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324th motorized rifle regiment in the first Chechen war, 1995. Night foray into the village Prigorodnoye

Georgiy Aleksandrovich Skipsky - Ph.D. ist. Sciences, teacher of the Yekaterinburg branch of the Academy of State Fire Service of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation, major of internal service (Ekaterinburg). He took part in combat operations in the Chechen Republic as part of the 324th motorized rifle regiment as deputy commander of the 3rd mortar battery for work with personnel in the period from January 21 to May 10, 1995.

Russian history has repeatedly proven that its lessons begin to be taken into account only after repeated repetitions of the mistakes made by their predecessors. The same incident happened with the First Chechen campaign, though. It would seem that our country has already had the bitter experience of the war in Afghanistan, and our grandfathers paid for it too dearly on the fields of the Great Patriotic War.

There is no doubt that, when making the decision to send Russian troops into the Chechen Republic, the country's top military and political leadership did not realize the consequences of this step. Moreover, once again the “hack-throwing” mood prevailed. The military side of the operation was not really planned at all. This can be confirmed by the following example: in the first period of the campaign, which can be conditionally defined by a chronological framework: December 1994 - March 1995, the supply of the federal group in the republic took place to a greater extent by the method of self-sufficiency. This meant that military personnel often obtained most of their food not from field kitchens, but from requisitions from the local population. The quality of food in the first days was below any criticism. When marching in the 324th regiment, a soldier was entitled to a can of canned pearl barley porridge with meat (more precisely, with a hint of its presence) and a third of a loaf of frozen bread per day. The shortage of food products was compensated by the population's reserves stockpiled for the winter and abandoned in houses when Chechens from lowland villages fled to the mountainous regions, where hostilities began only in May 1995.

Another example can be given. It seems strange to use units from all military districts for a military operation, based on the use of the surprise factor. Bringing units of the North Caucasus Military District to full combat readiness and their redeployment to the borders of the Chechen Republic could be carried out in a shorter time than the transfer of military trains from the Urals or Transbaikalia. One can, of course, object to this by saying that the facts of transporting military trains with equipment and personnel would have remained unknown to D. Dudayev, but such a position became similar to an ostrich, based on modern reconnaissance capabilities, as well as the good knowledge of the Chechen leadership about the plans Kremlin. When our train was standing on sidings near the town of Mineralnye Vody, a guard with warning shots stopped an attempt to approach it by a group of suspicious persons who were wandering around the train at night, which was located quite far from the city. That is, even before our train arrived at the unloading site, Dudayev’s informants already had information about it. On the night of January 21, 1995, while unloading the train at the Terek station (Republic of North Ossetia), we were fired upon, as a result of which one of the soldiers was wounded in the leg. The North Caucasus greeted us so hospitably on the first day of our stay.

On January 22, 1995, units of the 324th regiment lined up in a marching column, marched across the Tersky Range and settled down near the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, which is about 20 km from the city of Grozny. Unlike the 276th motorized rifle regiment, which, after unloading equipment and a long march, was immediately sent to storm Grozny, our regiment was given a week to conduct combat coordination in order to avoid the heavy losses that our fellow countrymen from the 276th regiment suffered in Grozny. This really gave positive results, as it turned out later. Indeed, if we had been thrown into battle in the same way as the 276th Regiment, the losses would have been even greater than in it. The fact is that to staff the 276th regiment, officers were sent from the entire 34th motorized rifle division, so they at least visually knew each other and their soldiers. The 324th regiment was formed as follows: almost completely, with the exception of 4 people, remaining in the permanent composition of the regiment at the beginning of 1995, the officer corps was staffed by units of the garrisons of Yekaterinburg, Verkhnyaya Pyshma, Elani, Chebarkul - i.e. from almost the entire Ural Military District. As a replenishment, transport planes were sent from the Trans-Baikal Military District with privates and partly officers from the Gusinoozersk garrison. Thus, at first the officers of the 324th Regiment did not even know each other by sight, not to mention their subordinate soldiers, with whom they would soon go into battle.

The fighting in the initial period of the campaign showed that the system of command and control of troops for carrying out combat missions was not at all suitable for the military-political situation that had developed in the Chechen Republic. To carry out an elementary maneuver or solve the immediate tactical problem, coordination of actions was required at the level of, at a minimum, the headquarters of the joint group of federal forces in the republic. At the same time, the militants extremely rarely brought forces larger than a company or battalion into battle, which made their actions very unpredictable for Russian troops and made observation difficult, not to mention the possibility of conducting reconnaissance.

The favorite technique of Chechen militants was the use of small groups, usually consisting of a machine gunner, a sniper and a grenade launcher. The grenade launcher hit armored vehicles, the sniper hit officers, and the machine gunner created a fire barrier for the organized exit of the troika from the zone of return fire from Russian units. Such tactics were used by the separatists not only in Grozny, but also in clashes with federal forces in the field, and in particular during the offensive of the 1st and 3rd motorized rifle battalions of the 324th regiment in mid-March 1995 in the area of Chechen settlements -Aul and Starye Atagi, which will be discussed in more detail later.

Under the current conditions, a successful outcome of the battle for the Russian troops was achieved only if the commander of the unit or unit took responsibility and made a decision based on the immediate situation, which changed much faster than the headquarters of the joint group could react to it. The most striking example was the advance of the regiment to the area of the villages of Gikalovsky and Chechen-Aul, which began on the morning of February 3, 1995 from the Primykaniya area (the eastern outskirts of Grozny). Its goal was to completely block the city of Grozny from the south, where until the specified time, starting from the moment of the assault on the Chechen capital, the so-called “green corridor” was in effect, along which civilians were supposed to be evacuated from the city. In fact, this corridor was used to supply militants in Grozny with reinforcements, ammunition, food, and to evacuate the wounded to secret bases in the highlands.

This corridor was also formed because a paradoxical picture arose from the point of view of military art. The federal troops that surrounded the city in the first months did not have a numerical superiority over the militants, whose number at the beginning of hostilities in the republic was about 35 thousand people (of which approximately 15 thousand were the so-called presidential guard, the rest were part of the local militia) , while the combined group of federal troops numbered approximately 18.5 thousand people (data on the number of warring parties was borrowed from the military press of that period, as well as materials from a military-practical conference held in November 1995 in Yekaterinburg, organized by the headquarters Ural Military District to generalize the experience gained). Given this balance of forces, it was not surprising that Grozny was only partially blocked by the federal group, and the battles for the city continued for almost two months.

Having received an order to capture and hold the village of Gikalovsky, the commander of the 324th regiment, Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Sidorov, organized an advance along a bypass road running along the south-eastern outskirts of Grozny, through the suburban areas - Neftepromysly and Chernorechye. Before reaching Chernorechye, our column, which was in the vanguard, unexpectedly turned off the road into the forest planting zone and, clinging to the soles of the dominant heights, began to crawl like a winding snake into the greenery. When the convoy had traveled no more than 2 km, it was fired upon with mortars. The mines fell at a sufficiently large distance, which made it possible to observe the trajectory of their flight and not be afraid of being hit by fragments (the scattering of mortar mine fragments reaches 200 m in radius). This meant that the militants noticed our column too late, so their fire was not aimed. Our forward detachment, consisting of a motorized rifle company and two mortar crews, as well as a tank platoon, passed Chernorechye at speed, sweeping away a few militant pickets along the way, and rushed along the highway to the village of Gikalovsky, between which and the outskirts of Grozny we did not encounter any serious resistance. When our vanguard burst into Gikalovsky, no one expected it. The militants fled so quickly that they abandoned all their property and documents. In the courtyard of the building there were cauldrons in which hot pilaf was still smoking. The fighters, inspecting the building of the tribal state farm, where the headquarters of the militants were located, found lists of personnel of the detachment of the field commander Isa Madayev, whose area of responsibility was the southern outskirts of Grozny (each field commander had his own pre-assigned sector of responsibility, which made it possible to react very quickly to the movements of federal troops and set up ambushes against them). The mortarmen's trophies included a headquarters van based on a GAZ-66, as well as several sets of field camouflage uniforms, stylized as a mountaineer national costume. Several militants were captured and, after a short search and interrogation, were shot. There was no point in sending them to the rear, since we did not have one.

After the 3rd battalion broke through Chernorechye, the militants organized a denser fire barrier, as a result of which not all units of the 324th regiment were able to get through the green line without losses. In our mortar battery, as a result of shelling, a vehicle bringing up the rear of the column, loaded with various field equipment, was hit. The remains of the car had to be towed, attaching it with a cable to the infantry fighting vehicle.

Subsequently, I had to draw up an act for writing off the car and the property in it 5 times. This once again confirmed that bureaucracy in the Russian army flourishes even during hostilities, when the outcome of a case is decided not by a document, but by the real actions of people. We were given such “trust” that it turned out as if we had almost sold the car with the property to the same militants. Although facts of the sale of weapons, equipment and ammunition took place during the first Chechen campaign, I myself and my comrades did not have information about such facts. It was necessary to repeatedly confirm the fact of the loss of property, although at the same time, from Grozny, when the railway connection was restored, not without the knowledge of the high authorities, entire platforms with foreign cars, household appliances, furniture, looted from abandoned houses both in Grozny and in other settlements of Chechnya. As they say, “to whom is war, and to whom mother is dear.”

The Marine Regiment, which was supposed to follow the 324th Regiment, encountering heavy fire from the militants, was also unable to support the actions of our battalion that broke through to Gikalovskoye. As a result, by the evening of February 3 we found ourselves almost completely surrounded. It should be said that if Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Sidorov had decided to follow the marching column strictly along the indicated route, the regiment would have suffered huge losses, and the author of these lines would hardly have been able to write them.

Having recovered from the first shock, the militants began to gather their forces to the village of Chechen-Aul, located 3 km from Gikalovsky, and from there they began to disturb us, carrying out periodic attacks, not allowing us to calmly dig in and take a breath. The whole night passed like this. At 5 a.m. on February 4, 1995, the battle flared up with renewed vigor. First, the militants, hiding behind a thick veil of fog, went out through the elm thickets and along the bed of the ditch to the rear of the positions of the tank platoon, located at the intersection of the Rostov-on-Don - Baku highway and the Grozny - Duba-Yurt highway, and almost point-blank shot two tanks from grenade launchers , and then quickly disappeared along the same path they came. The death of the tanks and their crews was a consequence of the fact that at night the tanks found themselves without motorized rifle cover, who were redeployed to the rear, on the orders of the regiment commander to cover the headquarters from Urus-Martan. The militants shot directly at the top of the turret, where the ammunition is located, so the explosions were so powerful that the turret of one of the tanks was blown away several tens of meters. Pieces of armor from another tank whistled over the heads of the mortar crews, one of whom pierced the parapet of the trench where the battery control was located. The battery commander, Captain V.Yu. Arbuzov, took it and, despite the whistle of bullets flying over our heads, went and showed it to his soldiers, thereby putting forward a weighty “argument” for them to tear off trenches at full height, and not like that, which were opened by morning - at most, in order to hide in them while sitting from bullets and shrapnel. Standing under bullets on the parapet of the trench, he, muffling the noise of the shots, used vocabulary “appropriate” for the given situation, thereby instilling in the soldiers an awareness of the need to fulfill their military duty.

The militants' attacks on the positions of the 3rd battalion continued for 7 hours. Their direction was constantly changing, as the enemy quite competently looked for a weak point in our defense. It was found from the direction of Urus-Martan, whose elders, during the start of the first Chechen campaign, declared neutrality on the condition that federal troops would not enter the village. Between Urus-Martan and Gikalovskoye the area is quite flat, an almost flat field with small hills. On it, the militants turned into a chain and moved straight towards the position of the mortar battery, which was located in the second echelon of the battalion’s strong point of defense. To repel the attack, it was necessary to temporarily stop the fire support of the motorized rifles, which were holding back the enemy’s onslaught from Chechen-Aul and Duba-Yurt, and transfer fire to the advancing chains, which were moving without bending down, just like in the film “Chapaev”. The soldiers somehow dug trenches for the mortars at night, but they didn’t have time for themselves, so they couldn’t fire from machine guns in full force without dooming themselves to certain death.

Several direct-fire salvos stopped the advance of the militants approximately 500 m from the mortar firing positions. During the hitch, a platoon of motorized riflemen on BMP-1s came to the rescue of the mortarmen and, with joint fire from the battery, scattered the battle formations of Dudayev’s men. Attempts by militants to break deep into our defense in vehicles were thwarted by crossfire from 7.62 mm machine guns mounted on infantry fighting vehicles. One of these vehicles nevertheless broke through the fire barrier quite close, but about a hundred meters from us it was still set on fire. I saw how militants engulfed in flames jumped out of it, and were immediately finished off by bursts of our machine gunners.

After the attack from Urus-Martan failed, the militants, dispersing their forces, tried to attack simultaneously from three sides. The motorized rifles really needed our fire protection, so the guns on the mortar battery were distributed two in each direction, and their fire was directed by officers, fearing that inexperienced gunners would cover the positions of their own comrades when firing direct fire. At this moment, it turned out that the ammunition for the mortars began to quickly run out, so it was necessary to urgently drive up a vehicle with mines, which was located behind the regimental headquarters building, with which contact had been lost. Captain V.Yu. Arbuzov sent me to complete this task. To be honest, it was very scary to get out of the trench under bullets. But the order had to be carried out, because without ammunition we would not be able to provide adequate support to the infantry. In the future there was the prospect of engaging in battle with notorious thugs who had gained combat experience back in Abkhazia, while our fighters barely owned their AKSU-74, suitable only for close combat (after the battle it turned out that the well-known "Abkhazian" was thrown against us battalion", formed back in 1993 by Basayev).

Having run across an open space and hiding behind a concrete fence, I managed to quickly find a car with mines, transmit our new radio call signs to headquarters (the militants jammed the frequencies on which contact with headquarters was maintained until the morning) and go back, showing the way to the driver of the mine-laden Ural ", who was very afraid to go out into the open. I had to walk in front of the car to show the driver that “the devil is not as scary as he is painted.” In addition, the feeling of fear for his comrades overcame his own instinct of self-preservation. The ammunition came in handy, and together with the battalion commander we quickly organized their unloading, although only one successful bullet hit on the tip of a mine could send the entire battery to Allah.

Having received a worthy rebuff from 18-19-year-old boys, from whom seasoned militants did not expect such agility, the latter stopped further attempts to attack us head-on and retreated to Chechen-Aul, which became a headache for the entire 324th regiment for a long month and a half. The results of the battle were quite depressing. Our battalion lost 18 people killed, 50 received various injuries. The tank company lost 5 vehicles, which were shot down mainly in the first minutes of the battle. The remaining tanks were saved by moving them to reserve positions behind the motorized rifles, which bore the brunt of the attack. The militants lost about 50 people killed. It was not possible to clarify the number of wounded, since the militants took them all with them, and after repelling the last attack, the regiment commander did not organize the pursuit of the retreating enemy, because he feared large losses and the possibility of being ambushed.

The firefight continued for another two days and three nights, but both sides did not dare to take more decisive action. On February 6, 1995, units of the 1st battalion of the 324th regiment with the support of the Marines made a breakthrough from Chernorechye, as a result of which our encirclement was lifted and Grozny was finally blocked. A few days later, while listening to the radio, we learned that the BBC radio had broadcast a message that a “Ural special punitive regiment” had been introduced into Chechnya. Since the Western media received information about the war in Chechnya mainly with the help of the separatists, this was a fairly high assessment of the combat effectiveness of our regiment. Later, as it turned out during negotiations with the elders of nearby villages, the militants dubbed us “red dogs” because our regiment firmly held its positions and did not allow anyone to move freely within the mine’s flight range (it is 7201 m). In addition, many officers in the regiment grew beards, which in the sun acquired a red tint. Once again the truism was confirmed that in the East force has always been respected. When, at the end of February 1995, units of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment from the Moscow Military District were located south of our regiment, the militants did not enter into any negotiations with them at all, but simply, giving a small bribe (a bottle of vodka, a carton of cigarettes), drove through them positions in the right direction. Such a thing was unthinkable in our regiment.

For a month and a half, starting from the arrival of units of the 324th regiment to the village of Gikalovsky, the militants fought grueling night battles. Every day, from sunset until late at night, as scheduled, our positions were shelled and forays were made into the front line of defense. This was done in order to ensure the transfer of ammunition, weapons and reinforcements to besieged Grozny. The mortar men were not idle. Often it was necessary to simultaneously “process” the “green stuff” in front of the motorized rifle positions in order to flush out the snipers and the fire escort groups accompanying them. At the same time, it was necessary to set up a fire barrier on the country roads along which the militants transported cars with ammunition and other property for their accomplices in Grozny. To detect the enemy, the battery periodically illuminated the area on the front line with illuminating mines.

As a result of raids behind enemy lines, the reconnaissance group of the Kyakhtinsky special forces managed to discover two field camps of militants, which were destroyed as a result of fire raids from our battery. The mortar fire was expertly corrected by the commander of the control platoon, Senior Lieutenant V.G. Bednenko, who went out with the special forces every night to search. As a result of these raids, the militants lost about 110 people killed (information was obtained as a result of a morning inspection of the sites of former militant camps). Since radio communications were monitored by the enemy, we used terminology from Fenimore Cooper's novels about the Indians of North America. In particular, the location of the reconnaissance group and our spotter was designated as a “wigwam”. V.G. Bednenko himself had the call sign “Eye”, the battery commander, Captain V.Yu. barely leaned out of the trench so as not to get shot by a Chechen sniper).

Despite the dramatically changed tactical situation, especially after all the main centers of resistance were suppressed in Grozny at the beginning of March 1995, Dudayev’s troops received a respite of at least two weeks, since a truce was declared on March 1. While it lasted, right under our noses the militants built a well-fortified and engineered stronghold, which covered the approaches to the only permanent bridge across the Argun River, located in the middle between the villages of Chechen-Aul and Starye Atagi.

The examples given above suggest that the transfer of hostilities from the lowland regions of Chechnya to the mountainous ones was deliberately delayed, since with the proper level of organization of the operation to “restore constitutional order” this was quite possible back in February 1995, after The city of Grozny was finally blocked. Until the snow melted in the mountains, and the forests in the foothills of Chechnya were not covered with green foliage, militant detachments were under the threat of missile and bomb attacks from the air, and their communications were limited only to river valleys and gorges, while mountain and forest paths avalanches and drifts could occur. This circumstance was taken into account only in the second Chechen campaign, but this is not the subject of our discussion. The deliberate delay in military operations in the spring of 1995, which took place in the form of moratoriums on the use of heavy weapons and equipment and the introduction of frequent truces, allowed the militants to regroup their forces, replenish supplies of food, fuel and ammunition, and finally, restore strength and heal wounds received in fierce battles during the winter months of the war.

Moreover, the truces only provoked the militant activity of the separatists and contributed to the development of a guerrilla war against federal troops, even in those areas where the local population did not offer strong resistance in the first period of the campaign. One example of such a provocation was the artillery shelling of the positions of the 3rd mortar battery and the headquarters of the 324th motorized rifle regiment, which occurred on March 2, 1995, in the village of Gikalovsky, located 12 km south of Grozny. The shelling was preceded by the appearance of a car with CSCE emblems and flag at the intersection of the Rostov-on-Don - Baku highway and the Grozny - Duba-Yurt highway. At this crossroads, after a truce was declared on February 28, 1995, on March 1, 1995, the exchange of captured Russian military personnel for the bodies of dead militants took place. Since the firing positions of the 3rd mortar battery and the headquarters of the 324th motorized rifle regiment were within direct visibility of the intersection, the negotiators on the Chechen side were able to fairly accurately determine the coordinates of these units. The next day, March 2, 1995, during lunch (the militants thoroughly studied the daily routine in the regiment), when one of the two fire platoons of the 3rd mortar battery went to the field bathhouse located behind the board building of the Gikalovsky tribal state farm, and the other platoon I was preparing for a meal, a piercing whistle was heard, and soon before my eyes, about 150 m from the battery positions and 100 m from the headquarters building, an artillery shell exploded (later it turned out that it was fired by a 76-mm anti-aircraft gun). Just a few seconds later, a second shell exploded. This time it happened almost at the headquarters building. Then came the third explosion. It occurred behind the battery positions with a flight of approximately 50 - 70 m. The first confusion passed, and the officers remaining in the firing position organized an artillery duel. The soldiers who were having lunch rushed first to their shelters, and then, on command, returned fire with 120-mm mortars.

The problem was that we were shooting from indirect positions (there were bushes and forests between us and the enemy), so the platoon needed to adjust its fire. About a minute was wasted in getting in touch with the headquarters of the 3rd motorized rifle battalion and clarifying at least the square that could be struck. After several volleys of three mortars, accompanied by adjustments via radio communications from the forward positions of the 3rd motorized rifle battalion, the shelling of our positions stopped. But the most interesting thing is that immediately after the end of the firefight, the regiment headquarters called the field phone and threateningly asked who had returned fire. And this is instead of using observers, who were usually located in the attic of the headquarters building and could carry out more accurate adjustments to the mortar fire than from the positions of a motorized rifle battalion, located in the middle of thickets of bushes and forest plantations, which made it difficult to observe the enemy.

Thus, it turned out that the militants were allowed to shoot at the positions of the federal troops during the truce, but the federals were not allowed to respond to them. It turned out to be some kind of strange game of “giveaway.”

To prevent further shelling of our positions by forces of a special forces group from the city of Kyakhta (Trans-Baikal Military District), attached to the 324th regiment, reconnaissance of the outskirts of the village of Chechen-Aul was carried out, during which a camouflaged firing position was discovered, as well as the basement of a house in which militants they hid a 76-mm gun and ammunition for it. The coordinates were soon transmitted to the mortar battery, and the 1st fire platoon (it was prepared for battle faster than the 2nd) directed its guns at the given target in advance. The 2nd fire platoon received as a target an area of possible retreat of the militants after the latter finished shelling. This fire trap worked only after a week. This time the shelling began at night, as the militants hoped that our vigilance would drop during the truce period. As soon as the repeated shelling of our positions began, with an interval of 1 minute they struck the 1st with a salvo first. and then the 2nd fire platoon. It soon became clear that the militants actually began to retreat after our first response salvo, since the entire area of their evacuation was littered with abandoned bloody bandages. As for the cannon, as a result of the shelling it was damaged and abandoned by the militants.

After this incident, artillery shelling of the positions of the 324th regiment temporarily ceased. The next attempt was made by the militants only at the end of March 1995, when they deployed a Grad launcher at a distance of approximately 10 km from the regiment’s positions (the firing range of the Grad launcher is 21 km). But this time it was destroyed by a flight of helicopters called from the military airfield in Khankala, located in the suburbs of Grozny.

The senselessness of conducting military operations in the Chechen Republic was proven by the behavior of the command of the federal group. On March 13, the 324th Regiment launched an attack on militant positions in the area of the villages of Chechen-Aul and Starye Atagi. The goal of the offensive is to capture the crossing of the Argun River. As a result of an 8-hour battle, the militants were pushed back to the river, and their stronghold in the area of a small-scale commercial farm was practically destroyed. But as a result of a mismatch in the actions of the 1st and 3rd battalions, a gap of about 800 m was created between them. It could have been closed by using the commandant’s company guarding the regiment’s headquarters. But instead, it was decided to withdraw the units to their original positions.

On March 15, a repeated offensive began on the positions of the militants, who used two days to restore the destroyed stronghold, even to the point of concrete-filling the trenches on the banks of the Argun River. The peculiarity of their equipment was that the trenches were located on steep slopes of the river bank and were equipped with evacuation passages to the river. When shells and mines hit, the fragments scattered and went above the positions of the militants, as a result of which the fire preparation that preceded the offensive of our regiment's motorized rifles was ineffective.

It should be noted that the militants did not wait for the deployment of our units, but prevented their deployment into battle formation as they approached their positions. Their favorite technique was to wedge themselves between companies and open fire first on one and then on the other. While the companies were turning around and trying to strike back, a group of militants, hiding in the thickets of bushes and in the beds of irrigation ditches, retreated to the main positions, and meanwhile a real battle broke out between our units, which was stopped only by the commander of the 3rd battalion, Lieutenant Colonel M.V. Mishin , who observed the deployment of units.

The offensive, which unfolded in the southeastern regions of Chechnya on March 24, 1995, was carried out with the massive use of aviation and artillery. The tanks were used as mobile artillery installations, accompanying with fire the advancing motorized rifle battle formations in front. The classic combination of various types of troops with numerical and technical superiority ensured a rapid breakthrough of the Dudayevites’ positions, as a result of which federal units occupied almost all the lowland regions of the republic with minimal losses and reached the foothills of the Greater Caucasus. But instead of pursuing the retreating enemy and inflicting a final defeat on him, the troops stopped again, as another truce was again declared, which contributed to a more organized retreat of the militants to the highlands.

Throughout April 1995, the 324th Regiment did not undertake active combat operations. However, on average per day, as a result of the actions of Chechen snipers, 1-2 people in the regiment were injured or died. To combat snipers, an on-duty combat group consisting of a motorized rifle platoon on a BMP-1 was assigned, which periodically combed the area around the regiment's location. This measure could not prevent enemy actions, since the regiment did not have its own specially trained snipers, and the special forces group from Kyakhta, assigned to the regiment in February 1995, was recalled in mid-April. Thus, the fight against enemy snipers turned into an attempt to kill a mosquito with the butt of an ax.

The positive consequence of the truce was that the soldiers had the opportunity to rest after exhausting night battles with militants, which lasted for almost two months, from the end of January to the end of March 1995. The negative was that discipline fell sharply, cases of unauthorized abandonment of positions became more frequent, which, due to excessive curiosity of the soldiers, led to their death on their own or Chechen tripwires or as a result of the actions of “civilians”.

At the beginning of April, reinforcements arrived in the regiment - approximately 200 people, which were distributed mainly between the 1st and 3rd motorized rifle battalions. It was striking that the newly arrived soldiers had practically no skills in handling a machine gun, not to mention the RPG-7 grenade launcher, PK machine gun or hand grenades. At the same time, training in the battalions was organized differently. In the 1st battalion, fighters from the replenishment immediately joined the units, and in the 3rd they were formed into three training platoons, the commanders of which were young officers, in order to consolidate the practical skills of unit management acquired during recent battles. It is noteworthy that two of them were “jackets”. Neither the 1st nor the 3rd battalions were without losses among their reinforcements, even before their participation in hostilities began. In the 1st battalion, on the very first night after arrival, two soldiers committed self-inflicted suicide (they shot themselves in the soft tissue of their legs with a machine gun). Two weeks later, a young soldier, a Baptist in his religious beliefs, hanged himself in the replenishment of the 3rd battalion.

It is noteworthy that the hanged soldier was assigned to the 1st training platoon, commanded by a young career lieutenant who had recently graduated from the Chelyabinsk Tank School. His style of command was to humiliate the fighters and instill in them unquestioning submission. A frequent occurrence was assault, swearing in front of the formation, meaningless push-ups on the ground - and all this in front of the soldiers of other training platoons. It is not surprising that it was in his unit that this emergency occurred.

When conducting field training with young recruits, I noted that the soldiers were happy to perform exercises in shooting from a machine gun and a grenade launcher, and throwing grenades. They showed significantly less enthusiasm when digging and equipping trenches and conducting tactical exercises. To avoid an accident, they were not initially given weapons. Only the platoon commander had it, who, by firing from a machine gun, accustomed the soldiers to a combat situation during field tactical exercises. I was particularly impressed by the testing of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. In the middle of the rut in the field, the soldiers dug trenches for prone shooting and were in them while first a tank and then an infantry fighting vehicle passed over them at low speed (the latter had a much lower landing, which made the soldier’s position in the trench very “uncomfortable”).

But the biggest revelation for me was that when my replacement, Lieutenant Misha Shchankin, arrived, he also did not know how to handle a machine gun, although shortly before conscription he completed a course of study at the military department of the Izhevsk Agricultural Institute. The question arises: why are career lieutenants breaking their hands so as not to go to Chechnya, leaving the army, driving soldiers to suicide, although they are professionals in military affairs. In my opinion, it is necessary to radically change the principles and methods of educational work in military schools that do not fulfill their purpose. Hopes for the "jackets" are illusory. Much depends on the excellent motivation of a reserve lieutenant entering military service.

Returning home happened like in a low-grade Soviet action movie about “Afghans.” It all started with the fact that I had to receive a travel order literally from the car that was leaving for Grozny. Without it, you would have to justify your absence from your unit, and then prove the fact of participation in hostilities. Then there was a continuation in the form of the vehicle following half of Chechnya, and, in violation of all sorts of instructions and unwritten rules worked out in Afghanistan, the vehicle went without military escort, and my companions and I were deprived of standard weapons. My fellow travelers were wounded soldiers and officers who hand over their weapons upon hospitalization, and I handed over my machine gun to my replacement. While en route to the city of Grozny, the "nurse" kept driving around potholes on the roads, and there was not a soul at the checkpoints; if they wanted, the militants could take us all prisoner without firing a single shot. This prospect “brightened up” the discomfort caused by the cramped conditions in the back, the stuffiness and scorching heat. The typicality of the picture was confirmed upon arrival at Severny airport. Before we had time to get out of the car, a drunken warrant officer came towards us and offered to try medical alcohol. We wisely refused, especially since the heat intensified by noon and we began to be thirsty.

After my companion, warrant officer Shalagin, who was leaving on leave for family reasons, and I checked in for a helicopter flight to Mozdok, we started searching for water. I was extremely amazed that there was already a restaurant at the airport, the prices of which turned out to be very unaffordable, and the staff - all mostly “persons of Caucasian nationality” - did not even want to talk to us. An attempt to seek help from the assistant military commandant at the airport ended with the fact that in response to his rude refusal, I could no longer stand it and left, slamming the door. As a result, I was detained by a called patrol and I was forced to humiliate myself in order to have my documents returned and given the opportunity to commit landing on a helicopter. From this incident, I concluded that those who are on the front line will never find a common language with the “rats in the rear.” We are needed only when we are "cannon fodder". As soon as you begin to return to peaceful life, you need to tune in to the fact that besides yourself and your loved ones, no one in this country needs you with your problems and only someone like you can understand you. We finally got water at the nearest checkpoint, which covered the road to the runway. The guys shared their meager supplies with us, and the thirst that had been tormenting us since the morning was somewhat quenched.

A new surprise awaited us in Moscow, where a transport plane arrived from Mozdok. It turned out that the money that Shalagin and I had was only enough for half the ticket. We were not given military travel documents upon departure, and there was no money in the regimental cash register to pay the advance. We were lucky that, while still in Mozdok, we joined a group of officers and warrant officers of the 276th regiment, in which replacements had been carried out since mid-April, and they were paid advances with which they could get home. I found a fellow countryman living on Elmash and borrowed money from him, which I repaid the next day after my arrival (the most interesting thing is that the train fare at the military unit was never paid for me, although it seemed that I was not returning from the resort). This is how the Fatherland greeted its sons, who fulfilled their constitutional duty to it.

Truly, our state continues to live outside of time and space, repeating past mistakes and correcting them due to the long-suffering of the people. But the safety margin of Russian society has come to an end. I mean the margin of safety, first of all, spiritual. The people's blind and boundless devotion to their state is giving way to the cynicism of the next generation. This cynicism, of course, is overcome when a person comes face to face with death. But in order to cure our sick society, we cannot drive it through the meat grinder of war, since, as we know, the best die in it, and such a medicine is very dubious. Those who returned alive from a local conflict zone can hardly be called mentally and morally healthy.

Russia and the Soviet Union in local wars and armed conflicts of the twentieth century: Scientific conference held by the Humanitarian University, the Ural State Pedagogical University, the Sverdlovsk Regional Union of Reserve Officers, the Municipal Museum of Memory of Internationalist Soldiers "Shuravi" on April 13 - 14, 2002: Reports. Ekaterinburg: Publishing House of the Humanitarian University, 2002. P.219-235

ZKVR 3rd Minbattr 324th Motorized Rifle Lieutenant Georgy Aleksandrovich Skipsky: “The 324th Regiment was formed as follows: almost completely, with the exception of 4 people who remained in the permanent composition of the regiment at the beginning of 1995, the officer corps was staffed by parts of the garrisons of Yekaterinburg, Verkhnyaya Pyshma, Elani, Chebarkul - i.e. from almost the entire Ural Military District. As a replenishment, transport planes were sent from the Transbaikal Military District with enlisted personnel and partly officers from the Gusinoozersk garrison. Thus, the officers of the 324th Regiment at first did not they even knew each other by sight, not to mention their subordinate soldiers, with whom they would soon go into battle."1

ZKVR 3 minbatr 324 msp lieutenant G.A. Skipsky: “On January 22, 1995, units of the 324th regiment lined up in a marching column, marched across the Tersky Range and settled down near the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, which is about 20 km from the city of Grozny.”2

NSh North Caucasus Military District, Lieutenant General Vladimir Yakovlevich Potapov: “The final stage of the operation to defeat illegal armed groups in Grozny began on the morning of February 3. Two regiments (324 and 245 motorized rifle regiments) of the South-East group of troops maneuvered from the Khankala region to the south and southeast of Grozny."3

Promotion to the village Gikalovsky

ZKVR 3 minbatr 324 msp lieutenant G.A. Skipsky: “Having received an order to capture and hold the village of Gikalovsky, the commander of the 324th regiment, Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Sidorov, organized an advance along a bypass road running along the south-eastern outskirts of Grozny, through the suburban areas - Oil fields and Chernorechye.”4

From the description of the battle: “Deputy regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir [Pavlovich] Bakhmetov only took three platoons with him: reconnaissance, infantry fighting vehicles and tank. “Enough,” they decided. “We’ll hold out for a little while, and then the others will come up.”5

From the description of the battle: “[Commander of the 324th MRR] Colonel [Anatoly V.] Sidorov really assessed the situation and decided to move not along the highway or bypassing the small village [Prigorodnoye], but through garden plots.”6

ZKVR 3 minbatr 324 msp lieutenant G.A. Skipsky: “Before reaching Chernorechye, our column, which was in the vanguard, unexpectedly turned off the road into the forest planting zone and, clinging to the soles of the dominant heights, began to crawl like a winding snake into the greenery.” When the column had traveled no more than 2 km, it was fired upon from mortars. The mines fell at a sufficiently large distance, which made it possible to observe the trajectory of their flight and not be afraid of being hit by fragments (the scattering of fragments of a mortar mine reaches 200 m in radius). This meant that the militants noticed our column too late, so their fire turned out to be untargeted. Our forward detachment, consisting of a motorized rifle company and two mortar crews, as well as a tank platoon, passed Chernorechye at speed, sweeping away a few militant pickets along the way, and rushed along the highway to the village of Gikalovsky, between which and the outskirts of Grozny we did not encounter any serious resistance."7

From the description of the battle: “We moved onto the road. And suddenly it seemed to foam. Fragments of mortar mines and torn pieces of asphalt showered the armored group with a shower. The armored personnel carrier, which was moving to the left of the rest, was literally thrown up by a wave from a mine that exploded a meter away and dropped onto the wheels that had already been punched along one side.<...>The column rushed forward. Coming out from under fire, Bakhmetov immediately contacted the regiment commander. Transmitted the coordinates of an enemy mortar battery. But he completely switched to solving the problem facing him only when he heard his call sign in the headphones of the headset, and then the message:
- Order. The target is hit. Keep moving."8

From the description of the battle: “We met a truck full of militants. They hit it with a tank. Which of the “spirits” survived was scattered. As expected, they were treated with machine guns. The reconnaissance even managed to take a prisoner. He was already seething with anger. And then ( where did he get it from?) suddenly grabbed a grenade and, shouting: “Allah Akbar!” swung at the soldiers. He didn’t have time. They took the grenade away. They crushed the prisoner a little, though. Then they interrogated him. He told everything. And what was near the former breeding state farm, where the armored group was going, there were about forty-five militants and that they were at the crossroads near the bazaar. And most importantly, on the side from which the Bakhmetovites were coming, no one was waiting for them. A little further, behind the state farm, there was a whole stronghold. We looked on the map: there is no bazaar near the intersection. Not marked. We decided to figure it out on the spot."9

In the village Gikalovsky

From the description of the battle: “The combat vehicles of the armored group jumped out in a flock from around the bend. They immediately sorted out the situation. Sure enough, there was a market near the road. Or rather, several “Shanghai” ones. At first the militants didn’t even really accept the fight. They ran away. They left everything as it was . On the grills, even the skewers with kebabs remained untouched."10

ZKVR 3 minbatr 324 msp lieutenant G.A. Skipsky: “When our vanguard burst into Gikalovsky, no one expected it. The militants fled so hastily that they abandoned all their property and documents. In the courtyard of the building there were cauldrons in which hot pilaf was still smoking. The soldiers, inspecting the building of the tribal state farm, where the headquarters was located militants, found lists of personnel of the detachment of field commander Isa Madayev, whose area of responsibility was the southern outskirts of Grozny<...>. The mortarmen's trophies included a headquarters van based on a GAZ-66, as well as several sets of field camouflage uniforms, stylized as a mountain national costume. Several militants were captured and, after a short search and interrogation, were shot. There was no point in sending them to the rear, since we did not have one.
After the 3rd battalion broke through Chernorechye, the militants organized a denser fire barrier, as a result of which not all units of the 324th regiment were able to get through the green line without losses. In our mortar battery, as a result of shelling, a vehicle bringing up the rear of the column, loaded with various field equipment, was hit. The remains of the car had to be towed, attaching it with a cable to the BMP."11

From the description of the battle: “And the resistance became more and more fierce. It happened that Bakhmetov’s fighters had to tear boxes of cartridges from armored vehicles on the move, which were specially hung on the armor against cumulative shots, in order to replenish their ammunition. And yet the resistance of Dudayev’s men was broken.”12

Militant counterattack

From the description of the battle: “By four o’clock in the evening, the commander drove up to the new location of the regiment. We conferred. We decided that that was all for today, the “spirits” would not come in again, but no. They climbed up. From the direction of Chechen-Aul. They only managed to They deployed a mortar battery for battle.
Intelligence by that time had reported that a cluster of about fifty Dudayev vehicles had been discovered. Getting ready to move. The regiment commander, Colonel Anatoly Sidorov, immediately contacted the artillery. Requested fire.<...>Well done, artillerymen! They did a great job then. The regiment was greatly helped out.
The battle lasted until eleven. Cruel. Persistent. But the approaching night gradually took its toll.
The cannonade has subsided, there is no point in landing shells in the darkness like a pretty penny.
And at the regiment’s checkpoint, the “battle” continued all night. Various options for upcoming actions were worked out, the tactical position of oneself and the militants was assessed, orders and instructions were given. Everyone who was there that night was amazed at their commander. Not a shadow of confusion on his face. Clarity and confidence in actions and in what is said. Only he smoked unusually a lot - three packs of cigarettes in a few hours. The officers could no longer stand it and took the smoke away. In exchange, they put bags of crackers on the table: a smart commander must be protected."

Night foray into the village Prigorodnoye

From the description of the battle: “In Chechnya, Zhuravlev was the commander of a tank platoon as part of the 324th motorized rifle regiment. All tanks were scattered among motorized rifle units to strengthen them, and Zhuravlev’s platoon was assigned to the company of captain Oleg Deryabin.
Located near the village. Prigorodny (south-eastern outskirts of Grozny), motorized riflemen and tankers began to wait for further instructions. It was January, and the silence over the white field in the disposition of our soldiers looked natural and peaceful. The suburban did not show any unfriendliness, and the white Zhiguli cars driving past our positions were, as it were, confirmation that the local residents had no stones in their bosoms. The Zhiguli disappeared, and a little later shelling began from Prigorodny.
In the evening, the officers excitedly summed up the results of the day. The result was in favor of the militants, because the Urals returned fire not at the enemy, but only in his direction. None of those gathered knew how long they would have to stay in these positions. But everyone, including Zhuravlev, understood that the next shelling could start at any minute.
- Who's with me? - Deryabin asked, having decided on a night foray into the village. There were a lot of people willing, but only twelve went. The company commander left the rest with the personnel.
They took their personal weapons and left. Only one of the dozen brave people had special binoculars that allowed them to see at least something in the pitch darkness of the black southern night. It was he who made it possible to detect a group of militants approaching...
Deryabin was the first to open fire, and a machine gun burst, breaking the silence, knocked down one of the Chechens. The rest, firing back, began to retreat behind the houses, and ours continued to hit them with machine guns. After some time, the shooting ended and the militants fled. The officers approached the dead enemy lying in a pool of blood. A military ID was found on the murdered Chechen, from which it was determined that he served in the airborne troops, as well as lists of names and telephone numbers in Rostov-on-Don, Stavropol and other cities of the North Caucasus. It later turned out that this was the intelligence chief of one of the large gangs.
Inspired by the success of the first battle, the brave souls continued along Prigorodny. The curved, numerous bends of the village streets limited visibility, so even binoculars shining through the darkness did not help. So they walked quietly and listened. Suddenly Zhuravlev heard the roar of a Zhiguli engine, well known from childhood. After a few seconds, no one doubted that it was the Zhiguli that was slowly moving towards us. Hiding around the corner, we waited until the car appeared around the bend in the narrow village street. The car that appeared was white - the same as the one that drove by during the day before the shelling. There were four militants sitting in it. They were shot at point-blank range.
Satisfied, hung with trophies, without a single scratch, the twelve officers returned to their own."13

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

1 Skipsky G. Lessons from the First Chechen Campaign // Russia and the Soviet Union in local wars and armed conflicts of the twentieth century. Ekaterinburg, 2002. pp. 219-235. (http://chechnya.genstab.ru/art_324reg.htm)
2 Skipsky G. Lessons from the First Chechen Campaign // Russia and the Soviet Union in local wars and armed conflicts of the twentieth century. Ekaterinburg, 2002. pp. 219-235. (http://chechnya.genstab.ru/art_324reg.htm)
3 Potapov V. Actions of formations, units and units of the Army during a special operation to disarm illegal armed groups in 1994-96. on the territory of the Chechen Republic.
4 Skipsky G. Lessons from the First Chechen Campaign // Russia and the Soviet Union in local wars and armed conflicts of the twentieth century. Ekaterinburg, 2002. pp. 219-235. (http://chechnya.genstab.ru/art_324reg.htm)
5 Belousov Yu. There are no combat draws // Remember and bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000. P. 318.
6 Khanmamedov A. The regiment that returned... // Ural Military Gazette. 1996. August 2.
7 Skipsky G. Lessons from the First Chechen Campaign // Russia and the Soviet Union in local wars and armed conflicts of the twentieth century. Ekaterinburg, 2002. pp. 219-235. (http://chechnya.genstab.ru/art_324reg.htm)
8 Belousov Yu. There are no combat draws // Remember and bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000. P. 319.
9 Belousov Yu. There are no combat draws // Remember and bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000. P. 319.
10 Belousov Yu. There are no combat draws // Remember and bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000. P. 319.
11 Skipsky G. Lessons from the First Chechen Campaign // Russia and the Soviet Union in local wars and armed conflicts of the twentieth century. Ekaterinburg, 2002. pp. 219-235. (http://chechnya.genstab.ru/art_324reg.htm)
12 Belousov Yu. There are no combat draws // Remember and bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000. P. 319.
13 Tikhonov I. War and peace of Captain Zhuravlev // Remember and bow. Ekaterinburg, 2000. P. 87.

Memorial complex of 34 MSD and 324 MRP on the territory of the division. Ekaterinburg. Photo from the personal archive of A.A. Venidiktova

Burial place of Igor Moldovanov. Trans-Baikal Territory, Chara village

Stella with the name of the hero, senior sergeant of Russia Igor Valerievich Moldovanov. Memorial complex 34 MSD and 324 MSP. Yekaterinburg city. Photo from the personal archive of A. Venidiktov

In different sources, information about the awardees varies. Two names of Heroes of Russia are indicated. Maybe this is because the guys died on different days. Igor Moldovanov - on the first day of the fight, and A. Sorogovets and Y. Nesterenko the next day. But steles with the names of heroes in Yekaterinburg were erected for all three.
324 SMEs dedicated

The field is covered with a white blanket.
Our platoon dies near Chechen-Aul.
Evil spirits are clinging to the shore of Argun.
Mortars are hitting infantry platoons.
The young boy wanted to return so badly.
And today he might be killed.
A festive garland in the air rockets.
The BMP burns with a funeral candle.
Hiding by the irrigation ditch, he smokes a cigarette.
The one who will, perhaps, be killed.
The boy meanders along the muddy ground.
Tears flow down my cheeks in streams.
He runs to attack and doesn’t know yet.
That he might be killed today.
On the broken field, the tanks are burning out.
In the smoky sky there is a pale disk of the sun.
Those who are still alive are pouring vodka.
By the river above the bridge there is a Black Obelisk.
White snow is fluffy, clean, silver.
From the dark clouds it breaks over the ground and spins.
He covered the area like a white shroud.
On this day I once lost a friend.
Poems by Sergei Eliseev, participant in military operations in Chechnya

Moldovanov Igor Valerievich
By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1059 of October 19, 1995, senior sergeant Igor Valerievich Moldovanov was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously) for the courage and heroism shown during the performance of a special task.
He fought in Chechnya as part of the 324th motorized rifle regiment of the Ural Military District. On March 13, 1995, during the capture of a fortified dairy farm south of Chechen-Aul, our units were stopped by heavy fire from militants. Acting as a signalman, Moldovanov ensured uninterrupted communication between the company commander and subordinate and attached units, which contributed to the successful solution of the task. During the battle, he personally destroyed the grenade launcher crew of the Dudayevites. Having received an order to cover the evacuation of the wounded, he took a seat in an infantry fighting vehicle and moved to the southeastern outskirts of a dairy farm, where one of the platoons suffered losses. Having taken up a convenient firing position, allowing him to cover his comrades who were carrying out the wounded, he essentially switched the fire of the militants onto himself. During the battle, the infantry fighting vehicle was hit and caught fire. Having received wounds and burns, senior sergeant Moldovanov did not leave his combat post and continued to fire from the flaming vehicle until the ammunition exploded.
http://www.divizia.org/history/heroes/23.html

Stella with the name of the hero of Russia Sorogovets Alexander Vladimirovich. Memorial complex of the 34th Motorized Rifle Division and 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment in the division. Yekaterinburg. From the personal archive of A.A. Venidiktov

Sorogovets A.V.

A. Sorogovets. Hero of the Russian Federation Ural Military District , senior lieutenant .
Top left. Chechen-Aul. 1995 photo by Yu. Belousov. Newspaper "Red Star"

Alexander Vladimirovich Sorogovets - participantFirst Chechen war , Hero of the Russian Federation , assistant chief of intelligence of the 324th motorized rifle regiment of the 34th motorized rifle divisionUral Military District , senior lieutenant .
Was bornMay 7 1971 V Tashkent . Belarusian . He graduated from 8 classes of secondary school No. 209 in the city of Tashkent (Karasu-1 microdistrict). Subsequently he studied atVocational school . Being an excellent student, he had the opportunity to enter the , but in the end chose the military path. From 1989 to 1993 he studied at the Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command School named after. V.I.Lenin.
After graduating from military school, he was sent for further service inTurkestan Military District .
He served in the military as commander of a special forces group of a special forces brigade, and deputy commander of a special forces company. IN1994 commanded a special forces group of a separate special forces company in the Ural Military District.
January 18 1995 was appointed assistant chief of intelligence of the 324th motorized rifle regiment of the 34th motorized rifle division. The regiment was stationed inYekaterinburg and prepared to be sent toChechen Republic . January 22 units of the 324th motorized rifle regiment arrived in Chechnya and settled near the villageTolstoy-Yurt. WITH January 23 1995 Sorogovets took part in the hostilities.
Died from severe woundsMarch 15th 1995 in the battle for the bridge over the riverArgun located near the villageNew Atagi . The command of the 324th Regiment requested that he be posthumously awarded the title "Hero of the Russian Federation ».
Buried atBotkin cemetery city of Tashkent.
In memory of Alexander Sorogovets, an obelisk was erected in the military unit in which he served.
Awards:
Medal of Honor" (April 20, 1995);
Title "Hero of the Russian Federation "(January 29, 1997).
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sorogovets,_Alexander_Vladimirovich

Stella with the name of the hero of Russia Yuri Ivanovich Nesterenko photo from the archive of A. Venidiktov

Hero of Russia - commander of a motorized rifle company, Captain Yuri Nesterenko. Killed in battle near Chechen-Aul on March 15, 1995 . 324th motor bridge rifle regiment

Tombstone of Yu.I.Nesterenko. Walk of Fame of Krasnogvardeisky Park, Vladivokavkaz, photo by Vl. Rogov

Nesterenko Yuri Ivanovich
By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1059 of October 19, 1995, for the courage and heroism shown during the performance of a special task, Captain Yuri Ivanovich Nesterenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously).
He fought in Chechnya as part of the 324th motorized rifle regiment of the Ural Military District. On March 15, 1995, the commander of a motorized rifle company, Captain Yuri Nesterenko, with one of the company’s platoons, struck the enemy’s flank and knocked him out of position.
At one point in the battle, Captain Nesterenko’s infantry fighting vehicle was damaged, the company commander himself was wounded, however, he did not leave the vehicle, but continued to fire and control the unit. After the second hit in the BMP, Nesterenko received another wound, but did not leave the battlefield, but took up a firing position in the trench. Having received medical assistance, he led the company on foot into an attack and captured the second line of defense of the militants. One of the platoons was pinned to the ground by heavy machine gun fire. Twice wounded, Captain Nesterenko with several soldiers rushed to the rescue of his subordinates. The machine gun crew was destroyed by machine gun fire and grenades, but received multiple shrapnel wounds from the grenade explosion. The brave officer died on the way to the hospital.
http://www.divizia.org/history/heroes/12.html

And the first monument to Igor Moldovanov was erected before Victory Day - there, on Chechen soil.
Boris Tsekhanovich:
“...The holiday was approaching - Victory Day, and there was a possibility that the militants would try to spoil our mood on this day. But everything went fine. On the morning of May 9, I built a battery and congratulated everyone on Victory Day, and after that I took everyone I could to a concert organized by the regimental amateur forces. Vitka Perets was in charge of the entire concert. After the concert, they installed a large-screen TV and showed a film about our regiment and the 276th, filmed by Sverdlovsk television journalists who came to us in February. There were also shots about an anti-tank battery; they showed me in a German helmet, which caused loud laughter. They also laughed at the TV journalist’s commentary, where he said in all seriousness that the militants during their stay in prison. station ate a herd of two hundred head of cows. Everyone laughed when they remembered how the regiment ate beef for a month.
After lunch, the officers went to the bank of the Argun, where they erected a monument to the children who died on March 15. At the entrance to the bridge, on a cliff, they installed a metal pyramid with a star and on a pedestal a tower from an infantry fighting vehicle, in which senior sergeant Moldavanov burned down.”

This monument: an iron stele, topped with an artillery shell and machine gun belts with a modest sign: “Eternal memory to the soldiers of the 324th MRR who died in Chechnya. From officers, warrant officers and soldiers” in 1996, after the conclusion of the Khasavyurt Peace Treaty and the withdrawal of our troops from Chechnya, will be blown up militants.

The dual power that emerged in Chechnya in 1991, which declared itself a sovereign republic, led to confrontation with the federal government and internal conflicts in the struggle for power, which ended with the introduction of Russian troops in December 1994. This is how not all of the country’s military leadership wanted to participate. But if the generals could resign and avoid being sent to the North Caucasus, then conscript soldiers and junior officers simply had no choice. In a hurry, the regiments were completed and sent to carry out combat missions in Chechnya. The 245th, which lost a significant part of its personnel during the hostilities, did not escape this fate. The most dramatic battle was the battle near the village of Yaryshmardy on April 16, 1996, which took place exactly twenty years ago.

245th SME

The 245th Regiment has the rank of Guards for its heroic history during the Great Patriotic War. Stationed in the Nizhny Novgorod region, during the ten days of January 1995 after the failed operation of the federal forces to capture Grozny, it began to be actively replenished with conscripts under wartime conditions. Its contingent grew 10 times and amounted to 1,700 people due to recruitment from the KDVO (Red Banner Far Eastern Military District). In addition to recruits, volunteers who had not undergone the necessary training were also called up. On the eve of entering Chechnya, the fighters did not have a single joint exercise to practice interaction.

If we take into account that already in the North Caucasus the regiment would change 4 sets of officers, using its example it becomes clear that the army was not prepared to participate in the First Chechen Campaign and was doomed to losses. Only those killed at 245 SMEs will amount to 220 people, including the son of Lieutenant General Pulikovsky (December 1995) and those guys who laid down their lives during another 20 military operations. The bloodiest battle was near the village of Yashmardy, which caused a huge public outcry.

In the war zone

The 245th SME was always in the forefront, participating in the assault on Prigorodny (Grozny), Goysky, Vedeno, Arktan-Yurt, Shatoy and Goth. Since the spring of 1995, the regiment settled near Shatoy, guarding roads and manning checkpoints. The fighters accompanied transport columns carrying fuel, food and civilians. Starting from February 1995, after the encirclement and blocking of Dudayev’s main troops in the “South-East” group of troops, strange events related to concessions to the separatists began to occur more and more often.

During the operation to capture Shatoy in June 1995, a column of the 245th regiment was ambushed near the village of Zone in the Argun Gorge. This happened due to the carelessness of the leadership and the lack of foot reconnaissance. Despite the losses, this fact remained almost unnoticed in the general rejoicing associated with the capture of Shatoy. But this was the first bell to a tragedy that went down in history as the Battle of Yaryshmarda. On March 31, 1996, a column of paratroopers was shot at the village of Benoy, heading to Vedeno, but this did not prompt the command to increase security measures when passing through the gorge.

What preceded the April events

On April 4, the administration of the village of Yaryshmardy signed a peace treaty with federal troops, which imposed a ban on military operations in the area. Based on a document from the chief of staff of the 324th MRR, under whose control the section of the road to Shatoi was located, a checkpoint was removed 500 meters from the village. The regiment commander was not informed.

The battle at Yaryshmarda will take place in the context of an order from the Minister of Defense on the use of artillery only in case of self-defense and a complete renunciation of the participation of aviation on the territory of Chechnya. He arrived through secret communication channels about ten days before the column left Khankala.

Shot column

The central base of the 245th SME prepared a convoy to Shatoy, the purpose of which was to deliver material and technical means, fuel and young reinforcements to the military unit. Those demobilized and sent home for family reasons joined the column. There is information that there were also soldiers’ mothers searching for their missing children. From Goisky, they were joined by 4 vehicles of the 324th SME. The rear column under the command of Major Terzovets left on April 15, immediately after the Easter celebration. After spending the night in Khankala, by the middle of the next day, cars and military equipment passed Dacha-Borzoi and Yaryshmardy, stretching for 1.5-2 km. Ahead there was a narrow mountain serpentine, commonly called “mother-in-law’s tongue.”

The reconnaissance controlled artillery spotter maintained contact with the 324th MRR, and that was all that was done to protect people and military equipment. The battle at Yaryshmarda was filmed by the militants themselves, whose material became public. Against the background of birdsong and conversations of the detachment of Jordanian Khattab and Ruslan Gelayev, the hum of cars can be heard. You can see from behind the branches from the cliff how a tented Ural, a tanker, and an armored personnel carrier appear. The distance between cars is about 20 meters. And suddenly the silence is broken by explosions, and then gunfire. With heavy fire from above, invisible behind the greenery and a curtain of smoke, the militants shoot at point-blank range the Russian column. The time recorded on the video is 13 hours 23 minutes. These are the minutes when the battle at Yaryshmarda began.

Battle scheme

The presented diagram shows that the militants deliberately waited for the convoy, having equipped up to 20 points for a fire strike. Trenches were specially dug in the rocks, which is a very labor-intensive task. All locations of the Khattab and Gelayev gang are equipped with a sufficient number of weapons. They are located on both sides, which allows you to shoot through all sections of the path. Radio-controlled landmines are installed on the road in the direction of traffic. The location for the attack is ideally chosen due to the curve that hides the lead transport from the tail of the column. The road in this area is so narrow that it is impossible for tankers or trucks to turn around to leave the battlefield.

On the left is an almost vertical cliff, on the right is a cliff about five meters high, under which the Argun River flows. During heavy fire, some soldiers managed to jump into a dry river. Those who did not crash during the fall were finished off by snipers, which excluded the possibility of escape. The trap for the transport column slammed shut when the leading tank was blown up by a landmine and an explosion was heard at the end of the procession. The bandits hit the target accurately, shooting the infantry fighting vehicles and BRDMs leading the column in the first minutes of the battle. Senior Major Terezovets, a radio operator and an artillery spotter were killed. The company of the 245th SME found itself without communication with the outside world (jamming was specially placed in the VHF range), without control and support from artillery and aviation. The battle at Yaryshmarda turned into a real massacre for Russian soldiers and officers.

1996: tragic events through the eyes of eyewitnesses

According to the 245th MRR, during the bloody events, 73 people were killed, 52 were injured, 6 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 BRDM, and 11 vehicles were destroyed. Komsomolskaya Pravda published an article indicating 95 dead, including those demobilized and those who joined the convoy, whose presence was not officially recorded by anyone. This is easy to believe, because the mother of the deceased machine gunner Oleg Ogoreltsev, one of those demobilized, had to search for her son in Chechnya for a month and she was able to identify the corpse in Rostov only after meeting with the surviving participants in the dramatic events. 30 bodies were taken from the battlefield without the possibility of identification: the guys burned like torches after direct hits from grenade launchers on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. What do eyewitnesses say about the battle at Yaryshmarda?

Sniper Denis Tsiryulnik, a contract soldier, says that after the smoke cleared, the surviving soldiers resisted until the last bullet in conditions of almost zero visibility. After the battle, seven corpses of militants - residents of the Shatoi region - will be found. Only at 6 o’clock in the evening did Miroshnichenko’s armored group and the 324th MRP, as well as a battered reconnaissance detachment, make their way to the column. By this time, the Chechens and Arab mercenaries participating in Khattab’s gang had already fled. Only one question was asked: why did help come so late? The lead BRDM resisted to the last, the guys could have survived. To which the answer came: the regiment command was waiting for instructions from above, and the groups began to break through to help only at four o’clock. The helicopters flew up and hit the mountains, artillery fired, but there were no militants on the slopes.

Igor Izotov, who was in the third truck, said that those who survived were those who managed to squeeze into the space between the front infantry fighting vehicle and the rocks, which became the only dead zone for the enemy. Snipers pulled the guys out from under the cars, shooting them with ricochets on the asphalt.

The wounded Sergei Cherchik recalls that, despite the fire, there was mutual assistance between the soldiers. He, wounded by shrapnel, was pulled out from under the car by a contract soldier, and when he himself was hit in the kneecap, the two of them were saved by a conscript soldier.

Eternal memory to the dead

The fact that the convoy was expected and Khattab had complete information about its composition is evidenced by the fact that the most important vehicles were hit by landmines and grenade launchers. The medical car remained untouched. The wounded were gathered into it, and the bodies of the dead were laid on the armor. When the MTLB began to turn around, its wheels hovered over the cliff. The driver miraculously managed to straighten the car, but the bodies of the already dead guys fell into the Argun. All morning on the 17th they cleared the road, finding seven more unexploded landmines. They threw burnt trucks off the cliff and searched for the soldiers' belongings and personal numbers. Thus ended the almost four-hour battle at Yaryshmarda.

The list of the dead 245 SMEs includes 11 officers, including artillery spotter Captain Vyatkin, who met death in the first minutes of the battle, Captain Lakhin, Major Milovanov, 2 warrant officers and 27 soldiers and sergeants. Among them, 8 33 remained unidentified, and for a long time their names, like the machine gunner Ogoreltsev, were established with the help of parents and relatives. A book of memory is posted on the website of 245 SMEs, and a monument to those who fulfilled their task at the cost of their lives was erected in the Nizhny Novgorod region.

Official investigation

The mass death of personnel of 245 SMEs became the subject of an official investigation, as a result of which the prosecutor’s office spoke in the State Duma, not seeing any corpus delicti in the actions of the officials. Rokhlin accused the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense of not controlling the situation in Chechnya and allowing the manifestation of carelessness that led to the death of the military. He pointed to a lack of vigilance, tactical illiteracy and lack of coordination between the 245th and 324th MRR. But no one, including the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Romanikhin, was punished for the dramatic battle at Yaryshmarda.

20 years later

On May 5, 1996, the first article appeared on the pages of the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper about the tragedy with the column of the 245th SME, which on the sidelines immediately began to be called sold. In a video message, Khattab openly talks about the corruption of some high-ranking officers. But you cannot trust him; a thorough judicial investigation is necessary, which should answer the question of the reasons for the terrible coincidences and the mass death of soldiers. But to date, such a trial has not been carried out. One of the mysteries of the First Chechen War remains the April battle at Yaryshmarda. Military secrets have been carefully guarded since those times when participants in the events were strictly forbidden to convey details of the terrible tragedy to everyone, including journalists. Today their memoirs have been published, but they do not answer the main question: why is the command not responsible for the lives of its soldiers?..

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