (battalions “North” and “South” - note of the “Caucasian Knot”) were former militants who went over to Kadyrov’s side after 2003. There were very different people there, it also happened that someone in these anti-terrorist centers continued to work underground - for example, the head of the Anti-terrorist center in the Vedeno region, Mairbek Eshiev, who disappeared in the spring of 2006 (Ramzan then said that he “fired” Eshiev). At the time, this was a way of adaptation and formalization of numerous former militants, drawn to the other side. They proved their loyalty by tying themselves with blood: they acted in the same place where they had previously fought in the forest, but now against those who remained in this forest: they knew the people , knew the area and were very efficient."
Conflict with special forces
In July 2010, the special forces of the internal troops from Bashkiria accused the Sever battalion of an alleged betrayal that took place in February of the same year.
Information about the conflict was described in detail in the publication of Moskovsky Komsomolets "Traitors at Arms - Special Forces of the Internal Troops Accuses Chechen Colleagues of Treason." The essence of the conflict: on February 4, 2010, between the villages of Dachu-Borzoi and Alkhazurovo in Chechnya, during a special operation involving the Sever battalion and special forces soldiers seconded from Bashkiria, five militants were killed, but five special forces soldiers were also killed.
One of the reports mentioned that an analysis of the wounds received by soldiers of the special forces units gives reason to believe that they were received as a result of fire from the 248th Osbba (battalion number "North"). In particular, a special forces corporal named Kiryanov was wounded by a VOG-30 shell - the militants, as the report said, did not have such shells. It was also stated that “Sever fighters gave the militants the location of the special forces, stole the military’s weapons and ammunition, and took the corpses of the bandits from the battlefield to hand them over to relatives.” .
Ramzan Kadyrov called these allegations nonsense and an attempt to “incite ethnic hatred, undermine the combat effectiveness of elite units, and cause mistrust between them.” “I do not consider it necessary to dwell on every point of the material, because it is unreliable from beginning to end,” Kadyrov told reporters at a press conference in Grozny .
The Moskovsky Komsomolets interlocutor said that after the special operation a criminal investigation was carried out, but in the end it was “hushed up.” According to some reports, the commander of the joint group of troops and forces, General Nikolai Sivak, tried to discuss this topic. But he was soon removed from office.
Murder of Nemtsov
On March 7, 2015, the head of the Russian FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, announced the detention of two men involved in organizing and executing the murder of Boris Nemtsov. Later, three more suspects in the shooting of Nemtsov were detained, among them former fighter of the Sever battalion Zaur Dadaev. During the Basmanny Court hearing, it was stated that Dadaev’s involvement in the murder was “confirmed by his confession,” but the accused himself did not admit guilt at the trial.
On the evening of March 7, 2015, in one of the apartments of a high-rise building on Lev Yashin Street in Grozny, security forces blocked a former soldier of the Sever battalion, 30-year-old Bislan Shavanov (Beslan). During an attempt to arrest him, he was fatally wounded by a grenade explosion. Beslan Shavanov served in the Sever battalion for more than 10 years and received awards and encouragement for good service.
On March 10, 2015, Zaur Dadaev told reporters that he confessed to the murder of Nemtsov only because he was promised to release his brother, but now he is ready to retract his testimony.
In particular, Zaur Dadaev stated: “They kept shouting: “Did you kill Nemtsov?” I answered that no. At the time of the arrest, I was with a friend, with my former subordinate Ruslan Yusupov. And they said that if I agree, then they will let him go. I agreed. I thought I would save him, and they would take me to Moscow alive. Otherwise, the same thing would have happened to me as to Shavanov. After all, he was allegedly blown up by a grenade."
On March 19, it became known that in the case of Nemtsov’s murder, operatives were looking for a former officer of the “North” battalion, Ruslan Geremeev, for questioning as a witness.
After accusations of involvement in the murder of Nemtsov by fighters of the North battalion, Ramzan Kadyrov stated on his personal Instagram page: “The Basmanny Court of Moscow authorized the arrest of Zaur Dadaev, suspected of involvement in the murder of Boris Nemtsov. I knew Zaur as a true patriot of Russia.<...>Zaur was one of the most fearless and courageous soldiers of the regiment.<...>I am firmly convinced that he was sincerely devoted to Russia and was ready to give his life for his Motherland. I do not understand the true reasons and motives for Zaur’s dismissal from the ranks of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.<...>Beslan Shavanov, who died the day before during an attempt to arrest him, was the same brave warrior. We believe that a thorough investigation will be carried out, which will show whether Dadaev is really guilty and what actually caused his action." .
The main defendants in the “Nemtsov case”, Zaur Dadaev and Ruslan Geremeev, were awarded the Order of Courage back in 2010 - “for courage, bravery and dedication shown in the performance of military duty in the North Caucasus region.” The award to the soldiers was presented by the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia Rashid Nurgaliev.
Scandals and incidents with military personnel of the North
On February 4, 2010, in the Urus-Martan region of Chechnya, a joint special operation was carried out by special forces of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and soldiers of the Sever battalion to block militants. According to Moskovsky Komsomolets journalists, during the battle in which five special forces soldiers were killed, Sever fighters not only revealed the location of the security forces, but also fired at their own. Ramzan Kadyrov's press secretary Alvi Karimov condemned the information about the connection between "North" military personnel and Chechen militants.
On the evening of December 31, 2010, in the Zavodskoy district of Grozny, an armed attack was carried out on servicemen of the Sever battalion. As a result, two servicemen were injured. A source in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Chechnya said that it was not possible to identify the attackers “hot on the trail.”
On August 6, 2012, a double explosion occurred in the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny, not far from the location of the Sever battalion. According to a source in the law enforcement agencies of Chechnya, two officers and a contract soldier of the 46th brigade of internal troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs were killed directly at the scene of the explosion; another serviceman later died from his wound in the hospital. Two more internal troops, a police officer and a local resident were injured as a result of these terrorist attacks.
On August 27, 2015, the deputy commander of the “North” battalion, Musa Ayubov, and his wife Zulay Umarova were found dead with gunshot wounds. A Sever serviceman, the nephew of the murdered man, Idris Ayubov, was detained on suspicion of murder. The detainee admitted guilt. The investigation named the reason for the murder as a conflict between the sergeant and his uncle, who demanded that he stop taking drugs and selling them on the territory of the military unit. On June 15, 2016, the North Caucasus District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don sentenced Idris Ayubov to 18 years in a maximum security colony.
On February 9, 2016, Novaya Gazeta, citing its own sources, wrote that about 20 former employees of the North battalion, dismissed in October 2015, could have been sent to Syria. “Our sources in the Chechen diaspora connected these dismissals with the sending to Syria of a certain group of well-trained comrades as volunteers,” the publication said. At the same time, back in September 2015, Ramzan Kadyrov stated that natives of Chechnya do not participate in hostilities against the Islamic State, which is banned in Russia by a court decision and recognized as a terrorist organization. But already on February 8, 2016, Kadyrov admitted that “special service agents from Chechnya were introduced into the ISIS camps” and that “it was he who sent his people there.”
At the beginning of March 2016, five people from Chechnya were arrested in connection with the murder of politician Boris Nemtsov, including former fighter of the Chechen battalion “North” Zaur Dadaev, whom the investigation considers to be the perpetrator of the murder. The case also involves Chechen officers Ruslan Mukhudinov, who is considered the alleged mastermind of the murder, as well as Sever battalion officer Ruslan Geremeev and Beslan Shavanov, who was killed during the arrest. On July 13, 2017, the Moscow District Military Court sentenced Zaur Dadaev to 20 years in prison, and the rest of the defendants in the case to terms ranging from 11 to 19 years. The Supreme Court, having considered the appeals of lawyers and victims, slightly softened the sentences of the convicted persons, canceling the fines imposed on them.
In August 2016, five people were arrested in Moscow on suspicion of extorting 100 million rubles from businessman Konstantin Zhukov, among whom were two officers of the Sever battalion, Said Akhmaev and Lechi Bolatbaev. According to the victim, his business partner Evgeny Katkov extorted money from him with the help of natives of Chechnya who introduced themselves as employees of the Investigative Committee. Katkov stated that he turned to his friend Bolatbaev after learning that Zhukov was transferring most of the profits of their joint company to his other company.
This case attracted media attention because Akhmaev and Bolatbaev were members of the entourage of State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov, Ramzan Kadyrov’s cousin. It was reported that Delimkhanov and Kadyrov, during the preliminary investigation, sent letters of guarantee to the court with a request to change the preventive measure for Akhmaev and Bolatbayev to house arrest or a written undertaking not to leave.
The criminal case was heard in the Zamoskvoretsky Court of Moscow. In the debate on October 26, 2018, the state prosecution asked to sentence Akhmaev and Bolatbaev to 7 years and 3 months, the rest of the defendants in the case - from 7 years to 7 years and 5 months in a maximum security colony. But when passing the verdict on November 6, the court reclassified the charge from extortion to arbitrariness and imposed the same punishment on all defendants - a fine of 50 thousand rubles. Due to the expiration of the statute of limitations under the article on arbitrariness, the court released the defendants in the case from paying a fine.
* "Islamic State" (IS, formerly ISIS) is banned in Russia by court decision and recognized as a terrorist organization.
Sources:
- The new Chechen army threatens Moscow // Human Rights Center "Memorial", 07/04/2006.
- “North” and “South” are responsible for peace // Red Star, 10.26.2006.
- The President of the Chechen Republic visited the Sever battalion // Grozny-inform, 10.22.2008.
- The “North” battalion was presented with a battle flag // Chechnya Segodnya News Agency, 12/26/2009.
- Chechen battalions moved to the state border // Nezavisimaya Gazeta", 09/15/2006.
- Kadyrov settles scores with the Vostok battalion. A battle with the “Yamadaevites” can begin at any moment // Newsru.com, 04/15/2008.
- Nurgaliev in Grozny presented a battle flag to the soldiers of the “North” battalion // Human Rights Center “Memorial”, 12/28/2009.
- Traitors in arms // Moskovsky Komsomolets, 07/14/2010.
- Kadyrov called the conflict between special forces and the Sever battalion nonsense // Lenta.Ru, 07/15/2010.
- The special forces of the internal troops accused the Chechen battalion "North" of treason // IA Chechnya.Ru, 07/15/2010.
- The head of the FSB announced the detention of two suspects in the murder of Nemtsov // Interfax, 03/7/2010.
- A soldier of the Sever battalion and a security guard were detained in the case of Nemtsov’s murder // RBC, 03/07/2015.
- Zaur Dadaev told the pre-trial detention center about his detention in the Nemtsov case // Moskovsky Komsomolets, 03/10/2015.
- Personal page Ramzan Kadyrov on Instagram
- Rashid Nurgaliev congratulated the 46th Separate Operational Brigade of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation on its 10th anniversary // Information portal of the President and Government of the Chechen Republic, 10.19.2010.
Publicity helps solve problems. Send a message, photo and video to the “Caucasian Knot” via instant messengers
Photos and videos for publication must be sent via Telegram, choosing the “Send file” function instead of “Send photo” or “Send video”. Telegram and WhatsApp channels are more secure for transmitting information than regular SMS. The buttons work when the Telegram and WhatsApp applications are installed. Telegram and WhatsApp number +49 1577 2317856.
