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Afghan and Chechen war. Class hour dedicated to the participants of the Chechen and Afghan wars. Time to fix mistakes

Last Wednesday, parliamentary hearings dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the withdrawal of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan were held in the Small Hall of the State Duma. The initiator of this event was the Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Hero of the Russian Federation, Colonel General Vladimir Anatolyevich Shamanov.

Under the cover of half-secret

The hearings in the Duma became a landmark event, reflecting changes in assessments regarding the participation of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in the military conflict on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. As Senator Franz Klintsevich, who spoke at the hearings, noted, he personally was unable to arrange such hearings in the Duma either on the 20th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, or on the 25th anniversary. Moreover, when in December 2014 Franz Klintsevich took the initiative to reconsider the decision of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which condemned the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, he did not find support from his colleagues, the Duma deputies.

Many issues were considered at the current hearings. We discussed a possible increase in the social status of war veterans in the DRA, civilian personnel, and family members of the deceased. We considered the feasibility of introducing additional social benefits. We assessed how the Afghan war of 1979-1989 was presented in school textbooks, etc.

However, the key point of the hearings was the discussion of the role of the USSR Armed Forces in ensuring the security of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, its economic and political development. Participants in the hearings proposed that the State Duma adopt a special resolution for the 30th anniversary of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, which would give “an objective political assessment of the stay and withdrawal of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops from the DRA.”

The Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR put a stain on the Afghan war in December 1989. Under the influence of “democratic forces,” he adopted a Resolution in which the decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan received “political and moral condemnation.”

It must be admitted that the Afghan war was extremely unpopular in the Soviet Union. First of all, because for the first time in the post-war years the country entered into a military conflict with heavy human losses. They were recognized semi-legally. Until 1987, zinc coffins containing the bodies of the dead were buried without military honors, and the monuments did not indicate that the burial was of a soldier killed in Afghanistan.

Not only losses were hushed up, but also the real goals of introducing Soviet troops into the DRA. The formulation “providing international assistance” in the eyes of ordinary people did not justify the intervention of the Soviet Union in the bloody civil conflict of a neighboring country.

This attitude changed little even when a detailed analysis of the real and potential strategic threats that the intra-Afghan armed conflict posed to our country appeared in the Soviet media. People still had a strong feeling of the unjustified participation of the USSR in this war and the unjustified losses suffered.

By the beginning of the Second Congress of People's Deputies, the picture of the Afghan war had become completely clear. Troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan. The facts of the unparalleled courage and dedication of our soldiers, the true military brotherhood of Soviet soldiers, have become widely known. It became clear to many: this is how you can only fight for your country.

It seemed that people began to perceive positively the participation of Soviet soldiers in the Afghan conflict. But then politics intervened. The new party leaders tried to distance themselves from the Brezhnev era, and the unpopular decision of the Politburo to send troops to Afghanistan was perfect for this. This is how the Resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies appeared, which for many years branded the Afghan War as a political mistake of the Soviet leaders.

Time to fix mistakes

At the Duma hearings, Senator Klintsevich thanked General Shamanov for his work in revising the assessment of the participation of the Soviet army in the Afghan war. Probably, Vladimir Anatolyevich Shamanov really deserves such praise from one of the participants in the Afghan events, which is Colonel Klintsevich.

Another thing is that the attitude towards the participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan conflict has changed in society itself. A lot has happened since then. There were, for example, two Chechen wars... In the spring, life brought me to the building where, among other things, the regional branch of the Russian Union of Afghanistan Veterans lives.

A memorial corner was set up in the lobby of the veterans' organization's office. The names of all those killed in Afghanistan and Chechnya are listed there. I looked at the lists and experienced culture shock. The memorial to those killed in Chechnya was twice the size of the Afghan one. At home I went into the reference books and looked it up. 15,031 people were killed in Afghanistan. In two Chechen wars - 13,184 (5731 and 7425).

According to official statistics, it turned out that fewer people died in Chechnya. Probably the region, the memorial corner of which shocked me, is not typical for the country. Perhaps his conscripts had a large share of participation in these conflicts. Be that as it may, the losses of modern times have accustomed society to the fact that soldiers, while defending the interests of the country, can die en masse in local conflicts.

Now we also have Syria. They say that any comparison is not accurate. However, some parallels still emerge. Our soldiers were invited to Syria, as well as to Afghanistan, by the legitimate government of the country. In the Middle East, Russian soldiers are extinguishing a hotbed of terrorism, from where home-grown Islamists really threaten our security.

In Afghanistan, ethnic Tajiks of warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud fought on the side of anti-government forces; ethnic Uzbeks and Turkmen took part in the battles on both sides of the conflict. Their consanguineous ties did not end with the border of Afghanistan and were a destabilizing factor for the republics of Soviet Central Asia.

Finally, by entering coastal Syrian waters, the Russian fleet pushed the Americans out of the eastern Mediterranean and pushed back the threat of their missile attack by about a thousand miles. In Afghanistan, the flying distance of US missiles worried the Soviet command no less than the ethnically close Mujahideen.

Other factors can also be mentioned. But the examples already given are enough to objectively assess the geopolitical significance of the Afghan war from the heights of modern times. Three years ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin did this for the first time.

In February 2015, meeting with “Afghan veterans” on the occasion of the next anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Putin noted: “Now, as the years pass and as more and more facts become known, we understand better and better what served then the reason and reason for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Of course, there were a lot of mistakes, but there were also real threats, which at that time the Soviet leadership tried to stop by sending troops into Afghanistan.”

For the first time, the leader of the country spoke not about “the unnecessary and unjustified adventure of the Brezhnev Politburo,” but about stopping the real threats to the Soviet Union emanating from Afghanistan in 1979. This spring, Vladimir Putin again returned to rethinking his assessment of the Afghan war. The President supported the proposal of the Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, Vladimir Shamanov, to bring the political outcome of the war in Afghanistan to the 30th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, formalizing it with a special decision or statement of the Russian parliament.

At the parliamentary hearings held last Wednesday, such a statement was actually agreed upon. Here is how it was presented by the main speaker, deputy Nikolai Kharitonov: “We must clearly state that the State Duma considers it necessary to recognize the moral and political condemnation of the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979, expressed in the resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Supreme Council of the USSR in 1989."

Everything is leading to the fact that thirty years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, this period of our history will receive an objective political assessment. On the eve of the anniversary, it will be formulated not only within the walls of parliament. People expect that all significant political figures in Russia, and President Vladimir Putin in the first place, will express their vision of the Afghan events.

In Vienna, the conflict between the Afghan and Chechen diasporas has once again escalated. After beating a Chechen boy, his relatives were preparing to take revenge on the people from Afghanistan, but things did not come to an open confrontation due to the intervention of influential representatives of the diaspora.
A few days ago there was a quarrel between Chechens and Afghans. The Afghans were suspected of drug trafficking in the Vienna Praterstern park. A quarrel between two diasporas led to a group of Afghans beating a 12-year-old Chechen boy, Kavkaz.Realii reports.

As soon as the news of the child’s beating spread on social networks and instant messengers, mailings began in closed groups calling on Chechen youth to gather for an action of retaliation.

However, new clashes were prevented, as representatives of the public organization “Council of Chechens and Ingush in Austria” became aware of them. As a result, representatives of the Afghan diaspora in Vienna, as well as the local police, were also involved in resolving the situation.

According to the Chairman of the Council of Chechens and Ingush in Austria, Shaikhi Musalatov, on Thursday night, representatives of both diasporas held an emergency meeting with youth and representatives of law enforcement agencies in Austria to develop a joint plan to prevent further escalation of the conflict.

The protracted confrontation between Afghan and Chechen youth in Austria, which from time to time turns into fights, began several years ago. In the spring of 2016, the beating of several Chechen teenagers by a large crowd of Afghans caused a great resonance.

According to police, at least 25 Afghans took part in the fight, armed with bladed weapons and baseball bats, while there were no more than five Chechens. Two Chechens were then seriously stabbed.

Afghans waylaid Chechens at the exit of a local youth recreation center, where teenagers spend their free time under the supervision of social workers.

Although some of the attackers were detained by the police, they were sentenced only to suspended prison sentences, which gave rise to discontent and resentment among Chechen youth.

In January 2009, in the center of the Austrian capital, Umar Israilov, a former security guard of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, was killed in broad daylight with several shots at point-blank range. The police detained three killers, one was able to escape. All turned out to be Chechens by nationality.

The press then wrote a lot about how the Chechen authorities were allegedly behind the exemplary execution, because Israilov, having personally accused Kadyrov of organizing secret prisons and reprisals against his opponents, filed a complaint against him in the Strasbourg court.

The Austrian investigation also adhered to this version. However, during the trial it was not possible to prove that the order for the murder came directly from Grozny. However, the direct perpetrator received a life sentence, the other two received 15 to 20 years in prison.

In general, about 30 thousand people from Chechnya live in Austria, the bulk of whom arrived in the Alpine republic in 2003-2004. Their integration, as migration services admit, has encountered difficulties and has not yet actually taken place.

Approximately half of Chechen migrants continue to receive the Mindestsicherung social benefit - in Vienna its amount ranges from 900 to 1,250 euros per person, plus 150 euros for each child.

Only about 5 thousand registered on the labor market as hired labor, and only a little more than 500 opened their own business.

At the same time, sociologists noted that Chechens practically did not develop horizontal social ties, preferring to lead a secluded lifestyle within the family and close circle of relatives.

Two or three years ago, the Austrian police were particularly concerned about teenage and youth Chechen groups. They arose on a territorial basis in places of compact residence of Chechens.

They were engaged in petty thefts and robbery in parks and recreation areas, sold drugs and fought for spheres of influence with other ethnic gangs, mainly with Afghans.

Sometimes skirmishes escalated into real massacres, when bladed weapons and firearms were used. The victims did not contact the police. Law enforcement officers were called by local citizens, who are very intolerant of any troublemakers.

More serious problems for Austrian law enforcement were created by radical Islamists - recruiters and volunteers going to fight in Iraq and Syria on the side of the Islamic State (an organization banned in Russia).

Of the nearly 300 IS supporters under constant surveillance by Austrian police, almost half are Chechens.

However, recently for the Austrians the Chechen issue has noticeably faded into the background. The country was hit by an unprecedented migration wave.

In 2015 alone, more than a million refugees from the Middle East, Afghanistan and North Africa transited through the Alpine republic, and almost 200 thousand migrants requested Austrian asylum.

Now police crime statistics are replete with Afghan and Arabic names. Due to the surge in migrant crime, law enforcement officers sometimes simply do not have time to arrive at the crime scene in time.

It happens that from the area of Vienna's Praterstern station alone, 15-20 calls about offenses are received per day.

According to police information, clashes between Chechen groups and Afghans or Arabs have almost completely stopped due to their significant numerical superiority. Although there are still high-profile crimes involving Chechens.

In November 2016, in one of the Viennese suburbs, 9 men from two Chechen families started a shootout over a domestic quarrel. As a result, four were injured, two of them seriously.

Typically, the investigation was unable to identify the instigators - all participants, strictly maintaining silence, refused to testify against their compatriots.

This happened again during the detention of Chechens on February 3 of this year. They, stubbornly talking about a joint walk in the fresh air, did not reveal the true reasons why 22 men with weapons (two pistols, a Kalashnikov assault rifle and a knife) met in a secluded place on the banks of the Danube. Searches of the apartments also did not bring clarity.

The grounds for the arrest could not be established; the Chechens were released a day later. Only two detainees were left in custody due to violation of the migration regime, and an investigation was started against another for illegally carrying a pistol. It is not yet clear who owned the rest of the weapons.

Due to the public excitement around the incident, the Austrian Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Sobotka personally took the floor. In this case, according to him, there was an ordinary criminal showdown, and not a meeting of terrorists. There were notes of relief in the minister's statement.

The Islamic religious community of Austria exercises control over many mosque communities, the publication says. However, some of them do not cooperate with the organization.

Most of the radicals come from these communities, in particular the Chechen, Bosnian and Albanian communities, says the report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. At the same time, the number one “problem diaspora” in Austria is often called the Chechen one, Die Presse notes.

By February 15, 1989, Afghanistan was completely gone. A veteran of that war, Hero of Russia, Vyacheslav Bocharov recalls the feelings with which he left Afghanistan, and compares his Afghan experience with what he later had to endure in Chechnya.

“My mouth was like a toy”

“I didn’t want to leave. I was in business. I liked my job. My company was like a toy,” says Colonel Bocharov, a short, modestly dressed man with scars on the left side of his face - a trace of a terrible wound received during the storming of a school in Beslan - I submitted a report to stay. Then, already in the Union, I submitted a report to return ( Bocharov left Afghanistan back in 1983 - RIA Novosti). But here it is - you assume, but the command has it. The commanders decided that I was more needed in the Union."

Vyacheslav Bocharov arrived in Afghanistan in 1981 as deputy commander of the airborne reconnaissance company of the 213th Parachute Regiment. Bocharov still remembers how he flew to Kabul from Tashkent. It was like a scene from the Soviet movie "Platoon".

“A whole planeload of replacements like me arrived, and those who won theirs left for Tashkent on the same board. How different we were from each other! This difference was not so much that their faces were dark from the rays of the Afghan sun , as much as the internal state that is a consequence of being in conditions associated with a risk to life. War leaves its mark on everyone,” he says.

“Today it’s hard to understand, but then we were rushing to Afghanistan,” recalls Bocharov. “I was an officer, and I knew why my Motherland raised and fed me. I grew up following the examples of Spain ( Spanish Civil War 1936-1939). For me, Afghanistan was a kind of Spain."

Back in 1980, the first of Bocharov’s classmates at the Ryazan Airborne Forces School, Ivan Prokhor, died in Afghanistan: “They were already returning from a mission in two infantry fighting vehicles when they were ambushed. They were fired upon. One vehicle caught fire. Prokhor covered the first one, which had been hit, in his vehicle "so that all the fighters could be safely evacuated from it. And I myself fell under shrapnel."

“What are you, fascists, or what?”

At the end of February 1982, Bocharov’s regiment moved to the area of the city of Tagab - this is 50 km northeast of Kabul. Bocharov’s own company was ordered to occupy a commanding height from which the dushmans could fire at the Soviet column.

“Shuravi” (Soviet soldiers) came across an ambush of “spirits”: “a machine-gun burst rang out. I didn’t feel any pain, but I fell - as if someone had hit my legs with a club.” Bocharov noticed holes in the trousers. He put his hand in - there was blood. Three bullets hit him in the legs.

“I injected a painkiller. But I didn’t tell the soldiers about the wound. There would have been unnecessary panic, unnecessary thinking,” says the officer. “It was very difficult to shoot at people for the first time. To shoot at a person, even the one who just shot at you, It’s very difficult. We had to overcome this moment. And then things got easier.”

Bocharov's company managed to repel the attack of the dushmans. “We checked all the doors for bandits. We broke down the doors. We found one guy. And the soldiers were so furious: two of ours were wounded. They wanted to put him against the wall, although they were not sure that he also shot. I shouted to the soldiers: “Leave him alone!” What are you doing, fascists, or what?"

For that battle, Bocharov received the Order of the Red Star. After the hospital, he fought in Afghanistan for another year.

"Everything was done perfectly"

Bocharov has no doubt about the need for the USSR to participate in that war.

“I understood perfectly well: Afghanistan borders on our territory. If we are not on it, then the United States will come. And they will shoot right through, to the Urals, with their missile systems into the territory of the USSR.

We didn't come there on our own. We were invited by the Afghan government. The army was not tasked with destroying everyone and taking control of the entire territory. The task was to help the national army restore order. Afghan units acted together with us. We approach the village and tell the Afghans: act, you are the masters here. True, it often happened that the Afghans fled, and then we had to solve the assigned task.

Now our military personnel come to Afghanistan and are greeted as friends. I have a friend, Alexey Posokhov - we studied together, fought together - he told me how he recently went to Afghanistan. I met with one Afghan, he lifted his shirt and showed a scar: this scar is from a shuravi! And he smiles happily at the same time. Because we fought honestly. This was a war of equals.

Afghanistan, especially when compared with the Chechen company, is a strict fulfillment of all the requirements of the combat regulations. There was no laxity there. No disorganization in actions. Clearly, using the experience of both wars and exercises. Everything was done perfectly. A soldier must wash once a week - he did. Yes, there were linen lice. But we fried the laundry. In the evening before going to bed, you brush your teeth, look for lice in the seams and crush them - if you want to sleep peacefully."

Odessa, who died in Grozny

In Chechen companies everything was completely different. In the first half of the 90s, Vyacheslav Bocharov already served in Moscow, at the General Staff of the Airborne Forces. He transferred here from Lithuania - after all, Russia began to withdraw its troops from the Baltic states. I transferred, but were not provided with housing, and my salary was delayed for months. To feed himself, Bocharov, like many headquarters officers, worked at night as a security guard in a convenience store. For the sake of a dorm room, I got a job as a janitor. “At five in the morning, I, a colonel, holder of orders, took a broom. You sweep, the broom goes to the pantry, and I go to the Airborne Forces headquarters. I didn’t leave the army: I hoped that this mess would end sooner or later.”

These were the realities of the country that started the war in Chechnya.

"The terrible first Chechnya. This is the result of the fact that there was no army. The union collapsed - the army was destroyed. There were some separate military formations, units. But they were practically demoralized. Troops were withdrawn from Eastern Europe, thrown into an open field. Where to put the family It’s not clear where to live. Everyone lives in tents. And suddenly they say: the war has begun. Let’s go to the Caucasus. There isn’t even a solid military unit. The commanders didn’t know their soldiers. Combined battalions, combined companies... They were pulled from everywhere. Sailors were even brought in! The sailors fought there, in the Caucasus! What kind of interaction could there be, what kind of training? There was no home front, everything was stolen. When you look at the photographs of that time, your heart bleeds. Poor soldiers, where your homeland threw you and forgot you there," Bocharov recalls.

And again, as in the days of Afghanistan, strings of “cargo-200” stretched out from the hot spot. Bocharov takes out a photograph of the New Bogorodskoye Cemetery (Novinsky district of the Moscow region) - it is lined with monuments to unknown soldiers who died in Chechnya. The remains have not yet been attributed. “Every year parents come here and go to the grave to which their heart leads them,” testifies Bocharov, who has seen this many times.

“My college classmate Volodya Selivanov died in the first Chechen war. At school his name was “Odessa” - he came from those places, and he was such a dashing guy, he loved to laugh. In Afghanistan he was the head of an intelligence regiment. We walk with him from the metro to headquarters, he says: “I’m going on a business trip in two days.” I didn’t attach any importance to it - not the first and not the last business trip of airborne headquarters officers. It’s a common phenomenon. I say: “Well, good luck!” Luck has turned away.”

After some time, Bocharov learned how Odessa died. He became one of one and a half thousand Russian soldiers and officers who died in the “New Year’s assault” on the capital of Chechnya on December 31, 1994. Colonel Selivanov's column entered Grozny from the eastern side and came under heavy fire from militants. He was not injured during the shelling, but the next day, while helping to drag the wounded, he received a sniper bullet in the back.

Chechnya, a meeting place for old friends

A few years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the experience of the “Afghans” was in demand in Chechnya. Bocharov was invited to the FSB Special Purpose Center, to the famous Vympel. He became deputy detachment commander.

Soon Bocharov received another injury: the helicopter on which he and a special forces group were returning from a mission was shot down by Chechens in the Vedeno Gorge. The helicopter miraculously did not explode, but only fell into pieces. The Vympelovites found themselves in territory occupied by militants and surrounded by minefields. All with serious injuries, except for Bocharov himself and Major Andrei Chirikhin. While firing back, Bocharov and Chirikhin carried 16 wounded soldiers away from the helicopter. Then they had to fight their way to their own. Many of the fighters were later awarded for this battle - except for Bocharov himself, "since the operation did not take place without heavy losses."

And just three months later, his assistant Andrei Chirikhin died tragically - special forces captured a particularly dangerous criminal in the village of Tsentoroi. The militant surrounded himself with his own children so that the special forces could not shoot. And he himself shot Major Chirikhin. “We caught the bandit, but not in front of the children. Children have nothing to do with it...” - as if Bocharov is still making excuses for the death of his colleague.

“Many Afghans fought in Chechnya. By the way, not only on our side, but also on the Chechen side,” recalls the colonel.

Bocharov did not have the opportunity to meet his former colleagues in Afghanistan on the opposite side, but he remembered one local policeman, a senior police lieutenant in the village of Dachu-Borzoi. “He was not for us and not for the Chechens. He was for order. He was a good man, correct. The locals respected him.” In Afghanistan, a Chechen fought in the infantry. And soon he was killed by separatist militants.

There was another unexpected meeting. “We arrived in Khattuni (a village in the Vedeno region). I came to the location of the Airborne Forces group to see the commander. I introduce myself: Colonel Bocharov.

— Comrade Bocharov, have you been to Afghanistan?

- Don’t you remember me?

I look at him and say: no, I didn’t have such fat ones. And he is so dense and bald.

“I’m your medical instructor who bandaged your legs in Afghanistan!”

I remembered. It turned out that since then he had long become a Hero of Russia and a colonel.

Afghanistan and Chechnya, fighters and their opponents

“In Chechnya, it was the same Russian soldier, with all his traditions of mutual assistance. I can remember a lot of examples of heroism in Chechnya - how officers covered young soldiers with themselves or fell on grenades to save the rest. But the army itself was not the same - disorganized, demoralized . Many did not understand what they were doing there at all. Like, why should I risk my life in this turmoil? For whom? Ideals were blurred. There were simply a lot of young, unfired soldiers.

Or the story of the 6th company: a company of 90 people opposed a detachment of two thousand militants (February 29 - March 1, 2000 near Argun). No one came to her aid, and the Chechen militants confessed on air that they paid “500 pieces of greenery” to escape the encirclement.

There were more professionals in Chechnya than in Afghanistan. We fought not only against bandits - ours, Russian citizens. There were bastards of all stripes there, they came from all over the world. The intelligence services of all states worked. There is only one task - to begin the process of tearing Russia apart into smaller parts. And if it weren’t for the army with all its shortcomings, this would have happened. In Afghanistan they fought like peasants. There was more of the local population, ordinary dekhans (peasants). But they were good at using small arms, like all nomadic peoples.

I wanted to go to Chechnya.

Ruslan Sultanovich, many years have passed since the end of the “Soviet-Afghan” war. Are there any “blank spots” left in its history?

– The biggest “blank spot” is the 273 prisoners of war who did not return home and missing persons, whose search and return to their homeland our committee is currently very actively engaged in.

– How do you look for them and what are the results?

– We work both in Afghanistan and in neighboring countries, in particular in Pakistan. In this case, we resort to the help of domestic and foreign intelligence services. Over the past year, we have been able to learn in detail about the uprising of 15 Soviet prisoners of war in Badaber (Pakistan) in April 1985, reconstruct the course of events, and find out the names of almost all participants.

– How many prisoners of war and missing persons have you found over the years?

“With the help of our committee, we found and returned 12 people to their homeland. Mostly from Afghanistan. But former Soviet soldiers also live in the USA, Canada, Germany... One, who lived in Afghanistan and was found by us, returned to his family and friends, after spending a little time in Russia, returned again “across the river,” as they said then: he already has long ago he had family, children, he converted to Islam...

Let me remind you that a total of 417 people were missing and captured, of which 119 were released, 97 returned home. We recently brought more remains of soldiers. We currently have a group working in Afghanistan, where two more burials have been discovered.

– What is the main lesson of that war for you personally?

– There is no need to impose your model of socio-economic and other structure on a foreign country, or introduce “your own” system of power. At that time, we transferred everything that was negative in the USSR to Afghan soil, even began to abolish religion... Therefore, we could not help but lose.

– There are American troops in Afghanistan now. To what extent do they take into account the experience of the battles of Soviet troops?

“In any case, they don’t conduct military operations there like we do.” They are huddled there in their camps, bases, conducting targeted special operations, nothing more.

– But to some extent they are trying to build democracy there in their own image and likeness...

– You need to know Afghanistan. As long as Washington gives money to Kabul, the Afghan government will tolerate the presence of Americans in the country. You know what our employees say when they come from business trips to Afghanistan. Former Mujahideen say: we are fools for fighting with you! The Americans deceived us, promised a bright future, but for several years now they have been solving only their own “narrow” problems, while speculating on the fight against international terrorism. And the Soviet Union at one time built roads, schools, hospitals in this impoverished country...

– How has the attitude towards internationalist soldiers in Russia and other CIS countries changed over the years?

- Yes, in general, no way. “Afghans” are honored and valued. In recent years, we have established close cooperation with public “Afghan” organizations in the Baltic countries. Except maybe Turkmenistan... The “Afghans” there, and there are more than 12 thousand of them, have withdrawn into themselves. We correspond with them, provide them with some assistance, I personally invite them to our events, but alas...

– What is the help you provide?

– Once a year we approve a program of medical and social rehabilitation. Currently, our committee has registered 2,000 internationalist soldiers with the absence of upper and lower limbs, 1,600 of them are missing both legs, 15 are missing both arms, 30 are missing legs and one arm, 430 live with one arm. The number of disabled people is growing. If in 1991 there were 15 thousand of them, then in 2003 their number already exceeded 20 thousand people. Every year, up to 12% of children who participated in combat operations are recognized as disabled for the first time. The war is catching up with them.

Through the Interparliamentary Assembly we are trying to synchronize some things. For example, there used to be benefits for “Afghans”, but now in many countries they have been abolished. But in other countries, say, in Russia, free travel for “Afghans” remains. And we want an “Afghan”, for example, from Ukraine, to be able to travel around Russia for free. Therefore, we are seeking the introduction of some kind of unified identification.

– How many internationalist soldiers are there now who fought in Afghanistan?

– According to official data provided to us by the republics, 673,846 people. These are those who were called up from the territories of the CIS countries. Most of them are in Russia (306,600), Ukraine (160,375) and Uzbekistan (72,102), the least in Moldova (7,412), Armenia (5,371) and Azerbaijan and Georgia are the same - 3,369 people each. In addition, there are still 5,400 “Afghans” living in Lithuania, 2,350 in Latvia, and 1,652 in Estonia.

At the moment, in a country like Russia, which is not emerging from wars, conflicts, or counter-terrorism operations, there is still no government body that would deal with “Afghans”, “Algerians”, “Spaniards”, “Chechens” "and other internationalist warriors. Let's say that in the USA there is a Department of War Veterans Affairs. This ministry is allocated $36 billion annually, which is almost a third of the budget of the Russian Federation. But our law on veterans, a good law that was adopted a long time ago and in the development of which we participated, practically does not work in its financial part. Its articles are suspended when the budget is adopted.

– The Afghan and Chechen wars, are they similar in your opinion?

“Both wars are similar in that in both we fight partisans of the same kind. Therefore, in combat and moral-psychological terms, the Afghan and Chechen wars are one and the same. But in the political and legal sense, these are, of course, completely different things.

But there is another aspect. Our state does not realize that when soldiers return from war, be it “Afghan” or “Chechen”, they need to be dealt with - in many areas. Our first return from Afghanistan was in 1980–1981, and the “Afghans” of the 80s still managed to somehow grasp onto a peaceful life. They introduced benefits to us, gave us jobs, gave us apartments, treated us, used our examples to educate young people... Later, when perestroika came, and then democracy and the market, all this was much more difficult to do. What can we say about “Chechens” today?! They are doing absolutely nothing for them now. Take the same “combat” ones. They will introduce increased salaries and will not pay the due money for months, or even years.

I understand this matter this way: a corresponding program is created, and funds are allocated for it, an official responsible for its implementation is appointed, etc. But here they say: why create a program or - especially - some kind of special body when we have the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Social Protection, the Pension Fund? So they each pull their own, but if there’s a problem: it’s not mine, it’s not mine... And then, don’t confuse the problems of the common man and the problems of those who went through combat operations, these are completely different things.

That's one thing. But we also made a mistake during the Chechen campaigns - we began sending police units to Chechnya, designed to protect public order. There he, a policeman, shot at people, killed, they shot at him, and now he has returned with his psyche turned upside down and must continue to protect public order! The “Chechen syndrome” is already at work in the police environment today; it is transmitted from “Chechen” police officers to those who did not participate in this counter-terrorism operation; an example of this are numerous cases of abuse of citizens by people in police uniforms.

– What is your forecast for the situation in Chechnya?

– As it goes, so everything will go. No war, no peace. Both for the near future and for the longer term. In addition, it is clear that the situation there is fueled by external forces. The same United States openly declared the Caucasus a zone of its interests.

– They say that the problem is that if the separatist leaders Basayev and Maskhadov are caught, the situation will change for the better and even turn around.

- Nonsense! Dudayev was killed - and what has changed? Money went from one to another or to others. The problem is that during the war years, even worse militants appeared there than Basayev, or Gelayev, or anyone like them. There, since 1992, when the events began, young people have grown up who neither studied at school nor were in the Komsomol (by the way, unlike Basayev), who are generally illiterate, learned only to play with military weapons and see the enemy in everyone Russian soldier. Those who were 7–10 years old in 1994, when the war began, are 17–20 today, these are real wolves. For ten years they only saw that they wanted to beautifully destroy them (“with two regiments”), and were brought up in the spirit that their enemy was Russia.

– Have you finally left politics? Do you have any plans for the future?

– I don’t have any plans yet. I do committee work and I love it. At one time, I came into politics forcedly. And if I wanted to become, say, a deputy, I wouldn’t have any problems. But I do not want. I can’t imagine what I would do in the current State Duma... Is this the State Duma?!

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Presentation on the topic: Afghan and Chechen wars

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In 1973, the Daud (Saur) revolution took place, overthrowing the monarchy in Afghanistan. The first president of Afghanistan was Mohammed Daoud Khan (cousin of the deposed king), who relied on the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan - PDPA. This party was formed in 1965 and adhered to a pro-communist orientation. In 1967, due to tactical differences, two wings took shape in it: “Khalys” (“People”), led by N.M. Taraki and "Parchan" ("Banner") led by B. Karmal, who received their names from the factional newspapers of the same name. The Afghan war lasted from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989, that is, 2,238 days. On December 25, 1979, at 7 o’clock in the morning, near the city of Termez, two pontoon-bridge regiments began to build a pontoon bridge

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At 15.00, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began in accordance with the order of the USSR Minister of Defense. The scouts were the first to cross, and then, under the leadership of General K. Kuzmin, the 108th Motorized Rifle Division. At the same time, military transport aviation began airlifting the main forces of the airborne division of a separate parachute regiment to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. Until the last minute, the paratroopers were not privy to the plans of senior leadership. It took forty-seven hours to transfer personnel, during which 343 flights were made. 7,700 paratroopers and 894 units of military equipment were delivered to Kabul and Bagram. On December 27, the 103rd Airborne Division took control of the building of the PDPA Central Committee, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Communications and other important objects in the capital of Afghanistan. By the morning of December 28, units of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division concentrated northeast of Kabul.

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The military operation to introduce Soviet troops into Afghanistan can be divided into two stages: 1) December 27-28, 2) December 29-31, 1979. At the first stage, on December 27, the Dar-ul-Aman palace, Kabul radio and other important objects were stormed. The second stage was to cross the state border and march along the routes Termez - Kabul - Ghazni and Kushka - Herat - Kandahar, to encircle the most important administrative centers of the country. Carrying out this task, the first motorized rifle division (12 thousand people) moved in the direction of Kushka - Kandahar, and other forces through Termez, the Salang pass - to Bagram and Kabul. Part of the Soviet troops from Kabul headed to Gardes.

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Before January 1, 1980, 50 thousand military personnel were introduced, including two airborne and two motorized rifle divisions. In January 1980, two more motorized rifle divisions entered Afghanistan, and the total number of Soviet troops reached 80 thousand people. During the first half of 1980, the Soviet military contingent continued to strengthen, especially with four combat aviation regiments, three helicopter regiments, and various independent brigades and regiments.

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Starting from the winter of 1980/81, the opposition intensified sabotage and terrorist activities. Instead of large formations of 500-1000 people, small detachments of 30-40 people and even smaller groups consisting of 2-3 terrorists began to operate. The objects of sabotage were industrial enterprises, transport, irrigation and energy structures. During these opposition actions, the Soviet military contingent, which was primarily used to carry out tasks to protect state and other DRA facilities, began to suffer noticeable losses. If in 1979 personnel losses amounted to 86 people, then in 1980 - 1484, in 1981 - 1298, in 1982 - 1948, in 1983 - 1446, in 1984 - 2343, in 1985 - 1868, in 1986 -1333, 1987 -1215, 1988 - 759, 1989 - 53 people

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Almost immediately after the introduction of Soviet troops, attempts were made to solve the “Afghan problem” politically. However, it was only in 1986 that the DRA leadership put forward a policy program for national reconciliation. This new course was directly influenced by the perestroika that began in the USSR and the new political thinking of the Soviet leadership led by M.S. Gorbachev in the field of foreign policy. The policy of national reconciliation included: negotiations with the armed opposition; creating conditions for the return of all refugees to their homeland; political and military amnesty for all Afghans who stopped fighting against the existing government, and even the formation of a coalition government. As a result of this new policy, new forces came to the leadership of the PDPA, and M. Najibullah became the General Secretary of the Central Committee in May 1986. On November 30, 1987, in accordance with the new constitution of Afghanistan, at a meeting of representatives of all segments of the population, Najibullah was elected president of the country.

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After this, the DRA government allowed the unhindered return to their homeland of all refugees, guaranteed the rights and freedoms of all DRA citizens who stopped the armed struggle, and by October 1989 signed agreements on the cessation of hostilities with 2/3 of all field commanders of the Afghan opposition. At the end of 1988 - beginning of 1989, meetings were held between representatives of the USSR and the Afghan opposition, as well as with representatives of the Pakistani and Iranian leadership and the former king of Afghanistan M. Zahir Shah about ending the war, restoring peace in the country and forming a coalition government. As part of these negotiations, the USSR confirmed that it would fully fulfill the obligations assumed in Geneva on April 14, 1988 for a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. By February 15, 1989, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed, which was monitored by UN observers

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The First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996. First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Republic of Chechnya) - military operations in Chechnya and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus in order to keep Chechnya within Russia. Often called the “first Chechen war,” although the conflict was officially called “measures to maintain constitutional order.” The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, facts of genocide of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted. Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the defeat and withdrawal of federal troops, mass destruction and casualties, de -de facto independence of Chechnya before the second Chechen conflict and the wave of terror that swept across Russia

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Chechen conflict In September 1991, Dudayev’s people defeated the Supreme Council of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in Grozny. Deputies were beaten and thrown out of windows, resulting in the death of City Council Chairman Vitaly Kutsenko. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation and the creation of the Republic of Ichkeria

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Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between government troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. For example, troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used. In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was personally planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI A. Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, B. Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander R. Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses. On November 26, the opposition unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time.

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