GRU special forces in Chechnya. Interview. In whose interests is the special forces group disbanded in Chechnya And everyone is a hero

The first Chechen 1994, which could have been the beginning of a new stage in the construction of Russia, ended on a tragic note. An attempt to restore order in Chechnya led to a bloody war. But why did such an experienced politician as Yeltsin suddenly get involved in the Chechen war? Sergey

GRU special forces brigades in the wars in Chechnya

The most acute phase of operations in the North Caucasus and in Chechnya in particular has already passed. But only for those who have never touched these events closely. Each GRU special forces fighter in Chechnya, videos about which can be found in a significant amount in this article, will hardly ever forget every day spent in the Chechen Republic. This article is long overdue, and it’s not even about the approaching one, there are simply topics that cannot be ignored.

Let's talk about the participation of special forces in the campaign against Chechen field commanders' militants. Or, to put it simply, about the GRU special forces in Chechnya. The video materials presented in the article will also arouse interest. It is also worth remembering the heroes of this war, or the counter-terrorist operation - as it is more convenient for anyone to call it. The essence of this will not change. As well as not returning those guys from the GRU special forces brigades in Chechnya, who forever remained to look at the mountains. Not through the sight of a machine gun, but from the sky.

Those who do not know history are forced to go through science anew. And it would be wrong to forget about the high casualties of special forces in this terrible southern meat grinder. You can safely watch the GRU special forces on television, having stumbled upon the news or films, but not know their glorious history. Yes, it often happens. Therefore, it will not be superfluous to talk about the glorious tough guys from the GRU special forces brigades, who honestly performed their duty. And here you can watch a video of the GRU special forces in Chechnya in good quality.

Chechen syndrome

What can I say, Russia has a long history, and everything has happened in it. Different people, different peoples live in our vast territory, and even now there are people who secretly dream of independence. What can we say about the collapse of the USSR and the creation of new independent states. Many countries had independent sentiments, but only 15 Soviet socialist republics stood out. The aspirations of SA General Dzhokhar Dudayev did not come true.

The Ichkerian conflict is, of course, not only Dudayev's battles against the GRU special forces in Chechnya. It just so happened that they were the most combat-ready formations in the newly formed Russian army, which lost in numbers, combat capability, the amount of equipment and material base. But it was nice to look at the GRU special forces - trained people, most of whom went through the crucible of the fight against dushmans in unfriendly Afghanistan.

Severe guys from the special forces brigades of the main intelligence department became everyone in the units that served in Chechnya. Often, after all, poorly trained recruits were thrown into the war, who were even afraid to shoot from a machine gun at Wahhabis, well-trained, radically minded, well-armed. Therefore, the losses were extremely high. But with the special forces, everything was different - the elite, whatever one may say, are fighters who are prepared to destroy the enemy. If you watch various videos of GRU spetsnaz in Chechnya, you can see how they perform often impossible tasks. But there are no random people in the GRU special forces brigades. It is a fact.

And everyone is a hero

I don’t know if you have heard about Senior Lieutenant Dolonin, who served in military intelligence e, V . Now this unit, unfortunately, no longer exists, it was disbanded as a result of the infamous reforms of the Russian army in 2009. But not the point. You will hardly find a mention of his feat in the video collections of the GRU special forces in Chechnya. Yes, and with films on this topic - extremely suitable, I note - a bit tight, frankly. But the man showed incredible resilience: being seriously wounded, for a long time he covered the retreat of his practically surrounded comrades with machine gun fire. Senior Lieutenant Dolonin died, but his comrades from the 12th GRU ObrSpN escaped inevitable death at the hands of Chechen fighters.

It is people like Senior Lieutenant Dolonin who are the quintessence of the whole essence of the role of special forces in the bloody war against the rebels. It was absolutely not a shame to look at the GRU special forces. They were proud of them, they were respected by their own and frankly feared by enemies. For the murder of a commando, a separate, very large bonus was relied on, plus promotion through the military ladder. But it was more likely that the soldiers of the GRU special forces brigades destroyed the enemies and carried out combat missions than fell into the bloody paws of the enemy and the cold hands of the goddesses of death.

No, of course, the special forces soldiers were dying. It cannot be that the warring parties did not lose anyone - this is the prerogative of myths, cheap action movies and all sorts of computer toys. The GRU special forces in Chechnya suffered very heavy losses, numbering in the tens, hundreds of people. There were losses due to errors in command and encirclement by enemies, from ambushes, during the performance of various tasks, including those that were considered and are considered impossible. But we are talking about the elite, the very best. Yes, there were losses, but if it were not for these soldiers, the best of the worst would have to be sent, and the losses would have been much greater. We must look at the GRU special forces as the force through which many young soldiers went through this survival school and returned home alive.

Conclusion

I repeat once again: I am convinced and believe that the role of the GRU special forces in Chechnya is practically invaluable. The military intelligence formations were the most combat-ready of all the formations of the Russian army, in principle, as they are now. That's how it should have been. And in wartime, their power, experience and hardening were very necessary to turn the tide of the war in their favor, so that the arriving guys would feel more confident under the wing of strong defenders. A war without experienced people develops into a banal throwing of meat.

It is not for nothing that the collections of videos of the GRU special forces in Chechnya are quite large - often tough guys from the special forces were at the forefront, performing a variety of functions and tasks. The broad masses of the population often do not know the names and surnames of ordinary workers of the GRU special forces brigades, but if you wish, you can always get acquainted with the list, at least of those who did not live to see the end of the war.

Military Intelligence Day is a very important holiday in the army calendar, perhaps not as famous as the day of the special forces of the Airborne Forces, but many people know about it. I would like, of course, to make this holiday more famous, but not everything depends on the Voenpro online store. We can (and do) write more about the GRU spetsnaz brigades, we can help people buy - we have a wide range of special forces goods - and we will continue to do this, because we consider it our duty to talk about deserving people.

To make the memory of service in the military intelligence unit and GRU special forces brighter, you can use your brigade, detachment, even the nominal flag of your platoon.

And in autumn and winter, in addition to the very symbolism of the formation and type of troops, you can be warmed by an excellent

In the Chechen conflict of 1994-1996, Russian special forces took part from the moment troops entered Chechnya - consolidated and separate detachments. Initially, special forces were used only for reconnaissance purposes.

Starting to work independently, the special forces began to use their own tactics, primarily ambush actions. With the deployment of hostilities in Dagestan against the armed groups of Wahhabis, Chechen and international terrorists, the special forces provided the troops with intelligence, revealing the fortifications and positions of the militants.

In Chechnya, the special forces met with their old acquaintances from Afghanistan - Arab, Pakistani and Turkish mercenaries and instructors who used methods of sabotage and terrorist war against the federal forces.

Special Forces veterans recognized many of them by their handwriting, the choice of places for ambush, the features of mining, radio exchange, avoiding persecution, and the like.

Most of the uninvited guests, among them prominent field commanders and mercenaries, fell ingloriously from bullets and grenades of the army special forces.

According to official, objective data, the GRU special forces operate in Chechnya ten times more effectively than other units. In terms of combat training and the fulfillment of assigned tasks, the GRU special forces are in first place.

The Russian special forces took an active part in the Chechen conflict. Consolidated and separate detachments acted from the brigades of the Moscow, Siberian, North Caucasian, Ural, Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern military districts.

By the spring of 1995, the detachments were withdrawn from Chechnya, with the exception of a separate special forces detachment of the North Caucasian Military District, which fought until the end of hostilities and returned to its permanent deployment point in the fall of 1996.

Unfortunately, special forces units, especially at the initial stage of hostilities, were used as reconnaissance units of units and formations of the Ground Forces.

This was a consequence of the low level of training of the personnel of the full-time reconnaissance units of these units. For the same reason, especially during the assault on Grozny, special forces soldiers were included in the assault groups. This led to unjustified losses. 1995 can be considered the most tragic year for the entire history of special forces, both the USSR and Russia.

So, at the beginning of January 1995, a group of a special forces detachment of the 22nd brigade was captured. As a result of a tragic accident in Grozny, an explosion occurred in the building where the special forces detachment of the 16th brigade of the Moscow military district was located.

However, subsequently, the special forces began to act using their inherent tactics. The most common tactic was the ambush.

Often, special-purpose groups worked with intelligence information from military counterintelligence agencies, the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. From ambushes, field commanders were destroyed, moving at night in cross-country vehicles with little security.

In May 1995, special forces detachments of the brigade of the North Caucasian Military District took part in the operation to free the hostages in Budyonnovsk.

They did not storm the hospital, but controlled the outskirts of the city, and subsequently accompanied a convoy with militants and hostages. In January 1996, one of the detachments of the brigade took part in the hostage rescue operation in the village of Pervomayskoye.

At the initial stage of the operation, a group of forty-seven people undertook a diversionary maneuver in order to pull the main forces of the militants over to themselves.

At the final stage, the detachment inflicted tangible losses on the breaking through grouping of Raduev, despite the multiple numerical superiority of the militants. For this battle, five special forces officers were awarded the title of Hero of Russia, one of them posthumously.

This period is also characterized by the fact that the 173rd separate detachment, operating in Chechnya, was again equipped with military equipment, which made it possible to increase the firepower and mobility of the special forces that ensure the activities of reconnaissance groups.

The recruitment of warring special forces units by contract servicemen began. The educational level of scouts at that time was quite high. People with higher and secondary technical education were attracted by high and regular cash payments.

February 21, 2000 forever became a black day for the army special forces. On this day in Chechnya, near the village of Kharsenoy, three groups of army special forces scouts - twenty-five people - were killed in one battle. Only two survived. I managed to talk with a direct participant and witnesses of these tragic events: senior sergeant Anton Filippov, one of the surviving scouts, as well as with army special forces major A., ​​special forces major of the Ministry of Justice Nikolai Yevtukh and lieutenant colonel A.

Major A says:

- In the winter of 2000, General Vladimir Shamanov launched an attack on the southern, mountainous part of the Chechen Republic. Our task was to advance along the routes of movement of the main column of motorized rifle units and provide them with cover. But the advance of the infantry was difficult, the equipment got stuck in the mud, almost drowned. We moved through the mountains only on foot. On the fifth day, all groups met and were redirected to Kharsenoy - this is a village. The task is the same - to hold the heights in order to ensure the passage of equipment of motorized rifle units.

On February 21, 2000, three reconnaissance groups went forward together, since they practically had no communication anymore, the batteries at the radios ran down, only one was still working. The day before there was a radiogram that by twelve o'clock in the afternoon an infantry unit should arrive, they would have both communications and food. They were supposed to replace us and continue to carry out this task themselves, and we had to leave. But by twelve o'clock they did not come, they could not climb the mountains. They moved very slowly, their technique was stuck.

While preparing materials about the war in South Ossetia, I met with many participants in the tragic events of August 2008. This is both, and, and, and, who spiritually nourished our fighters these days ... From conversations with them, it became clear: we won because we were right. We are right that they nevertheless came to the aid of such Ossetian women and children, seemingly far from us, whom the Georgian troops ruthlessly and methodically destroyed from volley fire installations. They are also right because they did not forgive the Georgians for the death of their comrades - fighters of the Russian peacekeeping battalion.

Of course, there were both political and diplomatic components in this five-day war. But the decisive victory over the enemy was still won not by politicians and diplomats, but by Russian soldiers and officers.

Therefore, our story is about those who utterly defeated and put to shameful flight the enemy many times greater in number, who was well prepared and armed by our so-called Western "partners" for this war. About those who, having barely left the fierce battles, already maintained public order in Georgian cities and villages abandoned by the authorities and delivered food there. About those who helped their defeated enemies bury the bodies of their dead. Honor and glory to the victorious Russian soldier!

BECOME A PARTICIPANT

PUBLIC FINANCING

CONTINUED TO THE BOOK "FROM DEATH TO LIFE..."!

(Transfer of any amount to the Visa card of Sberbank No. 4276550036471806)

For more details about what exactly is described in the 4th volume of the book “From death to life ...”, as well as other ways to transfer money, you can read in Sergey Galitsky’s blog: http: // site.

Alexandra.:

- Back in July 2008, it was obvious that we were being prepared for something: we began to spend a lot of time in the forest at training exits - a week in part, a week at the training ground, a week at the exit.

Still watching the news. And from everything it was clear that something like this was beginning in Georgia. And then the general came and said at the review: “Congratulations on the start of the exercises! The main thing is to return alive and healthy! The funny thing is that each of us was given a paper to sign with something like this: "I voluntarily agree to go to the exercises for an indefinite period." It was clear that these were not exercises. And openly that we were going to war, we were told only on the train. Maybe they were afraid that we would run away before sending? ..

But there were practically no refuseniks. We had one demobilization who had to leave from day to day. He wrote a report and did not officially go. True, there were also two such comrades who said to everyone: “We will go, we will go ...”. And they themselves simply did not appear on the day they were sent to the service. But on the other hand, there were, on the contrary, those who came on part of the holidays. They do not take them, but they: no, we will go with our own ... And yet they got their way - they were taken.

We drove for a long time, four days. The mood of the people was fighting, although among the fighters there were almost no those who fought in Chechnya. Officers, those - yes, many fought. Take our company commander: he has three or four business trips to Chechnya behind him. But our group commander was a very young lieutenant - just from the school. But his deputy, an ensign, was a military one: he went through Chechnya. Of course, this affected our work. Upon arrival, the ensign often said, looking at the map: "Let's go here, let's go further here ...". Moreover, he calmly fulfilled our standards for physical training, although he is already under forty (this is the fourth age group).

Captain V.O. Sidelnikov: bandaging the "spirit" ...

– During military exits in Afghanistan, I was seriously wounded twice. But I especially remember the day of August 9, 1982, when I really got hooked. We then stood in Surkhrud. Somewhere something had to be blocked, there was some kind of ambush. I, as expected, was on the armor next to the battalion commander. Then suddenly shooting starts ... The commander says: “Doc, move to the village, there is a job. Find out on the spot."

I sit down with paramedic Kolya on my native 683rd. I fly up to the village and see: they are carrying a soldier. It turns out that when he was on the roof of the house, one of our people thought something, and they accidentally fired at him. He thundered from this roof with fear and hurt himself badly. Nothing serious. As soon as I started to put it in the car, I hear a characteristic rustling sound. Boom! .. We were covered with a mortar. Okay, no one got caught. The platoon commander yelled at the top of his voice: "Come on, drive off quickly!". We went.

– The topic of captivity is taboo for many military men. But I’ll tell you all the same, because I experienced the full horror of this nightmarish state in my own skin.

Nothing foretold such a terrible ending. There was a standard situation - reconnaissance and search operations in the area of ​​the village of Aliheil, Nanganhar province. This is a settlement in a lowland, not far from the border with Pakistan. In the morning, at about seven o'clock, we were dropped off by helicopters. We had sappers and aircraft controllers with us. The task, in fact, was set quite ordinary: we block the settlement, and the Khadovites (KHAD. Afghan counterintelligence. - Ed.) Carry out their tasks already in the village itself. Our positions are on the mountains, from where we cover the Khadovites. At about twelve o'clock in the afternoon, a battalion of the 66th motorized rifle brigade from Jalalabad was supposed to approach this place and already carry out further actions. That is, the fulfillment of our task should have taken five hours in time - from seven in the morning to about twelve in the afternoon.

Recalling the war in Afghanistan, I understand that the officers who were most loyal to the state viewed these events not only in terms of international duty, but also in terms of gaining combat experience. Many officers themselves aspired to go to war, and I was one of those volunteers. After graduating from the Academy with honors, I was offered big and high positions in Moscow. And I refused all this and said: "I want to be a commander." I was appointed as a detachment commander in one of the army special forces brigades.

In Afghanistan, I commanded the 6th Omsb SN (a separate motorized rifle battalion for special purposes. - Ed.), It is also the 370th separate special forces detachment, which was stationed in the city of Lashkargah. He was introduced to Afghanistan in 1985 by Ivan Mikhailovich Krot. I was just about to graduate from the academy. Shortly before that, he arrives from Chuchkovo (the location of one of the army special forces brigades. - Ed.) and says: “I am bringing a detachment to Afghanistan, in Lashkargah. Study, Vlad, the transfer of parts and formations over long distances. I listened to him, and wrote a huge abstract for myself on this topic. And for sure - in May 1987 he was appointed commander of this particular detachment, and these notes were useful to me when withdrawing this detachment from Afghanistan to the Union.

Today, a Russian layman, discouraged by information about regular attacks by Chechen fighters, may get the impression that domestic special services often lose an armed confrontation with separatists. However, this is not the case. The editors of "VPK" publish an interview with Captain N (for understandable reasons, we do not indicate his last name), an officer of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This is an attempt to acquaint readers with the intellectual and moral character of the employees of the GRU special forces units who oppose extremists in the mountains of the North Caucasus.

In Chechnya, the GRU special forces can only rely on their own forces.
Photo by Peter Ilyushkin

- Currently, there are divisions of various law enforcement agencies on the territory of Chechnya: the Ministry of Defense, the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the GUIN, the Ministry of Justice: Which of them, in your opinion, are fighting illegal armed groups most effectively? And what part of all the work done is accounted for by the GRU special forces?

It depends on what is considered effective: the number of militants killed or information obtained. Personally, I liked the words of the President of the Russian Federation that up to 80% of combat missions in Chechnya today are carried out by the GRU special forces. I will not say the same, but about half of the work is done by the GRU special forces, because no one else goes to the mountains. This I know for sure. As for who works and how, we suffered more than once from the illiterate actions of the military commandant's offices: we fell under their mortar and artillery fire, although they each time had information on which area in the mountains it was impossible to shoot when ours was working in this place. group. I still don't know if they did it out of malice or not? The special forces of the Internal Troops are serious, physically well-trained guys, they perform their tasks quite well.

- What, in your opinion, is the number of militants in Chechnya today? Do they count in hundreds or thousands?

For thousands. The inhabitants of some villages, who plow during the day and take up arms at night, of course, are also militants. But I believe that at the moment there are 2-3 thousand people in the armed formations. These are those who constantly conduct military operations, and do not hide under the guise of civilians. I myself saw several bases that were designed for about 300 people, I personally observed a detachment of militants of about 150 people through binoculars. I believe that about several thousand people today are precisely in the armed formations that are constantly fighting. With the onset of winter, many of them, as a rule, descend from the mountains either to villages or to Georgia, they leave for Dagestan, because in winter you will see smoke and you need huge food supplies that need to be regularly delivered and replenished, and this is dangerous - groups ours constantly walk along some mountain paths. They also fight, climb mountains, but much less. And in the spring they come back, which is why there are so many skirmishes with them on the Georgian border in spring and summer.

- What kind of bandits in the Chechen mountains do you most often encounter: local residents or foreign mercenaries?

There are very few Chechens, that is, ideological ones who fight on their own land. Yes, there are shepherds with radio stations, and women with explosives, and even teenage children who remember well how his brother (father) was killed by "Russian dogs", and are eager to take revenge. And the cases when such a child takes a machine gun and shoots in the back are not at all isolated. But mostly mercenaries of various nationalities are now fighting there. This can be seen from intelligence information, interrogations of prisoners, examinations of corpses.

- I have heard that Shamil Basayev is hiding exclusively in the Vedeno region, so to speak, in his ancestral patrimony, since he is "ordered" to go to other regions - they say, there are his "bloodlines". But if so, why hasn't he been caught yet?

Because - I know this for sure - our weapons are literally withdrawn: "do not go there today", "do not shoot there today."

- Have you personally ever had such information that in some place there is absolutely a big leader of the militants? And if so, why not correct artillery fire at this place, for example? To then at least pieces of meat to collect?

Yes, there was such information that he was there, but I myself did not see him, which means that I did not have the right to aim artillery at this village. Because then I myself would have been imprisoned, like Comrade Budanov. He is a prime example, so I would not like to repeat his fate:

- By the way, how do your colleagues assess the proceedings against Colonel Budanov?

Everyone regrets that they made him extreme. They simply showed that "we are also fighting" with our "bad" ones. But I know exactly how much work this man did in Chechnya as the commander of his regiment.

- Is it true that our "specialists" are trying not to let any of the bandits out of the mountains alive, because they know in advance that they will be released later?

Nobody gets killed just like that, even if he is an Arab mercenary in a green headband with a beard and a grenade launcher. If it is possible to take him alive, they take him alive, interrogate him, and only then decide what to do with him next. Yes, there was a case when a "child" was walking along the street of the village with a machine gun, and when he was given the command to stop, he pointed his weapon towards the group - and was immediately shot dead. So when real danger exists, it is justified cruelty. But outright sadists who would just like to kill, I just did not meet. And their own officers will not pat anyone on the head for such a thing.

- And are the numbers of irretrievable losses that the GRU special forces in Chechnya bear in general?

The irretrievable losses of our detachment in 2000-2003 on each business trip (6 months) amounted to approximately 10% of its strength. (For 1999 - 30%.) The ratio of dead officers to the rank and file is one to five.

- In Afghanistan, the GRU special forces had their own armored vehicles, while in Chechnya your bosses are forced to beg armored personnel carriers and MTLBs from the commanders of motorized rifle units for each special operation. This, in your understanding, "minus"?

Yes, according to the state, armored vehicles are not allowed for us, and this is a "minus", because we have to work in all areas, everywhere. We get there when they give us something - on armored personnel carriers, on KamAZ trucks, on helicopters - and when they do it on foot. And, of course, our own armored vehicles would not hurt us: at least for the evacuation of the wounded. Because while you order it, while it arrives, many will simply bleed. And so at least there would be some hope.

- During the Cold War, GRU special forces brigades in various military districts were trained to work in a probable theater of operations in a certain geographical area and climatic conditions. Has this trend been preserved today, when many southern military districts no longer exist in Russia? Priority is given to work in the mountains or both in the desert and on the European plain?

Each brigade (special forces of the GRU. - V.U.) has its own direction, in which it will work in the event of large-scale hostilities. The European theater of warfare (as well as the Asian one) is also being considered. It's just that now there is Chechnya and all the brigades are working there. But our senior officers have combat experience in Afghanistan, and who is a little older - in Vietnam. After all, the GRU is military intelligence, it is always and in all places where hostilities are taking place. At the same time, our units can perform the tasks of other branches of the armed forces, as, for example, in Chechnya and the Balkans.

- And there are even successful examples of recruiting or obtaining some valuable information about military personnel of other foreign contingents?

Of course I have. This is military-technical information that concerns weapons models, new equipment, as well as those types of weapons and ammunition that are prohibited by international conventions. But for the most part, we and NATO simply observe each other's actions.

- Who serves in the GRU special forces? Are there conscripts in your unit?

Yes, almost everything.

- Doesn't the recruitment principle affect the level of skills and abilities of servicemen?

No. Influence personal qualities and training. It is the officer's fault if the soldier is not prepared.

- Is it even possible to compare the GRU special forces with the military of foreign elite units, like the British SAS, for example?

I met at international competitions for the championship of special forces forces with the guys from the SAS, the US Marine Corps, Italian, German and French paratroopers. These closed competitions are held once a year in Russia in different parts. Forced marches, exercises for physical endurance and group coherence are performed there, training tasks are solved: ambush, raid, sabotage, parachuting, gathering members of groups after landing, and survival skills are also practiced, for example: who boils water faster, who faster the fire will kindle, equip the hiding place and so on. If we compare our fighters with foreign special forces, then there is a huge difference between them in the human factor and the level of technical support. We serve mainly twenty-year-old guys, and they have "muzhiks" aged 30-35 years. And our soldiers, unlike them, are not whimsical at all, because how do they live in the same Chechnya? Always in tents, always in the mud, constantly do not wash, do not shave, but still they carry out the tasks assigned. And the Americans and Western Europeans are pampered very, very dependent on the technology of support.

- What problems are experiencing today domestic special forces?

The most elementary thing is to train the fighters in shooting, regularly travel outside the unit to the shooting range, but no one gives money for fuel and lubricants, for engineering training, too. And one more thing: the latest samples of communications, optics, and weapons are coming to our unit.

- You were injured in Chechnya, but you are not going to leave the Armed Forces. Why do people like you serve in the special forces - for the sake of an idea, devotion to the GRU, to Russia?

Well, about Russia, of course, everyone has their own concept, but as for devotion to the special forces, the spirit of the special forces - they serve for this. Not for the money that the state began to pay during the second Chechen war. They serve just for themselves, the main thing is the work itself. I really enjoy my work.

- Do you really care where you can be sent next time?

I don't care where to fight. If my commanders decide something, I'm not going to discuss their orders. Whether it will be one of the CIS countries, Chechnya, Africa is absolutely unimportant. I work for the state.

Show source