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Battle at Yaryshmarda. Sold column Death of column 245

REPORT TO THE STATE DUMA
Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Lev ROKHLIN
upon the death of servicemen of the 245th motorized rifle regiment
in the Chechen Republic on April 16, 1996

The tragedy with the shooting of the column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment was a consequence of its unpreparedness for combat operations.

The regiment's losses since its entry into the combat zone amounted to 220 people. In the last four months alone, the regiment suffered sensitive blows three times:

the second - in the battle for the village of Goyskoye, in which, due to an incorrect decision, 24 people were killed, 41 were wounded and 3 were missing;

and the third - on April 16, the shooting of a column in a gorge one and a half kilometers north of Yaryshmarda, where, as a result of carelessness, tactical illiteracy, lack of interaction, and loss of vigilance, 73 military personnel were killed, 52 were wounded, 6 infantry fighting vehicles, one tank, one BRDM, and 11 vehicles were destroyed.

Systematically, the regiment also suffered smaller losses.

This situation has developed, first of all, due to the dishonest performance of duties by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

The fault of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is that, while reducing the army from 3.5 to 1.7 million people, it did not leave fully deployed, highly trained, materially equipped formations and units.

Experience shows that the presence of 2-3 such divisions from the very beginning of hostilities could provide a prompt solution to all military issues in Chechnya.

There were no such divisions, despite the fact that there were 18 of them in the Western Group of Forces alone before the withdrawal to Russia.

To get out of this situation, after the failure to capture Grozny, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense decides to urgently deploy reduced-strength units and send them to the combat zone.

The 245th motorized rifle regiment, stationed in the village, also falls into the number of such units. Mulino near Nizhny Novgorod.

For 10 days from January 8 to January 18, 1995, the regiment is deployed with an increase in its strength from 172 to 1,700 military personnel due to the replenishment of conscripts from the Far Eastern Military District and officers and warrant officers from the army. They are urgently trying to organize combat coordination, but due to lack of time this can only be done at the platoon level without conducting company, battalion and regimental exercises. In addition, untrained soldiers had to be placed in the positions of riflemen, machine gunners, grenade launchers, and snipers, whose initial training usually takes 3-6 months, rather than the allotted 10 days.

Thus, already upon leaving for Chechnya, the regiment, due to its lack of coordination, lack of tactical skill, and low training of personnel, was doomed to losses.

This doom was compounded by other Department of Defense missteps.

Such mistakes include the decision to change officers in the combat zone after 3 months.

During the period the regiment was in Chechnya, 4 sets of officers were replaced. At the same time, the level of professional training of replacement officers was constantly declining due to the limited capabilities of the district, in which mainly reduced-strength units are located, as well as due to the short time for their training at special training camps. This drawback is complemented by the short deadlines for changing officers, which was carried out within 2-3 days without transferring the accumulated experience.

I know from my own service that 3 or even 6 months in a combat area is clearly not enough to gain combat experience. Therefore, having not yet really learned how to fight, having acquired initial experience at the cost of losing personnel, the officers handed over their positions to newcomers, who again learned from their mistakes, exposing themselves and their subordinates to enemy fire with inexperienced decisions.

The second omission is related to the replacement of retired personnel with volunteers directly from military registration and enlistment offices without preliminary training based on the skills they previously acquired during military service. Due to the fact that many of those drafted were not sent according to their specialty, forgot a lot or had weak previous training in the army, in fact they became “cannon fodder”.

The Secretary of Defense forgot how the reserves were trained for Afghanistan, when officers trained for months in officer reserve battalions, and soldiers were sent to combat units only after intense combat training in training units for at least four months.

The third omission is related to the lack of sufficient control and assistance to the troops both from the Ministry of Defense and the country's leadership.

Many warring units, especially in the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, are only 70 percent staffed with personnel, and 50-60 percent with serviceable equipment. For several months, military personnel have not been paid, and there have been interruptions in the supply of units with food and clothing. There is often unprecedented pressure on the media army.

There is no strict enough demand from the army leadership for losses. The Minister of Defense again forgot how they asked for this in Afghanistan.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense is a rare guest in the Chechen Republic, and if it appears there, it is no further than the Severny and Khankala airports, after which it urgently flies away.

Such an attitude to the matter, when the entire state is literally “sounding the alarm” about the events in Chechnya, when the issue of the country’s future is being decided, is of course unacceptable.

All of the above confirms that the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, like many other units, was doomed to losses throughout the entire period of hostilities.

This is also confirmed by the experience of the best units, such as the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Vasilievich Dianov). This brigade was deployed before the outbreak of hostilities, before entering Chechnya it was re-equipped and given the opportunity to conduct intensive combat training for three months. At the moment, the brigade is fighting with great successes and minimal losses. The brigade skillfully uses all types of weapons, and competently organizes the interaction of all available forces and means.

The country's leadership is also to blame for what happened, because by their inattention and decreased control over the security forces, they allowed the situation to arise in the troops.

How could it happen that now, in addition to the lack of deployed units in the army, there is not enough military equipment in Chechnya?

Troops were withdrawn not only from the Western Group of Forces, but there were also the Central, Northern, Southern Groups, a group of troops in Mongolia and the Northwestern Military District.

During the period of “euphoria of democracy,” the onslaught on the army, as a result of which it found itself without a conscript contingent, was not stopped in a timely manner. There were no soldiers in the units. Officers went on guard duty.

Control over reform in the Armed Forces was not established either. The reduction affected mainly combat units, but there remained many redundant departments, institutes, and enterprises, the timely liquidation of which would increase the staffing of combat units and the level of their support.

And, finally, the most important thing is that the army was left without funding. Officers have not received their pay for months. They are no longer interested in combat training and mastering a combat specialty. They are faced with the question of how to survive. The soldiers are malnourished. The troops are not receiving the necessary equipment, without which combat missions cannot be solved at a high level.

In Chechnya, the Minister of Defense and the leadership of the state became hostages of the attitude towards the army and the mistakes they made.

In addition to the objective reasons indicated above, in the case under consideration there were also a number of gross professional errors both directly in the 245th MRR and the neighboring 324th MRR, and in the leadership of the Operational Group of the Ministry of Defense.

In preparation for the departure of a column of 245 infantry regiments from a deployment point near Shatoi to Khankala, planned for April 15, for material resources, the Command and headquarters of the Operational Group (Commander - Major General Kondratyev) committed serious violations in the established procedure for preventing attacks by gangs on military columns. The commander was not personally involved in planning and preparing the convoy of the columns, entrusting these issues to the Chief of Staff of the Operational Group.

When preparing for the convoy, the headquarters did not clarify the assignments to the commanders of the units in whose area of responsibility the routes of the convoys were determined, and the interaction of forces and assets in the base centers was not organized with the loss of episodes to repel an attack on the convoy. No written order was given to the commander of the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment to provide escort for the convoy. The headquarters did not demand a report on the readiness of the route from the commanders of the 245th and 324th motorized rifle regiments. The order requiring the presence of two command and staff vehicles in the columns to organize reliable communications was violated. No aviation support was provided, although the convoy did not leave Khankala until 12:00 on April 16 due to bad weather conditions.

The sudden attack by militants on the convoy became possible due to lack of training, negligence and loss of vigilance of the command and personnel of the 324th and 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, who had been stationed for a long time in the area that signed the peace agreements. Most of the permanent checkpoints in the regiments' area of responsibility were removed. “Fire treatment” of the most dangerous areas of the terrain was not carried out.

The commander of the 245th infantry regiment, although there was direct communication, did not organize interaction with the commander of the 324th infantry regiment. The decision of the commander of the 324th infantry regiment to conduct a convoy in his area of responsibility, where the destruction of the convoy occurred, was not worked out. Reconnaissance of the movement route was not carried out, temporary checkpoints were not set up in dangerous areas, which allowed the militants to prepare in advance in engineering terms and carefully camouflage firing positions in areas of the terrain advantageous for an ambush.

An inspection of the state of affairs in the base centers showed that in 324 small and medium-sized infantry regiments there are serious shortcomings in service and combat activities. Information about the passage of the convoy from the checkpoint to the regimental command post was not communicated; the armored group sent by the regimental chief of staff to assist the convoy was returned by the regimental commander. The chief of staff did not report to the regiment commander at all about the removal of checkpoints in the regiment's area of responsibility.

In turn, the commander of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, sending out the convoy, appointed its senior deputy regimental commander for armaments - a person incompetent in matters of conducting combined arms combat. Of the combined arms commanders in the convoy guard, the highest official was the platoon commander.

During the march of the column, there was no reconnaissance of the area using foot combat patrols, even in the most dangerous places. The deployment of side outposts in the most dangerous areas, as well as the occupation of advantageous heights along the route of movement, were also not carried out. The regiment did not create reserves of forces and means to provide immediate assistance to the column. And the lack of a communications reserve did not allow us to immediately transmit a signal about the attack.

The battle unfolded as follows.

At 14.20, in the area 1.5 km south of Yaryshmardy, the column was ambushed by a large gang of militants, which included foreign mercenaries. Due to the fact that the command vehicle was hit from the first minutes of the battle, and the senior column, Major Terzovets, was killed, the sergeant major of the communications company tried to transmit a message about the attack via a walkie-talkie, but it was not accepted.

According to the report of the commander of the 245th infantry regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Romanikhin, at 14.40 he heard the sounds of explosions coming from the gorge. At 14.45, he assigned the task to the commander of the reconnaissance company, located in the Argun Gorge at temporary checkpoints, to move towards the column, clarify the situation and, if necessary, provide assistance.

At 15.30, the commander of the reconnaissance company reported that on the southern outskirts of Yaryshmardy the company came under heavy fire, there was a wounded man and he was consolidating at the reached line.

At 16.00, the regiment commander sends out the armored group he formed, led by the commander of the 2nd MSB, who is tasked with bypassing Yaryshmardy, destroying enemy firing points with tank and infantry fighting vehicle fire, and breaking through to the column together with the reconnaissance company. At the same time, the regiment commander sets the task for his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov, who was located near the village of Goyskoye with the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment, to send an armored group from the side of the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment for the same purpose.

At 16.50, the commander of the 2nd MSB reported that he had destroyed two machine-gun crews on the southern outskirts of Yaryshmarda with tank fire and was moving towards the column. At 17.30 he reported that he had reached the column. At the same time, an armored group approached from the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment. At 18.00 the resistance of the Dudayevites stopped.

The above analysis shows that urgent measures are required to streamline the activities of the Joint Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as to ensure the defense and security of the state as a whole.

For this purpose it is proposed:

I. On the United Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic

1. Strengthen the responsibility of security ministers for the state of affairs in Chechnya.

2. In order to strengthen the coordination of the actions of security forces in the interests of the Commander of the Joint Group, as well as control over the condition of the troops and their comprehensive support, propose to the President of the Russian Federation to appoint his authorized representative when leading the group.

3. To propose to the President of the Russian Federation, by his Decree, to urgently introduce additional benefits for participants in combat operations in the Chechen Republic.

These benefits are provided for in the draft federal law “On Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Status of Military Personnel,” developed by the State Duma Committee on Defense.

It would be extremely advisable for the State Duma and the Government of the Russian Federation to take all measures to speed up the entry into force of this bill.

4. Increase the terms of service for officers in the United Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic to one year.

At the same time, provide special benefits to encourage officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers to serve beyond established periods.

5. Carry out an urgent replacement with trained troops of the least combat-ready units in the Chechen Republic.

6. Urgently organize enhanced training in the training units of personnel intended to supplement units in the Chechen Republic.

7. Urgently organize training at special training camps for officers sent for replacement to the Chechen Republic.

8. To propose to the Government of the Russian Federation:

make a decision on the production of the most necessary military equipment, primarily communications and control equipment, all types of reconnaissance and electronic suppression;

take measures to provide comprehensive support to the troops, including timely payment of pay and material support.

II. In the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

1. Conduct an audit of all directorates, reduced-strength units, bases, arsenals, institutes, training grounds, enterprises and other institutions of the Ministry of Defense, reducing their composition and structure to reasonable limits.

2. Create the required number of fully deployed combat-ready divisions capable of resolving any local internal conflict if necessary.

III. To ensure the defense and security of the state as a whole

Based on the extremely difficult economic situation of the country, it is advisable to determine tasks in the field of ensuring the defense and security of the state for the near and long term.

It is proposed to consider the following tasks for the near future:

1. Preventing external aggression directed against Russia through nuclear deterrence. At the same time, all possible opponents must firmly know that we do not have any claims against any country, but at the same time we have enough determination to suppress any external aggression using nuclear potential.

2. It should be recognized that while Russia has not strengthened, the main danger in the near future is represented by intranational conflicts.

To promptly suppress them, it is necessary to have a combat-ready united group of all security forces.

When creating divisions, it should be taken into account that the mother does not care in which troops her son died. Her grief in all cases will be immeasurable.

It is easier and cheaper to amend an article of the Constitution or law than to create divisions and overlapping organizations in parallel in different law enforcement agencies.

As for the future, we are faced with a choice of what kind of power structures we need to have.

Some argue that the army should make up 1 percent of the country's population. Others try to justify its composition and structure depending on external threats.

But given the current poverty of the state, no matter how wonderful a structure is proposed, if we “cannot afford it”, it is doomed to failure. An army cannot exist when wages are not paid for several months, when soldiers are malnourished, when not a single tank is renewed in a year.

Therefore, for the sake of the long term, the main task should be to reduce the security forces on the basis of their comprehensive solution of all tasks of ensuring the defense and security of the state and thereby maintaining priority areas for the creation and production of weapons.

This will make it possible, when favorable conditions arise, to ensure the necessary equipment for the army and navy in the future.

To implement this it is proposed:

1. Determine a unified concept for the further development of all security forces in the interests of ensuring defense and security and the state, establishing a strict framework for each of them;

2. Establish funding standards for each security agency, determining the level of appropriations for the “National Defense” item at least 5 percent of the gross domestic product.

At the same time, special priority should be given to supporting promising areas of R&D and weapons production.

3. Create a single, permanent, professional body under the leadership of the President of the Russian Federation to control and coordinate the activities of all law enforcement agencies, their construction and reform.

Subordinate to this body an independent inspection that could truthfully and objectively report the true state of affairs in a particular structure.

4. To ensure every possible increase in the prestige of military service and the performance of military duty, as the most difficult and dangerous profession.

To revive the military-patriotic education of the population on the basis of the historical and cultural traditions of the Russian people.

And of course, solve the social problems of military personnel.

The previously mentioned draft law on the status of military personnel, developed by the Committee, proposes differentiated approaches to the service and responsibilities of military personnel. If it is supported by the Government and the Duma, many things in the lives of military personnel will change for the better.

This report is planned to be sent to the President of the Russian Federation. To develop it, the Committee plans to hold parliamentary hearings on the problems of military reform.

Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense L.Ya. Rokhlin

Report by L.Ya. Rokhlina at a meeting of the State Duma “On the death of servicemen of the 245th motorized rifle regiment in the Chechen Republic on April 16, 1996”

The tragedy with the shooting of a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment was a consequence of its unpreparedness for combat operations.

The history of the formation, deployment and combat activity of the regiment is typical for the mass of the same regiments and brigades of the Ministry of Defense and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs fighting in the Chechen Republic. The regiment's losses since its entry into the combat zone amounted to 220 people. In the last four months alone, the regiment suffered sensitive blows three times:

The first - during the capture of checkpoint No. 24 by the Dudayevites, when, due to a complete loss of vigilance, the sentries were disarmed, 31 servicemen were captured, 12 people were killed and 8 were wounded;

The second - in the battle for the village of Goyskoye, in which, due to an incorrect decision, 24 people were killed, 41 were wounded and 3 were missing;

And the third was the shooting on April 16 of a column in a gorge one and a half kilometers north of Yaryshmarda, where, as a result of carelessness, tactical illiteracy, lack of cooperation, and loss of vigilance, 73 military personnel were killed, 52 were wounded, 6 infantry fighting vehicles, one tank, one BRDM, and 11 vehicles were destroyed.

Systematically, the regiment also suffered smaller losses.

This situation arose primarily due to the dishonest performance of duties by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. The fault of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is that, while reducing the army from 3.5 to 1.7 million people, it did not leave fully deployed, highly trained, materially equipped formations and units. Experience shows that the presence of 2-3 such divisions from the very beginning of hostilities could provide a prompt solution to all military issues in Chechnya. There were no such divisions, despite the fact that there were 18 of them in the Western Group of Forces alone before the withdrawal to Russia.

To get out of this situation, after the failure to capture Grozny, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense decides to urgently deploy reduced-strength units and send them to the combat zone. The 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, stationed in the village, also falls into the number of such units. Mouline near Nizhny Novgorod.

Thus, already upon leaving for Chechnya, the regiment, due to its lack of coordination, lack of tactical skill, and low training of personnel, was doomed to losses.

This doom was compounded by other Department of Defense missteps. Such mistakes include the decision to change officers in the combat zone after 3 months.

During the period the regiment was in Chechnya, 4 sets of officers were replaced. At the same time, the level of professional training of replacement officers was constantly declining due to the limited capabilities of the district, in which the majority of the reduced personnel are located, as well as due to the short time for their training at special training camps. This drawback is complemented by the short deadlines for changing officers, which was carried out within 2-3 days without transferring the accumulated experience.

The second omission is related to the replacement of retired personnel with volunteers directly from military registration and enlistment offices without preliminary training based on the skills they previously acquired during military service. Due to the fact that many of those called up were not sent according to their specialty, forgot a lot or had weak previous training in the army, in fact they became cannon fodder.

The third omission is related to the lack of sufficient control and assistance to the troops both from the Ministry of Defense and the country's leadership.

There is no strict enough demand from the army leadership for losses. The Minister of Defense again forgot how they asked for this in Afghanistan.

Such an attitude towards the matter, when the entire state is literally sounding the alarm about the events in Chechnya, when the issue of the future of the country is being decided, is, of course, unacceptable.

All of the above confirms that the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, like many other units, was doomed to losses throughout the entire period of hostilities. This is also confirmed by the experience of the best units, such as the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Vasilyevich Dianov). This brigade was deployed before the outbreak of hostilities, before entering Chechnya it was re-equipped and given the opportunity to conduct intensive combat training for three months.

At the moment, the brigade is fighting with great successes and minimal losses. The brigade skillfully uses all types of weapons, and competently organizes the interaction of all available forces and means.

The country's leadership is also to blame for what happened, because by their inattention and decreased control over the security forces, they allowed the situation to arise in the troops.

How could it happen that now, in addition to the lack of deployed units in the army, there is not enough military equipment in Chechnya?

Troops were withdrawn not only from the Western Group of Forces, but there were also the Central, Northern, Southern Groups, a group of troops in Mongolia and the Northwestern Military District.

During the period of euphoria of democracy, the attack on the army was not stopped in a timely manner, as a result of which it found itself without a conscript contingent. There were no soldiers in the units. Officers went on guard duty.

And finally, the most important thing is that the army was left without funding. Officers have not received their pay for months. They are no longer interested in combat training and mastering a combat specialty. They are faced with the question of how to survive. The soldiers are malnourished. The troops are not receiving the necessary equipment, without which combat missions cannot be solved at a high level.

In Chechnya, the Minister of Defense and the leadership of the state became hostages of the attitude towards the army and the mistakes they made.

In addition to the objective reasons indicated above, in the case under consideration there were also a number of gross professional errors both directly in the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the neighboring 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and in the leadership of the Operational Group of the Ministry of Defense.

In preparation for the departure of the 245th Motorized Rifle Convoy from the deployment point near Shatoi to Khankala, planned for April 15, for material resources, the command and headquarters of the Operational Group (commander - Major General Kondratyev) committed serious violations in the established procedure for preventing attacks by gangs on military columns. The commander was not personally involved in planning and preparing the convoy of the columns, entrusting these issues to the chief of staff of the Operational Group.

When preparing for the convoy, the headquarters did not clarify the tasks of the commanders of the units in whose area of responsibility the routes of the convoys were determined, and the interaction of forces and assets in the base centers was not organized with the loss of episodes to repel an attack on the convoy. No written order was given to the commander of the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment to ensure the escort of the convoy. The headquarters did not demand a report on the readiness of the route from the commanders of the 245th and 324th motorized rifle regiments. The order requiring the presence of two command and staff vehicles in the columns to organize reliable communications was violated. No aviation support was provided, although the convoy did not leave Khankala until 12:00 on April 16 due to bad weather conditions.

The sudden attack by militants on the convoy became possible due to lack of training, negligence and loss of vigilance of the command and personnel of the 324th and 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, who had been stationed for a long time in the area that signed the peace agreements. Most of the permanent roadblocks in the regiments' area of responsibility were removed. “Fire treatment” of the most dangerous areas of the terrain was not carried out.

In turn, the commander of the 245th motorized rifle regiment, sending the convoy, appointed the senior deputy regiment commander for weapons - a person incompetent in matters of conducting combined arms combat. Of the combined arms commanders in the convoy guard, the highest official was the platoon commander.

The battle unfolded as follows.

At 14.20, in an area 1.5 km south of Yaryshmardy, the column was ambushed by a large gang of militants, which included foreign mercenaries. Due to the fact that the command vehicle was hit from the first minutes of the battle, and the senior column, Major Terzovets, was killed, the sergeant major of the communications company tried to transmit a message about the attack via a walkie-talkie, but it was not accepted.

At 15.30, the commander of the reconnaissance company reported that on the southern outskirts of Yaryshmarda the company came under heavy fire.

For this purpose it is proposed:

I. On the United Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic

1. Strengthen the responsibility of security ministers for the state of affairs in Chechnya.

3. To propose to the President of the Russian Federation, by his Decree, to urgently introduce additional benefits for participants in military operations in the Chechen Republic.

These benefits are provided for in the draft Federal Law “On Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Status of Military Personnel””, developed by the State Duma Committee on Defense.

It would be extremely advisable for the State Duma and the Government of the Russian Federation to take all measures to speed up the entry into force of this bill.

4. Increase the terms of service for officers in the United Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic to one year.

At the same time, provide special benefits to encourage officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers to serve beyond established periods.

5. Carry out an urgent replacement of the least combat-ready units in the Chechen Republic with trained troops.

6. Urgently organize enhanced training in the training units of personnel intended to complete the units in the Chechen Republic.

7. Urgently organize training at special training camps for officers sent for replacement to the Chechen Republic.

8. To propose to the Government of the Russian Federation: to make a decision on the production of the most necessary military equipment, primarily communications and control equipment, all types of reconnaissance and electronic suppression; take measures to comprehensively provide troops, including timely payment of pay and material support.

II. In the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

2. Create the required number of fully deployed combat-ready divisions capable of resolving any local internal conflict if necessary.

III. To ensure the defense and security of the state as a whole

Based on the extremely difficult economic situation of the country, it is advisable to determine tasks in the field of ensuring the defense and security of the state for the near and long term.

It is proposed to consider the following tasks for the near future:

1. Preventing external aggression directed against Russia through nuclear deterrence.

At the same time, all possible opponents must firmly know that we do not have any claims against any country, but at the same time we have enough determination to suppress any external aggression using nuclear potential.

2. It should be recognized that while Russia has not strengthened, the main danger in the near future is represented by intranational conflicts.

To promptly suppress them, it is necessary to have a combat-ready united group of all security forces.

When creating divisions, it should be taken into account that the mother does not care in which troops her son died. Her grief in all cases will be immeasurable.

It is easier and cheaper to amend an article of the Constitution or law than to create divisions and overlapping bodies in parallel in different law enforcement agencies.

As for the future, we are faced with a choice of what kind of power structures we need to have.

Some argue that the army should make up 1 percent of the country's population. Others try to justify its composition and structure depending on external threats.

This will make it possible, when favorable conditions arise, to ensure the necessary equipment for the army and navy in the future.

To implement this it is proposed:

1. Determine a unified concept for the further development of all security forces in the interests of ensuring the defense and security of the state, establishing a strict framework for each of them.

2. Establish funding standards for each security agency, determining the level of appropriations under the heading “National Defense” at least 5 percent of the gross domestic product.

At the same time, special priority should be given to supporting promising areas of R&D and weapons production.

Subordinate to this body an independent inspection that could truthfully and objectively report the true state of affairs in a particular structure.

4. To ensure every possible increase in the prestige of military service and the performance of military duty, as the most difficult and dangerous profession.

To revive the military-patriotic education of the population on the basis of the historical and cultural traditions of the Russian people.

And, of course, to solve the social problems of military personnel.

The previously mentioned draft law on the status of military personnel, developed by the Committee, proposes differentiated approaches to the service and responsibilities of military personnel. If he is supported by the government and the Duma, many things in the lives of military personnel will change for the better.

This report is planned to be sent to the President of the Russian Federation. To develop it, the Committee plans to hold parliamentary hearings on the problems of military reform.

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The dual power that emerged in Chechnya in 1991, which declared itself a sovereign republic, led to confrontation with the federal government and internal conflicts in the struggle for power, which ended with the introduction of Russian troops in December 1994. This is how not all of the country’s military leadership wanted to participate. But if the generals could resign and avoid being sent to the North Caucasus, then conscript soldiers and junior officers simply had no choice. In a hurry, the regiments were completed and sent to carry out combat missions in Chechnya. The 245th, which lost a significant part of its personnel during the hostilities, did not escape this fate. The most dramatic battle was the battle near the village of Yaryshmardy on April 16, 1996, which took place exactly twenty years ago.

245th SME

The 245th Regiment has the rank of Guards for its heroic history during the Great Patriotic War. Stationed in the Nizhny Novgorod region, during the ten days of January 1995 after the failed operation of the federal forces to capture Grozny, it began to be actively replenished with conscripts under wartime conditions. Its contingent grew 10 times and amounted to 1,700 people due to recruitment from the KDVO (Red Banner Far Eastern Military District). In addition to recruits, volunteers who had not undergone the necessary training were also called up. On the eve of entering Chechnya, the fighters did not have a single joint exercise to practice interaction.

If we take into account that already in the North Caucasus the regiment would change 4 sets of officers, using its example it becomes clear that the army was not prepared to participate in the First Chechen Campaign and was doomed to losses. Only those killed at 245 SMEs will amount to 220 people, including the son of Lieutenant General Pulikovsky (December 1995) and those guys who laid down their lives during another 20 military operations. The bloodiest battle was near the village of Yashmardy, which caused a huge public outcry.

In the war zone

The 245th SME was always in the forefront, participating in the assault on Prigorodny (Grozny), Goysky, Vedeno, Arktan-Yurt, Shatoy and Goth. Since the spring of 1995, the regiment settled near Shatoy, guarding roads and manning checkpoints. The fighters accompanied transport columns carrying fuel, food and civilians. Starting in February 1995, after the encirclement and blocking of Dudayev’s main troops in the “South-East” group of troops, strange events related to concessions to the separatists began to occur more and more often.

During the operation to capture Shatoy in June 1995, a column of the 245th regiment was ambushed near the village of Zone in the Argun Gorge. This happened due to the carelessness of the leadership and the lack of foot reconnaissance. Despite the losses, this fact remained almost unnoticed in the general rejoicing associated with the capture of Shatoy. But this was the first bell to a tragedy that went down in history as the Battle of Yaryshmarda. On March 31, 1996, a column of paratroopers was shot at the village of Benoy, heading to Vedeno, but this did not prompt the command to increase security measures when passing through the gorge.

What preceded the April events

On April 4, the administration of the village of Yaryshmardy signed a peace treaty with federal troops, which imposed a ban on military operations in the area. Based on a document from the chief of staff of the 324th MRR, under whose control the section of the road to Shatoi was located, a checkpoint was removed 500 meters from the village. The regiment commander was not informed.

The battle at Yaryshmarda will take place in the context of an order from the Minister of Defense on the use of artillery only in case of self-defense and a complete renunciation of the participation of aviation on the territory of Chechnya. He arrived through secret communication channels about ten days before the column left Khankala.

Shot column

The central base of the 245th SME prepared a convoy to Shatoy, the purpose of which was to deliver material and technical means, fuel and young reinforcements to the military unit. Those demobilized and sent home for family reasons joined the column. There is information that there were also soldiers’ mothers searching for their missing children. From Goisky, they were joined by 4 vehicles of the 324th SME. The rear column under the command of Major Terzovets left on April 15, immediately after the Easter celebration. After spending the night in Khankala, by the middle of the next day, cars and military equipment passed Dacha-Borzoi and Yaryshmardy, stretching for 1.5-2 km. Ahead there was a narrow mountain serpentine, commonly called “mother-in-law’s tongue.”

The reconnaissance controlled artillery spotter maintained contact with the 324th MRR, and that was all that was done to protect people and military equipment. The battle at Yaryshmarda was filmed by the militants themselves, whose material became public. Against the background of birdsong and conversations of the detachment of Jordanian Khattab and Ruslan Gelayev, the hum of cars can be heard. You can see from behind the branches from the cliff how a tented Ural, a tanker, and an armored personnel carrier appear. The distance between cars is about 20 meters. And suddenly the silence is broken by explosions, and then gunfire. With heavy fire from above, invisible behind the greenery and a curtain of smoke, the militants shoot at point-blank range the Russian column. The time recorded on the video is 13 hours 23 minutes. These are the minutes when the battle at Yaryshmarda began.

Battle scheme

The presented diagram shows that the militants deliberately waited for the convoy, having equipped up to 20 points for a fire strike. Trenches were specially dug in the rocks, which is a very labor-intensive task. All locations of the Khattab and Gelayev gang are equipped with a sufficient number of weapons. They are located on both sides, which allows you to shoot through all sections of the path. Radio-controlled landmines are installed on the road in the direction of traffic. The location for the attack is ideally chosen due to the curve that hides the lead transport from the tail of the column. The road in this area is so narrow that it is impossible for tankers or trucks to turn around to leave the battlefield.

On the left is an almost vertical cliff, on the right is a cliff about five meters high, under which the Argun River flows. During heavy fire, some soldiers managed to jump into a dry river. Those who did not crash during the fall were finished off by snipers, which excluded the possibility of escape. The trap for the transport column slammed shut when the leading tank was blown up by a landmine and an explosion was heard at the end of the procession. The bandits hit the target accurately, shooting the infantry fighting vehicles and BRDMs leading the column in the first minutes of the battle. Senior Major Terezovets, a radio operator and an artillery spotter were killed. The company of the 245th SME found itself without communication with the outside world (jamming was specially placed in the VHF range), without control and support from artillery and aviation. The battle at Yaryshmarda turned into a real massacre for Russian soldiers and officers.

1996: tragic events through the eyes of eyewitnesses

According to the 245th MRR, during the bloody events, 73 people were killed, 52 were injured, 6 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 BRDM, and 11 vehicles were destroyed. Komsomolskaya Pravda published an article indicating 95 dead, including those demobilized and those who joined the convoy, whose presence was not officially recorded by anyone. This is easy to believe, because the mother of the deceased machine gunner Oleg Ogoreltsev, one of those demobilized, had to search for her son in Chechnya for a month and she was able to identify the corpse in Rostov only after meeting with the surviving participants in the dramatic events. 30 bodies were taken from the battlefield without the possibility of identification: the guys burned like torches after direct hits from grenade launchers on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. What do eyewitnesses say about the battle at Yaryshmarda?

Sniper Denis Tsiryulnik, a contract soldier, says that after the smoke cleared, the surviving soldiers resisted until the last bullet in conditions of almost zero visibility. After the battle, seven corpses of militants - residents of the Shatoi region - will be found. Only at 6 o’clock in the evening did Miroshnichenko’s armored group and the 324th MRP, as well as a battered reconnaissance detachment, make their way to the column. By this time, the Chechens and Arab mercenaries participating in Khattab’s gang had already fled. Only one question was asked: why did help come so late? The lead BRDM resisted to the last, the guys could have survived. To which the answer came: the regiment command was waiting for instructions from above, and the groups began to break through to help only at four o’clock. The helicopters flew up and hit the mountains, artillery fired, but there were no militants on the slopes.

Igor Izotov, who was in the third truck, said that those who survived were those who managed to squeeze into the space between the front infantry fighting vehicle and the rocks, which became the only dead zone for the enemy. Snipers pulled the guys out from under the cars, shooting them with ricochets on the asphalt.

The wounded Sergei Cherchik recalls that, despite the fire, there was mutual assistance between the soldiers. He, wounded by shrapnel, was pulled out from under the car by a contract soldier, and when he himself was hit in the kneecap, the two of them were saved by a conscript soldier.

Eternal memory to the dead

The fact that the convoy was expected and Khattab had complete information about its composition is evidenced by the fact that the most important vehicles were hit by landmines and grenade launchers. The medical car remained untouched. The wounded were gathered into it, and the bodies of the dead were laid on the armor. When the MTLB began to turn around, its wheels hovered over the cliff. The driver miraculously managed to straighten the car, but the bodies of the already dead guys fell into the Argun. All morning on the 17th they cleared the road, finding seven more unexploded landmines. They threw burnt trucks off the cliff and searched for the soldiers' belongings and personal numbers. Thus ended the almost four-hour battle at Yaryshmarda.

The list of the dead 245 SMEs includes 11 officers, including artillery spotter Captain Vyatkin, who met death in the first minutes of the battle, Captain Lakhin, Major Milovanov, 2 warrant officers and 27 soldiers and sergeants. Among them, 8 33 remained unidentified, and for a long time their names, like the machine gunner Ogoreltsev, were established with the help of parents and relatives. A book of memory is posted on the website of 245 SMEs, and a monument to those who fulfilled their task at the cost of their lives was erected in the Nizhny Novgorod region.

Official investigation

The mass death of personnel of 245 SMEs became the subject of an official investigation, as a result of which the prosecutor’s office spoke in the State Duma, not seeing any corpus delicti in the actions of the officials. Rokhlin accused the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense of not controlling the situation in Chechnya and allowing the manifestation of carelessness that led to the death of the military. He pointed to a lack of vigilance, tactical illiteracy and lack of coordination between the 245th and 324th MRR. But no one, including the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Romanikhin, was punished for the dramatic battle at Yaryshmarda.

20 years later

On May 5, 1996, the first article appeared on the pages of the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper about the tragedy with the column of the 245th SME, which on the sidelines immediately began to be called sold. In a video message, Khattab openly talks about the corruption of some high-ranking officers. But you cannot trust him; a thorough judicial investigation is necessary, which should answer the question of the reasons for the terrible coincidences and the mass death of soldiers. But to date, such a trial has not been carried out. One of the mysteries of the First Chechen War remains the April battle at Yaryshmarda. Military secrets have been carefully guarded since those times when participants in the events were strictly forbidden to convey details of the terrible tragedy to everyone, including journalists. Today their memoirs have been published, but they do not answer the main question: why is the command not responsible for the lives of its soldiers?..

Trophy recording (of very poor quality) of the shooting of column 245 of SMEs in Chechnya on April 16, 1996. only 4 parts

At about 14.00 we set off. At 14.10 we passed Chishki and pulled the shutters in front of the entrance to the gorge. Arkasha says: “Look, there are only women and children.” And just yesterday the guys from the 324th Regiment told me a superstition: “If there are men, women and children on the road, everything is fine. If only women are idiots, there will soon be an ambush.”

The column stretched out on the “mother-in-law’s tongue” (this is a serpentine). The trucks on it barely turned around, and I don’t even know how the MAZ trucks that pulled the faulty equipment got through. Everything is quiet, calm. We're going, telling jokes. We passed Yaryshmard, the head of the column had already gone around the bend, and the bridges crossed the dry riverbed. And then - an explosion ahead, we look - the tank turret was thrown up from behind a hillock, the second explosion was also somewhere at the head of the column, and the third just hit between the tank in front and ours. The explosion tore off the hood and broke the windows. That was the first time I was shell-shocked. Arkasha had already gotten out of the car, and I got entangled in two door handles - well, I was simply stunned. Finally fell out of the cabin. The fire was very dense, but I already began to think and ran about 15 meters away from the pourer, despite the fire of the spirits. I found some kind of depression in the side of the road and pushed my butt into it. A conscript soldier lay down nearby. The first shock has passed - I’m observing how things are going. And things are not important. The trucks stood on the road. The guys from the pourer platoon are firing in all directions as best they can; where exactly the spirits are is still unclear. Arkasha wets the white light from under the wheel of his pourer.

Then a grenade slams past me and hits the tank that was walking behind us. The pourer is on fire. I figure that if it explodes now, we will all be very hot. I'm trying to figure out where this thing came from. I look like someone is fussing about 170 meters from us. I looked into the sight, and the “dushara” was already preparing a new grenade... I knocked him down with the first shot, and I really liked it. I begin to look for targets in the sight. Another “darling” is sitting in the trench, watering from a machine gun. I fired, but I can’t say with certainty whether I killed him or not, because the bullet hit the upper edge of the parapet at chest level, behind which he was sitting. The spirit disappeared. Either I finally got him, or he decided not to tempt fate anymore. I took aim again and saw that at the roll the spirit “on four bones” was crawling up the hill. I only scared him with the first shot. He moved his limbs more actively, but did not have time to escape. The second shot, like a good kick in the ass, threw him over his head.

While I was firing at the spirits, Arkasha drove away the burning pourer and threw it off the road. I listened and the machine gun seemed to be working. Something was set on fire from behind, and black smoke went towards us along the gorge, because of it we couldn’t see anything through the sights. Dmitry and I—that’s the conscript’s name—figured out that it was time for us to get out of here. They gathered themselves and rushed across the road, falling behind the concrete blocks in front of the bridge. You can’t raise your head, and meanwhile the machine gunner is hammering away at the tanks, and not without success. He set them on fire. Dima and I are lying down, and a river of burning kerosene, about a meter and a half wide, flows past us towards the bridge. The flames are unbearably hot, but, as it turned out, this is not the worst thing. When the river of fire reached the “Ural” with charges for self-propelled guns, all this stuff began to explode. I see some things with rags flying out of the car. Dima explained that these were lighting shells. We lie down and count: Dima said that there were about 50 of them in the car. Meanwhile, the second Ural with high-explosive shells caught fire. It’s good that it didn’t detonate entirely; the shells were thrown to the sides by explosions.

I lie there and think: “Damn, why isn’t anyone commanding us?” As it turned out later, Khattab planned everything so competently that literally at the very beginning of the battle, the entire control, which was riding on two command and staff vehicles, was mowed down by small arms fire, and the CVMs themselves stood untouched throughout the entire battle.

Suddenly, in the second "Ural" with high-explosive ammunition, something exploded so much that the rear axle with one wheel went up 80 meters like a candle, and, in our opinion, it should have plopped down right on us. Well, we think we've arrived. However, he was lucky: he fell about ten meters away. Everything is in smoke, everything explodes. You can't see anything through the scope because of the smoke. The shooting was erratic, but the spirit machine gunner stood out from the crowd. We decided to get out of this utter hell and ran to the green area. We distributed the firing sectors with Dima. I fire along the front, and he covers my rear and makes sure that no spirits come from above. We crawled out to the edge of the forest, and the tank, which stood at the tail of the column, was hit by spirits from RPGs. They hit eight times, but to no avail. Then they finally pierced the turret from the side of the commander’s hatch. Smoke poured out of it. Apparently, the crew was injured, and the mechanic began to back up. So he walked backwards through the entire column and, they say, reached the regiment.

An hour has passed since the start of the battle. The shooting began to subside. I say: “Okay, Dima, let’s go to the end of the column!” We ran under the bridge, I saw some people sitting in Afghan boots, about seven of them, with two corpses nearby. Let's run up. One of the people sitting turns around. Oh my God! He has a black beard, a hooked nose and wild eyes. I raise the rifle, press the trigger... The rest turn around - ours. Okay, I didn't press it. He turned out to be a bearded contractor. Even without me, he sits there, stunned, stuttering, unable to say anything. I shout: “Uncle, I almost killed you!” But he doesn’t get it.

The BMP is crawling “limping” towards us, collecting the wounded. They hit her in the torsion bar, and she hobbles around. They threw the wounded inside, drove onto the road - the cars around them were burning out, something was breaking in them. The firefight had almost died down.

Let's go. Somewhere on the road closer to Argun, men are shouting: “Guys! We have wounded here. Help!” I jumped down to them, and the car continued on. I approach the guys. They say: “Our major is wounded.” A major is sitting in camouflage, with the sign of the Marine Corps on his sleeve. Penetrating wound in the arm and chest. All pale from loss of blood. The only thing I had was a tourniquet. I pulled his hand. We got to talking and it turned out that he was the political officer of a battalion in the Pacific Fleet. At this time, one of the guys remembered that the car was carrying beer, cigarettes, juice, etc. I covered the guys, and they ran away and brought all this stuff. We lie down, drink beer, smoke. It started to get dark. I think: “Now it’s getting dark, the spirits will descend, there’s no help, and we’re screwed!” We decided to choose a better position. We took a fancy to a small hill, occupied it, lay there, and waited. The guys from RMO show me the situation. The vehicles with ammunition were burned by the spirits with RPGs, and those with food were simply cut down with small arms.

Will help come...

The artillery started working, very carefully, only on the slopes, and without touching either the settlement or us. Then four Mi-24s arrived and worked in the mountains. It got dark. We hear a terrible roar coming from the 324th Regiment. It turns out that help is on the way. Ahead is a T-72, followed by an infantry fighting vehicle, then a tank again. Not reaching 50 meters, he stops and points his gun at us. I think: “That’s it! They didn’t kill the spirits - they’ll finish off their own out of fright!” We jump up, wave our arms - they say, ours. The tank shook its barrel, turned around and darted into the “green stuff” 20 meters away. With this “help” people jumped out - crawling on the grass, watering around them with machine guns. We yell at them: “Guys, are you crawling? There’s no one here anymore.” It turns out that this was reconnaissance from the 324th Regiment. I approached the officers and said: “Why are you fighting here? We need to go to the head of the column!” And they told me: since you’ve been here and even have some sense, take ten people and move with them where you said.

I walked around, found the scouts, and we moved forward. I counted more than forty burnt corpses. Judging by which cars remained intact, the spirits had clear information about what was where. For example, the medical MTLB remained completely untouched, only the small arms mechanic was destroyed, and the ZUshka behind it was literally turned into a sieve. Then we wondered why help came so late: if they had arrived an hour and a half earlier, then someone at the head of the column would have survived, but there one BRDM resisted until the last, in which almost everyone was killed.

As the guys from the 324th regiment later said, when they reported that our column was being wetted in the gorge and it would be nice to rush to the rescue, they were told not to twitch and to stand where they were. Help came to us two and a half hours later, when everything was over.

REPORT TO THE STATE DUMA OF THE RF

Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Lev ROKHLIN

upon the death of servicemen of the 245th motorized rifle regiment

The tragedy with the shooting of the column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment was a consequence of its unpreparedness for combat operations.

The regiment's losses since its entry into the combat zone amounted to 220 people. In the last four months alone, the regiment suffered sensitive blows three times:

the first - during the capture of checkpoint No. 24 by the Dudayevites, when, due to a complete loss of vigilance, the sentries were disarmed, 31 servicemen were captured, 12 people were killed and 8 were wounded;
the second - in the battle for the village of Goyskoye, in which, due to an incorrect decision, 24 people were killed, 41 were wounded and 3 were missing;
and the third - on April 16, the shooting of a column in a gorge one and a half kilometers north of Yaryshmarda, where, as a result of carelessness, tactical illiteracy, lack of interaction, and loss of vigilance, 73 military personnel were killed, 52 were wounded, 6 infantry fighting vehicles, one tank, one BRDM, and 11 vehicles were destroyed.

Systematically, the regiment also suffered smaller losses.

This situation has developed, first of all, due to the dishonest performance of duties by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

Experience shows that the presence of 2-3 such divisions from the very beginning of hostilities could provide a prompt solution to all military issues in Chechnya.

There were no such divisions, despite the fact that there were 18 of them in the Western Group of Forces alone before the withdrawal to Russia.

To get out of this situation, after the failure to capture Grozny, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense decides to urgently deploy reduced-strength units and send them to the combat zone.

The 245th motorized rifle regiment, stationed in the village, also falls into the number of such units. Mulino near Nizhny Novgorod.

In addition, untrained soldiers had to be placed in the positions of riflemen, machine gunners, grenade launchers, and snipers, whose initial training usually takes 3-6 months, rather than the allotted 10 days.